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PREFACE 
Agriculture is constantly changing. The lack of certainty about the future creates risk, 
which may be defined as exposure to the chance of injury or loss. Profit can be viewed as a 
return for managing risk. Without uncertainty and risk there may be no opportunity for 
profit. While farmers have always had to manage risk, this aspect of farm management may 
become more important in future. The reason is the widespread trend affecting agriculture 
in many countries towards a more 'open' market structure. 
In recognition of the increasing importance of agricultural risk management, an interna-
tional seminar was organized to provide an overview of the state of the art in this field of 
research, to exchange ideas, and to initiate new research activities and cooperation. The 
seminar was held at the Wageningen International Conference Center (WICC), 
Wageningen, The Netherlands, from January 7-10, 1996. The seminar was one of the 
activities of EUNITA: EUropean Network for Information Technology in Agriculture. 
EUNITA (AIR3-CT94-1654) is a Concerted Action funded by the European Commission 
under the AIR (Agriculture and Agro-Industry including Fisheries) specific programme of 
the Community's Third Framework Programme for Research and Technical Development. 
The focus of the seminar was on the state of the art and future perspectives of risk 
management strategies. The seminar addressed the following five topics in risk 
management: (1) sources and measurement of risk, (2) risk attitude assessment and risk-
bearing capacity of farmers, (3) risk-management strategies, (4) agricultural applications of 
decision analysis, and (5) risk considerations in agricultural policy-making. For each of the 
five topics the seminar was organized as follows: a main paper, 2-6 short papers, and a 
paper to open the discussion. Internationally recognized experts were invited to present the 
main papers and discussion-opening papers. 
These proceedings are a selection of the papers presented at the seminar and contributed 
by authors active in different fields, institutions and parts of the world. Before inclusion, 
the papers were reviewed by two referees, and edited accordingly. The result is a collection 
of papers that provide a contemporary perspective on risk management strategies in 
agriculture. The variety of contributors makes it possible to include in the proceedings 
papers by well-known experts in particular fields as well as to reflect an interesting 
diversity of views. The editors believe that this volume will serve as a basis for further 
discussion and progress in the field of agricultural risk management strategies. 
The editors wish to thank several organizations which provided financial support for the 
seminar and for publishing these proceedings. Specifically, we acknowledge the support 
from (in random order): EUNITA (dr. I ver Thy sen, Denmark, coordinator of the EUNITA-
project), The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), Interpolis Insurance 
at Tilburg, Rabobank International at Utrecht, Mees & Zoonen Insurance Brokers at 
Rotterdam, LEB-fund and Wageningen Agricultural University, both at Wageningen. The 
cover was designed by Ernst van Cleef. 
Wageningen, April 1997 
Ruud B.M. Huirne 
J. Brian Hardaker 
Aalt A. Dijkhuizen 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of the Seminar was to examine the state of the art in agricultural risk 
management, and to assess the future prospects for improving how risks are managed by 
farmers, agribusinesses and rural policy makers. The implicit focus was mostly on 
European agriculture. 
Given the 300 plus pages of papers and the extensive discussions of those papers, to sum 
up effectively in a limited number of pages means highlighting some common issues. The 
following topics are addressed in this summary: choice of the SEU model (section 2), risk 
and risk sharing (section 3), perceptions of sources of risk and responses to risk (section 4), 
issues in decision analysis (section 5), efficiency analysis (section 6), policy issues (section 
7), and future perspectives (section 8). 
2 Choice of model—to SEU or not to SEU? 
Anderson argues that application of SEU model is accelerating—as a search of the recent 
literature shows. However, uses of the model seldom reflect that the axiomatic foundation 
embraces both a theory of utility and a theory of subjective probability. This is a key 
difference between the converted and the unconverted in regard to subjective probability. 
The unconverted, however, face impossible odds in analysing most real choice situations. 
Anderson claims that game theory, for games against nature, was a false start, but if it is 
dead it won't quite lie down, as was discusses in the Seminar. Moreover, some might have 
thought that mean-variance analysis would be rendered obsolete by the SEU model, but it 
has been injected with a new lease of life by Robison in his paper with Hanson. The ideas 
of pragmatism that Anderson mentions may explain the continued use of the convenient EV 
approach, despite its axiomatic weakness. A related technique that perhaps should have 
been painlessly put to sleep is MOT AD. It is an approximation to the EV rule which is an 
approximation to the SEU rule. In current mathematical programming applications, both 
direct SEU maximisation and SDRF can be applied, yet MOTAD too lives on because of its 
ease of application, as again demonstrated in the Seminar papers. 
In reviewing the state of the art, Anderson makes specific mention of a lost opportunity 
in application of stochastic dominance. While stochastic efficiency analysis was slow to be 
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taken up and has too often been abused, it now seems to be part of the 'normal' science of 
agricultural decision analysis. 
Hertzler's paper is especially interesting. He seems to be saying that his approach of 
dissecting risk preference and time preference means that SEU is saved. But he then tells us 
that most of the ways we have been using to implement the model are wrong. We need to 
press him to be much more explicit as to how we can put his theory to work. 
Huirne et al. confirm the strong suspicion that eliciting utility functions from farmers is 
at best a risky business. They found that a significant proportion of farmer respondents 
revealed a preference for risk—which could be regarded as unrealistic—and they have 
shown that elicited risk attitudes are very unstable over time. It is time for some intellectual 
honesty, and for us to admit that, for most farmers in most situations, we really cannot 
elicit credible utility functions. We must either infer risk preferences from observed 
behaviour, make an informed guess, probably expressed by the relative risk aversion 
coefficient, or fall back on efficiency analysis. 
It also emerges that we need to give much more careful thought to the argument of any 
assumed or elicited utility function. Applications suggest considerable confusion, with 
outcomes expressed in numerous ways, often inconsistently or inappropriately. 
Despite the practical problems and theoretical doubts raised by Hertzler and others, the 
axioms of the SEU hypothesis are so appealing that many agricultural economists are 
reluctant to abandon them, even when those axioms sometimes are violated. The fact that 
the model continues to be so widely used suggests that others agree. 
Support for the basic SEU model comes from Carpentier and Weaver and from 
Oglethorpe. On the other hand, Bouzit and Gleyses offered support for the extended 
decision model proposed by Quiggin, now called Rank-Dependent Expected Utility 
(RDEU). There is no wholly adequate way of identifying the 'right' model, but it is 
encouraging to see the healthy debate, as illustrated in the Seminar papers. 
3 Risk and risk sharing 
Scandizzo and Cucculelli offer a new insight into the measurement of risk. Their paper 
provides a means of avoiding the tricky business of eliciting a utility function. Scandizzo 
and Cucculelli suggest that risk aversion may be bounded by the market opportunities to 
buy and sell risk, provided that the risk arbitrage market is sufficiently well developed. 
However, as Anderson and Hazell suggest, and as Scandizzo and Cucculelli found, not all 
the markets for risk are fully developed. Nor do most farmers participate actively in 
existing markets. Such market failure is a topic for further future research. 
The Seminar papers illustrate a growing interest in risk sharing, and hence in the 
structure, conduct and performance of markets for risk. For example, Pennings and 
Meulenberg look at the interesting possibility of a futures market for production quotas; and 
Rister et al. examine rice marketing strategies in Texas. 
The comment by Scandizzo in the discussion that moral hazard, adverse selection and 
asymmetry of information characterise all risk-sharing situations is important and has too 
often been overlooked. More work is needed to develop the implications of this proposition. 
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4 Perceptions of sources of risk and responses to risk 
Patrick and Musser provide useful evidence about producers' perceptions of the sources of 
risk and their responses to those risks. Producers do not always see risk in the way that 
analysts do, and do not match their responses to risk very closely to their risk perceptions. 
Perhaps producers need further education about risk and risk management. Certainly, 
because risk is so tricky, we can be sure that there is too little guidance offered to managers 
by agricultural educators and advisers-a clear challenge for the future. 
Of particular interest is the importance that respondents in the Patrick and Musser study 
attached to family sources of risk-something largely ignored in the literature. Observations 
during the discussion suggested that risk analysis is best conducted in a combined farm-
household context. 
Some presentations and discussions have provided a different but practical view of risk 
and risk management: not all risk analysis must be. quantitative. By ignoring qualitative 
approaches we may be missing much of the game. Certainly, farmers and other decision 
makers in agriculture have managed risk, with more or less success, without recourse to the 
esoteric quantitative analysis of much academic research. What is more, farmers the world 
over have been coping with risk for thousands of years, with little or no help from 
academics! 
S Issues in decision analysis 
Assessing probabilities to measure risk 
Risk aversion may have received too much attention relative to the proper measurement of 
risk. The SEU hypothesis implies that all probabilities are subjective, but that does not 
justify picking numbers 'out of the air'. Rational choice requires giving the 'right' degree of 
effort to probability assessment, drawing on whatever sources and methods are relevant. 
Bayesian statistics offers part of the foundation for such assessments, but does not provide 
all the answers. A number of papers deal with aspects of probability assessment. 
Rasmussen has provided an interesting example of the quantification of variability in 
agriculture. Such work is needed in other contexts if risk analysis is to be more widely 
applied in European agriculture. 
Horst et al. have introduced us to the use of conjoint analysis for measuring risks. Their 
research leads to investigations of how this method can be\ adapted to give probability 
estimates, and how the approach compares with alternatives, such as the Delphi method. 
Jensen offers an exciting possibility of adapting Bayesian networks and influence 
diagrams to the task of updating judgements to improve the quality of decision making. His 
approach also goes beyond simple Bayesian revision and is worth further examination to 
determine its best use. 
Despite some good papers, we have only skimmed the surface of risk quantification. 
Work is needed to improve the quality of probability judgements about, say, weather 
variables important to farmers. Can farmers, extension personnel, agricultural researchers 
or policy makers make better use of sparse data and avoid bias in subjective probability 
estimates? Why is so little work done in agriculture on the calibration of subjective 
probabilities? This information is needed to help assessors reduce bias in their probability 
estimates. Such questions are important items for the future R&D agenda. 
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Partial analysis 
Anderson has pointed out the errors of omission and commission in many partial risk 
analyses and has provided a useful pragmatic solution to these problems. Pragmatism is 
likely to be the order of the day if risk analysis is to move from theory to application by 
farmers and other practitioners in agriculture. 
The view that risk aversion may not be as important as many people seem to think in 
partial analysis tends to be confirmed by Anderson. Anderson's assertion that background 
risk must be taken into account in analysing a risky investment is confirmed in the paper by 
Mahul. 
The dynamics of risk modelling 
This important and challenging topic is considered in a number of papers. It is the main 
theme of the Hanf paper, although his discussion ranges far beyond this topic. Kennedy has 
offered a suggested objective function for use in dynamic programming. An important issue 
is to understand more clearly the consistency between this approach and Hertzler's ideas 
about risk aversion and time preference. 
Noell and Odening deal with the dynamics of probability revision as learning, allowing 
for shifts in risk preference over time. Although essentially a theoretical paper, Nielsen 
provides an approach to investment planning. An interesting contribution of this paper is 
the dynamic treatment of price uncertainty—another example of the elaboration of 'better' 
methods of measuring risk. Kristensen and Jergensen provide a more powerful method of 
dealing with dynamic modelling problems using a multi-level, hierarchical Markov process. 
Even if Hanf is right that the problems of agricultural investment planning in a risky world 
remain complex, considerable work is focusing on finding effective solutions. 
The importance of downside risk 
Only a couple of papers, especially Hanfs, addressed the topic of downside risk, a 
neglected area of study. An important reason to account for risk in decision modelling is 
when assumed certainty leads to errors in assessing the expected payoffs. This will usually 
occur when there is embedded risk and the processes are non-linear. Because of diminishing 
returns (or increasing marginal cost), the expected value of the choice criterion will be less 
than the value under assumed certainty. The risk premium deducted from expected value to 
derive certainty equivalent for a risk-averse decision maker is only one example of this 
phenomenon. Again, the emphasis on risk aversion has been excessive relative to the 
neglect of proper risk analysis, especially overlooking downside risk. Current software 
tools such as the @Risk add-in to Excel or Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheets simplifies the 
stochastic budgets needed to represent the distributions of choice consequences properly. 
6 Efficiency analysis 
McCamley and Rudel offer a new and useful way of conceptualising generalised stochastic 
dominance analysis. In explaining their graphical method, they give a number of insights 
into stochastic efficiency analysis. Perhaps methods such as theirs will help to 'demystify' 
stochastic efficiency analysis, extending its use to a wider group of users, and satisfying 
Anderson's concern about 'missed opportunities'. 
Executive summary xin 
Extending the range of applications 
Several papers extending the range of applications, include those by Huirne et al. on 
income and sire selection; Da Silva Carvalho et al. on discrete stochastic programming to 
account for yield variability in planning mixed livestock-crop farms; Saatkamp et al. on 
contagious disease control; Berg on input use; and Chaherli on land allocation with 
stochastic crop returns and government intervention. Oglethorpe's paper is an assessment of 
the sustainability of farming in a risky world; a topic that will receive more attention in 
future. The 'risk' of an unsustainable earth is of paramount importance to society. 
Direct vs indirect applications 
The Seminar discussion about the scope for application of methods of risk analysis was 
interesting but rather inconclusive. The consensus was that the scope for direct application 
of comprehensive methods of decision analysis was limited, but by no means an empty set. 
However, the main scope lies in using decision analyses to better understand risky choice 
situations as an underpinning to the intuitive choice of risk strategies. Perhaps that scope 
will change as agricultural production becomes more 'industrialised', justifying higher 
investments in decision support systems, especially for repeated decisions, but also for case-
by-case decision analyses. 
7 Policy issues 
Anderson and Hazell provide a useful overview of the risk-related reasons for policy 
intervention and of the main policy instruments. As they note, a key issue is whether the 
failure of market mechanisms for risk bearing is strong enough to warrant policy 
intervention. Even if intervention is warranted, the possibility of being ineffective or 
counter-productive, should be faced. Problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, size of 
risk, and administrative and political failure can undermine many well-intentioned 
interventions. Of course, as Anderson and Hazell explain, some areas, such as large-scale 
irrigation and agricultural technology development, seem to universally require government 
action. 
The government itself can be a main source of risk, especially as it becomes involved in 
agricultural and related markets. Yet the process of liberalisation and deregulation to get 
governments out of farming also adds to risk. 
Future policy work on risk should focus on making risk markets work better. When 
markets do function, they are almost certainly more effective and efficient than government 
alternatives. Only where market failure is real and where policy instruments can be 
effective should official intervention be considered. 
8 Future perspectives 
'Good ' probability specifications 
A 'code of best practice' is needed for making the best probability judgements in a variety 
of situations, especially when data are sparse or biased, or when there are opportunities to 
learn about the uncertainty through time. 
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Measures of downside risk 
Non-linearities in stochastic systems usually make the expected value of the choice criterion 
less than would be calculated under assumed certainty. Thus, there is a need for more risk 
analyses that measure downside risk by better measuring the distribution of returns. 
Stochastic dominance analysis 
The use of stochastic dominance analysis allows a growing appreciation of the advantages 
of shifting distributions of outcomes to the right, rather than concentrating on reducing 
spread. Risk is often thought of as the variance of the relevant distribution. Stochastic 
dominance characterises risk in terms of the entire distribution—its location, spread, and 
general shape. Once methods of stochastic efficiency analysis are improved and extended, 
there may be less concern about the limitations of utility functions and problems with their 
elicitation. 
Understanding, improving and explaining markets for agricultural risks 
Markets usually work better than governments in helping farmers cope with risk. Thus, 
more effort needs to go to understanding, improving and explaining markets for various 
kinds of agricultural risks. 
Greater use of software packages 
Developments in software packages for risk analyses could be the theme of a future 
conference. User-friendly decision aids play a vital role in educating decision makers about 
risk analysis and in bridging the still wide gap between theory and practical applications. 
Electronic communication systems are involved as well. Significant progress in software 
development is occurring and further communication about these technologies is needed. 
Risk analyses in European agriculture 
More activity on risk in agriculture is expected in Europe as farmers and agribusiness 
become more exposed to international markets and as the policy environment becomes more 
unstable. Time will tell! 
C H A P T E R 1 
AN 'ABC' OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE: 
OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURES AND PERSPECTIVES 
J.R. Anderson 
The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA 
Summary 
An overview of the thematic structure of the seminar is provided, and some historical 
observations are offered to help set the scene for its deliberations. Several pragmatic 
suggestions are made for dealing with analysis of risk-management strategies in a cost-
effective manner. 
1 Risk in globalized agriculture 
Globalization trends are bringing significant new, and thus yet uncertain, changing 
challenges for the billions of risk managers in agriculture. Several elements contribute. 
Liberalization of international and, in some cases, even intra-regional trade has brought 
many farmers, and those working on policies concerned with their welfare, to a need to 
consider the new implications for commodity price risk. In some cases, scope has opened 
up to produce previously unfamiliar commodities or to market commodities previously 
produced in new ways to new customers. For those farmers hitherto sheltered behind high 
barriers of protection, the enforced interlinkage with other economies, and thus a 
heightened and directly confronted competitiveness with other groups of producers, will be 
a source of added risk. It will persist for some time as the people concerned gradually 
become more adept at comprehending the new reality. 
Other groups of farmers, particularly those in remote parts of the less developed world, 
are entering globalized agriculture by means of improved connectivity. This comes through 
new investment in rural transport and port infrastructures, as well as reformed marketing 
institutions that are often associated with closing down public enterprises as part of 
structural adjustment programs. There are many other changes in the wake of structural 
adjustment that, in the absence of well-functioning social safety nets, result in farmers 
suffering increased risk in their farm businesses. 
Such changed circumstances are probably nowhere greater than in the Republics of the 
former Soviet Union. Here the break-up of central planning and policy-making and the shift 
away from managed markets that have taken place since the early 1990s are having 
profound effects on what used to be the state and collective farms that so dominated the 
agricultural sector. New forms of farm ownership and the millions of new 'farmers' mean 
that there is much learning in progress and some of the most difficult learning tasks will be 
those that relate to effective management of risk. The new risks include formerly unknown 
marketing risks, together with significant policy risk, as the commercialization and 
2 Anderson 
liberalization of agricultural markets continue and the role of government in policy-making 
and the economy generally is progressively (albeit haltingly) redefined. Many such changes 
of adjustment and transition will properly be brought out within this seminar. 
Other global changes may also be adding to the risk burden of agriculture. The most 
spoken of, even if thus far the most subtle and slowly changing of phenomena, are those 
connected with the Enhanced Greenhouse Effect and consequent global warming. The 
effects of such warming are still highly uncertain, and surely are distant from being 
reasonably worked out, even in a probabilistic way. Consequences in terms of changing 
risk, however, are inevitable, notwithstanding the adaptive responses of farm managers, but 
the magnitudes and, in a few cases, the directions are still uncertain. 
2 Commentary on the thematic structure 
The scope of this seminar spans a commendably wide set of thematic issues. These range 
across the complete spectrum of possible influences of risk in the management challenge, 
although the way that the issues have been grouped and addressed in the program means 
that there is clearly something of a Northern or at least a European perspective in what is 
emphasized. Perhaps I can compensate for this in some small way by emphasizing 
perspectives from the South, being associated with a development bank that is committed 
primarily to economic development of the Second and Third Worlds. 
Sources and measurement of risks 
Risk perception is an art form that is quintessentially subjective. Along with many others, I 
have struggled at various times to catalogue major sources of risks in agriculture 
(Anderson, 1979a) and agricultural technology (Anderson and Hazell, 1994), and have tried 
to address how these might be measured (Anderson, 1991) and modelled (Anderson, 
1979b). I am confident that we shall have a refreshingly new cataloguing of methods and 
applications within our seminar discussions. I shall, however, be extremely surprised if the 
methods that will be advocated venture far from the subjective view of probability as the 
only practical language of analysed uncertainty (Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1977; 
Morgan and Henrion, 1990), and thus eschew the temptations of fuzzy (Zadeh, 1965; 
Kosko, 1994) and other approaches. 
The temporal horizon over which risk is assessed will clearly influence the elements of 
what are chosen as the most important sources, and also the technical issues involved in 
measurement. I expect that the long-term risks associated with climatic change may receive 
rather limited attention, while the attention given to market risks is likely to be much 
greater than that given to risk arising from sources of natural variation, such as drought and 
flood, for instance. This is understandable, given the presumed Northern emphasis in the 
seminar but, given the increased connectedness noted above, the implications of natural 
variability in less developed countries (LDCs) (e.g., Just and Candler, 1985) may soon 
begin to have more direct implications for risk management in more developed countries 
(MDCs). 
Risk-attitude assessment 
Assessment of risk attitudes among decision makers has been another highly artistic area 
that has experienced occasional forays by methodologists, sometimes writing in crusading 
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vein, sometimes empirically and statistically (Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Hey, 1993), 
sometimes cautiously and considerately (Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker 1977, pp. 73-74), 
sometimes boldly and pragmatically (Anderson and Dillon, 1992) . Over recent decades, 
fashions have traversed over a variety of approaches of diverse theoretical origins and 
mathematical formality. Whether the contemporary analyst should creatively weight 
probabilities as in the generalized or non-expected utility models in the spirit of Quiggin 
(1993)—a book emerging from his earlier University of New England PhD thesis—or 
creatively disentangle time preference from risk attitudes in the style of Hertzler (1995), is 
not yet fully clear, although there is some mildly reassuring support for linear weightings 
(Zagonari, 1995). The state-of-the-art assessment promised in this seminar theme should 
contribute critically to our deliberations. 
Risk-management strategies 
Consideration of sensible strategies for use in risk management is central to this seminar (as 
it has been in others, such as the long-running US Regional Research series represented, 
e.g., by Walker, 1983) , and thus it is here that we must listen attentively to a realistic 
assessment of just what methods can be effectively used to articulate strategies, and how 
these may best be employed to make risk management a more successful field than it has 
been in the past, notwithstanding the scepticism rampant Down Under (e.g., by Makeham 
and Malcolm (1993) and by colleagues such as Pannell, Malcolm, Kingwell, Murray-Prior 
and Wright at the Australian Agricultural Economics Society meeting of February 1995, 
and probably variously in press by the time of this seminar). By the nature of things, there 
may be few further Nobel prizes in prospect for this work, but then one can never be sure! 
Perhaps those focusing on agriculture need to look more widely afield for inspiration and 
cogent approaches, such as the worlds of commerce and industry (MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung, 1986) and science and engineering (Morgan and Henrion, 1990). 
Along with the rapid growth of the field of financial economics generally, market 
mechanisms for risk have been developed at an accelerating rate in recent times (Priovolos 
and Duncan, 1991; Claessens, 1993), although, with the coming of the 1995 Leeson 
Loses'em Effect and similar revelations, there is evidently even considerable risk associated 
with marketing some of the most exotic risk-management derivatives. The inventive process 
for novel instruments is surely not at an end but, in turn, further elaboration may require 
progress on the methodological front, to which we now must turn. 
Decision analysis 
I have rolled together two of the seminar thematic areas into this composite group, by 
which I mean to imply that the methodological issues that underpin analytical structures 
cannot yet be regarded as fully harmonized and ultimately as developed as one would like, 
despite such achievements in dealing with both credit and taxation dimensions of risky 
investment as have recently been documented (e.g., Milham, Hardaker and Powell, 1993). 
There is thus much work to be done to identify intellectually satisfying approaches that 
bring analytic power to formal analysis and ultimately individual empowerment for the 
billions of individual risk managers for whom we are ultimately working. I say this with 
sincerity, even if inconsistently, given my increasing pragmatism concerning procedures 
that are most worthwhile to use in many practical situations (section 4, and Anderson and 
Dillon, 1992). 
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Risk in policy-making 
Policymakers have much to learn from the discussions at meetings such as this one. I think 
it is fair to say that the policy outcomes that can be traced back to a linkage to one 
predecessor conference (in Mexico 1976, Roumasset, Boussard and Singh, 1979) have been 
significant. The work of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) that was partially triggered by that 
conference has doubtless advanced many policy analyses related to risk management, 
particularly in storage economics, and this work has continued to develop apace (Williams 
and Wright, 1991). The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has judged the 
field of risk in policy analysis to be sufficiently important to mount a major conference 
related to the theme (Hazell, 1986), and some of the participants strived diligently to distil 
worthy policy messages from that experience (Anderson, Hazell and Evans, 1987). With 
the assistance of the regrettably absent Peter Hazell, I will return to the policy theme in a 
later seminar contribution. 
3 Historical observations 
The modest intention in these few observations is to be selectively provocative. This 
seminar opener has had neither the recent opportunity to stay with the literature sufficiently 
to attempt a comprehensive overview, nor the opportunity to reflect as carefully as he might 
have on the history itself, although volumes such as that assembled by Gardenfors and 
Sahlin (1988) make the task more readily possible. Incidentally, I notice from recent 
evidence in Australia that one useful step in getting to such a reflective position is to 
undertake a formal retirement, and get involved in after-dinner retrospectives at 
professional society meetings (Dillon, 1995 pers. com.). Given the uncertainties of 
continued bureaucratic life in the World Bank, this sort of opportunity may come to me 
more quickly than I anticipate! 
False starts and dead ends 
The safety-first models that were popularized and given theoretical justification by Richard 
Day in the 1970s, and exploited in several insightful analyses by Stephen Turnovsky and 
others, seem to me to have been not only less than well conceived what with their 
arbitrarily set 'critical' values, but also somewhat dead-endish in outcome. One friend who 
was actively involved in this endeavour is James Roumasset, who is the policy-oriented 
economist who did most to champion this class of models in the agricultural economics 
profession (Roumasset, 1976). In coming to such a harsh judgment, I do not mean to say 
that there is nothing of value in the analytical structures developed, and that the policy and 
other implications for research and management were not also useful. My reservation here 
is that alternative analytical frameworks may have seen an even happier outcome, although 
I think this question, particularly when we get to assessing the success or otherwise of the 
subjective expected utility (SEU) model in our deliberations, is still very much on the table. 
Another candidate for leading 'false-start' status is game theory, at least in the games-
against-nature models that became so popular in the 1960s—parenthetically, I am certainly 
not condemning game theory in general, as recently epitomized by the serious Nobel 
Laureate and temporary Australian Harsanyi (1995) or the entertaining Avery, Heymann 
and Zeckhauser (1995)—and led promising young analysts, such as John L. Dillon, to 
climb on that bandwagon while (then) under-emphasizing the SEU model that could then so 
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readily have been alternatively applied. In his own confessions in this regard, Dillon (1971) 
pins (only in part facetiously) some of the blame on Earl 0. Heady never having really 
come to grips with the fledgling SEU model and so never having written an expository 
book about it in the late 1950s, and thus not 'properly' directing his many (subsequently 
highly influential) graduate students of that era. Be that as it may, the pioneering 
applications of using game theory to conceptualize risky farm decisions seem to have been 
insufficiently alert to the extreme risk-aversion assumptions that were implied in adopting 
some of the then-avowed criteria, such as Maximin, and it is thus not surprising, in 
retrospect, that perhaps this work did not lead to as much policy-relevant or management-
relevant insight as might have been the case for those particular young scholars at their key 
formative professional stages. 
We all doubtless have our own candidates for dead ends in the development of methods 
of risk management, and it will be interesting to hear any nominations. I suspect, for 
instance, that (a) SEU-based value-of-information studies (Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 
1977; Byerlee and Anderson, 1982) and (b) stochastic dominance of one type or another 
may be on some such lists! I shall come to my own confessions on the latter nomination in 
the following section. 
Missed opportunities 
The category of missed (or lost) opportunities is intended to facilitate the identification of 
cases where, for whatever reason, progress did not take off in what in retrospect would 
have been a more desirable direction and outcome. I guess that an extreme illustration of 
this would be those legions of limited vision who knew the Daniel Bernoulli 1738 work 
(Somer, 1954) yet were unable to see the wide potential applicability of his concept of 
utility or understand how such a framework could have been used to better understand 
contemporary economic phenomena of the passing decades. We had to wait a couple of 
centuries, particularly for the various creative endeavours of Frank Ramsey, John von 
Neumann, Oscar Morgenstern, Leonard Savage, Howard Raiffa, Robert Schlaifer. Ronald 
Howard and many others, before this really got up to significant operational speed— 
Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) provide one eclectic review. 
In more recent times, we have had other utility-based analytical structures that have 
perhaps not achieved all that they might have. Stochastic dominance, along with the idea of 
stochastic efficiency analysis, seems to be another candidate in this regard. I think I played 
a small part in exploring how this approach might find useful application in better risk 
management within agriculture (e.g., Anderson, 1974b), but perhaps I did not pursue the 
matter as energetically as I should have, particularly given the somewhat slow adoption of 
these ideas within the cutting edge of the farm-management-analysis community of, for 
instance, North America (Cochran (1986) provides a good mid-80s review). I think a 
similar claim could also be made for some of the more specialized extensions of this 
approach, such as the generalized stochastic dominance rules (Meyer (1977) even given the 
laudable efforts of King and Robison (1981)), and other extensions, such as convex 
stochastic dominance (Fishburn, 1974), which brought increased power to the procedures. 
What went wrong? I am not sure. Perhaps the techniques are intrinsically less than adequate 
for many of the policy questions to which we would all like answers. What does one do 
with a large and diverse efficient set?! Policymakers usually prefer simple and concise 
answers, and the trend towards greater simplicity and transparency seems to be strongly 
continuing as we daily encounter citizens whose maximum attention span is the seven-
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second TV 'grab,' or decision makers whose reading is confined to the half-page executive 
summary of a long complex document! 
Major achievements 
With the foregoing as introduction, it will come as no surprise that I think the major 
achievement in the field of risk-management analytical structures centers around the SEU 
model (Schoemaker, 1982). I still count it as major achievement, even though adoption 
within the agricultural risk-management community was somewhat slow. Perhaps this 
slowness itself was partly related to the unfortunate premature departure of Gerry Dean and 
later also Al Halter (who had carried forward Glen Johnson's early enthusiasm for work in 
this area), who were thus unable to proselytize the message of their 1971 book (Halter and 
Dean, 1971) in a way that may really have made a major difference for early adoption of 
utility-based techniques in North American Academe outside of the leading business 
schools. In spite of the assistance of Iowa State University Press, the Anderson, Dillon and 
Hardaker 1977 work made slow inroads, and it was not until the 1980s that the lag began to 
be corrected through books such as Barry (1984) and Robison and Barry (1987). 
Notwithstanding a slower than may have been ideal start, things have really picked up 
and we thus find the model being deployed in a high proportion of formal economic 
analyses and a growing proportion of informal analyses of risk in agriculture. This is the 
case, even with the proliferating advances of improved and better-founded theoretical 
approaches, such as we shall be reviewing throughout this seminar. Nonetheless, I feel that 
my vote in this documentation of achievement can only be placed on the SEU model. Our 
deliberations will reveal whether or not my personal prejudice in this regard is shared. 
4 Pragmatism in progressing towards the New Millennium 
There appears to be a general life-cycle effect whereby maturing professionals take a more 
pragmatic view of professional aspects than may have been the case in their more 
analytically oriented and enthusiastic youth. Some of the same tendencies lead economists 
to become more enchanted with policy-engaged work rather than theoretical analysis in the 
later stages of their careers. Perhaps such tendencies may have contributed to the 
pragmatism now sketched. 
The ideas underlying the following derive from experience with various endeavours to 
explore procedures for dealing with risk in public project analysis. The intention in these 
efforts was to depict when the Arrow and Lind (1970) rule of concentrating only on mean 
economic performance in project appraisal is indeed applicable in a world fraught with risk. 
An emerging sense of pragmatic simplification led to some simple guidelines based on 
second-order approximations to certainty-equivalent determination. The approach is 
analytically undemanding and fairly simple to use in practice, although still embodying the 
necessity to come up with proper and well-formulated estimates of mean economic return. 
This can be quite a demanding task in itself and, in many cases, may indeed involve the 
elaboration of a fairly comprehensively specified stochastic model which, if involving 
several nonlinearities, may well lead one to use of some type of ad hoc simulation approach 
(Pouliquen, 1970; Reutlinger, 1970; Anderson, 1974a). 
The essence of the model seems applicable to situations going well beyond those initially 
analysed in the context of public project appraisal. Indeed, it seems that the general issues 
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of planning a farm in a risky world can be tackled insightfully with such an approach 
(Anderson, 1995) and it is intended in what follows to draw out some simple analytical 
possibilities. 
'A' Additionality of new risks 
Earlier sections have noted the all-too-apparent pervasiveness of risk in the farm-planning 
environment and in the agricultural sector in general. This might be thought of as a general 
situation of background risk. All our lives are swathed in such risks, and to pretend that life 
is anything other than a very risky business is to deny an essential aspect of contemporary 
reality and probably a permanent aspect of the human condition. Thus, planning for 
managing risk must take such background situations as an important one of the givens that 
pertain to new decisions. This means that, whether one is considering a new policy, a new 
activity or a new technique for use in farming, the question is not: Is this a particular risky 
matter per se?; but rather: How does it add to (or subtract from) the prevalent risk? Such a 
question can only be answered by having some sort of measured comprehension of the 
extent of background risk, and a cogent assessment of the extent of the riskiness involved in 
the new item under consideration. These are minimal requirements. Some further relevant 
considerations are taken up below, particularly under 'C'. 
The assessment of these two groups of risks naturally takes one into all the usual 
techniques of risk assessment, and can be as sophisticated as current conceptual structures 
allow, or as crude and simplistic as something of the type that will be discussed below. One 
could speak of different approaches as being more or less elegant, theoretically well 
underpinned, or otherwise, but there is probably no such thing as 'an idealized procedure', 
and the level of sophistication to be taken must surely be problem- and analyst-dependent. 
'B' Best-bet simplifications 
The term best-bet was (I believe) introduced into the risk-management lexicon by some of 
my UNE colleagues in the 1960s—specifically John Dillon, Al Halter, Jack Makeham 
(Makeham, Halter and Dillon, 1968) and Bob Officer. They used it to justify a series of 
simple approximations to decision-analytic structures bearing on such decisions as the 
choice of drought fodder reserves by Australian graziers. Their approach involved such 
overtly inadequate presumptions as the use of quadratic utility functions, and imperfect risk 
assessments based on two moments only of relevant farm probability distributions. I am 
using the term here to convey a sense of bestness to a variety of procedures that are surely 
distant from first-best in a theoretical sense, but seem to capture the essence of risky 
planning situations without being excessively demanding on analytical requirements. 
The first simplification advanced is to focus on the subjective coefficient of variation (cv) 
of random variables as a convenient summary measure of the riskiness of uncertain 
quantities. This assumption of convenience sweeps together several related simplifications, 
namely, the use of mean and standard deviation only to capture the extent of relative 
variation, and combining these in a unit-free or dimensionless statistic that has more 
intuitive appeal than unfettered standard deviation, variance and other higher moment-based 
statistics. This is not to say that it is an easy statistic to arrive at by means of purely 
subjective elicitation, but then nothing else is either and, at least, this one has the advantage 
of ready conversational appeal. 
The measure is widely used by other disciplinary users of applied statistics, notably 
biologists, who frequently refer to 'normal' values of biological variation being, say, of the 
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order of cv=0.05. I have found it to be a useful approach in several contexts in applied risk 
analysis, ranging from studying the effects on yield variation of crop improvement and 
management research (Anderson and Hazell, 1989) through analysis of food risk and 
poverty (Anderson and Scandizzo, 1984) to the macroeconomic implications of climatic 
variation (Anderson, 1979a). Perhaps then it was not surprising that I seized upon it for 
simplifying approaches to risky project evaluation (Anderson, 1983; 1989). 
Proposing a focus on such a statistic does not pretend that it is perfect, and there may be 
the practical consideration to contend with of its extreme inadequacy in quantifying risk 
when the denominating mean approaches zero! Such matters can, however, perhaps be 
dismissed as mere practical details that need to be actively thought about in empirical 
applications, and then creatively down-played in the pursuit of analytical insight. 
'C' Correlatedness of new activities 
The next major consideration in viewing the significance or otherwise of a new risk is its 
statistical relationship to the background risk. Such an association may be captured crudely 
through some measure of statistical correlation such as, for instance, Pearson's correlation 
coefficient based on the covariance between and the variances of any pair of random 
variables. This measure has well-known properties of being bounded between plus and 
minus unity, and (thanks to Karl Pearson) it has a deep history in terms of sampling theory. 
What it does not have, unfortunately, is a ready means of subjective assessment, 
notwithstanding the efforts of Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977, pp. 34-37), and the 
subsequent more elegant achievements of others in this regard (e.g., Fackler, 1991). 
The use of the correlation coefficient as a measure of association between new and 
background risk seems then to be reasonably consistent with the use of a measure based on 
the respective variances for assessing the marginal risk of each case, as has been advanced 
for the cv above. Together then, these several simplifications can be combined in a simple 
and transparent model of risk assessment (Anderson, 1989), and this is the one taken up in 
the following subsection. 
'D' Deductions relative to mean maximization 
The foregoing considerations can now be blended into a simple model, which combines a 
new source of risk in the planning environment of the farmer or agricultural policymaker, 
captured by a random economic variable, X, which is potentially to be combined with the 
existing background risk, likewise captured through an aggregate economic variable, Y. The 
total economic performance, with all its risk, is determined by the addition of these into a 
new aggregate variable, T: 
T=X+Y (1) 
The earlier results developed in the context of project analysis can be summarized in the 
following two equations (2 and 3), where the proportional risk deduction, D, depends on 
the stated variables, several of which are expressed as the convenient coefficients of 
variation, C[], on the key correlation coefficient, g, and other variables as defined in the 
following: 
CE[T\ = E[T\ (l-D) (2) 
An 'ABC' of risk management in agriculture 9 
where CE[] denotes the certainty equivalent, £("•] is the expected value operator, and D is a 
second-order approximation given by 
D = rC{X\ {0.5 C[X]Z + g C[Y\] (3) 
D thus provides an index of the extent to which risk impedes economic efficiency 
through the potential addition of the new enterprise or policy, X. The concerned operator 
will be better off if D is a very small number, and some aspects of risk management will 
involve the manager trying to make this as small as is possible. Some elements of the 
deduction D are, however, difficult to shrink. The relative risk aversion coefficient, r, is 
probably between 1 and 2 for most MDC applications, although it may become a rather 
larger number for the impoverished circumstances of some LDC situations (Anderson and 
Dillon, 1992, p. 55). Background risk (C[Y\) is often fairly high and, depending on the 
level of aggregation being worked at, may be, for instance, as high as, say, 0.5 for 
individual dryland farming operations in countries such as Australia, and for open 
economies such as that one and now many others in the globalized world economy, it may 
be of the order of 0.1 for aggregate agricultural GNP. 
Just how risky the new enterprise or policy is, reflected in C[X], depends very much on 
the empirical circumstances, and could range anywhere from 0.1 to more than unity. This 
leaves two remaining key parameters, Z and g. Z is the relative size (in terms of expected 
values) of the new relative to the background, so that it may be the expected returns from a 
new farming enterprise expressed relative to the mean of existing farm returns in such a 
context, or it may be the corresponding expected return from a new project or policy 
relative to existing mean income in a more macro-application. It may thus be quite a small 
number, which will then correspond to the classic public-project case, where the size-of-
risk adjustment term vanishes to zero, or it may be a relatively large number in the context 
of a major new enterprise, or a significantly large policy change in more micro-
applications. 
The trickiest parameter of all is the simple correlation coefficient, g, that captures the 
degree of statistical association between the new and the background. In a fortunate risk-
management context, this might be a negative number, where the risk manager has 
creatively identified a new risky activity that moves in a counter-cyclical way with the 
prevailing background risk. Such activities are, however, rather difficult to find. Cases of 
positive correlation are the norm, unfortunately. There can still be risk-reduction benefits, 
however, providing that the coefficient of correlation is less than +1 . Fortunately, this is 
also the norm, and thus part of the challenge of the risk manager is to identify new 
activities that are less-than-strongly correlated with the main elements that contribute to 
background risks. In the farm-planning context, this may involve selecting new less-than-
traditional enterprises for which there is little market linkage with the major products in the 
existing farm plan, and for the macro-analyst, it may mean seeking out counter-cyclical 
policies, such as interventions that trigger during major downside risks, such as national 
catastrophes caused by flooding, drought, wildfires, etc. Family support policies that are 
triggered by such events will probably have a strong negative correlation and can thus 
facilitate the adoption of techniques and enterprises that are consistent with a more 
stabilized income. 
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'E' Enterprise selection and other managerial choices 
The theme of enterprise selection has already been taken up in the context of discussing the 
risk-deduction effect. Managerial choice depends on many different judgemental elements, 
including the ability to identify activities and new enterprises that have as a first 
requirement a high expected value of economic performance and thus will make a strong 
contribution to expected economic success. This is surely the primary requirement for an 
efficient manager, namely, to identify such opportunities and to act upon them. The extent 
to which the manager should reduce enthusiasm for such otherwise untrammelled pursuit of 
economic gain will properly depend on all the factors captured in the risk-deduction model 
sketched above. It will be the situation in many cases that the deduction is, however, very 
small and thus the pursuit of profit in a purely expected sense will indeed be the optimal 
path. Other situations are relatively easy to imagine, however, and the friction that goes 
with the risk of the new can thus be systematically assessed and accounted for in planning 
exercises by quick reference to the adjustment formula. 
5 Conclusion 
Risk in agriculture is here to stay, notwithstanding the wishful idealism of socially minded 
policy interventionists. Most of today's analysts are, however, not bound to tarry here long, 
at least in a professionally active way. It is appropriate then, at this late stage of the present 
millennium, to take stock, and to attempt to articulate a prospective agenda for those who 
will take this field into the New Millennium. I count myself fortunate for the privilege of 
being here to participate in this worthy undertaking, and for this opportunity to help to get 
the ball rolling. 
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Summary 
Economic theory on risk is usually based on the idea that agents display preferences over 
uncertain prospects. These preferences then can be used to rank alternatives through 
appropriate use of probabilities. This paper deals with some theoretical and empirical results 
of a new approach to measurement of risk that does not depend on the specification of a 
particular type of utility function on the part of the decision maker. It is based on the so-called 
agency costs of debt which arise from the conflicts of interest between different claimants on 
output of the firm. 
1 Introduction 
Most of the economic theory on risk is based on the idea that agents display preferences over 
uncertain prospects and that these preferences can be used to rank alternatives through 
appropriate use of probabilities. Although stochastic efficiency criteria are well established in 
the literature (see, for example, Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1977), they ultimately seem 
to have to rely on a choice depending on the preferences of the decision maker. 
In this paper we present some theoretical and empirical results of a new approach to 
measurement of risk that does not depend on the specification of a particular type of utility 
function on the part of the decision maker. The approach is based on the so-called agency 
costs of debt arising from the conflicts of interest between different claimants on output of the 
firm. In other words, the presence of uncertainty tends to generate forms of risk shared 
among different agents, which results in deadweight losses, and which can be used to measure 
the extent to which uncertainty is converted into some form of 'risk'. 
At the most elementary level, this conversion of objective uncertainty into subjective risk 
occurs because different types of 'stake-holders', under different conditions and expected 
payoffs, agree on a contract that stipulates that the returns (both positive and negative) of the 
enterprise are 'shared'. While the basic distinction of the capitalistic firm is between 
bondholders as senior claimants and stockholders as residual claimants, the structure of the 
contract can be complicated at will by differentiating the claimants on the basis of the degree 
of seniorship of the claim. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
introduces the basic model as well as a graphical approach to agency costs of debt. Section 4 
discusses the criterion of stochastic dominance and section 5 shows an alternative approach to 
the definition of risk. Section 6 presents the results of empirical tests. Some conclusions are 
reported in Section 7. 
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2 Related literature 
The standard framework of the agency costs of debt assumes that investment decisions go 
before the firm's financing strategy and that operating decisions are taken by shareholders (or 
managers) in order to maximize the value of equity. When there is no debt in the financial 
structure, an equity maximizing policy is equivalent to a firm's value maximizing policy. 
When debt is present, on the contrary, investment incentives can be distorted by the conflict 
of interest that originates when the project NPV is shared between claimants according to 
their relative 'seniority'. This distortion of incentives induces suboptimal investment decisions 
that result in a difference between the levered and unlevered value of the firm (agency cost of 
debt). 
The impact of the agency costs of debt have been envisaged in situations such as 'asset 
substitution' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 'overinvestment' and 'underinvestment' (Myers, 
1977; Berkovitch and Kim, 1990). 
Jensen and Meckling show how shareholders of a levered firm have incentives to increase 
the riskiness of a firm's assets, thus increasing the risk for debtholders, even if the greater 
risk is associated with lower present values of future cash flows. Shareholders are in fact only 
interested in the 'upper' side of the probability distribution of firm results, that is in the part 
where cash flows are greater than the face value of debt. Debtholders, on the contrary, 
receive only full payment of debt as specified in the contractual provision but nothing of the 
cash flows greater than the face value of debt. Therefore, they are interested in the 'lower' 
part of the probability distribution of firm results: the addition of risk-increasing projects to 
the firm reduces the expected value of their claim. In this case, the agency cost of debt 
consists of the increased cost of financing that debtholders require when they assess the 
shareholder's incentive to accept a risk-increasing investment project. 
Myers (1977) shows how shareholders of a levered firm can have incentives not to accept a 
positive NPV project: the 'underinvestment' incentive arises because existing debtholders get 
a share of the project NPV while shareholders bear the investment cost. In the presence of 
risky debt in the financial structure, debtholders appropriate the positive results of the project 
financed by internal funds up to the face value of their claim, leaving only the residual to the 
shareholders. The agency cost of debt is directly related to the change in the firm's value that 
the project would have produced if adopted, but that was lost because of the decision to reject 
the project. 
While in Myers' contribution the agency cost of debt is due to underinvestment incentives 
that come from risky debt, Berkovitch and Kim (1990) show that risk-shifting incentives can 
also produce significant deviations from the NPV rule. Using a model based on a different 
probability level for each state (high and low) and on a project entirely financed by an 
exogenous specified amount of debt, the authors show how under- and overinvestment 
incentives can arise from the 'seniorship' of debt. In particular, the issuance of senior debt to 
finance a new investment project can have two effects on the shareholders' investment 
incentives. On the one hand, a greater seniority of new debt with respect to existing debt 
makes the former less risky because it increases its probability of being paid back in case of 
default. This reduces the cost on new debt and makes use of senior debt to finance the 
investment easier, thus reducing the underinvestment incentives. On the other hand, the low 
cost of new debt, if senior to the existing one, can generate incentives to excessive investment 
expenses and can result in acceptance of negative NPV projects (overinvestment). Also in this 
case, the agency cost of debt depends on the relative weights of the two incentives and can be 
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defined as the difference between the firm's values that originate from the 
acceptance/rejection of the project. 
3 The financing structure of the firm 
Consider a firm whose cash flow has a present value of Y, where Y is a random variable 
distributed in the interval [-œ, YM] with a known distribution function F(). Assume that the 
firm lasts only one period and is financed by a zero coupon bond of face value D, which is 
discounted at market value at the beginning of the period and is due to be repaid at the end of 
the period. 
Proposition 1 - The value for the shareholders of a firm with one type of debt financing is 
independent of the debt-equity ratio and always greater than the net present value for the firm. 
Proof: If, for a given investment level of /, financing is obtained floating zero coupon notes of 
nominal value equal to D, the value for the shareholders, because of limited liability is: 
VA = max [0, Y - DJ (1) 
and the expected value is: 
EVA - ft' (Y-D)dF(Y) = [1 - F, (D)]EY - [1-F(D)]D (2) 
where F(Y) is the distribution of the cash flow, in the interval [-co, Yu], and F^D) is the 
ordinate of the Lorenz curve defined as: 
) _a vdF(v) 
The market value of debt, on the other hand, is: 
Vi> = max /min [D, Y], 0} (4) 
and its expected value is: 
EVn = !" vdF(v) + D(1-F(D)) = [Fi(D) - F,(0)]EY + (1 - F(D)) D (5) 
In order to finance the investment /, EVD = /, i.e., substituting into (5) and solving for D: 
D =
 J
 - [F'(°) - F,(0)]EY 
1 - F(D) ( ' 
Substituting this expression for D into (2), we readily obtain: 
EVA = EY - I + \F,(0)\EY (7) 
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where I F^O) | >0 denotes the absolute value of F^O). 
Comment: Expression (2) states that the expected value of the stock of a firm consists of two 
parts: (a) the share of the expected value of the cash flow in the states of nature where income 
exceeds debt payments and (b) the cost of paying the debt obligations in the same states of 
nature. Expression (5), on the other hand, states that the market value of the firm's bond is 
also made up of two parts: (a') the share of the expected value of cash flow in the states 
complementary to (a) and (b') the value of debt payments in the same states as in (a). Thus, as 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) noted, a larger amount of debt financing will have two effects 
that will exactly counterbalance each other: (i) the amount financed by the stockholders will 
decline, giving a boost to the net cash flow accruing to them, (ii) the market value of the 
bonds will also decline forcing the firm to issue more bonds for the same amount of 
investment. Note also that the creation of a firm with limited responsibility creates a 
distribution effect in favour of both stakeholders and at the expense of the owners' wealth 
external to the firm. The term | F^O) | EY represents in fact the expected dissipation of wealth 
not sustained by the stakeholders. The deadweight loss can be eliminated by an appropriate ad 
valorem tax on the cash flow Y. Furthermore, such a tax should be raised at a rate equal to 
! JFJCO) I /(l-+-1^,(0)1 - 0 where i=I/EY. It would have to be, therefore, a function of the 
investment financed by debt. 
Proposition 2 - The shareholders' value of a project financed through sale of junior debt may 
be greater, equal to or lower than its net present value. 
Proof: Denote with D{ the senior notes and with D2 the junior notes. The expected value of 
the firm for the shareholders is: 
EV'A = i ; v t t zdG(z) - (D, + D:) (1 - G(D, + D3) (8) 
where z = x + y, y being the cash flow from existing activities and x the cash flow from the 
project. G(z) is the distribution function of z. 
The face value of senior notes is the same as in (5) with D=DU while the value of the 
junior notes is: 
EVlh = \';;;,h (z - D,)dG(z) + D: 0-G(D,+ D:)) = L (9) 
where Ix denotes investment costs of the new project, while the investment cost originally 
borne to create the firm is Iy = EVD]. 
Substituting into (8) expressions (5) and (9) yields: 
EV'A = [C zdG(z) - ƒ, - !,] + []'„" ydF(y)-ft zdG(z)\ 
+ D, (G (D,) - F (D,)) 
Developing the integrals in the second square parentheses by parts, we obtain: 
(10) 
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EV'A = [ I,! zdG(z) - /,. - /,] + iï'(ü(u)-F(u))du 
Subtracting the expression for EVA: 
(ID 
EV', - EVA = (EX - IJ + ft' (G(u)-F(u))du (12> 
or developing again by parts: 
EV'A - EVA = NPV + [G(D,) -F(D,)]D, + [F, (D,)EY - G,(D,)E(Y+ X)J (13) 
Comment: The first term in square brackets in expression (13) measures the extent to which 
the project changes the probability of default for senior debt. If such a probability increases, 
the burden that falls on senior debt constitutes an incentive to undertake the project even 
where NPV is negative (overinvestment). The second term in square brackets, on the other 
hand, measures the extent to which the project changes the expected value of the cash flow. If 
this change is negative (the term in square brackets is positive) an additional burden of cost 
may be shifted from the shareholders to the senior creditors, providing further incentives to 
undertake the project. Conversely, if either the probability of default to senior debtors 
decreases or their expected share of the cash flow increases, the shareholders will count this 
as an increase in cost, and may reject projects that cause these effects even though their NPV 
may be positive. 
Corollary 2.1 - For risk-averse shareholders, the value of a project financed through sale of 
junior debt will be greater, equal to or lower than NPV according to whether the project 
increases, leaves unchanged or decreases the risk of the firm in default towards senior 
creditors according to the criterion of second degree stochastic dominance (SSD). 
Proof: The result follows directly from expression (12). 
Comment: While Proposition 2 holds also for risk-neutral shareholders, the corollary implies 
that risk-averse shareholders will always derive a benefit if the risk share of senior debt 
increases, while its face value remains unchanged. For a project that increases the value of 
expected cash flow, risk-neutral shareholders must compare the cost given by the leakage of 
the cash flow increase to senior debtholders to the possible benefit given by their additional 
shouldering of the burden of default. For risk-averse shareholders, on the other hand, this is 
equivalent to a reduction of risk, since the existence of senior debt allows them to shift 
without costs some of the project risks to senior creditors. 
Agency cost and project choice: a graphical approach. 
According to the model previously presented, a new project affects shareholders' wealth not 
only through its NPV but also by modifying the default risk of debt and the expected value of 
the cash flow. The net effect for the shareholders depends on these three components, so that 
over- and underinvestment incentives can be observed each time the project changes the risk 
of the bondholder's claim. 
To present the under- and overinvestment incentives graphically, we can use (13) : 
EV'A - EVA = NPV + fG(D,) - F( D,)lD, +[F, (D,)EY - G,(D,)E(Y+X)J 
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and, by setting NPV = E(X) -1, we obtain: 
EV\ - EVA =E(X)-I+ [Gtf>,) - F(D,)] Z), + F,(DX)E(Y) - G,(D,)£(K) - G,CD,)£(X) 
Then, collecting E(X) and E(Y), we get: 
EV*A - EVA = [1 - G,(D,)]£(X) - / + [G(P{) - F(D,)j Dl + [F,(D,) - G,(D,)]£(}0 
The first term denotes the share of the new project that accrues to shareholders; the second 
term is the change in the default risk of existing/senior debt and the third is the change in the 
expected value of existing firm cash flow. 
The increase in riskiness due to project adoption has a twofold effect. On the one hand, it 
increases the risk faced by existing debtholders by increasing the default risk of their claim. 
On the other hand, it also increases the expected value of the cash flow of the existing firm 
(E(Y)) that leaks to existing debtholders, thus resulting in an indeterminate net effect on 
shareholders claim. 
Equating EV*A = EVA, we obtain an indifference curve representing all the combinations 
of investment and cash flow [I and E(X)] that will leave shareholders indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the new project. 
I = [1 - G,(D,)]£(X) + [GiDO - F(D0} D, + [F^DJ - G,(Z>,)]E(y) (13.bis) 
Indifference curve (13.bis) is depicted in Figure 1 and corresponds to the line EV*A=EVA. 
Putting aside for the moment the second and the third terms—default of existing debt and 
cash flow—(13.bis) can be written as: 
/ = [1 - G,(D,)]£(X) 
and the line EV*A—EVA corresponds to the indifference curve for shareholders. Any point 
above this line represents a project that will decrease the shareholders' wealth while any point 
below the line represents a project combination [I,E(X)] that will increase shareholders' 
wealth. 
The line with the slope of 1 going through the origin and labelled NPV=0 represents all 
the combinations of / and E(X) that yield zero NPV. Any point above this line represents a 
project with negative NPV; any point below, a positive NPV project. 
The comparison between the two lines (NPV=0 and EV*=EV) reveals the conditions 
under which shareholders will deviate from the NPV rule. When E(X) is positive, the 
NPV = 0 line exceeds the EV*=EV indifference curve. Thus, any point between the two lines 
represents a positive NPV project which decreases shareholders' wealth (underinvestment 
incentive). The situation is reversed when£(X) is negative: the EV*=EV line now exceeds the 
NPV = 0 line. Thus, if a project falls between the two lines, the shareholders will accept the 
project even though it has a negative NPV (overinvestment incentive). 
Given this basic framework, let us consider the effects of the second and third terms of 
(13.bis). A change in the probability of default of existing debt (second term of 13.bis) will 
result in a shift of the EV* = EV line: in the case of an increase in the default risk of existing 
debt, the difference [G(D,) - F(D,)] is positive and shifts upward the shareholders' 
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indifference line. Given the level of existing debt, an increase in the default risk reduces 
underinvestment incentives and increases overinvestment by allowing a shift without costs of a 
share of the risk of the new project to debtholders (vice versa, a decrease in the default risk of 
debt increases underinvestment and reduces overinvestment). Furthermore, the intersection 
between the two lines is now in the second quadrant: overinvestment can happen not only 
when the project expected value E(X) is negative but also when the expected value is positive. 
I 
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Figure 1. Over- and underinvestment incentives 
The effect of changes in G)(D,) on the claim of shareholders is twofold. On the one hand, a 
change in GX(D{) results in a rotation of the indifference line EV*=EV. An increase in G^D^) 
reduces the coefficient of EV*=EV line (that is [1 - G^^]) and causes the line to become 
flatter: an increase in the probability of default of existing debt results in an increase of both 
under- and overinvestment incentives. 
On the other hand, the third term of (13.bis) shows how an increase in the default risk of 
the cash flow, with respect to the situation 'without' the project [G[(Dl)>Fl(Dl)], produces a 
downward shift of the EV*=EV indifference line, thus increasing underinvestment and 
mitigating overinvestment. As a result, the net effect on the equity value of a change in 
G^D,) appears determinate with respect to underinvestment (the change is in the same 
direction) but indeterminate for the overinvestment incentive. 
This is due to the increased expected value of the cash flow (because of the increase in G, (D,)) that makes the 
leakage of the cash flow to debtholders more expensive for shareholders, thus increasing underinvestment and 
reducing overinvestment. 
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4 Default risk and stochastic dominance 
By a very simple framework, we can obtain the effects of project adoption on equity by 
comparing the probability levels (for examples p and h) associated with the unfavourable state 
before and after the beginning of the project. Risk-shifting incentives can result in a change in 
the default risk of debt: for example, if the default risk is p(X - E) where p is the probability 
associated with the unfavourable state, X is the cash flow from the project in the same state 
and E is the face value of debt. A project that modifies the 'bad-state' probability from p to h 
has a direct impact on debt default risk and shareholders claim. That is, equity value can be 
related simply to the difference between two 'absolute levels' of probability. On the contrary, 
if we do not consider that project adoption can modify the probability distribution of project 
results, we obtain only a partial measure of risk: in fact, by doing so, we neglect the 'shape' 
of the probability function of firm value, in particular of the distribution to the 'left' of the 
nominal value of the debt. 
A more complete default risk evaluation can be obtained from (13), which shows the 
changes in equity value subsequent to the project acceptance: 
DAZ = NPV + [G^Z),) -F(£>,)] Z), + [F^DJE- YG^DJ E(X + Y)] 
and is obtained from the more general expression (12): 
DAZ = NPV +}"' (G(w) - F(u))du 
where G{u) and F(u) are the cumulative distribution functions of cash flow before and after 
the start of the project while the integral shows a risk-shifting effect that is consistent with the 
criterion of second degree stochastic dominance. In fact, if: 
l'0n(G(u)-F(u))du>0 
the project causes a change in the cumulative distribution function of firm results, from F(u) 
to G{u). This change implies a shift of probability from the centre of the distribution to the 
tails and a subsequent increase in the probability that the value of the firm will be insufficient 
to pay debt obligations. If it is not renegotiable, existing debt bears the increased risk of the 
firm through the reduction of its market value. 
The criterion of second degree stochastic dominance differs from the standard approach to 
bankruptcy risk because the latter assumes that if firm value (or project results) is normally 
distributed, the risk level may be obtained just from the ordinate of the probability function. 
Myers and Pogue (1974), for example, define a financial trouble situation as the area of 
normal density function (as the percentage of total area) in which the firm net worth is less 
2 
The measure of risk given by the difference between 'absolute' levels of default probability in different states is 
similar to the 'head count ratio' in the literature on income distribution, in which the degree of poverty is obtained 
as a percentage of individuals that have an income below the poverty line. As in that case, in which shifts in 
income that happen below the poverty lines have no relevance, the use of two probability levels can hide shifts of 
risk due to the change in the tails of distribution function. Cfr. Sen (1979), Barr (1993), Stiglitz and Norton 
(1988). 
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than face value of debt. In the same way, Kim (1978) and Castanias (1983) use the normal 
density function to evaluate bankruptcy risk and corporate debt capacity. 
More generally, a normally distributed density function allows the use of an E-V criterion 
when comparing different portfolios, thus permitting determination of the risk level on the 
basis of the ordinate of the probability function. This procedure is analogous to in the result of 
the first degree stochastic dominance but less 'severe' than the SSD criterion. 
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Figure 2. Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) o f f over G. The comparison is based 
on the area below the cumulative function rather than on the ordinate of the function itself 
Proposition 3 - A project is only superior to an alternative project if the increase in the equity 
value of the firm with the project is greater than with the alternative project for all possible 
financing structures. 
Proof: The proof follows directly from (12), which shows that project value can be divided 
into two parts: NPV and the change in the distribution function of firm returns. 
If the second term is greater for any value of debt Du and NPV is the same for both 
projects, clearly the project is better than the alternative. 
Comment: The proposition states that, between two projects, rational decision makers (even 
though they are risk neutral in terms of the classical definitions) should choose the project 
which is stochastically dominant of second degree. The definition, for all Dj, in fact is 
precisely the definition of second degree stochastic dominance or SSD. Proposition 3 
interprets this requirement not as a consequence of the convexity of the agents' preferences 
but as the result of the possibility of undertaking alternative risk-sharing contracts that shift 
the risks to the other claimant. In other words, only if no alternative risk-sharing structures 
produce a higher increase in equity value, can we conclude that a project is superior to its 
alternative. 
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5 Default, interest and debt 
An alternative approach to the definition of risk can be developed via interest rate. Within the 
framework already described, consider again a firm whose cash flow, displayed over a period 
of unit length, is represented by a random variable Y distributed in the interval [-co, YM], with 
a known distribution function F(). Assume, however, that the firm receives a credit equal to 
VD and that at the end of the unit period of time must repay D = VD (1 +r) where r is the 
interest rate required by the creditor. The market value of the credit will equal the present 
value of future payments: 
1 
Va 1+p 
judF(u) + (l-F(D))D (14) 
where F(u) is the cumulative distribution function defined as F(Y) = prob {u < Y} and f the 
opportunity cost of money for the creditor. Developing by parts the integral in (14) and 
simplifying, we obtain: 
1 
Vo 
l + f D- ƒ F(u)dy 
(15) 
0 
We can now state the following: 
Proposition 4 - Enterprise risk, for a given debt structure, can be measured by the difference 
between the interest paid by the debtor and the interest paid by the creditor (or the opportunity 
cost of money). 
Proof: Since D = VD (1 + r), expression (15) can be written as: 
~v(D) (16) 
r = r + 
V» 
i> 
where 
<r(D) = ƒ F(y)dY 
The ratio a/VD thus represents a risk premium to charge on the individual credit. A firm that 
pays a higher premium than another firm for any possible level of debt VD is clearly second 
degree stochastically dominated by the other. Thus, the interest rate differential measures the 
riskiness of a firm in a way consistent with SSD. This result immediately leads to: 
Corollary 4.1 - For an investment of a given size, enterprise risk can be measured by the 
difference between the present values of the investment at the discount rate for the creditor 
and the debtor respectively. 
Proof: The quantity of financing can vary from VD = 0 (no financing) to VD = /, where / is 
total investment in the firm. Substituting D = VD(\+r) and integrating we obtain: 
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' » f j j \ (16) 
ll^^-liTf-jrr)1 
Developing the integral and simplifying: 
(17) 
f H(z)dz = -
I 1+P 1+r 
where 
H(z) = ƒ F(u) du. 
Comment: The term on the left-hand side of (17) represents the criterion for stochastic 
dominance of third degree (TSD). Thus, if a firm shows a higher present value differential for 
all possible levels of investment /, it can be said that it is superior in the TSD sense to any 
comparable firm. Conversely, the extent to which a firm is riskier than another firm, for a 
particular investment of size /, can be computed by evaluating the integral on the left-hand 
side of (17). 
6 Empirical test of the model 
As a general result, the model presented above defines project risk as the damage to the 
debtholder's claim when a risk-increasing project is accepted by shareholders who are able to 
shift away a large share of the project risk to debtholders, or when a project that reduces the 
default risk of debt or cash flow is rejected. 
However, these risk-shifting incentives take place only if debtholders are not able to 
renegotiate their position by signing a new contractual agreement which considers the changes 
in risk and profitability parameters. Under the hypothesis that short-term debt has a degree of 
renegotiability greater than long-term debt, risk-shifting incentives are more likely to occur 
when the share of short-term debt in total debt reduces. 
In this section, the following hypotheses will be empirically tested: 
1. Shareholders' claims are positively affected by a project that reduces the expected value of 
debtholders' claims by increasing the risk of default of debt. 
2. The gain for shareholders is negatively related to the degree of renegotiability of existing 
debt. The more the existing debt is renegotiable (i.e., short-term), the lower is the incentive 
for the shareholders to shift the risk away to the bondholders. If the market realizes this 
incentive when valuing corporate equity, firm market value should progressively 
approximate book value when the share of short-term debt increases. 
3. A positive response to improvements in financial and operating performance should be 
expected in firm market value. An operating margin higher than market average margin, 
together with a good financial performance, should positively affect the market valuation of 
the firm, resulting in a higher premium with respect to the firm book value. 
4. A more diversified capital structure should generate, ceteris paribus, a higher market value 
for the firm: as for price discrimination in monopoly, a more complex capital structure 
allows exploitation of different elasticities of the demand for the assets issued by the firm. 
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Data and methodology 
The empirical test has been performed by using panel data of 261 firms of three different 
countries: United States, United Kingdom and Japan. 
The expression used for the test is the following: 
VMCALL, = a + b0 ROFAT, + bx OF FAT, + b2 BRE, + b3 SIZE, + bA SETT, 
+ b5 GD + b6 GCF + bn VM_CALL „.„ 
where: 
VMjCALL, = difference between firm market value and firm 'call' value 
ROFAT, = operating income from total sales 
OF_FAT, = interest expenses on total sales 
BRE = percentage of short-term debt of total debt 
SIZE = logarithm of firm total debt 
SETT = sectorial dummy 
GD = default risk of existing debt 
GCF = default risk of cash flow 
VM_CALL(tA) = lagged dependent variable 
The dependent variable VMCALL, has been obtained as the difference between the firm 
market value and the firm 'call' value. Market value for each of the 261 firms has been 
obtained from Datastream and includes yearly observations from 1984 to 1993. The call value 
for the firms has been calculated by the Black-Sholes option pricing formula reported 
hereafter: 
c (V, K, s, t, r) = VN(dO -KN(d2) 
where c() represents the value of the call option, V the firm net assets, K the face value of 
debt (strike price), s the volatility of the assets, t the term of the option and r the risk-free 
interest rates. N{d{) and N{di) are the values of the normal cumulative function calculated in 
d{ and d2, with: 
dx = [log(V/K) + rsih ]/siA d2 = dY- si!l 
Asset volatility in each year for each firm has been approximated by the standard deviation in 
the preceding five years. The net interest rate of government bonds has been used as a proxy 
for the risk-free interest rates in each of the three countries. The expiration date of the call 
option has been set at one year. 
The dependent variable VMJOALL has been chosen in order to isolate the effects of 
changes in the financial structure on the firm market value. The application of call option 
pricing allows evaluation of the shareholders' claim on the basis of 'objective' determinants of 
firm value, such as the debt/equity ratio and business risk, and it does not consider the 
changes in the seniority or riskiness of different debt claims. That is, given the total amount 
of debt, net asset values and the asset riskiness, the 'option' value of the firm net worth is not 
dependent on the changes occurring in the relative seniority of debt. Two firms showing the 
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same levels for the three variables listed above should have the same call option value. 
Therefore, differences in their market value will be attributed to financial risk or to different 
growth perspectives. 
With respect to the latter, it is important to underline that the firm market value includes 
the present value of firm growth options as described in Myers (1977) and Kester (1984). In 
particular, Kester has estimated the value of growth options as the share of firm market value 
in excess of the capitalization of the firm's operating income: the difference between the 
market value and the discounted value of the future stream of operating income (supposed 
constant each year) gives an estimate of the growth perspectives that the market attributes to 
the firm. More generally, two firms with the same amount of annual operating income should 
have the same 'objective' value, even if differences in asset value, debt or net worth are 
observed and properly assessed by the market. 
On the contrary, our estimate of the 'objective' value of the firm has been obtained from its 
'call option' value as a proxy of firm net worth, including also the share of non-distributed 
earnings. Given that the call value depends on 1) the firm net asset value, 2) the total amount 
of debt and 3) the firm business risk, two firms with the same calculated 'call' value can 
present different market valuation only if their profits from sales are different. In other words, 
differences in market values are allowed only if the market discounts the difference in 
operating performance and accepts to pay an extra premium for the firm that has a higher 
profit margin (or a higher operating income to sales ratio). In this framework, therefore, a 
positive correlation between the dependent variable VMJOALL and the operating income 
margin {ROFAT) should be observed: furthermore, differences in relative operating 
performance should explain a share of market value in excess of book value. 
If jointly considered, the variables ROFAT and OFJFAT account for the total effect on 
market value of the operating income margin and financial risk-return relationship. From an 
investor standpoint, a higher operating margin results in a better investment opportunity for a 
given level of risk. Vice versa, the higher the interest to sales ratio, the less attractive the firm 
is for the investor, because of the financial risk involved. As a result, if the firm's operating 
and financial performance is good with respect to the average market performance, the market 
value should present a positive extra premium with respect to the firm's call value. The 
expected relationship with the dependent variable is positive for the operating performance 
and negative for the interest expenses to sales ratio. 
Variable BRE is used as a proxy for the renegotiability of debt. Given that short-term debt 
allows a 'continuous' adjustment of credit conditions to changes in risk and profitability 
parameters, the higher the share of short-term in total debt, the lower will be the potential 
shift of risk/wealth from debtholders to shareholders. Considering the extreme case in which 
the debt is instantly renegotiable, the market value of the firm should not present any 
significant deviation from the call value. In the opposite case, if the debt is locked in a long-
term agreement, the market value will diverge from the call value any time project adoption 
allows shareholders to shift a part of the risk to debtholders. The expected relationship 
between BRE and the dependent variable will present a negative correlation. 
SIZE is the logarithm of the firm liabilities and shows the effects of debt diversification on 
equity. A more complex (diversified) financial structure should allow the shareholders to 
exploit the different elasticities of demand for the different types of debt issued by the firm. If 
we assume that diversification is directly related to the amount of debt—that is, if a firm has 
to issue a great quantity of debt, it will likely use many different types of it—more debt 
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should be related to an increasing ability of shareholders to issue debt on the best conditions, 
thus implying a positive relation with the dependent variable. 
SETT is a dummy variable indicating the sectorial distribution of the firms included in the 
sample. The sectors considered are: electric, electronic, chemical, aerospace, mechanical and 
pharmaceutical. 
Construction of GD and GCF series 
GD and GCF series have been obtained from the assumption that the firm cash flow and net 
asset values are normally distributed random variables with means equal to the values of the 
variable in each year and variances equal to those observed in the previous five years. This 
allows use of a Monte Carlo simulation with the generated probability function in order to 
produce an estimate of the default risk for each firm included in the sample. 
If we consider only the GD variable, its construction requires starting with the following 
assumptions: 1) the firm asset value observed in each year is drawn from a probability 
distribution whose mean is the observed asset value itself; 2) the standard deviation of the 
distribution is the standard deviation of the firm asset values in the preceding five years: thus, 
it represents a type of measure of risk because it is directly related to the variability of the 
asset values. Consequently, for each observation included in the panel—2610 observations 
from a cross-section of 261 firms over 10 years—it is possible to generate a 'simulated' 
density function and a related probability (cumulative) function in order to evaluate the default 
risk of debt. 
A simple comparison between two density functions or between two ordinates of the 
cumulative distribution does not provide, in general, complete information on the changes that 
occur in risk levels. For example, if we have two density functions with the same mean value 
but with two different standard deviations (mean-preserving spread), the areas on the left of 
the mean values in the density function (the ordinates of cumulative function) are the same in 
the two cases, even if differences in the risk distribution are observed. That is, applying the 
first degree stochastic dominance criterion, as in most of the existing literature, does not allow 
a complete specification of risk. 
The use of the second degree stochastic dominance criterion (SSD) requires the evaluation 
of the area below the cumulative probability function. According to this criterion, the 
dominance of F over G requires the area of the cumulative function F to be smaller than the 
area of the function G for each value of the independent variable. The measure of risk 
proposed by us, however, is based on the comparison between the areas on the left of the 
ordinate that corresponds to the face value of debt: that is, a ranking between distributions is 
obtained only for the part of them whose values are below the face value of debt. Even though 
it is consistent with SSD, this measure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for such a 
dominance to occur. It makes possible, however, to attribute to each observation a level of 
'risk' that takes into account the parameters of the distribution as well as the amount of debt 
in the financial structure. The comparison over time of these levels of risk allows a complete 
description of the time pattern of the default risk for each firm included in the sample. 
With reference to the proposed risk measure, once a 'simulated' cumulative function has 
been obtained for each of the 2610 observations, the area below this curve can be obtained 
through Monte Carlo simulation. It implies a great number of iterations in which a series of 
random numbers is extracted and associated with a specific probability level in the cumulative 
function. Furthermore, a probability level for debt is also obtained from the cumulative 
function by providing an exogenous specified face value of debt. This is successively 
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compared—for each of the 1000 iterations—with the probability level of the asset value: if the 
difference between asset value and debt probabilities is negative, the single iteration belongs 
to the left-hand side of the cumulative distribution, thus indicating a default state of debt. Vice 
versa, if the difference is positive, the single iteration does not indicate a default state. By 
summing all the results and dividing the totals by the total number of iterations, we obtain an 
estimate of the default risk of debt that is consistent with the SSD criterion: that is, the effect 
of the variance on the shape of the distribution function is explicitly taken into account. 
As for the GD variable, the GCF variable is also obtained through Monte Carlo simulation: 
the only difference relates to the variables included. In this case, the default risk of the cash 
flow is calculated as the probability that the cash flow is not sufficient to repay interest plus 
the financial debt repayable within one year, thus causing a cash flow default state. 
Empirical results 
This section summarizes the empirical results of econometric estimates. 
The F statistic reported in Table 1 cannot reject the null hypothesis of overall homogeneity 
—for both the intercept and the slope—only for the British and the American firms. This 
allows the use of OLS estimates directly to the pooled data, without testing more specific 
restrictions on the slope or the intercept for the whole sample. Furthermore, the F tests for the 
US and UK subsamples reported in Table 2 cannot reject the null hypothesis of a constant 
slope but a different intercept (conditional on a constant slope), thus supporting the use of a 
fixed-effect model in the panel estimate. In general, a constant slope/different intercepts 
combination is more frequently expected when dealing with firm data, making a fixed effect 
model more appropriate. 
With regard to Japanese firms (and also to the whole sample), F tests do not support the 
hypothesis of 'homogeneity' of intercept and slope among the firms: in any case, given the 
nature of the data, a fixed effect on the intercept appears more likely to occur. 
The OLS estimates on UK and US data show that the coefficients of the GD variable 
(default risk of debt) and GCF variable (default risk of cash flow) are statistically significant 
and confirm also the expected relation with the dependent variable. Furthermore, these 
coefficients are larger and statistically more significant than those obtained in previous 
estimates, in which the risk measure was provided by the ordinate of the probability function 
instead of the area underlying the function itself. 
With regard to the UK firms, all the variables included in the estimates are significant and 
confirm the expected relations, except for dummy SETT which indicates the sector each firm 
belongs to. It is worth noting, moreover, that this last variable has shown a very low degree 
of significance in all the subsamples considered. 
US data give results similar to the British ones, except for the variable BRE that synthesizes 
the degree of renegotiability of debt: its coefficient is approximately zero and shows a relation 
with the dependent variable in a direction opposite from expected. 
In the OLS estimates, the coefficients for the US sample are, on average, larger than the 
UK ones: the intercept is -0.34 for UK and -0.42 for USA; the coefficients of MOL, OFFAT 
and SIZE are also larger, and so is the coefficient of GD variable that gives the effect on 
market value of the default risk of debt. Conversely, the coefficient of GCF— that is the 
market valuation of the cash flow default risk—is lower in the US sample than in the UK 
sample, and close to zero. 
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Table 1. Total (plain OLS) estimate—Balanced data (dependent variable: VMCALL) 
Variable Country 
c 
VM CALL1 
MOL 
OF FAT 
BKE 
SIZE 
SETT 
GD 
GCF 
TOT 
-.874489 
(-10.191) 
.866538 
(64.485) 
.306787 
(2.993) 
-.428304 
(-.583)** 
-.696007 
(-5.215) 
.150610 
(10.205) 
.887672E-02 
(1.593)** 
.044866 
(2.192)* 
.033070 
(1.877)** 
UK 
-.343118 
(-5.560) 
.870180 
(14.310) 
.415313 
(5.610) 
-1.21302 
(-2.325) 
-.310946 
(3.244) 
.056579 
(5.195) 
.010454 
(2.248)* 
.129985 
(5.555) 
.106851 
(7.456) 
USA 
-.424082 
(-3.734) 
.881297 
(10.138) 
.604352 
(4.353) 
-1.40081 
(-2.608) 
.173076E-06 
(1.531)** 
.068233 
(3.730) 
.992711E-02 
(1.468)** 
.175441 
(5.255) 
.023423 
(2.201)* 
JAPAN 
-.590481 
(-6.564) 
.819375 
(23.158) 
.315853 
(2.610) 
.179052 
(.323)** 
-.366709 
(-2.994) 
.096604 
(6.263) 
.013676 
(1.965)* 
-.047279 
(-1.308)** 
.028945 
(1.157)** 
F-sm for A,B=Ai,Bi 
D.ofF. 
1.8904 
[.0000] 
(1836, 795) 
1.1931 
[.0991] 
(546, 145) 
0.86743 
[.8709] 
(562, 149) 
1.7583 
[.000] 
(880, 301) 
Mean of dependent var. 1.52151 .147335 .203953 .271734 
Std.dev. dependent var. 1.46359 .250628 .464090 .571751 
Sum of squared residuals 276.622 8.73219 21.6132 78.9466 
Variance of residuals .105140 .012637 .030398 .066847 
Std.error of regression .324252 .112415 .174351 .258548 
fl-squared .951066 .801121 .860432 .796887 
Adjusted Ä-squared .950917 .798819 .858862 .795511 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.26206 2.24084 2.06438 2.24729 
Chow test 18.1238 6.78415 2.55662 4.18837 
LR het. test (w/ Chow) 295.242 315.984 272.347 293.561 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 6391.94 347.935 547.911 579.186 
Log likelihood function -768.235 541.165 240.505 -74.3393 
Number of observations: 2.610 700 720 1190 
Number of firms: 261 70 72 119 
i) r-stat. in parenthesis 
ii) S.E.s and variance are heteroskedastic-consistent estimates. The ROBUST option causes 
standard errors that are consistent even in the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity by 
estimate its magnitude 
iii) * and ** are 5 % and 1 % significance levels 
TSP to compute 
using the data to 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the estimates using the fixed and random effect models. In both 
cases, the results achieved for UK and US data are confirmed, even though the overall 
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significance of the regression is lower than with OLS (see 7?-squared statistics). Furthermore, 
the coefficients of GD and GCF variables are quite similar to those obtained with OLS. 
By contrast, the results for the Japanese database do not support the theoretical model, 
at least for some important variables such as the financial ones. OFFAT, BRE and GD show 
low coefficients or low significance, together with the 'wrong sign' in the relationship with 
the dependent variable. These results could be attributed to the specificity of linkages that 
exist between financial and manufacturing firms in Japan. 
Table 2. Within (fixed effect) estimate (dependent variable: VMCALL) 
Variable 
VMCALL1 
MOL 
OFFAT 
BRE 
SIZE 
GD 
GCF 
/?-squared 
F-s ta t for^ , ,ß=/ l„ß , 
D.ofF. 
F-stat for A,B=At,B 
D.ofF. 
TOT 
.456114 
(24.644) 
.767595 
(5.140) 
.856091 
(2.142)* 
.1084756 
(1.481)* 
.221856 
(6.466) 
.064788 
(2.483) 
.053064 
(2.097)* 
.295787 
1.5308 
[.0000] 
(1573, 795) 
2.9873 
[.0000] 
(263, 2368) 
Country 
UK 
.724270 
(22.332) 
.220962 
(2.146) 
-1.88841 
(-3.924) 
-,4246ö3 
(-1.850)* 
.093559 
(4.509) 
.121070 
(4.549) 
.095570 
(8.504) 
.471828 
1.1450 
[.1653] 
(477, 145) 
1.3730 
[.0295] 
(69, 622) 
USA 
.628737 
(18.808) 
.633687 
(4.103) 
-1.97878 
(-2.675) 
.549175E-08 
(-.004)** 
.100798 
(3.251) 
.147525 
(3.625) 
.021567 
(3.305) 
.435978 
0.80608 
[.9538] 
(491, 149) 
1.5175 
[.0056] 
(71, 640) 
JAPAN 
.489073 
(18.167) 
.432439 
(2.614) 
.552807 
(1.592)** 
.668323 
(1.036)** 
.206267 
(5.863) 
-.011275 
(-.329)** 
.058291 
(2.254) 
.332944 
1.4909 
[.0000] 
(762, 301) 
2.5779 
[.0000] 
(118, 1063) 
Table 3. Elasticities 
Variable 
VM CALL1 
MOL 
OF FAT 
BRE 
SIZE 
GD 
GCF 
TOT 
0.45 
0.04 
0.08 
0.11 
0.99 
0.04 
0.02 
Country 
UK 
0.63 
1.24 
-2.63 
0.91 
0.27 
0.69 
0.25 
USA 
0.71 
2.71 
-4.61 
0.00 
0.52 
0.81 
0.13 
JAPAN 
0.48 
0.61 
0.02 
0.15 
0.86 
-0.01 
0.00 
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Table 4. Variance Components (random effect) estimate (dependent variable: VMCALL) 
Variable Country 
c 
VMCALL1 
MOL 
OF FAT 
BRE 
SIZE 
SETT 
GD 
GCF 
TOT 
-1.46921 
(-15.512) 
.752633 
(60.441) 
.417807 
(4.013) 
-.189784 
(-.553)** 
-.250182 
(-1.113)** 
.256231 
(17.810) 
.020908 
(2.334) 
.054735 
(2.375) 
.044714 
(1.933)* 
UK 
-.369572 
(-6.887) 
.844312 
(31.319) 
.411459 
(6.202) 
-1.31649 
(-4.297) 
-.3776319 
(-2.096) 
.061219 
(7.111) 
.012359 
(2.379) 
.128562 
(4.907) 
.056103 
(7.185) 
USA 
-.474753 
(-6.037) 
.850278 
(41.993) 
.625806 
(6.316) 
-1.55131 
(-3.227) 
.124750E-06 
(.102)** 
.076732 
(6.074) 
.012502 
(1.539)* 
.172513 
(4.315) 
.023569 
(4.128) 
JAPAN 
-.818862 
(-8.074) 
.711502 
(35.862) 
.400075 
(3.709) 
.337614 
(1.140)** 
-.5733006 
(-.970)** 
.136508 
(8.631) 
.018484 
(1.608)* 
-.027338 
(-.899)** 
.048552 
(1.029)* 
/^-squared 
Hausman test FE vs. RE 
D.ofF. 
.878305 
489.42 
CHISQ(8) 
.766525 
52.108 
CHISQ(8) 
.814090 
71.394 
CHISQ(8) 
.652569 
159.83 
CHISQ(8) 
The results for the whole sample database resemble closely the Japanese ones, with the 
difference that the variables expressing the debt and the cash flow default risk present 
coefficients quite stable in all three models considered (plain OLS, fixed and random models). 
The results obtained seem to support the hypothesis that the default probabilities of debt and 
cash flow are relevant for the determination of the equity value, given that changes in these 
probabilities are associated with corresponding changes in equity values. 
The difference between firm market value and firm 'call' value on the other hand, reflects 
the market 'opinions' about 1) firm growth options and 2) market valuation of the risk 
associated with the firm financial structure. In this respect, a positive and stable relationship 
has been found between the dependent variable and the MOL variable, which is a proxy for 
the firm growth opportunities. A positive relation has also been found between the dependent 
variable and the default risk of debt calculated as shown in section 5.2. However, this relation 
appears to hold only in the UK and US samples. 
As a proxy for the degree of renegotiability of debt, the variable BRE has shown a very 
poor performance: a good contribution of this variable in explaining the dependent variable 
has been observed only for the UK and US samples. 
If we consider the elasticities (Table 3) computed at the average level of each variable, the 
results show a greater sensitivity of the dependent variable for the US than for the other 
countries. 
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The dependent variable appears to be highly elastic to MOL in the US and UK samples, 
while it shows relatively low levels of' the elasticity (lower than one) in the Japanese sample. 
For the US sample, in particular, the elasticity value shows a strong effect of the MOL on the 
dependent variable. Given the same absolute levels for debt, asset value and asset volatility 
between two firms A and B, if firm A has a MOL value 10% higher than firm B, firm A will 
likely show a market value that is 25-30% higher than firm B. 
A high elasticity of the dependent variable has been observed also for the OFFAT 
variable, that is, the interest on sales ratio. This variable shows a very high elasticity for the 
UK sample and, above all, for the US sample, but is completely inelastic for the Japanese 
sample. 
As for the MOL case, in which high elasticity may reflect the ability of markets to evaluate 
the growth prospects of the firm, differences observed in the OFFAT elasticities among 
countries (US and UK versus Japan) can be partly attributed to differences in the linkages 
between financial and manufacturing activities. 
Except for the Japanese sample, the elasticity of the GD variable—the default risk of debt-
lies between 0.7 and 0.8 for the US and the UK samples: that is, an increase in the default 
risk of debt of 10% corresponds to an average market evaluation of 7%-8% increase in equity 
values. If we consider that an increase of the default risk of debt can be produced, ceteris 
paribus, by an increase of the absolute level of the debt, changes in the debt/equity ratio can 
be reflected in analogous changes in the distribution of risk (and wealth) between claimholders 
and, finally, in changes in the market valuation of firm equities. 
7 Some conclusions 
The concept of risk in economic theory is typically related to the display of individual 
preferences over random alternatives, with concepts such as risk aversion arising from 
particular models of expected utility. In this paper we have argued that a preference-free 
concept of risk can be developed with reference to the probability of default which is inherent 
to any enterprise. This probability gives rise to a structure of property claims that is largely 
devised to distribute the consequences of uncertainty for project payoffs among different 
economic agents. In turn this implies that the ensuing financial structure produces a systematic 
removal of the standard NPV rule every time (1) the returns of the project are uncertain, and 
(2) the seniority of new claims against the firm allows for the possibility that the existing debt 
level of riskiness is modified. 
The model presented provides an extended approach to identifying and measuring risks by 
using the agency costs of non-residual claims against the firm. These costs, represented by 
under- and overinvestment incentives, are closely related to the uncertainty of project results 
and to the existence of some default states of residual claimants versus non-residual ones. 
As a more general result, the model proposed a definition of risk based on the criteria of 
stochastic dominance of second and third degree. An extended NPV-rule includes a term that 
reflects the changes in the distribution function of the cash flow: in other words, the 
comparison between the cumulative probability functions of the cash flow, before and after 
the project adoption, provides a ranking that reflects the existence of the incentives to under-
or overinvest on the part of the shareholders and these, in turn, are related to a higher or 
lower level of riskiness of the enterprise. 
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These results have been empirically tested by using a measure of the default risk of debt 
consistent with the SSD criterion. The estimates confirm the expected effect on shareholders' 
claim of a change in the default risk of debt, by showing a positive relationship between the 
market valuation of the firm and the risk faced by debtholders. Residual claimants' wealth 
increases (or, similarly, new investors are willing to pay an extra premium) when the share of 
the risk that accrues to debtholders increases. The linkage existing between the default risk of 
debt and shareholders' wealth seems to confirm the existence of risk-shifting incentives for the 
shareholders—even though it is difficult to assess their ability to use them to their own 
advantage—or, more generally, some effects due to the agency relationship between 
claimants. 
Finally, these appear to hold only for the US and UK samples, thus suggesting 1) a greater 
effectiveness of those markets in evaluating enterprise claims and related risk and 2) the 
different role of the default risk of debt with very different degrees of linkages between 
claimants, in particular with respect to financial linkage. 
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YIELD AND PRICE VARIABILITY IN DANISH AGRICULTURE: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
S. Rasmussen 
Agricultural University KVL, Copenhagen, Denmark 
Summary 
An error components model was used to estimate the yield and price variability for various 
enterprises in Danish agriculture. The results show that the relative yield variability is highest 
for clover and grass seed crops, and lowest for animal products. The correlation between 
yields of the various enterprises within the farm was found to be relatively modest. Although 
the variability due to climatic conditions are important in crop production, more than 50% of 
the variability was found to be due to farm specific factors. Tests for normality show that the 
normal distribution seems to be a good approximation of the probability distribution of crop 
and animal yields. 
1 Introduction 
While theoretical models for planning and decision making under uncertainty have been 
treated extensively in the economic literature on farm management, the application of the 
models in extension work and practical planning and decision making has been rather modest. 
One of the main reasons is that empirical background for efficient application of such risk 
models is not available. 
The objective of this study is to estimate yield and price variability for the major 
enterprises in Danish agriculture. The intention is to provide quantitative measures of the 
uncertainty faced by the individual farmers in a decision-making context. Such information is 
thought to provide a basis for a more efficient application of various risk models, and to be 
valuable to agricultural advisers and individual farmers in their attempts to set up production 
plans, which are in accordance with the fanners' attitudes towards risk. 
Uncertainty is quantified by the probability distribution of the deviation of outcome 
realized from expected outcome. The relevant measures of variability in a normative context 
are therefore the variances and covariances of expected outcomes at the farm level. A review 
of the literature shows that this was not explicitly considered in earlier empirical studies of 
variability in agricultural yields and prices. The studies have served a more general 
descriptive purpose, and therefore the results have been less applicable in a normative context. 
(See, for instance, Heady et ai, 1954; Carter and Dean, 1960; Day, 1965; Yahya and 
Adams, 1977; Mathia, 1975; Brink and McCarl, 1978; Hazell, 1984; Buccola, 1986; Webster 
and Williams, 1988). 
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2 The models 
In the present study the method employed to estimate historical yield and price variability is 
based on the objective that the results should reflect variability in expected outcomes. As 
historical expectations have not been recorded, and as only little is known about how farmers 
formulate expectations, the method had to be based on plausible assumptions concerning 
farmers' expectations. 
Concerning yield variability, a simple expectation model is formulated according to which 
the expected yield of product q on farm i in year t is: 
expected yield = ßlqi + ß-^ + fi'ifau (1) 
whereßlqi, ß^, and./? '3(? are parameters, and xqil is a vector of inputs. 
To produce estimates of variability, which are independent of time horizon and individual 
subjective expectations, it was necessary to base the measurement of variability on deviations 
from 'perfect' expectations. Under this condition, objective measures of uncertainty are 
estimated by calculating the variance of the error term uqit in the following regression model: 
yQit = ßlqi + ßlqt + ß 3fy + Uqi, (2) 
where yqit is the yield realized, and where the parameters are estimated using the least-squares 
method. 
The statistical model used for estimation is a so-called Error Components Model. In this 
model the total variability is divided into three variance components, according to the 
following model: 
y git = ßlq +ß2qt + ß'rfqi, + rqi + Wq, + Vqi, (3) 
where rqi is a stochastic farm component with the variance sn wqt is a stochastic year 
component with the variance sw, and vqit is a residual error component with variance sv. The 
sum of the two error components wql and vqit is uqi„ and the sum of their variances sw and sv is 
the variance within farms (s„). The term sr is the variance between farms. The overall 
variance is se = sw + sr + sv. 
Concerning prices, estimation of variability was based on the following expectation model: 
expected price = pqo{\ + kq)' (4) 
where pq0 and kq are parameters. Estimation was performed on the log-linear form of the 
following regression model: 
Pqt = Pqo • exp(/z,/) • exp(<y (5) 
where pqt is the price of product q realized in year t, hq is a parameter, and dqt is an error term 
with variance sd. 
By using least squares to estimate the models (3) and (5), the estimated variances will be 
lower limit estimates of the uncertainty that farmers have experienced in real life by using (1) 
and (4) to formulate expectations. 
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3 The data 
The model was used to analyse yield data from the data base of gross margin accounts from 
The Danish Farmers' Union (GMA-data), and the data base of farm yield data from The 
Danish Farmers' Co-operative Seed-Growers Association (DLF) (DLF-data). The gross 
margin accounts included data from 1 to 2% of the total number of Danish farms, while the 
data from DLF included around one-third of the total Danish production of grass seed and 
clover seed. Only part of the data was actually used, and in any case, the farms included did 
not constitute a random sample. However, the data are thought to be representative of the 
more commercialized half of the Danish farms. 
The data included time series of yield data from individual farms in four different regions 
in the period 1973-1987. For crop products the data were of the harvest years 1973-1986 
(DLF: 1974-1986), while for animal products the data included production years 1973/1974 
through 1986/87. For pigs the calendar years 1976-1987 were included. The four regions 
included Storestrams county (STS), Fyns county (FYN), Eastern Jutland (0ST), and Western 
Jutland (VES). For each of these regions, separate analyses were carried out for each 
enterprise. 
The numbers of farms included varied from 11 to 153 depending on region and enterprise. 
For each farm and enterprise, the time series varied from a minimum of 4 to the maximum of 
14 (13 for DLF-data) observations per farm (unbalanced data). 
Concerning prices, the data were from various official Danish statistical publications and 
included the same time periods as the yield data. The data have further been described in 
Rasmussen (1990). 
4 Results 
Yield variability and correlation 
Measures of yield variability were estimated for a total of 22 crop enterprises and the 3 
animal enterprises of dairy cows, sows with piglets, and porkers. Independent estimations 
were carried out for each of the four regions, but because of regional specialization some of 
the enterprises were only included in one, two or three of the regions (lack of data). 
For various reasons (lack of data, etc.) the input vector xqit in (3) was not included in the 
estimation model for crop enterprises and dairy cows. For porkers and sows producing 25 kg-
piglets only fodder was included as an input in the xîà-vector. This means that as a measure of 
uncertainty the estimated variances may be positively biased. 
The main results for one of the 'average' regions, FYN, are shown in Table 1. The 
relative yield variability is highest for clover seed crops and grass seed crops, and lowest for 
the animal products. The coefficient of variation (CV) (the square root of the variance within 
farms divided by the average yield) is highest for white clover with a CV of about 55%, and 
red clover with a CV of around 40 to 45 % . For grass seed crops the CV is typically within 
the range 25 to 35 %, while for other crops such as grain, sugar beet, fodder beet, and rape 
the CV is around 15 to 25%. The relative yield variability for animal products is around 5 to 
10%. 
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Table 1. Estimated yield variability for 
Enterprise 
Spring barley (100 kg) 
Winter wheat (100 kg) 
Rye (100 kg) 
Winter barley (100 kg) 
Sugar beet (100 kg) 
Field peas (kg) 
Spring rape (kg) 
Meadow fescue (kg) 
Red fescue (kg) 
Timothy (kg) 
Peren, rye-grass (kg) 
Italian rye-grass (kg) 
Red clover (kg) 
White clover3 (kg) 
Fodder beet (SFU) 
Grass (SFU) 
Milk (kg per year) 
Piglets (number per sow) 
Pork (grams per day) 
Average 
yield1 
(1980) 
46.0 
59.5 
45.2 
60.2 
396.1 
4085 
2284 
698 
970 
439 
1353 
1282 
651 
440 
9806 
5543 
5768 
16.38 
598.2 
region FYN 
Variance components 
Farm 
(sr/se) 
0.23 
0.12 
0.34 
0.09 
0.19 
0.15 
0.19 
0.11 
0.22 
0.21 
0.18 
0.12 
0.18 
0.05 
0.29 
0.34 
0.66 
0.52 
0.38 
Year 
(sw /se) 
0.34 
0.45 
0.12 
0.34 
0.40 
0.36 
0.26 
0.37 
0.25 
0.13 
0.31 
0.15 
0.53 
0.53 
0.22 
0.05 
0.04 
-
-
Residual 
(sv /se) 
0.43 
0.43 
0.54 
0.57 
0.41 
0.49 
0.55 
0.52 
0.53 
0.66 
0.51 
0.73 
0.29 
0.42 
0.49 
0.61 
0.30 
0.48 
0.62 
Rasmussen 
CV within 
farms2 
(%) 
17.0 
19.0 
18.0 
18.4 
18.2 
26.2 
21.0 
37.0 
25.8 
38.6 
24.2 
27.6 
41.4 
54.9 
20.2 
22.5 
6.8 
11.0 
5.1 
1) per ha for crops; per cow for milk; SFU = sow feed units 
2) I00(sw/s,f5 /(average yield) 
3) data from region STS 
A test for heteroskedasticity shows that the variance within farms is relatively constant 
across observations. For crop products there is a tendency towards decreasing variance with 
increasing area of the crop. For spring barley and porkers the analyses showed an increasing 
variance over time. But despite a general increase in the yield level (except for grass seed 
crops and clover seed crops), the other enterprises did not show any increase in the variance 
over time. This means that the relative variability has decreased (or remained constant) over 
the time period analysed. 
A comparison of the regions shows that the coefficient of variation for crop yields has a 
tendency to increase from region STS over FYN and 0ST to region VES. This is primarily 
caused by decreasing yield level across the regions because the absolute variances do not vary 
significantly from one region to another. Only winter wheat, rye, and sugar beet have a 
variance which is significantly lower in region STS than in the other regions. 
The correlation between yields of the various enterprises within farms was found to be 
relatively modest. The main results are shown in Table 2. Only the coefficients written in 
bold and italics are different from zero at a significant level of 5% level or less. For animal 
products, yields are independent of the yields from other enterprises within the farm. For 
crops there is a clear tendency towards positive correlation between yields, but only few of 
the estimated correlation coefficients are significantly higher than zero, and almost all the 
estimated coefficients are less than 0.50. 
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Table 2. Correlation between crops within farms, Region FYN 
Crop 
(1) Spring barley 
(2) Winter wheat 
(3) Rye 
(4) Winter barley 
(5) Sugar beet 
(6) Field peas 
(7) Spring rape 
(8) Red fescue 
(9) Per.rye-grass 
(10) Peas for canning 
(11) Fodder beet 
(12) Grass 
(1) 
1.00 
0.14 
0.30 
0.28 
0.39 
0.62 
0.35 
0.08 
-0.24 
0.38 
0.31 
0.08 
(2) 
1.00 
0.28 
0.49 
0.24 
0.17 
0.25 
0.37 
0.34 
0.27 
0.12 
0.06 
(3) 
1.00 
0.40 
0.30 
0.37 
0.20 
0.06 
0.27 
0.24 
0.14 
-0.03 
(4) 
1.00 
0.19 
0.26 
0.34 
0.17 
0.68 
0.35 
0.11 
0.42 
(5) 
1.00 
0.45 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
0.42 
0.18 
(6) 
1.00 
0.09 
0.14 
-0.29 
0.28 
0.78 
0.16 
(7) 
1.00 
0.06 
0.17 
0.32 
0.29 
0.04 
(8) 
1.00 
0.11 
-0.12 
-0.64 
-0.55 
(9) 
1.00 
0.24 
0.25 
-0.11 
(10) 
1.00 
0.45 
0.22 
(ID 
1.00 
0.12 
(12) 
1.00 
Note: significant coefficients (5%) in bold and italics 
The correlation coefficients mentioned above are based on individual farm data. 
Correlation coefficients based on regional yield da'i were also estimated. The results (not 
reported here) show that, based on regional average yields, the correlation coefficients are 
considerably higher than the correlation coefficients within the individual farms. This finding 
underlines the fact that aggregated data will produce biased estimates of the correlations at the 
farm level. The results show that this bias can be quite substantial. 
The application of the Error Components Model also made it possible to analyse the 
variability across farms. 
The analysis shows that for some enterprises the variability in yield level between the 
cross-section units (farms) is higher than the variability in yields over time. Thus, for dairy 
cows the variance among farms is around 60 to 70% of the total variance of regression 
(region FYN 66% as shown in Table 1). For grass seed and clover seed this proportion is 
considerably less (10 to 30%), with the other enterprises in between (see the 'Farm' column 
in Table 1). 
For crops and dairy cows the analysis shows that there is a significant positive covariance 
among farms within enterprises. The reason is the common influence of climatic conditions. 
The covariance among farms constitutes from 15 to 60% of the variance within farms, 
depending on enterprise and region. This means that 15 to 60% of the variance within the 
individual farms is common to all the farms within the region. 
Even though these results show that climatic conditions within a region have an important 
influence on the crop yields on the individual farms, they also show that for the majority of 
crops more than 50% of the variance within farms is due to farm specific factors (the 
'residual' component is greater than the 'year' component in Table 1). 
If we use the term management to describe how production is organized and carried out 
(choice of production system, application of inputs, timing, etc.), we can see that the relative 
size of the covariance among farms (year component) is a function of differences in 
management among farms. Interpreted in this way, the results for crops show that 
management is most homogeneous across farms within the production of sugar beet and 
clover seed, and least homogeneous within production of rye and timothy. 
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Tests for normality show that normal distributions seems to be good approximations of the 
probability distributions of crop and animal yields. There is no systematic tendency towards 
the distributions being skewed in either directions. The only systematic deviation from 
normality which was found is that the distributions were more peaked than the normal 
distribution. 
While crop yields are not correlated over time, the yields from the animal enterprises show 
a distinct autocorrelation. Although this autocorrelation is relatively modest (autocorrelation 
coefficients about 0.30), the results are unambiguous for all three animal enterprises. 
Price variability and correlation 
The estimated variances (first column of Table 3) show that the relative price variability is in 
general less than the relative yield variability. For grain crops, rape, and sugar beet the 
standard deviation is around 5 to 8% of the expected price. For clover seed and grass seed the 
figures are around 20 to 30% . Milk has the lowest relative price variability (3%), while for 
pork the relative price variability is about the same as the relative yield variability (6%). 
Some of the prices show significant positive correlation. It was possible to identify three 
groups of products within which the prices are mutually correlated. These three groups are (1) 
grain, sugar beet, and potatoes for industrial purpose; (2) grass seed crops; and (3) animal 
products. Within these groups the correlation coefficients are almost all within the interval of 
0.50 to 0.90. 
Table 3. Product price variances, and correlation between yields and prices at regional level 
Product 
Spring barley 
Winter wheat 
Rye 
Sugar beet 
Potatoes, food 
Field peas 
Spring rape 
Meadow fescue 
Red fescue 
Timothy 
Peren, rye-grass 
Italian rye-grass 
Red clover 
White clover 
Milk 
Beef 
Pork 
Eggs 
Chicken meat 
Relative price 
variance (V.s/10 ) 
5.23 
7.55 
7.37 
6.90 
46.94 
19.02 
5.92 
25.99 
26.96 
10.89 
23.19 
23.92 
29.73 
22.87 
2.87 
4.62 
6.05 
9.51 
6.11 
Coefficient of correlation 
(price-yield) 
-0.85 
-0.16 
-0.20 
-0.67 
-
0.27 
0.24 
-0.24 
-0.65 
-0.12 
-0.08 
-0.18 
0.14 
0.06 
_ 
-
-
-
-
significant coefficients (5 % of more) in bold and italics 
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Correlation between yields and prices 
The positive covariance among crop yields from the individual farms indicates that high or 
low yields tend to appear on all farms at the same time. Depending on the market, the 
aggregated effect may influence prices, resulting in negative correlation between yields and 
prices at farm level. 
The estimated correlation coefficients in Table 3 show that this is true for most of the crop 
products. However, the negative correlation between yields and prices at farm level varies 
from one product to another. Spring barley and sugar beet have the highest negative 
correlation, while crops such as red and white clover do not show any correlation between 
farm yields and prices. 
Variability in economic outcome 
Except for the variances, the probability distributions of prices have not been identified. If we 
assume that both yields and prices follow normal distributions, they will contribute 
symmetrically to the variance of the product value. As yields have a higher relative variance 
than prices, the yield variability is seen to contribute the most to the variance of the 
production value of an enterprise. 
The consequence of negative correlation between yield and price is that the variability of 
the economic outcome (value of production) of the enterprise is less than one would 
immediately expect from the estimated variances of yield and price. 
To illustrate the importance of this, we make the assumption that yield and price follow a 
multivariate normal distribution. In that case the variance of the value of production (yield 
times price) is, according to Haldane (1942) (after Buccola, 1986), given by: 
sp = [E(P) x E(Y)f X [a + 2rab + b2 + (1 + r2) X ab2] (6) 
where E is the expectation operator, P is price, Y is yield, a and b are coefficients of variation 
of yield and price respectively, and r is the correlation between price and yield. 
If r is negative, the variance in (6) is less than the variance if r is zero. To illustrate this, 
the term in the last square brackets in (6) is estimated for spring barley and winter wheat 
using the previously estimated parameters for region FYN. 
The results show that for spring barley with a correlation of -0.58, the variance of the 
value of production is only 43% of the variance if the correlation was zero. For winter wheat 
with a correlation of -0.12, the variance of the value of production is reduced to 55% of the 
variance if the correlation was zero. 
Equation (6) shows that when yield and price are normal, they contribute symmetrically to 
the variance of the product value. According to the earlier results, yields have a higher 
relative variance than prices, and therefore—if the assumption of normality is valid—the yield 
variability contributes the most to the variance of the production value. 
It is shown that even relatively modest correlation between yields and prices may have a 
significant influence on the economic variability. It is therefore recommended that the 
correlation between yield and price is taken into account before the results in this study are 
used to draw final conclusions concerning the economic variability within the various 
enterprises. 
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5 Closing remarks 
The primary objective of this study was to provide a data base on which further research and 
development concerning risk management could be based. 
Besides this, the study demonstrated the use of an Error Components Model to analyse 
variability in yield data from farm accounts. The model has been shown to be an appropriate 
tool when the objective is systematically to describe and interpret the variability in combined 
cross-sectional and time-series data. 
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Summary 
Producers' perceptions of and responses to risk are important in understanding risk 
behaviour. Factor analyses were conducted on information obtained from the 1991 and 
1993 Top Farmer Crop Workshop participants. Pooled factor loadings suggested costs, 
family, livestock gross income, crop gross income, credit, and policy as underlying 
dimensions of risk sources. The underlying dimensions of risk responses were marketing, 
production, security, off-farm, and financial. A number of socio-economic variables were 
related to both the sources of and responses to risk. 
1 Introduction 
Producers' perceptions of and responses to risk are important in understanding their risk 
behaviour. Patrick et al. (1985) found the importance of sources of variability and 
management responses varied across geographic areas and by farm type. Boggess et al. 
(1985) found socio-economic factors had only limited effects on these variables in the 
south-eastern US. In a follow-up study, Wilson et al. (1993) adapted Van Raaij's (1981) 
model of the decision-making environment to agricultural firms and explored the 
relationships of socio-economic characteristics and risk perceptions as well as the impact of 
socio-economic characteristics and risk perceptions on risk responses. They found 'results 
illustrate the highly complex and individualistic nature of risk perceptions and the selection 
of management tools. ' 
This paper extends factor analyses initiated by Patrick et al. (1993) with participants in 
the 1991 Top Farmer Crop Workshop utilizing additional data from the 1993 Workshop. 
Factor analyses of the 1991 and 1993 data are compared for both the sources of risk and 
management responses to risk, and analyses of the pooled data are conducted. Socio-
economic variables are used as independent variables in regression analyses of the 
individual producers' factor scores. The factor scores from the sources of risk analysis are 
also used to predict the management responses to risk. The results of the factor analyses, as 
well as the regression results, have implications for further research on farmers' behaviour 
and decision making under risk. 
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2 Data and procedures 
Data for this study were collected from participants in the 1991 and 1993 Top Farmer Crop 
Workshops held at Purdue University. The workshops are intensive three-day programs, 
which provide an update on crop economics and production technology for the eastern 
Cornbelt. Useable questionnaires, with information about the operator and farm, were 
obtained from 80 of the 102 farms registered in 1991 (Ortmann et ai, 1992) and 61 of the 
estimated 95 farms at the 1993 workshop (Eckman, 1995). 
Although nearly one-half of the participants each year were from Indiana, producers 
came from eight states, primarily from the eastern Cornbelt. Workshop participants were, 
on average, about 40 years of age and had 15 years of formal education. They were large-
scale farmers, with over 730 hectares of crops, more than $500 000 in gross income, and 
with nearly three-quarters of their gross income from corn and soybeans. Average net 
worth exceeded $500 000 and the average debt/asset ratio was 34%. 
Participants were asked to assess their willingness to take risk and their managerial 
skills, relative to other farmers, on Likert-type scales ranging from one (much less) to five 
(much more). Framing the scales in reference to other farmers was designed to give farmers 
a basis for comparison. The standard psychometric perspective on such scales is that they 
are interval measures, similar to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Thus, 
standard parametric statistical procedures are appropriate. 
Respondents considered themselves above average in both their willingness to take risk 
and their management skills. Farmers rated their willingness to take risk in farm production 
at 3.69 in 1991 and 3.75 in 1993. Corresponding values for product marketing were 3.46 
and 3.59, while willingness to take risk in farm finance was 3.15 in 1991 and 3.08 in 1993. 
In overall farm management, the ratings were 3.56 and 3.67 in 1991 and 1993, 
respectively. None of the differences between years was statistically significant. Rating 
values for management skills were 3.91 and 4.06 in farm production, 3.54 and 3.69 in 
product marketing, and 3.82 and 4.00 for farm finance in 1991 and 1993, respectively. 
Only the difference in overall farm management skill, 3.92 in 1991 and 4.11 in 1993, was 
significant at the 10% level. The willingness to take risk scales had all positive correlations, 
which were significant at the 0.05 levels or higher. Similar results were obtained with the 
management skill scales. In both cases, the highest correlations were between the scales for 
the individual management areas and the aggregate scale rather than between scales for the 
individual areas. 
Producers also rated the importance of sources of risk in their farm decision making on 
Likert-type scales ranging from one (not important) to five (very important). There were 15 
and 16 sources of risk included in the 1991 and 1993 questionnaires, respectively. 
Producers also rated the importance of their management responses to risk on similar 
Likert-type scales. In 1991, the 18 responses were grouped into production, marketing, and 
financial categories. In 1993, 22 responses were presented in a mixed order without 
categorization. The additional risk management responses dealt primarily with family-
related aspects of the business and were not included in the later analyses. In 1993, 
producers also indicated whether they used the various management responses to risk in 
their farm operation. 
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3 Sources of risk and variability 
The mean ratings of importance for the sources of risk are presented in Table 1 for 1991 
and 1993. Crop price and crop yield variability were the top rated sources of risk in 1991 
but were the second and third in 1993. Concern about injury, illness, or death of the 
operator was the highest rated source of risk in 1993, significantly higher than in 1991. 
Family health concerns, a source of risk not included in the 1991 questionnaire, was the 
fifth ranked source of risk in 1993. The importance of changes in government 
environmental regulations, land rents, and technology also increased significantly between 
1991 and 1993. Although ratings of five of the 15 sources of risk decreased between 1991 
and 1993, none decreased significantly. 
Attitude research generally considers responses to individual questions as measures of 
underlying latent variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978a). For example, producers' responses 
with respect to the importance of injury, illness, or death of the operator and changes in the 
family labour force may be alternative measures of a latent, and perhaps unobservable, 
family-related variables. Factor analysis originated as a method to explore the relationships 
of attitude responses to the underlying latent variables. Patrick et al. (1993) identified five 
factors with eigenvalues greater than one for the 15 sources of risk, which explained about 
72.5% of variance in the 1991 data. Initial analysis of the 1993 data also found five factors 
with eigenvalues greater than one, which explained almost 71.5% of the variance. 
However, the factor loadings of the two solutions were somewhat different, suggesting 
some 'noise' in the solutions. 
Pooling the 1991 and 1993 data resulted in six factors with eigenvalues greater than one 
and explained more than 76% of the variance. A varimax orthogonal rotation was 
implemented. In general, the sources of risk have loadings which exceed 0.65 on one factor 
and do not exceed 0.30 on any of the other factors (Table 1). Changes in technology and 
land rents are the only sources of risk whose loadings exceed 0.30 on more than one factor. 
Factor 1 is called the 'costs' factor because of the large loadings, 0.75 or greater, 
associated with input costs, capital item costs, land rents, and technology. None of the other 
variables have a loading which exceeds 0.23 on this factor. Factor 2 is referred to as the 
'family' factor because of the heavy loadings of the three family-related variables. The 
variable changes in technology, which might impact on the future viability of the farm 
operation, has a crossloading of 0.33 on the family factor. Factor 3, 'livestock gross 
income', involves large loadings of both the livestock price and livestock yield variables. 
For Factor 4, the heavy loadings of both the crop yields and crop prices variables suggest it 
is a 'gross crop income' factor. A number of variables have loadings in the range of 0.15 to 
0.26 on Factor 4, suggesting it may have some aspects of a 'general risk' factor, perhaps 
reflecting the importance of the crop enterprises on these farms. Factor 5 is called the 
'credit' or 'finance' factor because of the large loadings of credit availability and interest 
rate sources. None of the other sources have loadings which exceed 0.16 on this factor. The 
final factor, Factor 6, is referred to as the 'government policy' factor because of the large 
loadings for the government commodity and environmental policy sources of risk. Land 
rent, which may be affected by policy changes, has a loading of almost 0.32 on this factor. 
Normalized factor scores, with a mean of zero and a variance of one, were computed for 
each producer and used as the dependent variable in a regression for each of the six factors 
identified. Age of the operator, gross sales, debt/asset ratio, percentage off-farm 
investment, willingness to take risk, and management skill were used as independent 
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variables. A dummy variable, equal to one if there were livestock on the farm and zero 
otherwise, was used in selected regressions. 
Table 1. Mean importance ratings" and varimax rotated factor loadings of source of risk 
Source of risk 
Input costs 
Capital item costs 
Land rents 
Technology 
Injury, illness or death 
of operator 
Family relationships 
Family labour force 
Livestock price 
Livestock yield 
Crop yields 
Crop prices 
Credit availability 
Interest rates 
Gov't, commodity pol. 
Gov't, environm. pol. 
Variance explained by 
each factor 
Per cent of total 
variance explained 
Importance 
1991 
3.70 
3.66 
3.18 
3.54 
3.86 
3.36 
2.96 
3.17 
2.86 
4.21 
4.31 
3.05 
3.48 
3.83 
3.81 
1993 
3.89 
3.77 
3.56**b 
3.84* 
4.39" 
3.73 
3.11 
2.75 
2.68 
4.13 
4.16 
3.21 
3.52 
3.66 
4.13" 
— 
1 
0.814 
0.732 
0.671 
0.589 
0.081 
0.001 
0.224 
0.065 
0.075 
0.129 
0.191 
0.110 
0.188 
0.038 
0.170 
2.194 
14.623 
2 
-0.165 
0.213 
0.190 
0.331 
0.821 
0.767 
0.750 
0.031 
0.089 
0.150 
0.064 
0.184 
-0.118 
0.015 
0.249 
2.188 
14.589 
Factor0 
3 
0.204 
0.019 
0.073 
-0.156 
0.022 
0.015 
0.100 
0.951 
0.934 
0.154 
0.189 
-0.021 
0.097 
0.026 
0.208 
1.973 
13.153 
4 
-0.039 
0.261 
0.084 
0.222 
0.140 
0.075 
0.010 
0.156 
0.176 
0.899 
0.879 
-0.029 
0.172 
0.170 
-0.186 
1.877 
12.512 
5 
0.104 
0.073 
0.113 
0.159 
0.053 
0.044 
-0.023 
0.058 
0.013 
0.054 
0.082 
0.886 
0.856 
0.075 
0.008 
1.597 
10.648 
6 
0.032 
-0.071 
0.317 
0.081 
-0.097 
0.286 
0.112 
0.065 
0.135 
0.014 
0.029 
0.086 
0.006 
0.896 
0.736 
1.592 
10.612 
a) 1 equals not important, 5 equals very important 
b) an * or ** indicates that difference between years is significant at the 10 and 5% levels respectively 
c) factors 1 to 6 are costs, family, livestock gross income, crop gross income, credit and government policy 
respectively 
c) total variance is equal to 15, the number of the sources of risk considered 
There was a considerable difference in the overall statistical significance of the 
regressions, ranging from an Ä-squared of 0.07 for Factor 6 to 0.41 for Factor 3, although 
at least one variable is significant in each of the equations (Patrick and Musser, 1995). The 
Factor 1, costs, equation had an ^-squared of 0.127 with age and the livestock dummy both 
significantly negative. The family equation, Factor 2, had an /{-squared of 0.110 with gross 
sales, debt/asset ratio, and management skill significantly different from zero. Percentage 
off-farm investment and the livestock dummy were significant in the livestock, Factor 3, 
equation. In the crops equation, Factor 4, which had an ^-squared of 0.192, gross sales, 
debt/asset ratio, and percentage off-farm investment were significant. The credit equation, 
Factor 5, had an /^-squared of 0.379 with age, gross sales, debt/asset ratio, and willingness 
to take risk as significant. Only willingness to take risk was significant for Factor 6, policy. 
These results confirm and extend the findings of Patrick et al. (1993). The producers 
analysed do view risk in farm decision making as having various underlying dimensions but 
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not as many as the sources of risk considered. Although agricultural economists tend to 
view price and yield risk separately, the producers appear concerned with gross income risk 
for both crops and livestock. With the increased importance given to changes in government 
environmental policy in the US, the 'policy' factor is viewed as a separate dimension of risk 
rather than being incorporated in price risk as is typical in many studies. In addition, 
producers focus on 'family' risks as an important source of risk, which agricultural 
economists typically do not consider. 'Credit' or 'finance' is viewed as a separate 
dimension of risk in decision making by these producers. These results support the 
distinction between business and financial risk which is common in agricultural economics. 
However, the distinction between production and marketing risks which is also common is 
not supported by these factor analysis results. 
4 Managerial responses to risk 
Workshop participants also indicated the importance of various management responses to 
risk and whether the responses were used in their farm operation. The mean ratings of 
importance and the percentage of producers using the response in 1993 are presented in 
Table 2. The rankings of responses within the production, marketing, and financial 
categories tended to be almost identical between years and importance ratings were similar. 
Thus, although not tested statistically, the grouping of responses in the 1991 questionnaire 
does not appear to have influenced the results. Four of the five marketing responses 
considered had significantly higher importance ratings in 1993 than in 1991. Perhaps this 
reflects the increasing market orientation of US farm policy. Alternatively, it may reflect 
the forward pricing and marketing emphasis in other parts of the questionnaire (Musser et 
ai, 1996). The importance given to the financial responses of multiple peril crop insurance 
and off-farm investments also increased significantly from 1991 to 1993. None of the 
responses to risk had a significant decline during the period. Use of the risk responses by 
participants ranged from 17% for off-farm employment to 74.1% for production practices 
which work under a variety of conditions. 
The separate exploratory factor analyses for 1991 and 1993 both found that the 
production response, 'being a low-cost producer', which was rated at 4.26 and 4.45 
respectively, was uniquely associated with a factor with an eigenvalue of less than one. 
Following Kim and Mueller (1978b), this minor factor response was excluded from further 
analysis. The factor analyses of the 1991 and 1993 data with varimax rotations both 
indicated five factors with eigenvalues greater than one. The five factor solutions explained 
63.3 and 67.9% of the variance in the 1991 and 1993 data respectively. The five factor 
solution was also found for the pooled 1991 and 1993 data and explained 61.1% of the 
variance. The factor loadings are presented in Table 2. 
Based on the concentration of the factor loadings, the five factors are named 'marketing,' 
'production,' 'security,' 'off-farm,' and 'financial' factors. In contrast to the factor loading 
pattern for the sources of risk, the factor loadings for the risk responses tend to be lower 
and there are more crossloadings. For example, the heaviest loading for multiple peril crop 
insurance, 0.51, is on the 'marketing' factor but it has loadings which exceed 0.35 on both 
the 'security' and 'off-farm' factors. Having back-up labour/management, enterprise 
diversification, geographic dispersion of production, and government program participation 
all have their highest loadings on the 'production' factor. However, government program 
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participation has nearly equal loadings on the 'production' and 'security' factors. Only one 
response, hail/fire crop insurance, has a loading which exceeds 0.5 on the 'security' factor. 
However, multiple peril crop insurance, liability insurance, and debt/leverage management, 
in addition to previously mentioned government program participation, all have loadings 
which exceed 0.35 on the 'security' factor. 
Table 2. Means, importance rating3 percentage using'1 and varimax rotated factor loadings of 
responses to risk 
Risk management response 
Options 
Hedging 
Minimum price contracts 
Forward contracting 
Multiple peril crop insurance 
Back-up management/labour 
Enterprise diversification 
Geographic dispersion 
Gov't program participation 
Hail/fire insurance for crops 
Off-farm employment 
Off-farm investment 
Liability insurance 
Financial/credit reserves 
Debt/leverage management 
Variance explained by each 
factor6 
Per cent of total variance 
explained 
Importance 
1991 1993 
2.70 
3.21 
2.49 
3.86 
2.18 
3.48 
3.60 
3.11 
3.83 
2.79 
2.13 
2.64 
4.43 
3.93 
3.93 
— 
3.10**c 
3.74" 
2 .95" 
4 .24" 
2.62* 
3.36 
3.58 
3.02 
3.90 
3.05 
2.05 
3.02* 
4.41 
4.10 
3.80 
_— 
— 
% 
using 
37 
60 
21 
73 
35 
43 
46 
43 
73 
49 
17 
43 
73 
59 
56 
— 
1 
0.76 
0.74 
0.71 
0.61 
0.51 
-0.13 
0.10 
0.33 
0.25 
0.17 
-0.10 
0.24 
0.04 
0.14 
0.13 
2.59 
17.29 
2 
-0.12 
0.05 
0.20 
0.22 
-0.10 
0.75 
0.70 
0.63 
0.47 
-0.01 
0.12 
0.25 
0.29 
0.02 
0.09 
1.96 
13.09 
Factor 
3 
0.21 
0.21 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.40 
0.08 
-0.06 
0.03 
0.46 
0.82 
0.23 
-0.02 
0.41 
-0.25 
0.36 
1.56 
10.38 
4 
0.06 
0.01 
0.18 
-0.14 
0.36 
0.07 
0.17 
0.05 
-0.12 
0.21 
0.76 
0.68 
-0.46 
0.09 
-0.11 
1.55 
10.3 
5 
0.29 
-0.08 
0.15 
0.04 
0.09 
0.07 
0.14 
-0.07 
-0.10 
-0.00 
0.18 
-0.15 
0.34 
0.83 
0.69 
1.49 
9.96 
a) 1 equals not important, 5 equals very important 
b) percentage of 1993 respondents indicating that they use this risk management response in their farm 
operation 
c) an * or ** indicates that difference between years is significant at the 5 and 10% levels respectively 
d) factors 1 to 5 are marketing, production, security, off-farm, and financial respectively 
e) total variance is equal to 15, the number of the responses to risk considered 
The responses with the heaviest loadings on the 'off-farm' factor are off-farm 
employment and off-farm investment. However, multiple peril crop insurance and liability 
insurance have loadings whose absolute values exceed 0.35. The negative loading on 
liability insurance indicates that it is tapping a somewhat different aspect of the security 
factor than the positively loaded responses. Maintaining financial/credit reserves and 
debt/leverage management have their largest factor loadings on Factor 5, the 'financial' 
factor. However, liability insurance and options have loadings which are nearly 0.3 or 
greater on the financial factor. 
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The crossloadings associated with many of the risk management responses suggest that 
they may be perceived as having multiple roles in risk management. Participation in the 
government program has production, security, and marketing implications as indicated by 
the loadings of 0.25 and greater. Multiple peril crop insurance would commonly be 
considered to have a major role in 'security' but its heaviest loading (0.51) is on the 
'marketing' factor. This suggests that recent educational efforts {e.g., Barnaby, 1994) for 
US farmers to integrate their marketing and crop insurance program are not inappropriate 
for farmers. Both the off-farm investment and liability insurance responses have loadings of 
0.24 or larger on several factors. Although the link between the use of options and the 
'financial' factor indicated by the factor loading of 0.26 is logical, the relationship between 
geographic dispersion of production response and the 'marketing' factor suggested by the 
0.33 factor loading is less clear. 
Normalized factor scores were also computed for the individual producers for each of the 
responses to risk factors and used as dependent variable in a series of regressions. In 
addition to socio-economic variables and characteristics of the farm, factor scores of the 
individuals on some of the sources of risk factors were also included as independent 
variables. In contrast to the results for the sources of risk, all of the regressions had F 
values of 2.6 or greater, ^-squares of 0.232 or greater, and all had variables which were 
significant at the 0.01 levels (Patrick and Musser, 1995). The self-assessed management 
skill of the operator was significant in all of the regressions except the security equation 
(Factor 3), where it was larger than its standard error. The coefficient was negative in the 
off-farm equation (Factor 4), indicating the higher the self-assessed skill of the operator, the 
lower the score on the off-farm factor. Age of the operator was statistically significant in 
marketing (Factor 1), production (Factor 2), and off-farm equations and larger than its 
standard error in the security equation. The sign of the coefficient for age varied, 
suggesting that the influence of age differed by the type of risk management response. Both 
crop and livestock gross income sources of risk factor scores were significant in the 
production factor response equation. The off-farm job/business involvement dummy 
variable was significant in the off-farm and marketing factor equations. The debt/asset ratio 
was significant in the security and off-farm equations and was substantially larger than its 
standard error in the financial equation. Gross farm income was significant in the marketing 
and production equations, while an alternative form of the farm size variable, total crop 
acres, was significant in the financial equation. 
5 Conclusions 
These results confirm that large-scale US Cornbelt farmers do view a variety of underlying 
sources of risk in their decision making. The number of dimensions is greater than typically 
considered in economic analysis. These largely cash grain farmers focus on crop and 
livestock gross income as sources of risk rather than price and production variability 
independently. Although economic research commonly analyses impacts of changes in 
government and credit policy, these policies are generally not considered risks in 
modelling. Costs may be stochastic in some models but family factors are rarely 
considered. 
There are also several dimensions to producers' risk responses. Security and off-farm 
factors were identified in addition to marketing, production, and financial factors. There 
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does not appear to be a one-to-one correspondence between the sources of and responses to 
risk. Furthermore, the crossloadings of some responses on various factors suggest that 
some risk responses are viewed as having multiple roles in risk management. 
A number of the socio-economic variables assumed of importance in risk perception and 
responses do have significant effects on factor scores of individual producers. A 
considerable amount of the variability is unexplained for both the sources of and responses 
to risk, creating a challenge for further research. The explanatory power of the models was 
generally better for the management responses than the sources of risk. In other socio-
economic environments, the specific sources of and management responses to risk may be 
different from those of US Cornbelt farmers. However, the factor scores on the sources of 
risk were significant in three of the management response equations. 
Previous research suggests that perceptions of specific sources and management 
responses to risk differ geographically and by farm type. Institutional structures and other 
factors affecting the operating environment of producers are also likely to be of importance. 
However, the underlying dimensions of both the sources of and responses to risk found for 
these US. Cornbelt farmers are very general. Producers in most economic settings today 
face revenue, cost, financial, policy, and family risk. Thus, although the results are specific 
to the group of farmers studied, there may be much wider applicability of these underlying 
dimensions. 
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MEASURING SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASE 
OUTBREAKS USING CONJOINT ANALYSIS 
H.S. Horst, R.B.M. Huirne, A.A. Dijkhuizen and J-B.E.M. Steenkamp 
Wageningen Agricultural University, Wageningen, The Netherlands 
Summary 
More than two-thirds of the Dutch annual meat production is exported. Thus, the 
Netherlands is very sensitive to export bans as a result of outbreaks of contagious animal 
diseases. Stochastic simulation models could provide important tools for decision making on 
disease eradication and prevention. However, underlying data to base such models upon are 
scarce. Conjoint analysis is a widely used technique in marketing research to obtain data 
with respect to consumer preferences. In this paper an experiment is described which 
evaluates the possible application of conjoint analysis as a subjective probability generating 
technique in the field of disease control. Although the results presented in this paper are 
preliminary, it could be concluded that, when historical and/or experimental data are 
scarce, conjoint analysis provides a useful tool for obtaining additional information, such as 
subjective probabilities, to be used in constructing models. 
1 Introduction 
In 1994 the Dutch export of live animals and animal products represented a value of more 
than 4.5 billion US dollars (PVE, 1995). More than two-thirds of the annual meat 
production was exported. Consequently, export bans can be disastrous for the Dutch 
livestock industry. Outbreaks of diseases that are on list 'A' of the Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE) can cause such bans and these diseases, therefore, are greatly feared in the 
Netherlands and in all other meat-exporting countries. The most important List A diseases 
are: Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), Swine Vesicular Disease (SVD), Classical Swine 
Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF), Newcastle Disease (ND) and Avian Influenza 
(AI). FMD affect swine and cattle, SVD, ASF and CSF affect only swine, ND and AI are 
contagious poultry diseases. 
In the Netherlands, the probability of occurrence of these diseases is generally rather 
low. However, the consequences can be extremely serious if an outbreak does occur. 
Berentsen et al. (1990) estimated total losses from an outbreak of FMD in the Netherlands, 
including prevention and eradication costs, to be between 60 million and 7 billion US 
dollars, depending on location of the outbreak (livestock density of the affected region) and 
control strategy applied. The large range of this outcome indicates that policy decisions 
concerning prevention and eradication may have a large impact. 
To aid policymakers in the area of disease prevention and eradication, a simulation 
model will be developed which should be flexible enough to analyse the effects of different 
55 
56 Horst, Huirne, Dijkhuizen and Steenkamp 
strategies. It would be ideal to base such a model on historical and/or experimental data. 
But history shows that outbreaks occur irregularly and differ in magnitude, making it very 
difficult to derive general properties and predictive values. Furthermore, in 1992 the 
European Union decided to cease preventive vaccination against almost all List A diseases. 
Thus, outbreaks dated before 1992 occurred in a vaccinated and more or less protected 
population, while the Netherlands and the other EU countries are now dealing with an 
unvaccinated and thus highly susceptible livestock population. Experimental data are scarce 
as well. However, decisions on eradication and prevention programs have to be made 
regardless, and hence considerable effort must be put into obtaining reliable estimates and 
assumptions for the simulation model. 
These assumptions and estimates can be derived by consulting knowledgeable people 
working in the fields concerned. The general issue is then how to obtain reliable and 
quantitative information. If there is no 'golden standard' available to judge reliability, one 
should as least aim at consistent quantitative information, which mirrors the opinions of the 
people consulted as closely as possible. 
There are several techniques available to deal with this situation, ranging from very open 
in-depth interviews to strictly organized experiments. This study focused on the use of the 
so-called 'conjoint analysis' technique. Conjoint analysis is a questionnaire technique, well 
known and widely used in marketing research to estimate the impact of selected product 
characteristics on consumer preferences for products (Cattin and Wittink, 1982). According 
to Fishbein (1963), a product or an event can be evaluated as a composition of attributes or 
characteristics. The importance of each attribute is determined by the person who examines 
the object. Conjoint analysis enables the quantification of the relative importance, or in 
other words the subjective probability, of these attributes. The traditional approach of 
conjoint analysis is called 'full profile' and confronts the respondents with all attributes at 
the same time. Green and Srinivasan (1990) argue that the full profile method of conjoint 
analysis works very well if there are only a few (about six) attributes. If the number of 
attributes gets larger, the full profile approach causes information overload for the 
respondents and will thus result in less reliable estimates. Adaptive Conjoint Analysis 
(ACA) is a modified conjoint analysis approach, PC-based and especially designed for large 
numbers of attributes. With this approach the respondent is never asked to evaluate more 
than two or three attributes at a time. 
For this study, both techniques were used to elicit the opinion of knowledgeable people 
on risk factors which can be responsible for virus introduction into the Netherlands. A 
number of 7 risk factors (attributes) were considered, thus creating a good situation to 
compare both the full profile and the ACA method. Because no 'golden standard' was 
available, comparison was based on behaviour of the respondents only, i.e., consistency of 
respondents' answers and predictive value of both techniques. 
2 Conjoint analysis 
General 
Conjoint analysis is a technique that enables quantification of the relative importance of 
attributes of a product or event in relation to the final preference of a subject for that 
particular product or event. The method was developed in the 1960s and was rooted in 
traditional experimentation techniques (Krantz, 1964; Luce and Tukey, 1964; Krantz and 
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Tversky, 1971). Basic assumptions of conjoint analysis are: (1) a product can be described 
according to levels of a set of attributes, and (2) the consumer's overall judgement with 
respect to that product is based on these attribute levels (Steenkamp, 1987). 
Conjoint analysis is a so-called 'decompositional' method. Respondents are asked to rank 
or give a score for combinations of attributes. Using statistical analysis, the importance of 
each attribute can be estimated. These 'importancies' are termed 'part-worth scores' and 
indicate the influence of each attribute on the respondent's preference for a particular 
combination. 
Conjoint analysis may look like a rather complicated and indirect method to reveal 
systematic components that underlie people's evaluations of objects. It is also possible to 
use a compositional method, such as direct questioning. Compositional methods ask 
respondents to assess values for attributes, and use these values to build up preferences for 
attribute bundles or profiles (Huber, 1974). These methods, also referred to as self-
explicated methods, have speed and simplicity as their main advantages. However, there are 
also some problems, the major one being lack of realism. It is difficult for respondents to 
provide a non-biased score for one particular attribute, other things being equal. The 
decompositional methods provide the respondent with a more realistic situation, because 
attributes are evaluated as combinations (as is the case in the 'real world'). Besides, many 
researchers have compared the predictive performance of the conjoint method with the self-
explicated approach and in most studies the conjoint techniques outperform the latter 
(Huber et al., 1993; Green et al., 1983). A further advantage of conjoint analysis is that the 
technique provides information on the consistency of answers given by the respondents. 
Full profile 
The traditional way of performing conjoint analysis is called 'full profile'. If using the full 
profile method, respondents are asked to rank or give a score for a number of profiles, 
where a profile stands for a specific combination of attributes. A typical example of full 
profile conjoint analysis may be performed by order of a car company, planning to develop 
a new car. In selecting a car, important attributes may be: colour, price, make, maximum 
speed, size etc. In this case, potential buyers will be shown a number of small cards, each 
presenting a different car. On those cards, the car is described as a combination of 
attributes (speed, make etc.), a profile. The respondent is asked to rank or give a score for 
each card. Statistical regression techniques are then used to derive the part-worth scores for 
all attributes. The customary approach to conjoint analysis is disaggregate. That is, each 
respondent is modelled separately. The model can be a simple additive one, but it is also 
possible to include interactions between attributes. 
Most information can be derived when all possible profiles (a complete factorial design) 
are evaluated. However, in most cases this would be impractical (e.g., when using seven 
attributes, each at two levels, a complete design would mean that respondents should 
evaluate a number of 2 or 128 profiles!). The number of profiles can be reduced, with only 
minimal loss of accuracy, by using a fractional factorial design. Addelman (1962, 1963) 
designed a number of 'basic plans' which can be used for construction of profiles. His 
schemes can be used for additive models ('main effect design') as well as for models that 
include interactions ('compromise design'). 
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Adaptive Conjoint Analysis 
Adaptive Conjoint Analysis (ACA) is a PC-based system for conjoint analysis. The term 
'adaptive' refers to the fact that the interview is interactive and questions are customized for 
each respondent. ACA is a combination of self-explicated and conjoint techniques and 
belongs to the group of 'hybrid conjoint models'. Hybrid conjoint modelling combines the 
speed and simplicity of the self-explicated approach with the realism and generality of 
traditional conjoint analysis. Individual differences are retained while respondent evaluation 
time is reduced (Steenkamp et al, 1986). 
The ACA-system first screens all attributes and levels to discover which attributes are 
most important to the respondent. In this stage, preliminary estimates of the respondent's 
utilities for the attributes are made. In the second stage 'trade-off' questions are asked, 
based on the attributes that are important to the respondent. The questions asked in this 
stage are based on the information obtained in the first stage. The answers are used to 
refine the utility estimates, and choose further questions most likely to provide additional 
precision in the utility estimation. Finally some 'calibrating questions' are asked. These 
questions are similar to the full profile questions, the respondent is asked to indicate his/her 
level of interest for a certain combination of attributes (Johnson, 1987). The 'adaptive' 
nature of the interview enables the researcher to cover larger numbers of attributes with a 
relatively small number of questions. 
3 Experimental design 
General 
To minimize the influence of social and/or political connections among participants, the 
experiment was structured in the form of three full evening's workshops, during which 
participants were asked to complete a computerized questionnaire individually. Both 
conjoint techniques were incorporated into this questionnaire. The program was designed to 
be self-explanatory in order to minimize interaction of the participants with either one 
another or the workshop organizers. The program included a full profile as well as an ACA 
task. Participants were randomly assigned to a certain task order, in such a way that about 
half of them started with ACA and the other half with full profile. 
The aim of the workshops was to invite all people thought to be knowledgeable about, or 
even experts on one of the six diseases under study (FMD, SVD, CSF, ASF, ND, and AI). 
Fifty people were invited to join either one of the workshops. Participants were not 
expected to be knowledgeable about more than one or two diseases. They were given the 
opportunity to choose the disease about which they felt themselves most knowledgeable. 
Only questions for that disease were asked. 
To illustrate the design and the results of the experiments, Classical Swine Fever (CSF) 
will be described in detail. The other diseases were dealt with in a similar way. 
Questionnaire 
Introduction of virus from any country into the Netherlands takes place by the so-called 
'risk factors'. The literature and earlier in-depth interviews with experts have produced the 
following list of risk factors concerning CSF: 
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1. import of livestock, 
2. import of animal products, 
3. feeding of import swill (airports, harbours), 
4. tourists, 
5. returning livestock trucks, 
6. wildlife, and 
7. air currents (airborne transmission). 
The Netherlands has relations with almost all European countries, thus in principle all 
countries can be responsible for transferring CSF-virus to the Netherlands (if an outbreak 
occurs in one of these countries). To incorporate country differences, while keeping the 
whole exercise of controllable size, the countries were grouped into the following five 
clusters: 
1. cluster 1: Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg; 
2. cluster 2: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; 
3. cluster 3: Austria, France, Switzerland; 
4. cluster 4: Eastern Europe; and 
5. cluster 5: Great Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia. 
In this study conjoint analysis was used to derive the subjective probability of each of 
these risk factors with respect to each of these clusters. The introduction of virus into the 
Netherlands was seen as the 'event', the risk factors were the 'attributes'. Each risk factor 
could be either present or not present (two levels). 
The full profile approach, using the Addelman schemes, resulted in eight profiles. Three 
randomly chosen profiles were added as 'holdouts', which were used to check the fit of the 
model (regression coefficients are based on the first eight profiles only). These holdouts 
were also used to gauge the respondents' consistency in answering the questions. The 
participants were presented with the profiles on their computer screen (one profile at a time) 
and asked to give a score (ranging from 0 to 100) for each profile. These scores were 
evaluated with the following model: 
score = c + ßxxy + + ß1x1 (1) 
In this simple additive model, score is the risk score given by the respondent, c is a 
constant, ßt are the estimated coefficients belonging to the risk factors, and *, are the risk 
factors (with values 1 = present and 0 = not present). Based on the model, the method 
estimates the subjective probability of each risk factor (all factors add up to 1.00 or 100%). 
The ACA-system produces utility estimates for each attribute level, which are a 
combination of the information obtained in the several stages of the method (for more 
details, see Johnson, 1993). These utilities can be used to calculate the subjective 
probability of each risk factor. 
To evaluate the predictive value of both conjoint techniques, a 'choice task' was 
incorporated into the questionnaire. For this task, participants were presented with three 
situations at a time and asked to indicate the situation they thought to be the most risky. 
They were also asked to indicate the least risky situation. A situation was presented as a 
combination of selected attributes (only three or four). Figure 1 shows an example of this 
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choice task. Based on this choice task, so-called 'hit rates' can be calculated (among others, 
Huber et al, 1993). For this calculation, the respondent's choice, as presented by the 
choice task, is compared with the estimated choice based on either the ACA or the full 
profile method. A higher hit rate indicates a higher predictive performance. Another 
measure for the predictive performance is the 'share of first choice', based on Huber et al. 
(1993). This measure indicates which percentage of the respondents choose a certain 
situation as the most risky one. 
SITUATION 1 SITUATION 2 SITUATION 3 
import of livestock tourists returning livestock trucks 
feeding of import swill returning livestock trucks import animal products 
tourists import of livestock feeding import swill 
WHICH IS THE MOST RISKY SITUATION? 1 
WHICH IS THE LEAST RISKY SITUATION? — 
Figure 1. Structure of the choice task 
4 Results 
In this paragraph only an illustrative selection of preliminary results is presented. Further 
analyses are being conducted. 
All invited people responded positively to the invitation and 43 of them were able to join 
the workshops, which is a response rate of 86%. 
The consistency in answers of the participants can be gauged in several ways. A 
common way when working with full profile (FP) is to make use of the holdout profiles. 
Consistency is measured by the correlation between the values for the holdouts as given by 
the respondents and the values for these holdouts as estimated by the model. Also ACA 
enables a kind of a consistency check: the program provides the user with the correlation 
between values for the calibration questions as given by the respondents, and these values 
estimated according to the calculated utilities. For both methods more than 85% of the 
respondents showed correlations larger than 0.8. 
Table 1 presents the subjective probability for the risk factors concerning CSF, for all 
country clusters, according to both full profile and ACA. These results are based on the 
answers of consistent participants only. To reduce the influence of extreme answers on the 
aggregated results, an M-estimator or generalized maximum likelihood estimator (Tukey's) 
was used (Hoaglin et al., 1982). An M-estimator assigns weights to the responses. These 
weights decrease as distance from the centre of the distribution increases. Thereafter the M-
estimators were rescaled to 100%. Risk factors 'wildlife' and 'air' are only relevant and 
considered for cluster 1 (surrounding countries of the Netherlands). 
Table 1 shows that, according to both methods, 'import of livestock' is the most 
important risk factor, followed by 'swill' and 'returning trucks'. No large differences can 
be observed between clusters. ACA and full profile both result in the same ranking of risk 
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factors; however, full profile seems to result in more extreme probabilities (higher 
percentages for the most important factors, lower percentages for less important factors). 
Table 1. Subjective probability (%) of CSF risk factors, results FP and ACA respectively 
Risk factor 
Livestock 
Animal products 
Swill 
Tourists 
Returning trucks 
Wildlife 
Air 
Total 
1 
FP 
56.0 
8.1 
13.2 
4.4 
10.9 
3.7 
3.7 
100.0 
ACA 
39.5 
8.1 
16.1 
4.5 
21.3 
4.5 
6.0 
100.0 
2 
FP 
55.6 
7.9 
17.4 
3.6 
15.5 
100.0 
ACA 
44.7 
9.3 
19.4 
4.7 
21.9 
—-
100.0 
Cluster 
3 
FP 
58.4 
9.1 
14.5 
3.3 
14.7 
.... 
.... 
100.0 
ACA 
49.0 
7.5 
18.0 
5.9 
19.6 
— 
100.0 
4 
FP 
60.3 
8.6 
13.2 
4.8 
13.1 
.... 
.... 
100.0 
ACA 
50.4 
7.3 
18.9 
4.9 
19.1 
.... 
.... 
100.0 
5 
FP 
59.4 
6.2 
15.7 
5.9 
12.8 
.... 
— 
100.0 
ACA 
51.6 
9.2 
19.5 
6.6 
13.1 
— 
.... 
100.0 
The choice task formed the basis of several comparison evaluations. Both conjoint 
methods resulted in subjective probabilities for the risk factors, separately calculated for 
each respondent. Using these values, the expected outcome of the choice task was 
calculated and thereafter compared with the outcome provided by the respondent. 
Comparing the estimated with the 'real' outcome resulted in the hit rates for both conjoint 
methods. Table 2 presents the hit rates for both methods, for all country clusters (hit rates 
over all diseases). 
Table 2. Hit rates FP and ACA, per cluster 
Cluster 1 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 
Cluster 4 
Cluster 5 
Most 
FP 
67.5 
74.5 
73.8 
70.7 
76.0 
likely situation 
ACA 
58.2 
74.4 
64.3 
75.6 
76.0 
Least 
FP 
65.1 
81.4 
85.7 
80.5 
72.0 
likely situation 
ACA 
79.1 
69.8 
76.2 
73.2 
84.0 
Hit rates for full profile were somewhat higher than those for ACA. For most clusters, 
the hit rate for the least risky situation was higher than the one for the most risky situation. 
Table 3 illustrates the 'share of first preference' with the presentation of the results for 
Classical Swine Fever (with 19 respondents the most 'popular' disease among the total 
group of respondents), for cluster 1 (countries surrounding the Netherlands) and cluster 4 
(Eastern Europe). These clusters are generally thought to be the most important concerning 
virus introduction. 
62 Horst, Huirne, Dijkhuizen and Steenkamp 
Table 3. Share of first choice (%), CSF, clusters 1 and 4 
Situation 1 
Situation 2 
Situation 3 
Total 
FP 
26.3 
7.9 
65.8 
100.0 
Cluster 1 
ACA 
28.9 
5.3 
65.8 
100.0 
Choice 
15.8 
0.0 
84.2 
100.0 
FP 
0.0 
76.3 
23.7 
100.0 
Cluster 4 
ACA 
10.5 
84.2 
5.3 
100.0 
Choice 
0.0 
89.5 
10.5 
100.0 
According to this table, considering cluster 1, situation 3 was evaluated as the most 
risky, chosen by 84.2% of the participants. Both conjoint approaches estimate a lower 
percentage for this situation. In cluster 4, situation 2 was thought to be the most risky one 
(89.5% of the respondents chose this situation). 
Table 3 shows that both conjoint methods estimate the same trend, which is also similar 
to the trend of the choice task. To obtain better insight into how closely both methods 
estimate respondents' choices, the 'mean absolute error' was calculated (based on Huber et 
al, 1993). This measure indicates the absolute difference between the estimated and real 
share of each situation, for the choice task as a whole. The mean absolute error of the full 
profile method, for cluster 1, was calculated as follows (see also Table 3): 
(| 15.8-26.31 + | 0 . 0 - 7 . 9 | + 184.2 - 65.81)/3 = 12.3 
A total presentation of the values concerning CSF is given in Table 4. 
(2) 
Table 4. Mean absolute error, CSF, clusters 1 and 4 
Full Profile 
Cluster 1 12.3 
Cluster 4 8.8 
ACA 
12.3 
7.0 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
So far results have provided interesting information about the possible applications of 
conjoint analysis in the field of animal health control. For a good comparison between the 
full profile and the ACA approaches, more information is needed. However, the 
preliminary results concerning the hit rates seem to favour the full profile method. In this 
experiment a maximum of seven attributes was used, which is about the maximum number 
suggested that can possibly be evaluated using the full profile approach (Green and 
Srinivasan, 1990). The small difference between full profile and ACA is therefore not 
surprising. A larger number of attributes will possibly favour the ACA approach. 
Further research is under way and is aimed at obtaining more information on the 
predictive performance of both methods and possible influence of task order (first full 
profile or first ACA). Also the consistency of participants' answers will be evaluated 
further. 
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The 'golden standard', i.e., the true value of the risk factors is difficult to obtain, if at 
all possible. It can be concluded, however, that methods such as the conjoint analysis 
technique are very useful in quantifying the subjective probabilities of experts about aspects 
concerning the introduction of virus. Not until historical data are available or experimental 
research is able to provide better data, do methods such as conjoint analysis provide a 
useful tool to obtain valuable information to be used in modelling risks and economic 
consequences of outbreaks of contagious animal diseases. 
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C H A P T E R 6 
A NEW THEORY FOR EXPLAINING THE PARADOXES IN DECISION MAKING 
UNDER RISK AND FOR MEASURING TIME AND RISK PREFERENCES* 
G. Hertzler 
The University of Western Australia, Nedlands, Australia 
Summary 
This study makes two modifications to expected utility theory. Rather than directly 
modelling risk preferences by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of wealth, risk 
preferences and the expected utility of wealth are derived from consumption and investment 
decisions over time. Rather than using future wealth as the reference point for evaluating 
risk preferences, current wealth is used instead. The revised theory is both normative and 
descriptive. It specifies how rational people ought to make decisions under risk and explains 
the major empirical findings about how people actually make decisions. For example, the 
Allais Paradox and its variations, preference reversals and framing effects all result from 
rational decisions by uniformly risk averse people. Moreover, apparently risk-seeking 
behaviour can result from risk averse people with low rates of time preference taking risks 
to save for the future. The revised theory also shows why eliciting certainty equivalents 
cannot measure peoples' risk preferences but leads to new procedures for measuring both 
time and risk preferences. 
1 Decision theories, risk preferences and time preferences 
The history of decision theories is a history of theoretical explanations followed by 
paradoxes followed by new explanations (Machina, 1987; Camerer, 1994). In the 17m 
century, Pascal, De Fermât and others proposed the expected value of a lottery as a 
decision theory. Nicholas Bernoulli provided a counterexample, known as the St. 
Petersburg Paradox, in which people would never be willing to pay the expected value. 
Daniel Bernoulli hypothesized what we now call a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function to resolve the paradox. In this theory, people evaluate a gamble, not by its 
expected value, but by their expected utility from the wealth which the gamble provides. 
Expected utility theory was born. During its lifetime, it has greatly increased our 
understanding of decisions under risk and has been widely applied to many problems in 
economics and psychology. Unfortunately, expected utility theory is being overcome by 
paradoxes and its eulogy is being written in the economics and psychology literature. 
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 39th annual conference of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society, University of Western Australia. Nedlands, Western Australia, February 14-16, 1995. I 
would like to thank Bryan Gorddard for the discussions which led to this study. 
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Allais (1979) provided the first paradox. Expected utility theory is linear in probabilities 
but peoples' choices systematically violate linearity. To resolve the Allais Paradox and its 
variations, several researchers (Chew, 1983; Fishburn, 1983; Quiggin, 1993; Machina, 
1982) formulated new decision theories, collectively called non-expected utility models, 
which are nonlinear in probabilities. At about the same time as the Allais Paradox was 
being resolved, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) discovered preference reversals. People 
appear to reverse their preferences by assigning a higher certainty equivalent to one risky 
alternative but choosing another. Several theories, collectively called nontransitive choice 
models, have been developed to explain preference reversals (Fishburn, 1991), but perhaps 
the most prominent is expected regret theory (Bell, 1982; Fishburn, 1982; Loomes and 
Sugden, 1982). Also at about this time, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) discovered framing 
effects. People appear to be risk averse if a problem is framed so that the outcome is a gain 
and to be risk seeking if the same outcome is a loss. Prospect theory has been developed to 
explain different risk preferences for gains and losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
People who violate linearity in probabilities still seem to be rational and the non-
expected utility models may be worthy successors to expected utility theory. However, 
people who reverse their preferences or are susceptible to framing effects appear to be 
irrational. Psychologists are unconcerned and posit expected regret theory and prospect 
theory as descriptive of how people actually choose rather than normative theories of how 
people ought to choose. Economists are extremely concerned. The presumption of rational 
behaviour underlies both expected utility and non-expected utility theories but the best of 
these theories are only partially consistent with preference reversals and cannot begin to 
explain framing effects (Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman, 1990; Safra, Segal and Spivak, 
1990; Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme, 1994). Expected utility theory and its 
descendants may be the last of their line. 
Yet there is hope. Consider a further anomaly which none of the decision theories can 
explain. Farmers in many lesser-developed countries appear to be very risk averse but talk 
of living for the present and not worrying about the future. Bryan has travelled the world 
working with farm households and has formulated the following conundrum. 
Bryan's Conundrum: Risk preferences are confounded with time preferences. How can 
you distinguish a person who is afraid to get out of bed in the morning from a person who 
lays around in bed all day, enjoying the present rather than working and saving for the 
future? 
Farmers are not the only ones who confound time and risk preferences. So do many 
economists and psychologists. In the United States, for example, most academics invest in 
TIAA-CREF. The TIAA account provides a guaranteed annuity upon retirement. The 
CREF account is a high-risk stock market account with potentially high returns. Academic 
economists and psychologists can allocate their retirement savings to either of the accounts 
and revise their allocation periodically. In a leaflet accompanying the prospectus, the 
managers of TIAA-CREF offer the following advice for choosing an allocation: 
Most experts agree that you should not take too much risk with your pension 
accumulation. On the other hand, if you don't take enough risk, you might not build 
sufficient assets for a comfortable retirement. So you need to find a risk-reward balance 
that's comfortable and appropriate for you. 
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Economists and psychologists routinely choose greater risks for greater savings, yet they 
formulate theories of decisions under risk which are devoid of a savings motive. 
The purposes of this article are to incorporate a savings motive into expected utility 
theory and resolve Bryan's Conundrum. Serendipitously, the other paradoxes are resolved 
as well. Expected utility theory with a savings motive is both normative, describing how 
people ought to make decisions, and descriptive, explaining more of the empirical evidence 
than other decision theories. Perhaps the eulogies are premature and expected utility theory 
may yet be revived. 
The revised theory is based upon a consumption and investment model first constructed 
by Merton (1971) to analyse financial decisions and later generalized by Hertzler (1991) to 
analyse household consumption and production decisions. The theory differs from other 
decision theories in two fundamental ways. First, there is no utility function for wealth. 
Instead, the expected utility of wealth is an indirect function derived from time preferences 
and the utility of consumption. Second, people cannot use future wealth as a reference point 
because time is asymmetric, moving only forward. Instead, they must use current wealth as 
the reference point for evaluating their risk preferences, forming expectations about the 
future and making decisions. 
2 A dynamic decision theory 
As a benchmark, consider a consumer on a fixed salary with no risky investments. 
Consumers may behave as if they are maximizing the present value of utility over time 
subject to a budget constraint for the change in wealth. 
V(W,s) = max] e^'ß(q-r)adt ... 
subject to: 
dW = (iW-pq + Y)dt 
Indirect utility of wealth, V, at initial time s, depends upon an endowment of wealth, W. 
It results from choosing consumption, q, in each time period, t, to maximize direct utility, 
pXq-yf, discounted at the rate of time preference, p. Direct utility is the so-called Stone-
Geary function in which consumption is measured against a subsistence level, /, and a and 
ß are parameters. Wealth increases with investment income at the risk-free rate, i, 
decreases with expenditures on consumption at price p, and increases with risk-free salary 
income, Y. For convenience, the time horizon is infinite. This assumption can be relaxed to 
include a finite time horizon and a utility function for bequests to future generations without 
substantially changing the results to follow. 
Maximizing utility over the entire time horizon is equivalent to maximizing the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in each time period. 
0=V, + maxfe-0 ß(q - y)a + Vw (iW - pq + }')] (2) 
Consumption is chosen to maximize the discounted direct utility of consumption plus the 
marginal indirect utility of wealth, Vw, multiplied by the change in wealth. The maximized 
result and the marginal indirect utility of time, V„ sum to zero. 
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By assuming the Stone-Geary function for direct utility, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
equation can be integrated into a closed-form solution for indirect utility. 
Indirect utility is a Stone-Geary function of disposable income, iW -py + Y, augmented by 
a shift term containing the real rate of time preference, p - ai. The advantage of a closed-
form solution is the exact measurement of welfare effects from income changes. 
Consumption above subsistence also has a closed form defined by a linear expenditure 
equation. 
V ( l - a > / 
A fixed proportion of disposable income is expended in each time period with the trade-off 
between present and future consumption determined by the real rate of time preference. 
Next consider a consumer whose income is risky. In addition to choosing consumption, 
this consumer must choose among risky investments. 
U(W,s) = max El \ e^ß(q - y)a dt 
subject to: 
dW = (iW-pq + {r- i)R)dt + crRdZ 
Expected utility, U, is maximized by forming expectations about the future, E, and 
choosing consumption, q, and investments, jR. Risky investments generate income at the 
rate r and must pay an opportunity rate i because wealth is diverted from risk-free 
investments. Although risky investments are expected to return the real rate r - i, 
expectations will be in error by aRdZ, where a is a standard deviation and dZ is a Weiner 
process (Gard, 1988, pp. 24-25). Squaring the error gives the variance of changes in 
wealth, a2R2dt. 
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation now includes a variance term. 
0 = C/( +m3.x{e-p'ß(q~y)a +Uw(iW-pq+(r-i)R) + y2Uwwa2R1} (6) 
Consumption and risky investments are chosen to maximize the discounted utility of 
consumption plus the marginal utility of wealth, Uw, multiplied by the expected change in 
wealth, plus one-half the second derivative, Uww multiplied by the variance of changes in 
wealth. Marginal utility of wealth is positive and, if the consumer is risk averse, the second 
derivative is negative. As before, the maximized result and the marginal utility of time, U„ 
sum to zero. 
Expected utility also has a closed-form solution. 
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Disposable income, iW - py, no longer includes salary income, but the real rate of time 
preference, p- ai- /2(a/ (\ -a))((r--i) : I a2), now subtracts a risk-adjusted rate of return 
on investment. As part of this risk-adjusted rate, the expected real rate of return, (r - i), is 
divided by its coefficient of variation, a I (r - i). 
Expected utility in equation (7) can be discussed in two parts. The part containing 
disposable income is a member of the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion family of functions 
and can describe any sort of risk preferences, including all feasible combinations of 
increasing, constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing, constant or 
decreasing relative risk aversion (Merton, 1971). The coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
measures the degree of curvature of expected utility. 
-u iu -Q-"* 
iW - py (8) 
For a risk averse consumer with positive disposable income, a is less than one and the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is positive. The coefficient is a function of observed 
current wealth. At the beginning of each time period, consumers take stock of their wealth, 
evaluate their risk preferences, form expectations about the future and make decisions. In 
this way, the Markov, nonanticipating and martingale properties (Gard, 1988, pp. 25-26, 
41, and 49) are preserved. The Markov property ensures that all relevant information about 
the past is summarized by a consumer's current wealth. The nonanticipating property 
acknowledges that a consumer is not clairvoyant and cannot observe the future. Finally, the 
martingale property allows people to form expectations about the future. In summary, time 
is asymmetric, moving only forward. 
By contrast, other decision theories use future wealth as the reference point. For 
example, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion may be calculated from a Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which depends upon future wealth. This leads to the 
following circular logic: 
Risk preferences cannot be evaluated until future wealth is calculated; future wealth must 
be calculated from current wealth by adding the outcomes of the decisions being made; 
decisions cannot be made until risk preferences are evaluated. 
Static decision theories resolve this circular logic by assuming that risk preferences are 
evaluated, decisions are made and outcomes occur simultaneously. However in a dynamic 
model, risk preferences are evaluated and decisions are made today. Outcomes occur in the 
future. The circular logic of using future wealth as a reference point could only be resolved 
if a consumer is clairvoyant and does not just form expectations but observes future 
outcomes. Because consumers are not clairvoyant, the reference point for evaluating risk 
preferences and making decisions must be current wealth. 
The other part of expected utility in equation (7) contains the real rate of time 
preference. This part shifts expected utility, depending upon a consumer's impatience for 
current versus future consumption and the riskiness of investments. Traditional expected 
utility theory shifts utility by multiplying by probabilities. Rank-dependent expected utility 
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theory and other non-expected utility theories shift utility by a nonlinear weighting of 
probabilities (Quiggin, 1993). These nonlinear weightings are ascribed to risk preferences. 
However, in equation (7), the nonlinear weighting is because the model is nonlinear in time 
preferences. 
As in the previous case without risk, the linear expenditure equation for consumption 
depends upon disposable income and the real rate of time preference. 
p{q-y) = p-a\i + y2 i (l-a)o-
iW - py . 
T-^)T) (9) 
In this case, however, expenditure can be interpreted as the real rate of time preference 
divided by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
The demand for risky investments depends upon disposable income, the expected real 
rate of return and the variance for the rate of return. 
(r -i) f iW - py 
Alternatively, demand can be interpreted as the inverse of the coefficient of variation 
divided by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If investments are quite risky, the 
coefficient of variation will be large and demand will be small. Conversely, if investments 
are less risky, the coefficient of variation will be small and demand will be large. 
Investments need not be positive. If forward contracts or futures markets are available, a 
risk averse person who expects a negative real rate of return will go 'short' and make a 
negative investment by selling more than they own on the promise of buying in the future. 
Most methods for measuring risk preferences elicit people's certainty equivalents. A 
certainty equivalent is the risk-free income for which indirect utility without risk equals 
expected utility with risk. 
C-- [r-if 
p-ai (\-a)a (iW-pY)
 ( 1 1 ) 
Substituting certainty equivalent C to replace risk-free income Y equates indirect utility in 
equation (3) to expected utility in equation (7). A certainty equivalent depends upon time 
and risk preferences. Therefore, an elicitation method based solely upon certainty 
equivalents will confound the two. 
Studies to elicit risk preferences usually describe risky alternatives as lotteries having 
various probabilities of gains or losses. The model here describes risky investments by a 
stochastic process having an expected return and a variance. 
dR = {r-i)Rdt + aRdZ ( 12) 
This stochastic process can be converted to probabilities by specifying its transition density 
and integrating to find transition probabilities. Its transition density is log-normal. 
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I ( r - / ) ) ) ^ / 2 t r 2 ( r - ( ) (13) 
Transition density, p (not to be confused with the price of consumption) depends upon the 
current time, t, the current demand for risky investments, R„ a future time, r, and the 
future outcome for risky investments, RT. Given current investments, the probability that 
the future outcome will be less than some constant, say Rh is the area under the transition 
density from -oo to Rt The probability that it will be greater than Rh but less than Ru is the 
area from Rt to Ru, and the probability that it will be greater than Ru is the area from Ru to 
oo. These three transition probabilities will be called Pu P2 and P3 for low, medium and 
high outcomes. 
P, = \p(t,R,,r,x)dx (14) 
P2 = \p(t,Rl,r,x)dx 
OO 
P3 = \p(t,RnT,x)dx 
p(t,Rt,t+1,Rt+1) 
0.6-
Figure 1. Probabilities 1, 2 and 3 for low, medium and high outcomes 
Transition probabilities are illustrated in Figure 1 with future time r equal to t + 1, the 
bound R,, equal to 95% of the original investments, R„ and the bound Ru equal to 145% of 
the original investments. Event 1 is an outcome on the x-axis of less than 713, Event 3 is an 
outcome of more than 1088 and Event 2 is an outcome between 713 and 1088. Probabilities 
for these events are the areas Pu P2 and P3 under the transition density for the log-normal 
distribution. As areas, they depend upon the mean and variance. A large F3, for example, 
results from either a high expected rate of return, which shifts the transition density to the 
right, or from a large variance, which flattens the peak and thickens the tails of the density. 
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Using these probabilities, implications of the model can be related to empirical findings 
in the literature. Baseline assumptions for parameters are listed in Table 1. In particular, 
people are moderately risk averse and investments are very risky. 
Table 1. Baseline parameters for simulation 
2 
t a ß y p l r a 
0 0.6 1 100 0.05 0.04 0.1 0.5 
P 
1 
W 
5000 
Y R, Ru 
50 0.95/? 1.45R 
T 
t+\ 
3 Gamblers as savers 
People can be risk averse but have a strong savings motive and appear to be seeking risks. 
Binswanger (1980) found that farmers in India have similar degrees of risk aversion but 
nominate a wide range of certainty equivalents. The explanation is shown in Figure 2 for 
three people having the same baseline parameters from Table 1 except for different rates of 
time preference. First, certainty equivalents, C, are calculated from equation (11) and 
expected returns from risky investments, (r - i)R, are calculated as the real rate of return 
multiplied by the quantity invested from equation (10). Then, ratios of certainty equivalents 
to expected returns are plotted versus returns from risky investments. Traditionally, if the 
ratio is greater than one and the certainty equivalent exceeds the expected return, a person 
is labelled as risk seeking. If the ratio equals one, a person is labelled as risk neutral, and if 
the ratio is less than one, as risk averse. In Figure 2, the person with a lower rate of time 
preference (p = 0.0316) has a ratio of 2.8 but is just as risk averse as the person with an 
intermediate rate (p = 0.0366) and a ratio of 1 and as risk averse as the person with a 
higher rate (p = 0.0466) and a ratio of 0.4. Although returns from risky investments are 
unaffected, certainty equivalents are extremely sensitive to rates of time preference. 
Certainty-Equivalent / 
Expected-Return Ratio 
P = 0.0316 
P = 0.0366 
P = 0.0466 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Returns from Risky Investments 
Figure 2. Ratios of certainty equivalents to expected returns for three rates of time 
preference 
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Plotting expected utility in Figure 3 verifies that all three people have the same degree of 
risk aversion. Expected utility is shifted by each person's rate of time preference but, at a 
given level of returns, has the same degree of curvature. For example, at returns of $20, all 
three people have a coefficient of absolute risk aversion, -U^y/I Uw, equal to 0.00036. 
Expected Utility 
20 30 40 50 60 
Returns from Risky Investments 
Figure 3. Expected utility shifted by rates of time preference 
Certainty equivalents can be explained graphically by comparing expected utility under 
risk with indirect utility under no risk. Figure 4 plots expected utility and indirect utility for 
the person who has a higher rate of time preference. The result is apparently consistent with 
traditional theory in which expected utility is below a concave utility function and the 
certainty equivalent is less than the expected returns from risky investments. For example, 
risky returns of $20 give the same utility as a certainty equivalent of $8, for a ratio of 0.4. 
Utility 
20 30 40 50 60 
Returns from Risky Investments 
70 
Figure 4. Expected utility and indirect utility for a higher rate of time preference 
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Although not shown graphically, expected utility coincides with indirect utility for the 
person who has an intermediate rate of time preference. The certainty equivalent always 
equals expected returns, giving a ratio of 1, even though expected utility is concave and the 
person is risk averse. Figure 5 plots expected utility and indirect utility for the person who 
has a lower rate of time preference. This result has no counterpart in other decision 
theories. A lower rate of time preference shifts expected utility above indirect utility and the 
certainty equivalent exceeds expected returns. In this example, a risky return of $20 has a 
certainty equivalent of $56, for a ratio of 2.8. 
Utility 
20 30 40 50 60 
Returns from Risky Investments 
Figure 5. Expected utility and indirect utility for a lower rate of time preference 
A person may be averse to risk but have a low enough rate of time preference to shift 
expected utility until the certainty equivalent equals or exceeds expected returns. A desire to 
save can easily dominate aversion to risk. As a consequence, studies that elicit certainty 
equivalents confound time and risk preferences and people labelled as risk neutral or risk 
seeking may simply wish to save for the future. 
4 From a gambler to a miser 
People appear to change their risk preferences as probabilities change. Kachelmeier and 
Shehata (1992) paid high monetary incentives to students in China to accurately elicit their 
certainty equivalents. Ratios of certainty equivalents to expected returns ranged from 
around 2 to 4 at low probabilities of winning a lottery but fell to around 1 or less at high 
probabilities of winning. The results were replicated for low monetary incentives paid to 
students in Canada and the United States. Non-expected utility theories can explain these 
results if the same person is interpreted as being a gambler at low probabilities and a miser 
at high probabilities. An alternative explanation comes from expected utility in equation (7) 
and the certainty equivalent in equation (11). Both can be nonlinear in the real rate of 
return, in the variance and, as a consequence, in probabilities, even though people are 
uniformly averse to risks. 
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Figure 6 illustrates. For the same risk averse people as before, ratios of their certainty 
equivalents to expected returns are graphed versus the probability of winning. The 
probability of winning is the chance that any money put at risk will remain the same or 
increase. It is calculated as the transition probability P3 in equation (14) with the bound Ru 
set equal to the risky investment, R,. For a positive real rate of return, the probability of 
winning will start above 0.5 and increase to 1 as the rate of return increases. In Figure 6, 
the ratio of certainty equivalents to expected returns falls from 2.8 to just above 1 for the 
person with a lower rate of time preference. In this case, the ratio is highly nonlinear in 
probabilities. The ratio starts at 1 and declines gradually for the person with a medium rate 
of time preference, and starts at 0.4 and stays about constant for the person with the higher 
rate of time preference. In the latter two cases, the ratios are almost linear. Nonlinearity of 
the ratios, then, is evidence of a lower rate of time preference, linearity is evidence of a 
medium to higher rate but neither provides evidence about risk preferences. 
Certainty-Equivalent / 
Expected-Return Ratio 
3 T 
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p = 0.0316 
p = 0.0366 
P = 0.0466 
0.7 0.8 
Prob(R t + 1>R t ) 
0.9 
Figure 6. Ratios of certainty equivalents to expected returns for increasing probabilities 
winning 
Binswanger (1980), followed by Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) found that people 
appeared to be less risk averse or more risk seeking when the payoffs from a lottery were 
lower. Binswanger (1981) attributed the findings to increasing relative risk aversion. For 
risk aversion to change as the payoff of the lottery changes, people must use future wealth 
as their reference point in evaluating their risk preferences. This is consistent with other 
decision theories but inconsistent with dynamically optimal decisions under risk. 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) attributed the apparent differences in risk preferences to 
the enjoyment of gambling as entertainment which enters directly into peoples' utility. At 
low payoffs, the marginal utility of gambling becomes more noticeable. Certainly, people 
do enjoy gambling (Conlisk, 1993). The question is whether the marginal utility of 
gambling is necessary to explain apparently greater risk seeking for low payoffs. 
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Figure 7 shows the effect of low payoffs on a person with a low rate of time preference. 
To model a low payoff, the real rate of return and the standard deviation for the stochastic 
process of equation (12) are multiplied by a constant, k, which is less than one. So, this 
means dR = k(r - i)Rdt + koRdZ. If a person is restricted to the same investment as with 
the high payoff, their certainty equivalent in equation (11) is unaffected but expected 
returns, k(r - i)R, will be smaller by the proportion k. In Figure 7, the ratio of certainty 
equivalents to expected returns is higher at all probabilities if investment is restricted. 
However, a person would rather choose a larger investment, larger by the proportion 1 / k, 
and expected returns, (r - i)R, will be the same as with a higher payoff. Due to the lower 
real rate of return, however, the probability of winning is lower and the ratio of certainty 
equivalents to expected returns in Figure 7 is lower with optimal investment. 
Certainty-Equivalent / 
Expected-Return Ratio 
3 
0.7 0.8 
Prob(R t + 1>R t ) 
Figure 7. Ratios of certainty equivalents to expected returns for high and low payoffs 
Even though time and risk preferences are constant, the ratios of certainty equivalents to 
expected returns will vary with the payoffs to a lottery. How the ratios will vary depends 
upon the rules of the lottery. Binswanger (1980) and Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) 
restricted people's choices and found higher ratios. 
5 Allaying the Allais paradox 
According to traditional theory, people's choices should be linear in probabilities. Figure 8 
graphs these indifference curves over probabilities for three possible events. Event 1 has the 
lowest payoff and a probability shown along the x-axis. Event 3 has the highest payoff and 
a probability along the y-axis. Event 2 has an intermediate payoff and a probability which 
equals one minus the sum of Probabilities 1 and 3. Along the hypotenuse of the triangle, for 
example, Probabilities 1 and 3 sum to one and Probability 2 equals zero. At the origin, 
A new theory for explaining the paradoxes in decision making 11 
Probabilities 1 and 3 equal zero and Probability 2 equals one. Elsewhere, Probability 2 is 
between zero and one. 
In Figure 8, the indifference curves are parallel lines. Moving from right to left, 
Probability 1 for the low payoff event decreases and expected utility increases. Moving 
from bottom to top, Probability 3 for the high payoff event increases and expected utility 
also increases. Expected utility is greatest at the upper left-hand corner of the triangle 
where Probability 3 equals one and the other probabilities are zero. Inscribed within the 
probability triangle is a parallelogram with corners Au A2, Bl and B2. At point Ax, Event 1 
has a probability of 0.05, Event 2 has a probability of 0.95 and Event 3 has a probability of 
0. At point A2, Events 1, 2 and 3 have probabilities 0.1, 0.6 and 0.3 respectively. 
Compared to Ax and A2, points B{ and B2 have larger probabilities for Event 1, smaller 
probabilities for Event 2 and the same probabilities for Event 3. For the indifference curves 
in Figure 8, people will prefer point A2 to Ax and point B2 to Bx along the upper edge of the 
parallelogram. When asked to choose, however, people tend to prefer points Ax and B2 at 
opposite corners of the parallelogram. This is the Allais Paradox. Variations of the paradox 
are the common consequence effect, the common ratio effect and the utility evaluation 
effect. 
Probability 3 
Increasing Expected Utility 
0.4 0.6 
Probability 1 
Figure 8. Indifference curves for traditional expected utility theory 
Machina (1987) offers an explanation for the Allais Paradox in which indifference curves 
are not parallel, but rather 'fan out.' In Figure 9, indifference curves are still straight lines 
but have a shallower slope in the lower right-hand corner of the probability triangle and a 
steeper slope in the upper left-hand corner. For these indifference curves, people will prefer 
events at opposite corners of the parallelogram, points A[ and B2. 
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Increasing Preferences 
0.4 0.6 
Probability 1 
Figure 9. Indifference curves for Machina's hypothesis of 'fanning out' 
Empirical evidence suggests that indifference curves are not straight lines. Camerer and 
Ho (1994) graphed the indifference curves for a selection of non-expected utility theories 
and for prospect theory. Those for prospect theory are very similar to the indifference 
curves for expected utility in equation (7) of this study. Figure 10 illustrates. Expected 
utility increases by moving up and to the left and is greatest where Probability 3 approaches 
0.8 and Probability 1 approaches zero. People do not prefer to be at the upper left-hand 
corner of the probability triangle because Event 3 has a high expected return and a high 
variance and Event 2 has an intermediate expected return but a low variance. Risk averse 
people prefer a combination of the two. The lower right-hand corner is avoided because 
Event 1 has a low return and a high variance and risk averse people will never prefer it. 
Moreover, the indifference curve nearest the centre of the probability triangle demarcates 
desirable risks on the left from undesirable risks on the right. To the left, expected utility 
exceeds the utility a person could achieve if they took no risks and the certainty equivalent 
is positive. People are willing to pay for the opportunity to invest. To the right, expected 
utility is less than the utility a person could have by avoiding risks entirely and the certainty 
equivalent is negative. People would be willing to pay to avoid these undesirable risks and 
will invest only if forced to do so. 
If asked to nominate certainty equivalents for the desirable risks Ax and A2 and for the 
desirable risks Bx and B2, people will tend to nominate higher certainty equivalents for Ax 
and B2 on opposite corners of the parallelogram, in accordance with the Allais Paradox. 
However, careful distinction must be made between certainty equivalents on the one hand 
and the actual choice among risky alternatives on the other. This topic is discussed next. 
6 Reversing preference reversals 
People may place a higher value on one alternative, yet choose another. Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (1971) presented people with lotteries called the P-bet and the $-bet. The P-bet had a 
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0.4 0.6 
Probability 1 
Figure 10. Indifference curves for expected utility in equation (7) 
high probability of an intermediate payoff and the $-bet had an intermediate probability of a 
high payoff. When elicited for their certainty equivalents, many people put a higher value 
on the $-bet. When asked to choose between bets, they chose the P-bet. By valuing the $-
bet higher but choosing the P-bet it appears they reversed their preferences. 
In a dynamic model with consumption and risky investments, people can nominate a 
higher certainty equivalent for one investment yet choose another without reversing their 
preferences. A certainty equivalent in equation (11) is affected by choices for both 
consumption and risky investments and depends upon both time and risk preferences but 
demand for risky investments in equation (10) depends only upon risk preferences. Figure 
11 plots iso-demand curves within the probability triangle. Along an iso-demand curve 
different combinations of Events 1, 2 and 3 have the same coefficient of variation and result 
in the same level of investment. Nearest to the centre of the probability triangle is the iso-
demand curve for zero investment at the demarcation between desirable and undesirable 
risks. Moving to the left, investment increases and the iso-demand curves become almost 
linear. Notice that the iso-demand curves are also consistent with the Allais Paradox as 
discussed in the previous section. 
Now suppose the P-bet and the $-bet have the following forms: 
P-bet: < 
0.20 chance of Event 1 
0.65 chance of Event 2 
0.15 chance of Event 3 
•bet 
0.15 chance of Event 1 
0.35 chance of Event 2 
0.50 chance of Event 3 
The P-bet has a large chance of an intermediate payoff and the $-bet has a reasonable 
chance of a large payoff. In Figure 12, the P-bet is at the intersection of a low indifference 
curve and a high iso-demand curve. The $-bet is at the intersection of a higher indifference 
curve but a lower iso-demand curve. A person may be willing to pay a larger certainty 
equivalent for the opportunity of investing in the $-bet but choose the P-bet by risking more 
of their wealth on it. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) also constructed $-bets which had a 
Hertzler 
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Figure 11. Iso-demand curves for risky investments over combinations of events 
greater demand for investment than the P-bet. Such a bet is any point to the left of the iso-
demand curve and above the indifference curve which intersects at the P-bet. In summary, 
eliciting a person's certainty equivalent does not simultaneously elicit their choice among 
risky alternatives because there is no correspondence between the two. A certainty 
equivalent is an income measure similar to the compensating variation of consumer theory 
but choices are governed by a demand equation. 
7 Constrained by the frame 
People appear to be risk averse when expecting a gain and risk seeking when expecting a 
loss. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated this by giving people two decision 
problems with identical outcomes. 
1. In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1,000. You are now asked to 
choose between a xh : Vi chance of a gain of $1,000 or $0 or a sure gain of $500. 
2. In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2,000. You are now asked to 
From the reference point of final wealth, the two decision problems are symmetric. A 
person who chooses the sure gain in problem 1 and the sure loss in problem 2 will have a 
final wealth of $1,500. A person who gambles in both problems will have a final wealth of 
either $1,000 or $2,000. Although the problems have identical outcomes, most people 
choose the sure gain in the first problem and the gamble in the second. Apparently identical 
problems lead to different decisions depending upon how they are framed. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) postulate that people are risk averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses 
and have advanced prospect theory to predict peoples' behaviour. 
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Figure 12. Higher certainty equivalent for the $-bet and greater investment in the P-bet 
In a dynamic model of decisions under risk, the reference point is not final wealth, but 
current wealth. Several empirical studies have observed the stability of risk preferences 
over risky alternatives (Markowitz, 1952; Machina, 1982) and are consistent with current 
wealth as the reference point. People observe their wealth, evaluate their risk preferences, 
form expectations about the future and make their decisions. From this vantage, decision 
problems 1 and 2 are not symmetric. Problem 2 contains an element of compulsion which 
problem 1 does not. To elaborate, suppose people are given a third alternative in each 
problem. Once the reference point of initial wealth is established, they may choose the 
gamble or the sure bet, as before, but they may also choose neither. If they choose neither, 
they simply retain their initial wealth. In problem 1, everyone would choose either the 
gamble or the sure bet and expect to be better off than at their initial wealth. In problem 2, 
everyone would choose neither because both the gamble and the sure bet would make them 
worse off than at their initial wealth. The framing of problem 2 constrains people to take 
losses which they would otherwise avoid. 
From the reference point of initial wealth, problems 1 and 2 are completely different. A 
decision problem for losses which is symmetric to problem 1 for gains would be as follows: 
3. In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1,000. You are now asked to 
choose between a lA : Vx chance of a loss of $1,000 or $0 or a sure gain of $500. You 
may hedge the gamble if you wish by going 'short' and choosing a negative gamble to 
convert the loss into a gain. 
In a world with risk markets, people can invest positive or negative amounts. If a risk 
averse person expects a gain, they will go 'long' and make a positive investment. If they 
expect a loss, they will go 'short' and make a negative investment by selling more than they 
own on the promise of buying in the future. A negative gamble in problem 3 turns the 
chance of a ioss into a positive expected return on investment. 
The demand for investment in equation (10) places no restrictions on R, the amount of 
wealth put at risk. If a risk averse person expects the real rate of return, (r - i), to be 
positive, they will invest a positive amount. Otherwise, they will invest a negative amount. 
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Either way, expected return on investment, (r - i)R. is positive and the investment is a 
desirable risk. A person must be constrained to take an undesirable risk on the right-hand 
side of the probability triangle. The constraint could take many forms but, for illustration, 
assume a person is constrained to invest an amount which is equal in magnitude but 
opposite in sign to the amount they would freely choose. This particular constraint allows a 
closed-form solution in which the coefficient of +Vi in equations (7), (9) and (11) is 
replaced by -VA. Figure 13 shows the indifference curves in the right-hand side of the 
probability triangle in the region of undesirable risks. As before, expected utility increases 
from right to left. Figure 14 shows the iso-demand curves. Investment increases from left to 
right in the direction opposite to preferences. Camerer and Ho (1994) measured what they 
thought were indifference curves but were actually iso-demand curves in the right-hand side 
of the probability triangle. They found the curves to be concave, similar to those in Figure 
14. These iso-demand curves are very different from those for desirable risks and someone 
who is forced to take a loss will not behave symmetrically. 
Probability 3 
0.4 0.6 
Probability 1 
Figure 13. Indifference curves in the region of undesirable risks 
0.4 0.6 
Probability 1 
Figure 14. Iso-demand curves in the region of undesirable risks 
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Figure 15 illustrates the unconstrained and constrained decision problems. It shows three 
indifference curves and two iso-demand curves. The iso-demand curves have points C and 
D on them. As before, the indifference curve near the centre of the probability triangle 
demarcates desirable investments on the left from undesirable investments on the right. A 
positive certainty equivalent will increase utility from that of the indifference curve near the 
centre to that of the indifference curve on the left. A negative certainty equivalent, which is 
equal in magnitude, will decrease utility to that of the indifference curve on the right. The 
iso-demand curve on the left is for a desirable investment, either positive or negative. The 
iso-demand curve on the right is for a forced investment equal in magnitude but opposite in 
sign. 
0.4 o.e 
Probability 1 
Figure 15. Equal and opposite unconstrained and constrained investments 
Analogous to problems 1 and 2, the two decision problems for Figure 15 are as follows: 
I. Given your current wealth, choose between i) a 17% chance of Event 1, a 26% chance 
of Event 2 and a 57% chance of Event 3 at point C; ii) a certainty equivalent to reach the 
indifference curve shown furthest to the left in the triangle; or iii) no change at the 
indifference curve nearest the centre of the probability triangle. 
II. Given your current wealth, choose between i) a 57% chance of Event 1, a 26% chance 
of Event 2 and a 17% chance of Event 3 at point D; ii) a certainty equivalent to reach 
the indifference curve shown furthest to the right in the triangle; or iii) no change at the 
indifference curve nearest the centre of the probability triangle. 
In decision problem I, a risk averse person may choose a certainty equivalent to reach 
the highest indifference curve rather than the risky investment at point C. In decision 
problem II, a risk averse person may choose no change along the indifference curve nearest 
the centre. If this option is eliminated, they will be forced to choose the risky investment at 
point D. People need not flip their risk preferences for their decisions to be asymmetric. 
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They may be uniformly averse to risk but make asymmetric decisions because, from the 
vantage of current wealth, the decision problems are asymmetric. 
8 Resolving Bryan's conundrum 
Eliciting a person's certainty equivalent cannot disentangle their time and risk preferences 
but eliciting both a certainty equivalent and the demand for investment can. First, a person 
can be presented with an investment opportunity which has either a positive or negative real 
rate of return, (r - i), and a variance, <?. If it will make the presentation easier, equation 
(14) can be applied to convert the rate and variance to events with probabilities. Then the 
person can be asked how much they wish to invest, R. Substituting equation (8) into 
equation (10) and rearranging allows the calculation of their coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. 
i 
-Uww IUW=R (15) 
A risk-averse person with a positive coefficient will invest a positive or negative amount 
depending whether the real rate of return is expected to be positive or negative. Either way, 
a risk averse person expects to make a gain. Interestingly, a risk-seeking person invests the 
opposite way and expects to make a loss. Defining behaviour in this way suggests that most 
people are risk averse and few are truly risk seeking. Even gamblers may be at the casino 
for entertainment (Conlisk, 1995) and might appreciate better odds. In their study, 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) explained students' behaviour as risk-seeking but provide 
anecdotal evidence that the students were actually risk averse. Students all chose to 
participate because they expected to gain. Risk-seeking students would have participated 
even if they expected to lose. 
For the next step in the elicitation, a person could be asked for their disposable income, 
iW -py. Using information on investments and disposable income, the coefficient a can be 
calculated after rearranging equation (10). 
a = l_(r-i)(iW-py 
a 
2
 I ~iR~) (16) 
Coefficient a will be less than one for risk aversion. Finally, a certainty equivalent could be 
elicited and the rate of time preference, p, calculated after rearranging equation (11). 
p = a + v,^l 
( . °x^ 
;\2 
(l-a)a2 iW - py (17) 
Alternatively, a person's time and risk preferences could be ascertained from their actual 
consumption and investments. From information about rates of return, variances of the 
rates, disposable income and investments, a could be calculated using equation (16). With 
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further information about expenditures on consumption above subsistence, p could be 
calculated after rearranging equation (9). 
\(\-a)i J V (1 -a)a J 
Time and risk preferences can be disentangled either by eliciting peoples' choices in 
experiments or by observing their actual behaviour. Either method requires a considerable 
amount of information but is otherwise straightforward to implement. 
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Summary 
This paper explores the issue of estimating Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) 
models. Farmers' risk preferences are elicited by direct questionnaires based on simulated 
gambling situations. First, an individual utility function is elicited by the trade-off method 
proposed by Wakker and Deneffe (1994). Second, the probability transformation function is 
evaluated by a certainty equivalent method using the estimated utility function. Parametric 
utility and probability transformation functions are fitted to the assessed values by non-
linear regression. The results show that classification of farmers' risk attitude is generally 
consistent with farmers' typology based on social and economic characteristics. 
1 Introduction 
The classical criterion, maximizing Expected Utility (EU), is used extensively in most 
models of decision making under risk and uncertainty. However, empirical studies show 
inconsistencies in and violations of the behavioural implications of these models (Munier, 
1992). Since the 1950s, with Allais's paradox, many alternative models of behaviour have 
been proposed. Currently the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) theory represents a 
leading candidate as a formalized successor to the EU theory (Weber, 1994). This model 
was first initiated by Quiggin (1982) under the denomination of Anticipated Utility. The 
RDEU theory is based on the belief that a decision maker tends to substitute objective 
probabilities into subjective decision weights. In addition to indexing outcomes to utilities, 
(s)he employs a probability distortion to indexing cumulative probabilities. The preference 
functional is represented on both the probability transformation function and the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (v-NM) utility function. Theoretically, the RDEU model is more 
attractive than the conventional EU model in that (i) it can explain most violations of EU 
hypothesis observed in experiments; (ii) it has a good predictive capacity and a superior 
descriptive performance and (iii) it does not exclude EU maximization but rather includes it 
as a special case of non-expected utility criterion. 
A critical step in application of farm decision analysis under risk is the encoding and 
estimation of farmer preference functionals. Within the framework of the EU model, many 
The authors are grateful for helpful comments from M. Abdellaoui, P. Rio and T. Rieu. 
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agricultural economists have attempted to measure utility functions by direct questioning. 
We refer to empirical studies done by Officer and Halter (1968); Lin, Dean and Moore 
(1974); Halter and Dean (1978); Dillon and Scandizzo (1978); Binswanger (1980) and 
many others (see Robison (1982) for a review and references). Critics of descriptive 
decision analysis often attack the use of hypothetical questions in direct assessment 
procedures, and most of the studies cited have revealed inconsistent or incoherent 
responses. However, it appears that if we want any structured description of the decision 
maker's risk preference, quasi-hypothetical and direct questions will necessarily have to be 
addressed to the decision maker (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 18). On the other hand, some 
inconsistencies are resolved by considering probability weighting effects (Abdellaoui, 
1993). 
This paper investigates the direct preference functional elicitation under the RDEU 
hypothesis. Farmers' risk preferences are elicited by a questionnaire on gambling. The pilot 
questionnaire was conducted in a field environment with sixteen farmers in South- France. 
The procedure used is mainly based on three steps: pre-analysis and preparation for the 
interview; utility function elicitation; and probability transformation function elicitation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the RDEU model formulation. 
Section 3 develops a procedure used to assess the two functions. Section 4 describes a pilot 
experiment and discusses some estimation results. Finally, we conclude with some remarks 
in section 5. 
2 RDEU model: conceptual background 
The RDEU hypothesis involves disaggregating a risky decision problem into separate 
assessments of the decision maker's subjective beliefs about uncertainty, captured via 
probability transformation function and his/her preferences for consequences, captured via a 
v-NM utility function. A particular alternative is preferred to another as long as the value of 
the RDEU of the first alternative is greater. Thus, the best or optimal solution to a 
particular problem would be the feasible solution with the maximum expectation of utility 
with respect to a transformation of the outcomes of cumulative probabilities. 
For any random outcome variable z = (zl,...,zk,...,zK) assigning probability distribution 
p = (Pi,..., pk,..., pK), where K is the number of possible states of nature under which the 
outcome may be experienced, (when having ranked the outcome (z, <. . . <z J t<... <zAr), the 
RDEU preference functional is expressed by: 
RDEU(z) = iw„(P) w(z*) (1) 
where: 
w*(p) = g[F(zk)] - glFku)] * = 1, 2, . . . , AT (2) 
and u(z) is a v-NM utility function, wk(p) is an elementary decision weight function 
associated with the probability of outcome zk , wk(p) = wk(pl, ..., pk ,..., pK) is consistent 
with the probability calculus, g(p) is the non-linear probability transformation function. It is 
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assumed that g:[0,l]->[0,l] is continuous, differentiable, increasing and defined up to an 
affine transformation with g(0) = 0 and g(l) = 1. 
F(zk) is a cumulative probability distribution of outcome zk, 
F(zt) = Pr[z < z j = \j.pjj (3) 
The principal role of the transformation function g(p) is to modify the cumulative 
distribution function F(zk) in a way that can avoid the consequence of EU violations. 
Because g(p) is applied to the cumulative distribution function, the weight wk(p) depends on 
all the elements of p and not merely on pk. This means that it is possible for two events 
with the same objective probability to have different weight values. A complete axiomatic 
basis for the RDEU theory and its properties are provided by Wakker and others (see 
Quiggin, 1993, p. 145). 
In RDEU theory, risk aversion and risk-seeking attitude are determined jointly by u(z) 
and g(p) functions. Following Quiggin (1993, p.82) and Hilton (1988), total risk aversion is 
a mixture of an 'outcome' risk aversion reflecting a standard Arrow-Pratt risk aversion with 
respect to probability transformation and a 'probabilistic' risk aversion expressed by g(p). 
The shape of g(p) can be interpreted in terms of optimism or pessimism as to the attitude of 
the decision maker. This means that a decision maker could be risk averse without 
necessarily having a diminishing marginal utility for outcome, i.e., with a concave utility 
function. 
In light of this new development, risk programming models applied to farmers' decisions 
can be reformulated in the RDEU framework. For example, a land allocation decision 
problem under risk with resource constraints can be written as: 
Max RDEU[z(c,x)] = ƒ u(z) g[F(z)] dz (4) 
subject to 
x e A = {x e R : <p(r) <b, x > 0} 
where x is a vector of cropping pattern decision variable; c is a vector of random gross 
margin variables; F(z) is a joint (objective) cumulative probability distribution of net returns 
z(c, x), and cp(x) < b represents technical constraints on the choice set. Bouzit et al. (1994) 
have given an empirical illustration of the Quiggin model; the simulation based on the 
Hazell example shows that optimal cropping pattern is sensitive to both weighting and 
utility effects (u and g functions). 
Throughout the paper, the hypothesis that farmers' operational decisions are consistent 
with a criterion of maximizing RDEU of total net incomes over available resources was 
assumed. A subsidiary hypothesis was that a useful preference functional (u and g 
functions) could under some conditions be derived from the farmer. 
3 Procedure 
Several methods exist for utility elicitation within the EU theory context. The most popular 
one is the certainty equivalent method (This method is also known as the equally likely 
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risky outcome method or Ramsey method), see Anderson et al. (1977) for a review. The 
decision maker is asked to assign a certainty equivalent (CE) for a lottery [x, p; y, l-p] 
where x is obtained with probability p and y with probability (1-p). If x and y are fixed, u(x) 
= 1 and u(y) = 0, the EU criterion leads to: u(CE) = p u(x) + (1-p) u(y) = p. 
In the RDEU framework, and for a two-outcome lottery (K=2), the same indifference 
would be expressed as: u(CE) = g(p) u(x) + g(l-p) u(y) = g(p). 
In consequence, standard methods like the CE-method cannot be used to estimate utility 
functions. A fundamental problem is that we need to know the probability transformation 
function before making a utility calculation. 
Wakker and Deneffe (1994) resolved this problem by asking for indifference for two-
outcome lotteries. Given fixed reference outcome R and r (R > r), the decision maker is 
asked to compare two lotteries: 
lottery 1: [X, p; R, l-p] ~ [x, p; r, \-p] for X > x 
lottery 2: [Y, p; R, l-p] ~ [y, p; r, l-p] for Y > y 
The outcomes x, y, and probability p are pre-assigned values given by the analyst and the 
subject reveals the indifference value X (respectively the value of Y), leading to two 
equalities: 
indifference 1: g(p) u(X) + g(l-p) u{r) = gip) u(x) + g(l-p) u{R) (5) 
indifference 2: g(p) u(Y) + g(l-p) u{r) = g(p) u(y) + g(l-p) u(R) (6) 
then: u(X) - u(x) = u(Y) - u(y) (7) 
Thus, the two-lottery equivalent method (two-LE-method) provides an equality of utility 
differences that can be used for utility elicitation without prior knowledge of the function 
gip). The advantage of this method is that the analyst does not need to know exactly the 
probabilities; (s)he can just refer to probabilities by verbal expressions like 
favourable/unfavourable states of nature. 
We used this method to propose a complete procedure of preference functional 
elicitation. The procedure is based on the prescriptive decision analysis framework (Keeney 
and Raiffa, 1976, p. 188) but we applied it as a descriptive farmers' decision analysis. 
Pre-analysis and preparation of the questionnaire 
First we explained the objective of the questionnaire to the farmer. We introduced the 
individual interview by a small set of general questions regarding (i) types and effects of 
risk, (ii) his/her risk perception, (iii) strategies to respond to risks. This should make the 
farmer more comfortable with the concepts that would be offered to him/her, such as 
lotteries or probabilities. On the other hand this permitted us to use the farmer's situation 
and vocabulary to describe a hypothetical decision context. 
Next, we asked the farmer the worst and best net income (s)he had obtained over the 
past ten years, and his/her actual net income. We denoted these values by z0, z and za. We 
assess the farmer's preference in the net income range [z0, z ]• The actual income za was 
used to choose fixed reference incomes r and R which were defined as: r = (1 - 8)za and R 
= (1 + 5)z„ , 8 was taken equal to 10%, the value at which net income variation became 
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sensitive to the farmer. Thus, the reference incomes r, R were chosen on the right-hand 
side of the interval estimation. These values should be significant for the farmer so that the 
consequences are represented as realistic values. 
Elicitation of utility function u(z) 
The second set of questions was designed to encode some quantitative points of the utility 
function in the income range defined. For this, we used the two-LE-method described 
below. We presented the farmer with a series of 'chaining' lottery comparisons (5 to 10 
questions). First, the respondent was asked to specify the income Z\ that made him/her 
indifferent to the lotteries [zy, Vi; r] and [z0, Vi; R]. Afterwards, we asked for income z2 
that made him indifferent to lotteries [z2, Vi; r] and [zu Vi; K\. Logically, any z, was 
defined such that the farmer revealed indifference: [z,-+1, Vz; r] ~ [z„ Vi; R]. This process 
was continued until a sufficiently wide range of incomes had been covered.1 
From the lottery equivalent data generated by the successive indifferences, the following 
simultaneous equation system could be obtained: 
u{zi) - u(z0) = M utiles (8) 
u(z2) - u(zi) = jU 
u(zt) - u(ziA) = n 
u(zn) - u(znA) = ju 
To solve this system of n equations in n + 2 unknown variables, we needed to assign an 
arbitrary utility value to incomes z0, u(z0) = 0 and // = l/n. This was justified by the fact 
that utility was unique up to an affine transformation. Then, the utilities index 
corresponding to the incomes elicited (zt, z2 >••• >z*) could be calculated. 
Elicitation of the probability transformation function 
Step 3 in the elicitation procedure was determining the probability transformation function 
g(p). That is, we used a standard CE-method for different value of probabilities p=0.l, 0.2 
, , 0.9. We asked for a certainty equivalent CEp that made the farmer indifferent to a 
lottery [z0 , p, z ]. As we knew the utility function from the step before, we can write: 
u(CE) = g(p) u(z0) + d-gip)) u(z) (9) 
then: 
u(CE )-u(z') 
8(P) = —r^—rr- (10) 
u(zQ)-u(z ) 
Fixed probabilities are expressed in terms of the percentage chance that climatic 
conditions are unfavourable. 
Assuming that probabilities were equally likely (a 50 % chance that economic/climatic conditions are 
favourable/unfavourable), the farmer was asked to specify his/her preference for farm I or farm II, which 
were assumed to be identical to his/her actual farm. If farm I was preferred (respectively farm II was 
preferred) we reduced income zj by decrement (respectively increment) of 5 or 10 kF until indifference was 
established. 
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Choice of utility and transformation function forms 
There exist many alternative forms of utility functions such as exponential, logarithmic, 
quadratic or power functions. The choice of the function form is critical because it can 
affect the model formulation and results. However, function choice should not be only a 
mathematical artifice with some desirable proprieties such as continuity, monotonically 
increasing and strictly positive marginal utility income. It should be based on individual 
characteristics of decreasing, constant or increasing risk aversion (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976). In our case, we suggest a modified Saha's utility function (see Saha, 1993) for 
formal and theoretical justification for the utility form). The expo-power utility function can 
be expressed as: 
H(Z) = 
\-exp(-ß(z-z0Y) 
l -expC-Az ' -Zo) ' ) 
where ß and <j> represent parameters with restrictions /? * 0, <l> * 0 and ß<$> > 0. The expo-
power utility function represents the advantage that it exhibits decreasing, constant or 
increasing absolute and relative risk aversion. Therefore, no additional qualitative analysis 
on risk preference structure was necessary. The expo-power utility exhibits decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA) when ^ < 1, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) when 
0 = 1, increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) when <f> > 1. 
We followed the usual custom of projecting from a difference between the lower and 
higher incomes. The utility points [z, u(z)] elicited in step 2, the specified range of income, 
were completely specified by the best-fitting parameters ß and (j>. 
In the same manner, a specific parametric form was chosen for the probability 
transformation function: 
This function form was first introduced by Quiggin and applied by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) in the cumulative prospect theory. An advantage of the form for g(p) 
above is that with a single parameter it satisfies a mixture of concave and convex patterns 
(S-shaped curve). Notice that À = 1 implies g(p) = p, corresponding to linear weighting 
(EU model). The probability transformation points \p, g(p)] derived in step 3 were used to 
fit parameter A. 
Two steps could be added to the procedure described above. The first one is a qualitative 
analysis to identify the forms of the utility and transformation functions. This was omitted 
and replaced by choosing flexible analytic functions exhibiting different risk attitudes. The 
second one is a consistency check to ensure consistent responses to the different lotteries in 
steps 2 and 3. Practically, we performed this by dividing the range of possible income [z0, 
Z ] into three nested intervals (low, medium and high), thus permitting a standard lottery to 
be built for each interval. The farmer was asked for the certainty equivalents of the three 
lotteries. 
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4 Experiment and estimation results 
To explore the practicability of the procedure, we used it to estimate preference functionals 
of sixteen farmers from the Biterrois region (South-France). The farmers were interviewed 
through personal visits on their farms. This region was surveyed by Cemagref (1994) as a 
part of broader research on irrigation adoption in the region, where wine production is 
prevailing. Irrigation has often been a major step associated with a diversification process to 
produce crops other than grapes. This study was conducted to produce a typology of the 
132 farms which were included in the sample. The typology is based on knowledge of some 
social, physical and economic characteristics. It distinguishes nine homogeneous farm 
types, which represent the main farming enterprises of this region well. For simplification, 
the nine types are summarized in three groups (Table 1): a specialized grape growers 
group, a mixed group of growers with wine production and some diversified crops and a 
diversified group without wine production. Diversified production mainly concerns cereals 
and fruit trees. We have selected some representative farmers from each group. 
Table 1. Data on the study farms 
Farmer Cultivation practices Farm size Mean net Cemagref No. of farms 
group (ha) income sample interviewed 
A Specialized grape growers 10-35 325 98 8 
(small farms) 
B 'Mixed' growers, improved 20 - 50 631 18 3 
wine production and 
few/intermediate diversified 
crops 
C Diversifiers, highly 40 - 250 1256 16 5 
diversified crops, no grapes 
To motivate the farmers, the questionnaire referred to their real situations. The use of 
farm context, net income, and farmer vocabulary designation to explain risky perspective 
was designed to provide farmers with a sense of 'realism' in responding to the decision 
lotteries. The farmer was simply asked to respond as realistically as possible as to how they 
would react if faced with the particular alternative. Also, the farmers were encouraged to 
check whether they were satisfied with the responses. It was explained to them that they 
had to understand that there were no objectively correct preferences, and that the preference 
had to represent their subjective feelings. If the farmer gave some response which was 
incoherent (for example, the same values to two different games), we informed him of the 
error and invited him to reconsider his response. This was designed to inform the farmer on 
inconsistencies and to avoid bias. Some farmers who were more familiar with the concepts 
of risk and probabilities give more useful responses, other farmers retreated after some 
questions. To make the questionnaire easier to understand, the lotteries were drawn 
schematically on paper and presented to the farmer with oral explanations. Each interview 
took about 1.5 hours. 
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters of u(z) and g(p) functions, for the Biterrois 
farmers. Joint estimation was done by a nonlinear regression program which employs a 
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Levenberg-Marquardt numerical method of nonlinear least squares. The flexible form of 
expo-power utility presents a disadvantage in that the two utility parameters in comparison 
to the number of elicited values (4 to 10 observations) can lead to overfitting. 
Table 2. Utility and probability transformation parameters for the 16 farmers interviewed 
Farmer 
number 
A.l 
A.2 
A.3 
A.4 
A.5 
A.6 
A.7 
A.8 
B.l 
B.2 
B.3 
C.l 
C.2 
C.3 
C.4 
C.5 
Subj. 
actual 
income 
la 
50 
90 
90 
100 
170 
180 
190 
240 
200 
200 
250 
200 
220 
300 
350 
400 
Subj. 
interval 
income 
(kF/year) 
bo- z*] 
[0, 50] 
[0, 100] 
[10, 150] 
[0, 100] 
[0, 170] 
[0, 200] 
[0, 200] 
[0, 300] 
[0, 200] 
[0, 300] 
[0, 300] 
[0, 250] 
[10, 300] 
[-100, 400] 
[0, 400] 
[100, 500] 
«(z) 
parameter estimates 
(std errors) 
ß </> 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.002)* 
0.013 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.002)** 
0.015 
(0.0132)* 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.157 
(0.078) 
0.006 
(0.0018)** 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.001)* 
0.342 
(0.070) 
4.910 E-3 
(1.650 E-3) 
8.014 E-5 
(4.128 E-5) 
1.148 E-5 
(0.704 E-5) 
8.735 E-4 
(4.812 E-4) 
9.716 E-5 
(5.022 E-5)* 
0.941 
(0.135) 
0.814 
(0.071)** 
0.904 
(0.063)** 
0.969 
(0.120)** 
0.969 
(0.306)* 
1.147 
(0.352)* 
0.417 
(0.049)** 
1.040 
(0.082)** 
0.988 
(0.072)** 
1.096 
(0.059)** 
0.467 
(0.151) 
1.128 
(0.098)** 
1.928 
(0.342)** 
2.113 
(0.373)** 
1.167 
(0.398)* 
1.573 
(0.169)** 
8(P) 
parameter 
estimate 
(std errors) 
X 
0.922 
(0.058)** 
0.762 
(0.077)** 
0.952 
(0.176)* 
0.994 
(0.150)* 
0.628 
(0.041)** 
1.438 
(0.073)** 
0.843 
(0.045)** 
0.867 
(0.137)* 
1.987 
(0.258)** 
0.860 
(0.040)** 
2.145 
(0.261)** 
1.511 
(0.084)* 
2.231 
(0.191)** 
1.270 
(0.288)** 
1.113 
(0.04)** 
0.884 
(0.136)** 
The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors 
1%, (*) for less than 5% and no asterisks for more than 59 
freedom depend on the number of utility points elicited, which 
adjusted R coefficients obtained is more than 0.87 
(**) indicates a significance level of less than 
I significance. For u(z) estimation, degrees of 
varied between 3 and 9. For all regressions the 
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A first overview of estimation results shows that the hypothesis of expected utility can be 
rejected for most farmers. Many probability transformation functions are significantly non-
linear (Â * 1). 
Following Quiggin (1993), quasi-concave utility u(z) and S-shaped transformation g(p) 
function display a mixture of 'total' risk averse and risk-seeking behaviour. However, 
regarding utility parameters values, a quasi-concave function shows that all farmers seem to 
be risk averse relative to incomes.2 Most farmers from groups A and B (specialized grape 
growers and mixed growers) exhibit an 'outcome' decreasing absolute risk aversion ((/>< 1) 
with respect to probability weighting. Farmers (A.l), (A.4), (A.8) and (B.l) display more 
outcome-CARA than outcome-DARA (0 very close to 1). Diversifiers (group C) exhibit 
mostly an outcome-IARA {(<j>> 1) with respect to probability weighting. In contrast, 
positive parameter estimates for ß imply outcome-increasing relative risk aversion for all 
farmers. 
Probability transformation function parameters show that specialized grape growers 
(group A) and 'mixed' growers (group B) had a tendency to be pessimistic (0</l< 1) in the 
sense that they tended to assign more weight to low incomes (by overevaluating associated 
probabilities) and less weight to moderate and high incomes. However, most diversifiers 
tended to assign less weight to low incomes and more to moderate and high incomes 
(parameter X> 1), displaying an optimistic attitude. This provides an intuitive link between 
probability transformation and diversification, since farmers with a 'probabilistic' risk 
attitude (pessimistic) will generally be less attracted by diversification than farmers with a 
less 'probabilistic' risk aversion. A pessimistic attitude in some sense implies a preference 
for 'waiting' (no investment is viewed as a factor of security). In contrast, an optimistic 
attitude implies a preference for diversification. Under the RDEU assumptions, generally 
diversifiers seemed to be less risk averse than the specialized grape growers. The 
contribution of 'probabilistic' risk aversion is more important than 'outcome' risk aversion. 
Figure 1 plots farmers' attitudes in term of outcome risk parameter <j> versus probabilistic 
risk parameter X plan. It can be seen that different farmer groups react differently to risk 
and have various characteristics. These characteristics are in accordance with the group 
characteristics defined. Most specialized grape growers (group A) are classified in the 
window corresponding to 0.42 < (/>< 1 and 0.63 <Â< 1. The exemptions of farmers A.6 and 
A.8, who exhibit </>>l, can explained by their high net incomes relative to the average 
income of the group. Two of the three 'mixed' growers (group B) are classified in the 
window (0.24<(/Kl and K / K 2 . 2 3 ) . Four diversifiers (group C) are classified in the 
north-east window (</>> 1 and A> 1). 
By enforcing a degree of homogeneity within each group of farmers, only a few 
questions need to be added to questionnaires used to asses risk attitudes in the classical way 
in order to obtain an RDEU preference functional for one 'representative' farmer in each 
group. 
2 
This has been confirmed primilary by pre-analysis questions where all farmers gave negative responses to the 
question 'Do you usually buy lottery tickets'. 
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A2 A.5 
Parameter <fc 
Figure 1. Risk attitude parameters distributed over farmers 
The relationships we found between risk attitude classification and a typology based on 
social, physical and economic characteristics are interesting, but further theoretical 
elaboration and more empirical testing are needed. 
5 Conclusions 
In the light of the new development of expected utility theory, a farmers' risk preference 
questionnaire was designed for a pilot study and RDEU functional preferences were 
estimated. RDEU assumptions, the estimated probability transformation functions, were 
significantly nonlinear. It is therefore important to account for farmers' probability 
weighting in modelling their decisions under risk. 
The findings seem consistent with predictions based on previous typology and in 
accordance with a given grouping typology. This means that implementing risk preference 
questionnaires could be an efficient tool to check homogeneity and to determine the 
functional form of the objective function of a representative farmer of each type. Yet, our 
method and testing questionnaire need extended testing with other respondents to evaluate 
any biases due to problems with the elicitation process. In addition to questionnaire biases, 
the number of questions, i.e., elicited points, should be sufficient to avoid the overfitting 
dilemma. The traditional way to handle the fitting problem is to use functional forms which 
are parsimonious in number of parameters, restricting flexibility, but still being flexible 
enough to describe the true utility and probability transformation functions. 
Our study has shown that it was possible to derive arguments from the RDEU model 
empirically. Accordingly, it would be interesting to: (1) extend classical risk programming 
models to the RDEU framework, and (2) consider risk attitudinal characteristics in 
constructing farms typology. 
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Summary 
The objective of this paper is to analyse farmers' chemical use in the French crop sector. 
Our study focuses on two issues which are successively addressed through the estimation of 
a production function and the use of an appropriate testing strategy: farmers' information 
use and the consistency of their input choices with expected utility maximization. We use a 
balanced panel data set drawn from the European Accountancy Data Network for 496 
farmers for the years 1987 to 1990, and analyse these data using the Hansen's Generalized 
Method of Moments statistical framework. 
1 Introduction 
When farmers' pesticide use in the French crop sector is considered, two issues are of 
interest: farmers' (lack of) information use and the consistency of their input choices with 
expected utility maximization. These issues are successively addressed through estimation 
of the production function and the use of an appropriate testing strategy. 
Farmers may use information to reduce the uncertainty they face and to make sounder 
decisions on input use. In the second section we test this hypothesis by using instrumental 
variable techniques and find some evidence against it. The estimates of the production 
function parameters presented in the third section show that pesticides are generally used by 
farmers above their expected profit maximizing level. In the fourth section, we model the 
conditional variance of production to input use to assess the effects of pesticide use on 
production risk. Our econometric results are consistent with a significant risk-reducing 
effect of pesticides on production variance, suggesting that French crop growers use 
pesticides above their profit maximizing level to self-insure their profits. Lastly, we draw 
some conclusions as to our results for farmers' pest management modelling. 
Our empirical work involves a balanced panel data set drawn from the European 
Accountancy Data Network for 496 farmers for the years 1987 to 1990, and relies on 
Hansen's (1982) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) statistical framework. The data 
set considers one aggregate output and three inputs: pesticides, fertilizers and an aggregate 
of all other variable inputs. All variables are measured as Paasche indices and are expressed 
in 1987 French Francs per hectare. The revenue of the selected producers is dominated by 
oilseeds and cereals which are produced by applying intensive cropping technology. More 
details about this data set can be found in Carpentier (1995). Due to space limits, this paper 
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focuses on the presentation of the logic of the inference method and of its main results. 
Further details on the results and on the estimation and testing procedures can be found in 
Carpentier and Weaver (1995) and Carpentier (1995). 
In two related papers, the authors used this data set to study other aspects of agricultural 
production. In Carpentier and Weaver (1997a), they investigated and compared the effects 
of potential heterogeneity biases and of the choice of functional forms on the estimation of 
the marginal productivity of pesticides. In Carpentier and Weaver (1997b), using a different 
inference method, they mainly focused on the potential effects of the omission of the 
variation across time of the production function parameters. 
2 Assessment of producers' information use 
Specification of the microeconometric model 
In empirical studies, a production function is specified as a functional form parameterized 
by a vector of parameters (a0 ) linking yields (y), input use (x) and effects of random events 
(u). If panel data are used, the production function can be specified as follows: 
yil=rj,f(xil,a0) + uil where E[uu] = 0; t=l,...T; i = l,...,N (1) 
The subindices t and i denote the / period and the / farmer respectively. The y term 
represents the i'h farm specific effect. It may embody the influence of farmer's management 
quality (Mundlak, 1961) and/or the effects of omitted or unobservable quasi-fixed factors 
(Chamberlain, 1984). The yt term represents time-specific effects common to all farmers 
such as climatic effects. Equation (1) describes only a technological relationship. In addition 
to (1), we suppose that the following assumptions are satisfied: 
E[uJxil,...,xi,_,] = E[uil) = 0 where t=2,...,T; i = l,...,N (2) 
The production function model defined by (1) and (2) represents a static technology. That 
is, we assume that the crop production dynamics are stable enough to be correctly described 
by the y parameters. Finally, our last assumption is that: 
(y'i ,yt >*',- ) is independently and identically distributed across i = l,...,N 
(3) 
where y, and x, are defined as (y;1 ,...,yiT)' and (xn' ,...,xiT')' respectively with x„ being 
defined as (xlit,...,xKiiy. K is the number of the inputs considered. Given these three basic 
assumptions, the components x~ =(x;],...,*„_,) can be used to construct instruments for uit 
and, as a result, may allow the estimation of OQ under the three weak assumptions given in 
(1) to (3). 
Within this context, two reasons encourage us to check whether or not x,„... ,x,T can also 
be used to construct instruments for the «,-,'s. Obviously, from an econometric point of view 
the answer to this question is crucial. From an economic point of view, the solution to this 
problem may provide some valuable insights concerning farmers' use of information. Along 
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the lines of Chamberlain (1984), we describe briefly the four cases which may typically 
occur: 
Case 1 : E\uu /xkjl 1*0. This conditional moment implies that the farmer i 's input k choices 
are endogenous with respect to uit. The xkil's cannot be included in the construction of 
instruments for the w,/s. This conditional moment suggests that farmer i has got relevant 
information concerning uit and that (s)he is able to use it when deciding on input k. In this 
case, the farmer may have checked the conditions of the land and/or may have used past 
experience and the possible dynamic structure of the uis's (e.g. an autoregressive process) to 
gather information. 
Case 2: E\ui( /xUl ] = 0. This conditional moment implies that, either farmer i does not have 
any information on uit when choosing input k quantity, or does not use the information (s)he 
has in choosing xit. In these two cases, the xkil's can be included in the construction of 
instruments for the M„'S. 
Case 3: E\uil/xkis\ï0 for s>t. This conditional moment indicates that farmers' input k 
choices are to some extent determined by past yields. As explained above, this causality 
relationship may be induced by the fact that farmer i uses past experience and the possible 
dynamic structure of the uis's to produce information on uit. However, this relationship may 
be implied by intertemporal constraints on farmer Fs input choices, such as financial 
constraints. 
Case 4: E\uu/xte] = 0 for s>t. In this case, farmer fs behaviour is static, i.e., not 
influenced by past experience. This conditional moment implies that the xkis's, can be used in 
the construction of instruments for the uit's. 
Testing producers' use of information 
Considering estimation of the parameters of the technology specified, two types of problems 
arise. Given that it is impossible to conduct tests without prior estimates of the model 
parameters considered, the first problem is estimating asunder the minimal assumptions (1) 
to (3). The second one is testing the hypothesis specified in subsection 2.3. 
Estimation of the minimal specification parameters 
Consistent estimation of models (1) to (3) follows from Chamberlain's (1992a) and 
Wooldridge's (1991) applications of Hansen's GMM. The approach allows convenient and 
robust estimation when panel data sets have large N, yet small T. While a small T allows 
direct parameterization of the fixed firm effects by using dummy variables, an alternative 
approach must be taken for the individual effects. 
As explained above, equations (1) and (2) can be combined to specify conditional 
moments of the following form: 
E[y« -r,rJMü)lr,^l\ = £["<< (»o>/, )//,•>*« ] = o> t=\,...,T (4) 
By specifying the conditional moments by x~ and y, and by including yt in the parameter 
set, we implicitly assume that the y and /, terms may be known by farmer i and, as a 
consequence, may affect the input choices. As shown by Mundlak (1961), the omission of 
this possible dependence of the x,'s on the #'s may cause heterogeneity biases. To overcome 
this problem, we use the 'fixed effects' approach defined by Chamberlain (1992a and b) and 
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Wooldridge (1991). That is, the fixed firm effects are eliminated by using a transformation 
of equation (4): 
E\rit(,aa,y,,y,_x)ly„x:,^ E^ia^y,.y,_,)/x~_^ = Q (5) 
where f=2,...,Tand rit (.) is defined in analogy to the first differencing transformation as: 
7, ƒ/,(««) _ 7, f,,(ao) (6) 
r,l{a^7n7,-x) = y„ -ƒ,•<-] 7,-i //,-i(«o) " "" 7,-, fi,-t(a0) 
This transformation allows inference on 0O =(y2,yi jy 1 ,...,/r/yr_i ,« 0 ' ) 'conditional' 
on y even if it is not observed by the econometrician (for identification purposes we impose 
The approach to estimation first exploits (5) to build computable (unconditional) 
orthogonality conditions that are at the core of Hansen's GMM framework. Equation (5) 
implies that vectors of instruments for /-„can be chosen as a known function of x., and à>N 
where this last vector is an (easily computed) root N consistent estimator of some vector of 
parameters co. Usually we have: m = G. If the instruments ( wu(x~,a>N) = wu(a>N)) are 
'rich' enough, they can be used to construct orthogonality conditions that identify 90 our 
parameters of interest. In this case, we have: E[wtl {co)'ru (9)] = 0 if 9=90 and 
£[w«(co)'ru(#)]*0 otherwise (f=2,...,7). Stacking these conditions over t we use the 
resulting orthogonality conditions as a basis of our estimation: 
4w/(ö ,)' r/(<?o)] = 0 where w, = Diag(w,,,....,w,7.) and r, =(ri2,...,rir) 
(7) 
The unconditional moment restrictions above and the law of iterated expectations allow the 
construction of method of moments estimators which minimize a quadratic form in the 
sample counterpart of these restrictions. In this context the efficient GMM estimator of 9 
subject to (7) can be written: 
9N = ,4rgmin Zr,(0)'w,.(S„) n: Iw',(Sv)V,(0) ArgmmG(9,(0N ,QN) 
e 
(8) 
where QN is a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the 
orthogonality conditions (7): Q0 = E[wi(a)'ri(90)rl(90)'wi(co)]. Given an initial root N 
consistent estimator of 90, denoted by ~9N , Q v can be defined as the sample counterpart of 
QQ computed at 0N and a>N . The efficient GMM estimator of 0O : 0N is root N consistent, 
that is, JN(9N -<90)—^->N (O^R^n,1 Royl) where R0 = E[w.,(a))'dr^O^/dO']. A 
consistent estimator of R0 is given by its sample counterpart computed at 6N and aN : RN. 
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This estimator can be used to construct a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix of 6N : 
^ ( ê ^ - U v « ^ ) - 1 where ÙN =^-ftwl(.äNyri(&N)ri(0Ny\vl(oiN) (9) 
A" N '=i 
When ~9N, an initial estimator of 60, is available, a convenient and asymptotically 
equivalent estimator of 0N can easily be computed. Because it can (asymptotically) replace 
its corresponding GMM estimator, we denote this one-step efficient estimator by 6N . It is 
given by (Newey, 1985; Wooldridge, 1991): 
9N ~^N ~CN where cN = RN n ; !* v R.'Q-^tw^.yrß,) (10) 
where RN is the sample counterpart of R0 at mN and 6N . An important advantage of the 
estimation approach outlined above is that, under any form of heteroskedasticity and 
temporal dependence of the uit, hN and ÙN are consistent estimators of Q0 (Hansen, 1982; 
Newey and West, 1987). This allows estimation and inference which are robust with 
respect to any form of heteroskedasticity and temporal dependence of the uit 
Test of the hypotheses related to information use 
Considering the discussion of farmers' information use provided in the first part of section 
2, three types of hypotheses may be tested. The first one is related to farmers' knowledge 
of Yh which is not considered here. In this paper we assume only that farmer i knows 
his/her own Yi- That is, we assume that farmers' input choices are correlated with the fixed 
firm effects. Here, we concentrate the discussion on inference related to two other types of 
hypotheses: (1) the validity of the minimal model specification (1) to (3), and (2) farmers' 
information use as considered in the four cases described above. 
The validity of the minimal model specification may be tested along the lines of Hansen. 
Hansen's (1982) approach is to test the validity of the orthogonality conditions used for the 
construction of the GMM estimators. To do so, he recognizes that some of linear 
combinations of these orthogonality conditions may be imposed in estimation to identify the 
model parameters. The excess conditions, which exist when the number of the initial (non-
redundant) orthogonality conditions exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated, can 
be viewed as overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the model is 
correctly specified, H0: E[wi(a>)'rl(Oa)] = 0, these overidentifying restrictions would not 
be statistically different from zero. The Hansen's (1982) test statistic is simply defined as 
the objective function used to construct the GMM estimator (8) taken at QK , 6N and 5A, : 
G(6N,Û)N,ÙN) . This test statistic, under the null hypothesis, converges in distribution to 
a centred %2 distribution with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
overidentifying restrictions (i.e., the number of orthogonality conditions used to build 6N 
minus its number of elements). By design, this test procedure considers both the functional 
form specification and the validity of the instruments. 
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Addressing the farmers' information use question requires additional formalization. 
Consider first the case of input k. We are interested in checking whether or not at period s 
farmers choose input k quantities using information they have on current or past yields. 
Consider the hypothesis: farmers do not use information on «„ to decide xkis. Given that our 
panel data set has small T, we cannot estimate consistently the uit's individually because we 
cannot estimate consistently the #'s. As a result, we cannot check the validity of 
orthogonality conditions of the form: E[xkisull(00)] = 0. Considering that the minimal 
model is correctly specified, this can only be statistically tested by testing the validity of the 
following null hypotheses: 
Ho*: E[xkl/il(0o)] = O where 2 <t < T and / - 1 <*< T (Ha) 
Hm+l„: E[XusM(0o)] = O where 2<t<T and t<s<T (Hb) 
That is, at time 5 farmers' input k choices are not correlated with «„and, H/M or w,-,+ 1. Note 
that writing H0kls we restrict ourselves to the case where: co =00 . Following Newey (1985) 
and Wooldridge (1990), we derive a statistic to test H0kIS by the use of the following term: 
1 N (12) 
* Iriv 
äff 
where B0 = (R0'Q"1 R0)~] R0'Q.0]. It can be shown that, under H0 and H0kts, the term 
JN L0kts converges to a univariate centered normal distribution when H0 holds but H0kts 
does not. This term and its asymptotic variance can easily be consistently estimated. L0kts 
can be estimated by its sample counterpart at QN : Lmi<. The construction of an estimator 
for f [ 4 J „ ] , say ^[Z,,,,,,], is, computationally more tedious but follows the same logic (see, 
e.g., Wooldridge (1990) or Gouriéroux et al. (1990)). We can then construct a test statistic 
based on the normalized quadratic form of -IN Lokls to check the validity of H0kts: 
<? = N f' V \l T' î (13) 
Given the notation above, a consistent test of H0kts against the alternative hypothesis: 
E\xufu(0o)\*0 a t confidence level a can be defined by the test statistic Smix associated 
with the critical region {NL'm, VN [Lokls]L'Ntls > x]_a (1)}. 
Results 
Our empirical application uses a translog form in the three inputs considered for ƒ(.). This 
functional form was chosen because of its flexibility. Thus (1) can be rewritten as: 
y„ =/, rfexp(Ax /,a0) + w/, (14) 
where the vectors Go and Ax„ are given by a0 = ( a , , . . . , « ^ , « , , , . . . , « ^ ^ , , . . . , « ^ ) and 
to» = (lnx\u ,••••, In xKll, In xu, In xu,,..., Inxkll In xk,{ik)il,..., In xKil In xKII ) , respectively. 
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Thus, the vector of parameters of interest 6Q has 12 elements. This vector is estimated 
under (1) to (3) by use of the one-step efficient GMM estimator 9N based on the 
orthogonality conditions (7): £[w,.'r,.(tf0)] = 0. The instruments w, for the r,(.) are chosen as 
wi = s~ = Diag(s~2,...,s~) where w„ = s~ = (1, Axn,Ax/2,...,Ax„_2). As a result, the 
construction of the estimator 0N is based on 30 orthogonality conditions. The first-step 
estimator of 6Q is simply defined as a Non-Linear Two-Stage Least Squares estimator using 
the Wj's as instruments for the w,'s. This estimator is root N consistent (Hansen, 1982). 
For the test of the assumptions underlying the minimal specification, the estimated value 
of 5;V is 13.76. As a consequence, H0 cannot be rejected at a reasonable confidence level: 
P(%2 (18) > 13.76) s 0.74 and we can conclude that (1) to (3) are acceptable. 
Given that H0 can be accepted, the test procedure developed above should lead us to 
reject H0kls only if the corresponding orthogonality condition does not hold: 
E\xkl/It (#„)] *• 0. The results show that each of the hypotheses H0kts (where 2 < t < T and 
/ - 1 < s < T ) cannot be rejected at a confidence level inferior or equal to 5 % (this 
confidence level was chosen by e.g., West, 1987). However, these hypotheses can 
generally be accepted with a much higher confidence level. Hence, these results suggest 
that the French crop growers' attitude toward variable input decisions is essentially static. 
The random variable uit outcome does not affect the current and subsequent choices of 
farmer ('. In this case, we can reasonably assume that farmers' input choices xit are strictly 
exogenous with respect to uis conditional on the fixed effects y, (Chamberlain, 1984): 
The term yj,f„ (a0) can thus be considered as the expected yield of farmer i at time t. 
That is, at time t, there no information (concerning the mean yield) available to farmer i 
other than the deterministic relationship linking input use and firm effect to yield. The first 
conclusion of these tests is that farmers act as if they have no information on uit. That is, 
the farmers of our sample face output risk based on uit when choosing their input quantities. 
This point is addressed in the fourth section. In the next section we consider the 
econometric estimation of «Q. 
3 Estimation of the expected yield model parameters 
Estimation method under the strict exogeneity assumption 
The results of the tests described above show that we can construct an estimator of 6>0 on 
the basis of the conditional moments (15). Chamberlain (1992a and b) has shown that using 
a fixed effect approach allows the construction of efficient estimators of 0Q. That is, because 
the firm's fixed effects are not consistently estimable, use of the conditional moments: 
%. (0o)/x J = £[r, (0O )/*,,_,, x,,] = 0 (16) 
is warranted. Chamberlain (1987, 1992a) has also shown how an efficient estimator (i.e. 
efficient among the classes of the root N estimators) of 0Q can be constructed on the basis of 
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(16) within the GMM framework. However, the construction of these instruments requires 
use of an ad hoc parameterization of £[ / , /* , ] or nonparametric methods (Chamberlain, 
1992a). 
The approach chosen in this paper is much simpler, and has been suggested by 
Wooldridge (1991). We simply chose the instruments which are the closest to the optimal 
instruments and for which we can easily construct a root N consistent estimator. Following 
the recommendations of Wooldridge (1991), we adopt instruments of the form 
w, (0O ) = Diag(wra (<90),..., wrlr(6>0 )) where: 
w„(0„)S act 
(17) 
to construct a one-step efficient GMM estimator based on (16). Hence, the construction of 
the one-step efficient GMM estimator 6N is based on 30 orthogonality conditions. In this 
case, 0N , the first step estimator of 0O, is simply defined as the following Non-Linear Two-
Stage Least Squares estimator using for the «,'s as instruments defined as 
s, =Diag(sn,...,siT) with s„ =[l,Ax,,,...,Ax,7 ] . 
Results and implications 
The estimated Hansen's overidentification test statistic is equal to 19.20. Given that the 
number of overidentifying restriction is equal to 18, we cannot reject the validity of the 
orthogonality conditions underlying the construction of 0N P{%2 (18) > 19.20) = 0.40. That 
is, neither the assumption of the strict conditional exogeneity of farmers' input choices nor 
that of the translog functional form for the conditional mean yield model are rejected by our 
data set. 
The results indicate that all inputs are applied above their expected profit maximizing 
level at the sample mean point. The estimated expected productivity elasticity of each input 
is inferior to the share of their corresponding expenses in the total product value (0.11 for 
pesticides, 0.12 for fertilizers and 0.14 for the other variable inputs). Moreover, the results 
show that fertilizers and pesticides are (slightly) coopérant in the Rader (1968) sense. This 
was expected since the farmers in the data set employ intensive cropping technologies 
(Carpentier, 1995). These results seem in accordance with views of French agricultural 
scientists. 
Two further points must be discussed. First, the estimates show that the expected 
marginal productivity of the other variable inputs in aggregate is increasing. This surprising 
result may highlight the heterogeneity of this aggregate which includes very different inputs 
such as seeds, energy, etc. Second, the estimated expected marginal productivity of 
fertilizer is rather small. An abundant literature has been devoted to this usual 
'underestimation' of the marginal productivity of fertilizers without providing a definitive 
solution. 
Following Feder (1979), the fact that pesticides are used above their profit maximizing 
level (at the sample mean point) suggests that farmers' choices of pesticides would be in 
accord with expected utility maximization if these inputs actually reduce risk. We 
investigate this last hypothesis in the next section. 
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4 Estimation of the yield variance model parameters 
The Just and Pope specification 
Along the lines of Just and Pope (1978), we specify a function linking the conditional 
variance of production to input use, in order to assess the effects of pesticides on production 
risk: 
u^e.YiCT^x^ß») where % , / W / ] = % , ] = 0, E[£J,jx,,y\ = E[el] = 1 (18) 
This specification assumes that the firm's fixed effect on mean yield also affects the 
variance of yield. This assumption implies that the fixed effect represents farmer fs target 
yield. However, this assumption is necessary to estimate ß since we do not impose absence 
of the serial correlation of the eit (Wooldridge, 1990). It should be noted that this 
specification includes a special case, the Griffiths and Anderson's (1982) specification, 
which is usually applied in this context. Thus, its estimation by weighted least squares may 
result in estimates that reflect heterogeneity biases (see Carpentier, 1995). 
Estimation of the yield variance model parameters 
Using (18) and (15), we use the following conditional moments to provide the basis for 
estimation 
S0 =(al,ß0'y : E[yf,/ynx,] = y;[y,f„(a0)2 +<rlh,,(ß0)2], t = \,...,T 
(19) 
Applying the fixed effects approach described above (see section 2), we use the following 
transformation to eliminate the y] terms: 
E[v„(Ûo,So)/yl,xl]=E[vll(Û0,o0)/x,] = 0, t = 2,...,T (20) 
where, by analogy with the function r,,(), the v„(.) function is defined as: 
(21) 
Stacking these conditions over t, the conditional moment used to build an estimator of 50 
are given by E[vi(60,S0)/x^ = 0. In analogy with our choice of instruments for the 
conditional mean model estimation we chose instruments wv,(0N,SN) of the form: 
Diag(wvn(èN,'ôN),...,wvjr(dN,ôs)) where £v is an initial estimator of SQ , 6N is the 
estimator of 9Q constructed in section 3 and: 
108 
v„(0*A) = 
Carpentier and Weaver 
CO' 
(22) 
X^-IJV/Ä-IOZN) 2 +o\h„-A'ßs)~ 
Using the estimators 5N and 6>Ä , the efficient GMM estimator of 00 based on the 
orthogonality conditions E[wvi (0O,50)' v,. (0O,S0)] = 0 can be defined as: 
SN = Arg min I>v , (£„,£„) v,(Ä„,<J) *?; Ï w v ( ( Ö w , ^ ) v,(èN,6) 
(23) 
where ¥„ is an estimator of T0 ^Ffwv,^,, , J v ) , v,(6 ' v ,^ 0 ) | = K[wv,(é»0,(yo)'v,(6'N,J0)]. 
This expression explicitly takes into account the fact that 6N is an estimator of 90 which 
does not appear in the expression of the instruments. Gouriéroux et al. (1990) have shown 
that a consistent estimator of % ( 4^ ) can be constructed as the sample counterpart of % 
at 0N and öN by noting that we have: 
T 0 = K XwV,(ö0,<50) ,V,(Ö0^0)/V^+4M'V,(Ö„^„)'^V/(ö0,<y0)/^ö']V77(Ö;v-Ö0) 
(24a) 
and 
[N(èN-eis) = {A0'^Aoy Ao'T-[~iwri(0Jr,(0o) + or(\) 
with 
A = £ v,(e„SJ âv,(0o,SJ/âff] and S0 = £ [w , (0 jV , (6>> , (0Jw , (0 o ) 
Results and implications 
Our application uses a Cobb-Douglas form in the three inputs considered for h{.). Thus, uit 
may be rewritten as follows: ull=s]lyl a0h(x:l,ß0) = sjlyl a0 exp(ln x„ '/?0 ) where 
ßa = (/?,,...,ßK) is a vector of three elements. The one-step efficient estimator 
asymptotically equivalent to the GMM estimator Ss is constructed as described above (see 
section 2) with an initial Non-Linear Two-Stage Least Squares estimator using as 
instruments for v(- the matrix qi = Diag(ql2,...,qa._]) where qit is defined as the vector 
(l,Axn,...,AxlT) with Ax,., being defined as follows: 
(In xhl ,...,lnxKil; xhl In xUl,..., xKI, \nxKil ; In x„, /x,„ ,..., In xKi, jxKil ) It is based on 12 
orthogonality conditions. 
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The main results are reported in Table 1. Hansen's (1982) test statistic estimate is equal 
to 15.06. As a consequence, the model of the conditional variance of yield can be accepted 
with only a low confidence level: P( j 2 (8) > 15.06) = 0.07 . However, the results show that 
pesticides are risk-decreasing inputs (measured by their effect on yield variance). A 1% 
increase in pesticide use is estimated to lead to a decrease in yield variance of 3.7%. This 
effect is statistically significant. The fertilizers and the other inputs are not found to affect 
yield variance significantly. 
Table 1. Selected parameter estimates of the Just and Pope (1978) production function (and 
asymptotic standard deviation) 
Conditional parameters 
Conditional mean translog 
first-order parameters (a) 
Conditional error structure 
Cobb-Douglas parameters (ß) 
Pesticides 
0.092 
(0.031) 
-1.857 
(0.539) 
Input coefficient estimates 
(estimated standard deviation) 
Fertilizers 
0.033 
(0.018) 
-0.291 
(0.566) 
Other variable inputs 
0.107 
(0.014) 
0.596 
(0.356) 
5 Concluding remarks 
In the context of agricultural production analysis, the advantage of panel data over single 
cross-sections or time series is twofold. 
First, the combination of cross-sections and time series allows examination of the 
dynamics of producers' behaviour even if the observation period is limited. In particular, 
although our panel data set covers only four years, it allows us to test some important 
aspects of farmers' behaviour dynamics. From an econometric point of view, the serial 
dimension of a panel data set allows the use of instrumental variable techniques to 
circumvent some problems related to the endogeneity of some variables. The 
implementation of these techniques does not require the use of 'external' variables able to 
identify the parameters of interest. This is due to the availability of predetermined lagged 
variables as long as the dynamics of the technology considered satisfies certain conditions 
(see, e.g., Hall and Mairesse, 1995). 
Second, panel data allow inference and estimation that is robust regarding the 
heterogeneity that is often present in microeconomic data. This advantage, first pointed out 
by Mundlak (1961) in an agricultural production context, has not been considered so far in 
this paper. However, some studies conducted with this data set show that the omission of 
this possible heterogeneity and its implications on the choice among inference methods is of 
considerable importance. In particular, this omission would result in the rejection of the 
strict exogeneity hypothesis, and in the conclusion that the sample farmers use pesticides 
below their expected profit maximizing level (Carpentier and Weaver, 1997a and b; 
Carpentier, 1995). 
The results presented in this paper provide some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the French crop producers' pesticide choices are consistent with the expected risk-averse 
utility maximization. Obviously, further investigation is needed to confirm this point. In 
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particular, the troublesome estimated effects of the fertilizers and of the other variable 
inputs on the expected yield lead us to be cautious in the interpretation of our results. 
However, the inference method which has been used in this paper seems to provide enough 
promising results to constitute a strong empirical background for future studies on farmers' 
behaviour toward input use. 
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Summary 
Considering risk in dairy farming is important not only for major investment decisions. It is 
also important to take into account the risks involved for various day-to-day decisions, such as 
which sire (bull) to use for breeding the cows. The accumulated effect of these decisions may 
have a significant influence on overall income. In this paper we describe workshops that 
focused on assessing the risk attitude of dairy farmers with respect to both income and sire 
selection. Two commonly used methods were applied to estimate farmers' utility functions: 
ELRO and ELCE. In total, 49 dairy producers participated in the workshops. The results of 
the study indicate that farmers are less risk averse with respect to sire selection than to general 
income decisions. Furthermore, the differences in risk attitude between farmers are 
considerable, and, as follow-up research showed, risk attitudes do not show much consistency 
over time. The decision context seems to have an impact on risk attitude. 
1 Introduction 
Agriculture is constantly changing. Lack of certainty about the future creates risk, which may 
be defined as exposure to the chance of injury or loss. Profit can be viewed as a return on 
managing risk. Of course, farmers have always understood this and have taken account of risk 
in their own ways in running their farms. For many decisions, such as important decisions in 
farm business or government, there is a good deal of uncertainty and there are important 
differences between good and bad consequences. Taking risk into account can also be 
important in various day-to-day farm management decisions, such as feeding livestock, 
fertilizing land and sire selection, where the accumulated effect of choices may have a 
significant impact on overall business performance. For all these decisions, therefore, risk 
may be considered very significant. 
Sire selection is an important activity on dairy farms. It influences both production and 
income. Moreover, it is a decision which most farmers are interested in and on which they 
usually spend quite some time. The risk attitude of the farmer has a significant effect on sire 
selection. There are some computer programs available that try to find an optimal trade-off 
between profit and risk involved in breeding. Results of these programs suggest that risk-
seeking or risk-loving farmers in the Netherlands should use about three different sires to 
breed their cows, while risk-averse farmers should use at least ten different sires to breed the 
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same number of cows (Wind, 1992). Other personal and farm specific characteristics have an 
important influence on sire selection as well. 
This paper presents the results of a research project that was initiated to gain more insight 
into the process and backgrounds of farmers' decision making with respect to risk in income 
and in sire selection. Three workshops were organized in the Netherlands with in total 49 
participating farmers. The workshops included various kinds of exercises focused on sire 
selection and on farm management in general. Examples are exercises on breeding goals, 
information needs for sire selection, computer exercises on sire selection, and decision cases 
on risk attitude regarding income and sire selection. 
In this paper, the outline of the sire selection workshops is presented and discussed first, 
after which the results are presented. Special attention is paid to differences in farmers' risk 
attitude with respect to income and sire selection. The consistency of the farmers' risk attitude 
over time was studied in a follow-up research project, of which the major findings are also 
reported in this paper. 
2 Material and methods 
Definition and measurement of risk attitude 
In agricultural decision making, imperfect knowledge arising mainly from unpredictable 
variability leads to risk. Two issues are important to the concept of rational choice under risk 
(Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson, 1997): the decision makers' beliefs about the uncertainty 
they face, and their preferences for possible consequences. Beliefs can be measured as 
subjective probabilities. Preferences can be encoded via Bernoullian utility functions. An 
optimal risky decision is defined as one that maximizes the decision maker's subjective 
expected utility (SEU). The SEU model may be used in both prescriptive and descriptive 
analyses of risky choice. 
In defining the relevant terms, we follow Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) and 
Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997). A decision involves a choice by a person amongst a 
set of alternative actions (or acts). The consequences of the action selected depend on the 
outcomes of uncertain events or uncertain quantities. Because the consequences are risky, 
each action open to the decision maker can be viewed as a risky prospect. The decision maker 
is assumed to hold beliefs about the occurrence of the uncertain events bearing on his decision 
as well as to have preferences for possible consequences. A rational decision is therefore 
defined as one that is consistent with the decision maker's beliefs and preferences. 
It is commonly observed that people do not base decisions under uncertainty on expected 
monetary value (EMV) of risky consequences of alternative actions. Most people opt for a 
choice with sure monetary consequences over a choice with a slightly higher EMV but 
involving risk (such as US$100 for sure or US$500 with a probability of 0.25). Bernoulli 
developed a non-linear utility function which can be used to encode an individual's preference 
for monetary consequences such that risky choice would be properly based on SEU. 
An important notion in measurement of preferences is the certainty equivalent (CE). The 
CE of a risky prospect is that sure value, in terms of the measure (often monetary) of 
consequences being used, which the decision maker is just willing to accept in lieu of the 
risky prospect (Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson, 1997). If more of the outcome is always 
preferred to less, as with monetary outcomes, it is useful to compare CE with EMV of a 
prospect. When CE is less than EMV, the decision maker is said to be risk averse; if CE is 
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greater than EMV, the decision maker is said to be risk preferring. The difference between 
EMV and CE is called the risk premium for the prospect. The case where CE equals EMV 
(i.e., risk premium is zero) is the special and relatively rare case of indifference to risk. These 
three cases can also be distinguished in terms of the shape of utility functions. In the risk-
averse case the utility function is concave. In the risk-neutral case the utility function is a 
straight line, while in the risk-preference case it is convex. 
A measure that can be used to capture the shape of the utility function in order to classify 
decision makers with respect to risk attitude is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion (r(x)). It is defined as the negative ratio of the second and first derivatives of the 
utility function u(x); i.e., r(x) = -u"(x) I u'(x). The Pratt-Arrow coefficient is positive for risk 
aversion and negative for risk preference (Pratt, 1964; Raskin and Cochran, 1986). 
The ELCE (Equally Likely risky prospects and finding its Certainty Equivalent) method is 
a simple method to elicit the risk attitude of a decision maker (Anderson, Dillon and 
Hardaker, 1977). A basic element in ELCE is to find CEs for a series of hypothetical 50/50 
lotteries with risky consequences. The first step is to find the CE for the 50/50 lottery with 
the best and worst possible outcomes of the decision problem. The next step is to find the CE 
of each of the two 50/50 lotteries involving the first-established CE and the best and worst 
possible outcomes. This process of establishing utility points is continued until sufficient CEs 
are elicited to plot the utility function. For more details, the reader is referred to Anderson, 
Dillon and Hardaker (1977) and Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997). 
Another method to calibrate the decision maker's utility function (over the range a to z, 
with a<z) is the ELRO (Equally Likely but Risky Outcomes) method, also described in detail 
by Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977). The ELRO method is started by selecting a 
reference interval, involving two monetary outcomes y and x (with x<y). Then the decision 
maker is presented with the hypothetical 50/50 lottery: there are two choices a{ (a 50% 
chance of outcome x and a 50% chance of outcome b), and a2 (with a 50% chance of outcome 
y and a 50% chance of outcome a). Then the value of b is varied until indifference is found 
between the risky prospects ax and a2. This process is repeated with the newly established 
value of b in place of a to find a further indifference value c. The sequence of further lotteries 
presented to the decision maker provides the points on the utility curve (Alderfer, 1994). 
Research method and data collection 
Workshops were organized to determine the risk attitude of dairy farmers with respect to 
income and sire selection. They were run in February 1993, from 7:00 until 11:00 p.m. The 
workshop program and supporting materials centred around exercises and computer programs 
that encouraged active participation. In developing our workshops, we made fruitful use of the 
material of a more general workshop described by King et al. (1992). Twelve to fifteen 
farmers participated in each workshop 
Prior to each workshop, participants completed a worksheet that provided summary 
information about their farm operations and their information systems. After the introduction, 
during which the objectives and the time schedule were explained, the workshop began with 
participants introducing themselves and sharing some of their responses to questions on the 
farm information worksheet. The workshop had two major sections. The first one focused on 
the more general aspects of management, assumed to form the basis of the decision-making 
process of the farmer. This section included five exercises to help the participating dairy 
farmers define their business goals and management. Two exercises were focused on 
assessing the risk attitude for income using the ELRO method (see previous section): one 
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involving the entire range of monetary outcomes (positive and negative) and one where there 
were only positive values for income (so, situations with losses were not possible). In the 
second section of the workshop, the focus was on sire selection, being one of the critical 
success factors in dairy farming (Huirne et al., 1993; Huirne, Harsh and Dijkhuizen, 1994). 
Three exercises were included in this part of the workshop. The first one was about breeding 
goals, in which farmers ranked traits in their breeding goals. The second exercise related to 
information needs for sire selection. The final exercise was focused on risk attitude towards 
sire selection. In this exercise the farmer's risk attitude regarding sire selection was assessed 
by using the ELCE method (see previous section) based on several sire selection case 
problems that were solved by each farmer. In each problem, the farmer had to balance the 
different attributes of possible sires: price, reliability and expected production capacity (type-
production index or TPI). 
At the end of the workshop, all the completed worksheets were collected. They were also 
used for preparing follow-up reports that were mailed back to the participants (along with the 
worksheets) within a few weeks after the workshop. 
Participants and data analysis 
Participants for the workshop were selected as follows. From the data bank of the Dutch 
Dairy Herd Improvement Association (DHIA) about 150 addresses of farmers, spread over 
three regions in The Netherlands, were randomly selected. The only criterion was that the 
farmers had at least 25 black-and-white cows. In total, 49 farmers were able to attend the 
workshops in their region. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to conduct a non-response analysis. So, it may be possible 
that farmers who participated were particularly interested in topics such as 'decision making', 
'information use', and 'sire selection'. This potential self-selection bias must be kept in mind 
in interpreting the results of the study. 
Two major methods were used to analyse the data collected in the workshops: group 
comparison and regression analysis. In group comparison, data were divided into a number of 
groups according to a certain key-variable. Then averages per group were calculated and used 
to compare the groups. Several SAS-procedures were used to carry out these calculations. 
Regression analysis was carried out using SYST AT for Windows to estimate the utility curves 
of the workshop participants (in both the ELCE and ELRO method) according to the least-
squares method. In estimating the utility functions, the negative exponential utility function 
served as the basis: u(x) = a + b ecx, with a, b and c as parameters. This function was 
suggested by Smidts (1990), Clemen (1991), and Zuhair, Taylor and Kramer (1992). 
3 Results 
Description of the participants 
The ages of the 49 dairy fanners who participated varied from 22 to 60 years. Average age 
was 40.6 years. The average size of the farms was 66 cows, 65 replacements, 30 ha of 
pasture, and 7 ha of cropland. The farms had 1.7 operators, while 50% were involved in a 
partnership. More than half of all farmers used a PC and a feeding computer (Table 1). Farm 
characteristics of all participants were above national averages. This means that the workshop 
participants had relative large, well-automated farms with above-average results. 
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Table 1. Average farm information and breeding practices of the 49 dairy farmers 
Average farm information Breeding practices 
Number of dairy cows 
Number of replacements 
Pasture (ha) 
Cropland (ha) 
Milk production/cow (kg) 
Number of operators 
Partnerships 
PC-usage 
Feeding computer usage 
66 
65 
30 
7 
7769 
1.7 
50% 
63% 
42% 
Do-your-own AI 
Advice of classifier, etc. 
Local group info exchange 
Embryo transfer 
Using beef bulls 
19% 
42% 
60% 
21% 
38% 
In 1993 the farmers used on average 10 sires to breed their herds. The most popular sire in 
1993 turned out to be Sunny Boy. He was selected 35 times in the fanner's top-three, 
followed by Ideal, Nordkap and F16. In total, the 49 farmers mentioned 50 different sires in 
their top-three. 
In Table 1, some breeding practices of the farmers are also outlined: 42% of the farmers 
used advice from other people (classifier, technician or semen salesman) in their sire 
selection. Beef bulls were used on about one-third of the farms. About 60% of the farmers 
were members of a local group that exchange breeding information and ideas. 
Estimating the utility functions 
The three utility functions estimated for each of the participants were: (1) ELRO-income, (2) 
ELRO-income +, and (3) ELCE-sire. The negative exponential utility function served as the 
basis for parameter estimation. This function performed quite well: the corrected R2 (i.e., the 
variance in u(x) explained by x, corrected for the degrees of freedom) was acceptable for all 
three methods (see Table 2 and Alderfer, 1994). 
Table 2. Minimum, average and maximum values of corrected T?2 of the estimated utility 
functions 
Type of utility function Minimum Average Maximum 
Income (ELRO-income) 0.92 
Positive income (ELRO-income+) 0.92 
Sire selection (ELCE-sire) 0.93 
0.97 
0.99 
0.99 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
As can be seen from Table 2, the average corrected /^-values are greater than 0.97 for 
each type of utility function. The lowest corrected K found for the ELRO-income + function 
was 0.92, which is still an acceptable value. 
Pratt-Arrow coefficients 
Parameter c in the negative exponential function represents the Pratt-Arrow coefficient 
(Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson, 1997). This coefficient was estimated for all participating 
dairy farmers. Note that the Pratt-Arrow coefficient is positive for risk-averse people and 
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negative for risk-preferring people. The greater the coefficient, the greater the degree of risk 
aversion. 
Table 3. Pratt-Arrow (PA) coefficients for different types of utility functions 
Fractile 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
Average PA-coefficient 
ELRO-income 8
8
8 
o
d
d
 
i 
0.0036 
ELRO-income + 
-0.0014 
0.0015 
0.0033 
-0.0007 
ELCE-sire 
-0.0004 
0.0010 
0.0023 
0.0011 
Table 3 presents the averages of, and indications of the spreads in the estimated Pratt-
Arrow coefficients. Three fractiles (points on the cumulative distribution function) were used 
for evaluation. For instance, the 0.25 fractile means that 25% of the farmers had a coefficient 
less than -0.0011 in the ELRO-income method, i.e., 25% of the farmers were more risk 
seeking than the corresponding coefficient of -0.0011. The 0.50 fractile represents the 
median. The 0.75 fractile indicates that 75% of the farmers had a Pratt-Arrow coefficient less 
than 0.0064 (ELRO-income). 
The average Pratt-Arrow coefficient is less for positive income (ELRO-income + : -0.0007) 
than for income in general (ELRO-income: 0.0036), which means that dairy producers were 
less risk averse when there were no outcomes with a loss (Table 3). 
In general, one may conclude that there are considerable differences in risk attitude 
between dairy farmers. One factor to be considered here is the decision context (for example, 
general income versus income without losses). With respect to sire selection, farmers tend to 
decide in a less risk-averse manner, although this does not result in a higher number of people 
being classified as risk seekers. 
Classification of farmers 
Classifying the dairy farmers as risk averters and risk seekers on the basis of the sign of the 
Pratt-Arrow coefficients gives the results in Table 4. Note that not a single farmer had a 
coefficient of exactly zero, which would represent risk neutrality. The percentages of risk 
averters in this group are quite stable (ELRO-income versus ELRO-income+). 
Table 4. Classification of dairy farmers in two classes with respect to risk attitude 
Type of utility function Risk averse Risk neutral/seeking 
Income (ELRO-income) 65% 35% 
Positive income (ELRO-income+) 65% 35% 
Sire selection (ELCE-sire) 68% 32% 
Consistency in risk attitude over time 
To gain insight into the consistency of the farmers' risk attitude over time, the workshops 
were repeated in 1995 with exactly the same materials, at the same locations, and at the same 
time of the year (February). Of course this was not been told the farmers when they were 
invited for these follow-up workshops. The follow-up workshops only focused on (risk 
attitude regarding) sire selection. In total 26 farmers (out of the 49) were able to participate 
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for the second time. A non-response analysis showed that the 26 participating farmers had the 
same farm characteristics as the entire group (Huirne et al., 1996), and thus could be seen as 
representative of that group. 
Risk attitudes towards sire selection were significantly different between 1993 and 1995. 
As presented in Table 4, most farmers turned out to be risk averse (68%) in 1993, while 32% 
was risk neutral/seeking. In 1995, however, only 8% of the farmers were risk averse, while 
46% were risk neutral and 46% were risk seeking. When comparing the individual responses 
of the 26 farmers, a consistency of only 23.1% was observed. This means that the risk 
attitude of 76.9% of the farmers {i.e., 20 out of the 26) had changed between 1993 and 1995. 
All these changes went in the direction of less risk averse. 
4 Concluding remarks 
There are several methods to assess the risk attitude of individuals. In the workshops with 49 
dairy farmers conducted as part of the current study, two methods were used: ELRO and 
ELCE. Although it was possible to estimate utility curves for the farmers, several 
complications may have arisen. The first one relates to the computer programs used with the 
farmers. It was difficult to be sure that the farmers really understood the program and the 
questions involved. According to King and Robison (1981), utility functions derived in this 
way may be somewhat inaccurate because of problems with statistical estimation of the 
parameters and the difficulties a decision maker may have in specifying his/her preferences. 
The second complication may be the representation of risk aversion by means of the Pratt-
Arrow coefficient. The coefficient is only a local measure for concavity or convexity of the 
utility function. Pratt-Arrow coefficients can therefore only be used as an indicator of the 
degree of risk aversion or risk preference of a decision maker. A third complication may be 
the impact of the decision context (which cannot be controlled by the decision maker, such as 
the general economic situation, inflation, time available for making a decision) on the risk 
attitude. This probably explains part of the low consistency in risk attitudes over time found in 
the follow-up workshops. So far, the utility function u(x) has been estimated directly from the 
observations «A; without correction for differences in the decision context. Consider, for 
example, the analogue in estimating breeding values in animal sciences: 'phenotype = 
genotype + environment'. So, the values observed (phenotype) are corrected for 
'environment' before the real 'genotype' is estimated. Controlled laboratory experiments 
(experimental economics) with farmers may be a means to conduct such an analysis. First 
experiences with this were promising (Verstegen et al., 1995). Further research on this issue 
is needed. 
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ANALYSING FIRM RESPONSE TO RISK USING MEAN-VARIANCE MODELS 
L.J. Robison and S.D. Hanson 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, USA 
Summary 
This paper suggests that future research will emphasize at least three areas. These include: 
more general relationships between indirect and direct outcome variables; more complex 
models with multiple risk responses and multiple sources of risk; and dominance analysis, 
the effect on risk efficiency of including additional risk instruments in the firm's portfolio. 
The paper then discusses the usefulness of expected utility (EU) models and mean-variance 
(EV) models in future risk research. Both models will continue to dominate risk analysis, 
but more complicated risk models will increasingly rely on EV models. 
1 Introduction 
The expected utility (EU) model is the most widely accepted indexing rule for ordering 
choices and doing comparative static analysis under risk. Schoemaker (1982) claims it has 
been the major decision-making paradigm since World War II. Although several concerns 
and empirical contradictions have emerged to challenge the EU model, its dominant role as 
a theoretical tool for the analysis of the firm under risk continues. There are good reasons 
for EU's pre-eminent role in the analysis of risk. First, it can be derived from reasonable 
assumptions. Second, it has produced theoretical results that in most cases correspond with 
our intuition. And third, it leads to empirically useful ranking tools including stochastic 
dominance rules (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Hanoch and Levy, 1969; Meyer, 1977). 
The most durable challenger to the EU model has been mean-variance (EV) or the 
equivalent mean-standard deviation (MS) model. The EV model is popular for many 
reasons including the following. First, under some conditions EV models can be shown to 
be consistent with EU models. Second, EV models have produced theoretical results that in 
most cases correspond with our intuition; namely, that risk-averse decision makers prefer 
increased expected income and dislike increased variation of income (Hawawini, 1978). 
Third, EV theory leads to an empirically useful efficient EV set or frontier that can be 
generated by programming models and other maximization algorithms. Fourth, results 
derived by using EV analysis can be described in two-dimensional space that facilitates the 
communication of results. Fifth, compared to EU models, EV models often produce more 
tractable analytic results d lastly, EV sets permit us to perform dominance analysis; that 
is, we can examine v t conditions one set of risk instruments is preferred to another 
set by all risk-avr 
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Differences between the needs of decision makers and analysts have resulted in 
differentiated preferences for the EU and EV models. EV models are popular in schools of 
business and among financial market analysts. They are also popular among many applied 
researchers. On the other hand, the EU model is still used for most theoretical analysis by 
economists and many agricultural economists. Thus both EU and EV models have proved 
to be accepted tools of analysis, although EU appears to be most useful as a theoretical tool 
while EV appears more suited for applied analyses that focus on the identification of 
efficient sets. 
In what follows, we compare the usefulness of EV and EU models for ranking 
distributions and for theoretical analysis. Then we suggest three areas we expect future risk 
research to emphasize. We also suggest how EV and EU models may contribute to progress 
in these three areas. The three future areas of risk research emphasis include the analysis 
of: (1) more complicated transformations between direct and indirect outcome variables, (2) 
more complicated decision environments with multiple sources of risk and choice variables 
that better match the real world conditions facing firms, and (3) dominance conditions 
analysed from a theoretical perspective. 
2 Ranking empirical distributions using EV and EU models 
Consider first EV analysis as a decision theory tool that orders probability distributions into 
efficient and inefficient sets. Efficient sets are defined with reference to a particular class of 
decision makers and sometimes restricted to well-defined probability distributions. If the 
well-defined class of decision makers unanimously prefer distribution A to B, then 
distribution A is an efficient choice and distribution B is inefficient. 
Risk-averse EU decision makers facing normal distributions or distributions that differ 
by location and scale but otherwise are identically distributed will find their preferred 
choice in the efficient EV set. Risk-averse EU decision makers will also find their preferred 
choice in the efficient EV set when there is only one risky investment to select that 
increases in variance and expected return. Under less restrictive conditions, risk-averse EU 
decision makers will find their preferred choice in the second degree stochastic dominance 
(SSD) efficient sets. 
Inconsistencies between EV and SSD sets are not likely to occur in most empirically-
derived efficient sets. The reason is that Porter (1973) and others who derived SSD choices 
that were not EV efficient assumed that the distributions being chosen were the true 
distributions measured without error.1 Meyer and Rasche (1992) demonstrated that if 
estimation error is included, large amounts of data are required to find any statistically 
significant difference between EV and EU efficient sets. Thus, as long as we recognize that 
we rarely know distributions with certainty and lack large amounts of data for estimating 
the empirical distributions, there is little basis for distinguishing between EV and SSD 
efficient sets in empirical work. 
Stochastic dominance criteria derived from the EU model do have one important 
advantage over EV analysis in applied work. It is that efficient sets can be identified for 
more narrowly-defined sets of decision makers using stochastic dominance. EV sets contain 
See also Levy and Markowitz (1979) and Tsiang (1972) for empirical comparisons between EU and EV 
models. 
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the efficient choices for all risk averters, while EU efficient sets can be specified for any 
particular subset of decision makers, usually identified by their absolute risk aversion 
functions. While an efficient subset can be selected from an EV set, the class of decision 
makers for whom the subset is efficient is less clear unless the decision makers are all 
constant absolute risk averters. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent one from 
applying stochastic dominance ranking techniques to EV sets. This approach would 
combine the efficient set selection techniques of EV analysis and the improved decision 
class identification techniques associated with stochastic dominance with respect to a 
function. 
3 Using EU and EV models to derive theoretical results 
Now consider EU and EV models as theoretical tools. Early efforts to demonstrate 
compatibility between EU and EV models relied on normality and constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) assumptions that led to the linear EV objective function (Freund, 1956).2 
Additional support for the linear EV model was provided by Pratt's EV approximation of 
an EU model. Another EV model was obtained by demonstrating that a second order 
Taylor series approximates a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function as a quadratic 
function whose expected value contains the variance of the random variable as arguments. 
Neither the assumption of quadratic utility nor the assumption that distributions are normal 
have proved adequate to justify the use of EV models for theoretical use. Quadratic utility 
implies increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) which is unrealistic under most 
conditions. Worse, quadratic utility functions allow for negative marginal utility. Finally, 
normality and CARA are also severely limiting assumptions if the goal is to derive 
theoretical results under more general conditions such as decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA). 
To allow for DARA and IARA income effects using the EV model, Robison and Barry 
(1987) developed a nonlinear EV model. Choice variable solutions were obtained by 
maximizing a linear mean variance function at a slope where tangency occurred between the 
expected utility function and the EV set. They argued that maximizing a linear EV function 
would provide a solution identical to that obtained using EU analysis as long as all choices 
were contained in the EV set, a condition always satisfied for models containing a single 
choice variable. Having found the initial solutions using a linear EV model, Robison and 
Barry (1987) performed comparative static analysis. Substitution effects were measured as 
changes in the choice variables in response to parameter changes holding the slope 
coefficient constant. Income effects for DARA and IARA decision makers were measured 
as the changes in the choice variables in response to slope changes. In other words, 
parameter changes that changed expected income or variance were allowed to change the 
equilibrium slope on the EV frontier. 
More recent support for EV models was provided independently by Meyer (1987) and 
Sinn (1983). They showed that if risky choices differ only by location and scale then the 
EV set of choices or the mean standard deviation (MS) sets contained the expected utility 
choices for von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers. Meyer went on to show that 
This linear function also solves for solutions on the EV efficient set linking the theoretical model to its 
empirical counterpart. 
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comparative static results could be obtained for DARA and IARA decision makers that 
were consistent with slope conditions earlier derived by Robison and Barry (1987) and Cass 
and Stiglitz (1972). Since these results are generally well known and available elsewhere we 
will not dwell further on how EV models can be used for comparative static analysis. 
4 Conflicts in theoretical results derived using EU and EV models 
When the choice variable(s) analysed theoretically with the location-scale condition not met, 
inconsistencies between EU and EV models results are possible. Two classes of 
inconsistencies are possible. The first class of inconsistency is that identified by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1971). They pointed out that in a multi-variable portfolio model the EV model 
produced definitive results when none such could be generated using EU analysis. This is 
because the relationship between probability density functions is more narrowly constrained 
in an EV model. The second class of conflicts between EV and EU models are those in 
which definitive results are derived using both models that are inconsistent. 
Consider the importance of the two classes of possible conflicts produced using EV and 
EU models. The first class of conflicts should not be considered a shortcoming of EV 
analysis. This is because the EV model provides information about conditions in which EV 
and EU consistency cannot be rejected empirically. For example, portfolios of stocks that 
Meyer and Rasche (1992) showed were EV efficient can be analysed theoretically using EV 
analysis and produce theoretical results that have proven to be useful. But no such results 
for portfolio models of multiple random variables have been derived using EU models. 
The second class of possible conflicts between EV and EU models is more serious than 
the first. This class of conflicts, however, is likely limited because definitive results from 
EU models in more complicated risk settings are possible only in narrowly-defined risk 
settings. To illustrate, to find definitive results using an EU model, Lapan and Moschini 
(1994) specified random variables whose means were independent of their variances. The 
second class conflict is removed when the independent assumption is removed. Thus, class 
two conflicts are likely limited because of the difficulty of obtaining definitive results for 
increases in risk in more complicated models using EU analysis (Meyer and Ormiston, 
1985). In contrast, definitive results for increases in risk in EV models are common. 
It is not correct to assert that conflicts between EV and EU models all result from the 
absence of higher moments of the distributions in EV models. EV and EU models will rank 
even significantly skewed distributions consistently as long as location and scale conditions 
are satisfied. Even when location and conditions are not satisfied, consistency between EV 
and EU models may still be obtained because changes in skewness most often change the 
means and variances as well in ways that leave ranking between the two models consistent. 
The trade-off between EV and EU models for theoretical analysis should be clear. The 
preference for EU models is because of its rigorous deductive underpinnings. However, 
definitive results using EU models will likely be limited unless the generality of the random 
variables considered are significantly restricted. 
The justification for nonlinear EV analysis is that it produces results consistent with EU 
models when location-scale conditions are met and it approximates EU results when 
location-scale are not met. The accuracy of the approximation of the nonlinear EV model to 
EU model results when location-scale are not satisfied has not been carefully examined. 
The advantage of EV models is that they can often derive definitive results in complex risk 
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models for which results cannot be produced using EU models. Since definitive EU results 
are extremely difficult to obtain in more complicated risk models, researchers have often 
turned to the EV framework to obtain results. Examples include Chavas and Pope (1982), 
Sarassoro and Leuthold (1991), Coyle (1992), and Robison and Barry (1987). The EV 
framework has proved useful for more complicated risk problems because it ignores higher 
moments and specifies relationships between random variables with their covariances. 
Thus the decision to use EU or EV analysis is not a right or wrong choice. It is a trade-
off between the stronger axiomatic foundations of the EU model versus improved ability of 
EV models to analyse theoretically more complex risk problems. The use of these two 
models will depend on are the requirements of risk research in the future. 
5 Future areas of emphasis for firm level risk analysis 
In our view, there appear to be three areas in which risk analysis for the firm can be 
extended theoretically.3 We introduce and illustrate these three areas in the remainder of 
this paper. The first area will consider more realistic relationships between indirect and 
direct outcome variables. The second area will build models with more than one choice and 
stochastic variables. The third area will focus on what we call dominance analysis. All three 
areas have one common element; significant progress will likely require the increased use 
of EV models. Results could, of course, be obtained using numerical analysis in an EU 
framework, but the generalization of these results would be limited. 
6 Indirect and direct outcome relationships 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are defined over direct outcome variables. 
Most often the direct outcome variable is final or end-of-period wealth. Indirect outcome 
variables such as income contribute to the value of the direct outcome variable but are not 
themselves the argument of expected utility functions. Most of what we know theoretically 
about the firm's response to risk has been deduced under a very restrictive assumption 
about the relationship between direct and indirect outcome variables (Robison and Lev, 
1986). The most common assumption is that stochastic wealth, w~(w, a ), is related to 
nonstochastic initial wealth w0 plus stochastic income y~(y,a ) 
w = w0+ y (a) (1) 
where the distribution of y depends on the choice variable a. 
The solution for the choice variables in (1) can be found by maximizing the linear mean 
variance function equal to the sum wCE of expected wealth, w0 +y(a), less the variance of 
income, ay weighted by the EV slope coefficient A./2: 
Max wCE = w0 + y(a) - -a (a) (2) 
a 2 
We recognize, of course, that theoretical work must be followed by appropriate empirical testing. But this 
subject must await later discussions. 
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This simplified relationship between income and wealth suggests that if the choice 
variables only affect y, then the first-order conditions contain only derivatives associated 
with y and ay. Thus from an analytic perspective, little is gained by including explicitly 
the initial wealth variable in the model unless it somehow constrains the choice variables 
affecting a. However, in many analyses, even this weak link between y and vv0 described 
in (1) is ignored. 
In the early development of risk models, ignoring the link between initial wealth w0 and 
y may be excused. After all, the attention needed to be focused on the effects of particular 
risk instruments. Further progress in understanding the effects of risk instruments now 
requires that we test our risk instruments for use in the real world. That is, we need to test 
the robustness of our models when more realistic assumptions are made about the 
relationships between direct and indirect outcome variables. So, we next describe models 
that increase in realism and complexity in their relationships between indirect and direct 
outcome variables beginning with Sandmo's (1971) model of the firm facing output price 
risk. 
The Sandmo model: w = y 
Consider Sandmo's production model in which the stochastic element is output price 
p~(p,o ) . The relationship between end-of-period wealth w and income earned during the 
period y is simply w = y. The EV or, in this case, the MS set is easily found. From the 
stochastic expression for income y, we write the equation: 
y = pq-C(q)-B (3) 
In Sandmo's model described in (3), C(q) is the cost function for producing output q 
such thatC \q), C "(q) > 0, C(0) = 0, and B is fixed or time costs. For a particular choice 
of q, y is a linear function of the stochastic variable ß, satisfying location-scale conditions. 
-fB + C(q)J 
Figure 1. The relationship between y and p~ in the 
Sandmo model 
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Expressions for y and o in the Sandmo model are: 
y = PI ~C(q) - B 
and: 
a = q a 
y H p 
Solving for q in the expression for o and substituting the result into the expression for 
y produces the MS frontier equal to: 
y = P 
a a 
-*• - c M - (4) 
The MS graph of the basic Sandmo model is in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. The MS frontier for the Sandmo model 
Sandmo with transactions costs 
Consider the following relationship between y and initial wealth w0 in which a transactions 
cost ô is incurred if the stochastic price realized is less than p(w0). Stochastic income y 
can be written as: 
pg-C(q)-B-à 
pq-C(q)-B 
P < PoK) (5) 
In this model, in contrast to the earlier models, income y is not linear in p. The kinked 
linear relationship is described in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. A jump relationship between y and 
stochastic prices p 
Let the probability distribution function and cumulative density function for p be dF(p) 
and F(p) respectively. Then, y and o are equal to: 
= pq-C(q)-B-6F(pD) 
Gy = q2Op + à2F(p0)[l-F(p0)] + 2qà[pF(Po)-Pl 
where: 
Po 
ƒ pdFip) 
The first term on the right of the equation for a equals that portion of the variance 
contributed by p. The second term to the right of o is the variance associated with the 
transactions cost ô and the third term to the right of oy is the covariance between p and ô. 
This problem is a good example how changes in skewness caused by transactions costs 
change the variance as well. 
Obviously, transactions costs increase the variance of the original Sandmo model. 
Transactions costs may occur because unfavourable price outcomes require firm 
restructuring by liquidating assets. Or, they may require downsizing with severance costs 
associated with terminated employees. Or, they may require borrowings with its attendant 
sacrifices of time and application fees. Whatever the source, it seems reasonable to assume 
that a firm may face the possibility of liquidation fees that are related to its financial wealth. 
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Thus: p0 = p0(w0) mddp0/dw0<0. 
Even though this model is no longer linear in p and thus violates location-scale 
assumptions, still all EU maximizing choices are on an EV frontier.4 Thus any given EU 
solution for q can be found by specifying the appropriate slope A./2 and by maximizing the 
certainty equivalent expression equal to: 
- A. 2 . „ 
y CE = y - - °y (6) 
where optimal q must satisfy: 
P- C '{q ') - \{q * o) + à[pF(p0) -Pi] }=0 
Increased risk costs associated with ô and lower expected returns cause the MS frontier 
for the transactions cost model to lie below the original Sandmo model. Moreover, the 
trade-off between expected return is less because of increased risk costs, thus lowering 
optimal q for most risk-averse decision makers. Expected profit maximizing q, however, 
occurs for the same q in both the Sandmo and the transactions cost model but for different 
variances of income. All of these results easily obtained in the EV model would be much 
more difficult to deduce in the EU model. 
Sandmo with limited liabilities 
Consider a model in which losses of the firm are limited according to the specification 
below: 
P0(w0)q-C(q)-B p < p0(w0) 
pq-C(q)-B p > p0(wa) 
w
 = y = ) ^ _ r,,„s o - . ",... ; ( 7 ) 
The motivation for this model is that institutionally-imposed safeguards may limit the 
actual loss incurred by a firm. Bankruptcy laws may protect firms against losses beyond 
minimum levels as does unemployment insurance. Thus realistic examples of the limited 
liabilities model exist. 
As in the transactions cost model, y is no longer linear in the random variable p, but all 
choices remain on the EV frontier. The relationship between y and p is described in Figure 
4. 
It can be shown that because the indirect outcome variable does satisfy location-scale, the analysis can be 
made consistent with EU through the appropriate transformation of the utility function in final outcome space 
(Robison, 1994). 
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Pfrc,) 
p0 q-C(q)-B 
Figure 4. Limited liabilities depending on w0 
The expected value and variance of y in the limited liabilities model are equal to: 
y = [p0F{p0)+p2]q-C(q)-B 
where: 
ƒ pdFip) 
and: 
where: 
a\ = ƒ (p-p2)2 dF(p) 
Again, all choices of q are on the EV frontier. Thus the linear EV model can be made 
consistent with any EU model results. And again as in the transaction costs, any changes in 
the skewness also affects the variance. 
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Sandmo with background risk 
Background risk reflects an investment environment in which the firm begins the decision-
making period with some resources committed to a risky investment. For example, assume 
that the firm has committed resources that return a stochastic return of w0. This model, 
Sandmo's with background risk, is represented in equation (8). 
w = w0+pq~C(q)-B. (8) 
The question to be answered is how do these pre-existing and fixed commitments change 
the investment decision compared to the earlier Sandmo model? To answer this question 
and others we find the expected value and variance of ending wealth described next: 
w=w0+pq-C(q)-B 
0=0 +q20 +2qpO O 
where w0~(w0,ow ) and the covariance between stochastic committed investments and 
stochastic income from production is 2q pa aw . The effect of background risk depends on 
its correlation with other stochastic investments and may or may not increase q. The 
analysis can be easily completed using the nonlinear EV model. 
7 Dominance analysis and more complicated risk models 
An advantage of the EV model for theoretical analysis is that it permits the analysis to 
occur in two separate spaces. The analysis can occur in the utility space confined by 
available choices on the EV set or the discussion can focus on the EV set and how it is 
changed by altering parameters in the existing model or by adding risk instruments. This 
later approach considers what we refer to as dominance analysis. Dominance analysis 
defined here is finding the conditions under which the addition of a new risk instrument 
produces a new EV set that is preferred by risk-averse agents to the EV set previously 
available. This topic appears to us particularly relevant for the analysis of the firm facing 
risk because so many practical questions involve choices between risk instruments. 
Dominance analysis requires that we identify risk instruments as efficient or inefficient. 
Efficient risk instruments permit the following. Beginning at an existing level of expected 
return and variance, the addition of an efficient risk instrument allows a move to a more 
efficient EV location not on the original EV frontier. The improvement permitted by adding 
an efficient risk instrument is described in Figure 5.5 
Of course, the risk instrument may exhibit both risk efficiency and inefficiency depending on the value of 
other parameters and variables in the model. 
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Figure 5. Class I and II risk efficient instruments 
Efficient risk instruments are of two classes described in Figure 5. Class one instruments 
allow us to move to EV locations with increased means and/or reduced variances. Class two 
efficient risk instruments allow us to move to EV locations in spaces Ha and lib which 
increase (decrease) in mean and variance a rate greater than (less than) possible with the 
existing EV set. Risk instruments that fail to qualify as class one or class two efficient risk 
instruments are inefficient risk instruments. To describe precisely the conditions required 
for first-class risk efficiency, assume the original relationship between final wealth w and 
initial wealth w0 to be: 
w = w0 + y(w0,a) (9) 
where the choice variable a and initial wealth w0 affect the distribution of stochastic 
income. 
Now suppose there is another risk instrument that could be added to the model. This 
second instrument that produces stochastic income is represented as £(ß;w0)~(z,oz;ß) where 
ß is a vector of choice variables associated with the new risk instrument. Furthermore, let 
the correlation between y and f be p. Then the new risk instrument is efficient if the 
following two conditions are satisfied where strict inequality holds in one of the two 
equations: 
£[£(ß;>0] i 0 
o„ + a] + 2po o < al 
(10) 
If strict inequality holds in the second requirement then it follows that the correlation 
coefficient must be negative and less than the negative ratio of the variance of the new risk 
instrument to twice the variance of the old risk instrument. This relationship is described in 
equation 11. The implication of this second condition is that the variance of the new 
instrument can be larger than the variance of the old instrument and still qualify as risk 
Analysing firm response to risk 133 
efficient. But only negatively correlated instruments can qualify as efficient risk instruments 
of the first class. 
P < - ^ (11) 
2o 
y 
Now having identified requirements for first risk efficient instruments, we intend to 
demonstrate how risk instruments can be tested for efficiency. It is, of course, obvious, that 
dominance analysis requires more complicated risk models be considered. Thus our 
dominance analysis combines two of the new areas of analysis into one model: including 
more than one risk instrument in dominance analysis. 
Sandmo plus hedging: w = y 
Consider again the Sandmo model with a new risk instrument included. The risk instrument 
considered first is hedging with a futures contract. Hedging allows the firm to exchange an 
uncertain spot price p for a certain future price pf. As long as pf>p, selling futures 
satisfies the conditions required for first-class risk efficiency. If p,<p~ then negative 
hedging (speculation) increases return at a faster rate than income earned without hedging 
and may satisfy the conditions required for second-class risk efficiency. 
Let the amount of q hedged be h. Then, hedged income can be expressed as: 
y = pq+(pf-p)h-C{q)-B (12) 
Assume for the moment that the futures market is unbiased so that pf=p so that the first 
condition for first-class risk efficiency is satisfied with equality. Then consider how hedging 
has altered the variance. The variance of the hedged income can be expressed as: 
o
2
y = q*o2p+h2o2p-2qho2p (13) 
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the variance of unhedged 
production. The second term is the variance associated with the hedge. The third term with 
its implied correlation coefficient of negative one is the covariance. As long as |h \ < 2 q the 
second condition for first-class risk efficiency is satisfied and hedging is a first-class risk 
efficient instrument.6 
The hedging model is an important prototype. It introduces into the risk model a risk 
reducing input; that is, increasing h reduces a2y. Other examples of risk reducing variables 
are the purchase of insurance, investing in information, investing in kill functions that 
reduce a pest, or capital investment that moderates the effects of drought, floods, and frost. 
6
 The properties of the hedged Sandmo model are well known (Meyer and Robison, 1988; Feder, Just and 
Schmitz, 1980; Holthausen, 1979). Output is chosen independent of risk. If the futures price equals the 
expected value of the spot price the amount hedged equals the amount produced. If the futures price exceeds 
the expected value of the spot price, then the amount hedged exceeds the amount produced. 
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Hedging with limited liabilities 
An important contribution of dominance analysis is that it focuses on the unique risk 
environment of the firm. Recognizing the uniqueness of the risk environment facing each 
firm leads to the recognition that a particular risk instrument such as hedging added to the 
firm's portfolio will produce differential effects depending on the firm's unique risk 
environment. To illustrate, suppose that the firm has its liabilities associated with 
unfavourable prices limited to p(w0). This limitation might result from government policies 
or the firm's adoption of other risk strategies. We want to know if the hedging results are 
robust; that is, we want to know if hedging is an efficient risk instrument when the firm's 
liabilities are limited. 
Figure 6 illustrates how the effectiveness of a hedge is altered by the changed risk 
environment. Earlier, hedging could completely eliminate the firm's risk. And if the futures 
price was unbiased, the firm would desire a hedge equal to its production. Now, as can be 
seen from Figure 6, no single futures hedge can eliminate risk. Furthermore, the expected 
output price is no longer the expected spot price because of the limited liability. Therefore, 
an unbiased futures price is less than the expected value of the firm's returns from 
production. Thus, limited liabilities have the effect of converting a class one instrument to a 
class two instrument. As a result, a hedge equal to production levels will no longer 
eliminate risk. Clearly, the optimal hedge will be quite different than those derived in 
earlier studies. 
(Pf-P)h 
Figure 6. Hedging Sandmo with limited liabilities 
Options and limited liabilities 
In the case of a truncated output price, futures were no longer able to provide a perfect 
hedge because they were linear in the cash price (see Figure 6). Now consider the role of 
options when the producer faces limited liability. For simplicity assume there is no basis 
risk, basis is zero, and the producer's minimum cash price is p(wg). The producer can use a 
call option to manage risk which has a payout of: 
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V O p s p0(w0) 
(14) 
Assume the cost of the option is r and is assumed to be unbiased in the sense that 
r = E(V). Now the producer's profit function becomes: 
y = pq-C(q)-B+z(r-V) ( l 5 ) 
where z is the number of call options (sold is positive) held by the hedger. Stochastic 
income in (15) can be rewritten as follows: 
\p{wa)q-C{q)-B + zr p < p(w0) 
* ~ \pq-C(q)-B + z[r -p +p(w0)] p > p(wa) 
Because the options are priced at their expected value, adding options to the portfolio has 
no impact on the expected profit level. However, since they reduce variance they are a 
class-one risk instrument. Choosing to sell q call options (z = q), riskless profits become: 
y = [p(*0)+r]q-C(q)-B (17) 
The variance of profit has been eliminated while the expected profit is unaffected. The 
call option has provided a perfect hedge when the producer faces the truncated cash price.7 
8 Summary and conclusions 
This paper has suggested three areas of future research emphasis. First, we expect future 
research will analyse more general relationships between indirect and direct outcome 
variables. Relationships between indirect and direct outcome variables examined in the past 
have often been linear. But institutions that limit liabilities, create transactions costs, 
provide various kinds of insurance and options, and facilitate shared risk arrangements may 
all produce nonlinear relationships between direct and indirect outcome variables. Second, 
we expect future risk research to explain the results of increasingly complex numerical 
models and simulations. Thus, risk models will be required to include multiple choice 
variables and sources of risk. And third, we expect future risk research to consider 
dominance analysis. This analysis will ask what combinations of risk instruments are 
efficient. In EU, this analysis would require numerical simulations and the applications of 
stochastic dominance rules. EV analysis allows us to approach the problem more generally. 
This is because the EV set is efficient for risk-averse decision makers and relationships 
between risk instruments can be used to evaluate their efficiency. 
We expect that progress in all three areas of future research will make increased use of 
EV models. The reason is that increases in risk are not easily analysed in the EU model 
unless severe limitations are placed on the variables considered. 
See Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson (1991) for a discussion of a model with combined production, hedging 
and options. 
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Many questions must still be answered about the plausibility of the implicit assumptions 
about preferences in EV models before they are generally accepted as a theory tool. The 
analogy between results obtained using the nonlinear EV model and those obtained in the 
EV model when location-scale conditions hold is the following. In econometrics certain 
properties of models are obtained that depend on large samples. Yet there are models that 
need analysing even if large samples are not available. The best that can be done in such 
circumstances is to infer from the large sample properties to the models that are estimated 
with small samples. We find ourselves in a similar circumstance in our application of the 
EV model. We have EV model properties that are developed under location-scale. We infer 
these same properties even when location-scale conditions do not hold in our use of the 
nonlinear EV model. 
So, future risk research will require trade-offs. Some important work remains to be done 
using models that are EV and EU consistent. This work can proceed using EU or EV 
models and obtain consistent results. Work in the three areas discussed in this paper, 
however, will likely require models that are not location-scale. We expect only limited 
progress using EU models to solve more complicated models and even this progress may 
often require restrictions on choice and random variables that limit the usefulness of the 
results. On the other hand, progress is much more likely using EV models. But EV models 
do not yet have the strong axiomatic basis of EU models leaving us less certain about the 
usefulness of the results. Perhaps this trade-off between EV and EU models suggests still a 
fourth area of future research: empirical and theoretical testing of conditions required for 
consistency between EV and EU models. 
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SELF-INSURANCE IN THE PRESENCE OF BACKGROUND RISK 
O. Mahul 
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Rennes, France 
Summary 
This paper addresses the question of whether independent and undesirable background risk 
will lead farmers to use more input against another risk that is self-insurable. Background 
risk generally has an ambiguous effect on the optimal input decision. However, if 
preferences exhibit standard risk aversion, the qualitative effect of the added background 
risk is unambiguous and depends whether the input is risk increasing or risk decreasing. 
Natural disaster can be such an exogenous risk. The limitation of individual liability for 
financial loss by programs of public disaster relief or the reduction of the loss probability 
influences the farmer's decision to self-insure against another independent risk. 
1 Introduction 
In the standard model of self-insurance, the stochastic production function is defined by one 
input and one single source of uncertainty, which characterizes the states of nature (Just and 
Pope, 1979). Market insurance is assumed unavailable. In the context of a simple expected 
utility model, the individual decision to self-insure is influenced by the decision maker's 
attitude towards risk and the nature of the technology. This technology is described by the 
relation between the marginal return to input on self-insurance and the occurrences of the 
random variable. Optimal application of risk-decreasing (increasing) input is found to be 
higher (lower) as the preferences are risk averse. 
The model described above assumes that the decision marker's profit contains a single 
source of uncertainty. Such a framework is obviously at odds with the more realistic 
environment in which farmers must cope with multiple risks. In this paper, we consider the 
analytically simpler problem of choosing optimal level of input use in the presence of an 
undesirable and independent background risk which affects a second output. This output is 
considered exogenous, because it is beyond the control of the agent when (s)he chooses the 
level of input use affecting endogenous risk in his/her first output. Any correlation between 
the background risk and the risk which is to be self-insured will obviously be significant. It 
will be clear that a positive correlation increases the effectiveness of self-insurance, whereas 
a negative correlation provides a partial insurance of the two risks against each other 
(Mayers and Smith, 1983; Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1991). 
The main question considered in this paper is: How does an undesirable and independent 
background risk affect the level of input use selected by a risk-averse farmer ? Although 
there is no correlation effect under independence, risk-averse behaviour is often altered 
(Nachman, 1982). A sufficient condition on underlying preferences, which allows us to 
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define unambiguously the optimal application of input, is standard risk aversion (Kimball, 
1990). This paper shows how a natural disaster can be treated as background risk in the 
farmer's maximization problem. 
The modification of probability of loss or the introduction of public financial 
compensation to victims of natural disasters based on a deductible or co-insurance is a 
particular case of a change in the distribution of the background risk. These programs may 
affect farmer's optimal application of input. Thus, the authorities can force farmers to 
modify their use of input by changing the riskiness of exogenous wealth. 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the standard model of 
self-insurance and the relation between the types of input, the farmers' attitudes towards 
risk, and their optimal level of input use are defined. In the third section an undesirable and 
independent background risk is introduced and the effects on the optimal application of 
input when the preferences exhibit standard risk aversion analysed. The fourth section is 
devoted to analysing changes in background risk to farmer's input decision. 
2 Self-insurance and risk aversion 
Consider an economy in which each farmer is endowed with an exogenous value of 
monetary wealth, W0 > 0, and a stochastic technology q = f(x,a>), where q is output, x is 
input and w is a random variable. Because of a>, output is random. Individual beliefs 
about the distribution of the random variable m are represented by the arbitrary cumulative 
density function O(co) defined over the interval [Û>,,&>2]where a)t <co1. 
We assume that the marginal productivity of input is positive and decreasing, so we have 
fxs — > 0 and fxx = ?-£- < 0 
âx âx 
Greater realizations of w are assumed to correspond to greater levels of output, so 
0(0 
The marginal return of input, fx, will vary with severity of a. We can consider two types 
of inputs (Leather and Quiggin, 1991). Input is called 'risk increasing' when the marginal 
productivity of input is higher in more favourable states of nature (fxl0 = — > 0). 
âxâcù 
It is called 'risk decreasing' when the marginal productivity of input is higher in more 
adverse states of nature (fxa <0). This input corresponds to self-insurance. 
In an agricultural context, fertilizers are often risk increasing in their impact on output 
risk (Just and Pope, 1979; Leathers and Quiggin, 1991) while pesticides, herbicides, 
irrigation and vaccination against epidemics are risk decreasing (Lewis and Nickerson, 
1989). 
Farmers will select the application of input x which maximizes their expected utility of 
profit 
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MaxEU(W(x,w)) (1) 
with U a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined on profit, 
W{x,a>) = W0 + f(x,a>)- px , where output price is normalized at unity and input price is 
P-
The first-order condition of the maximization problem above is 
E[U'(W(x,ä))(fx(x,ä)-p)] = 0 (2) 
This condition is necessary and sufficient if we assume that the farmer prefers more to less 
(£/' > 0) and (s)he is risk averse (£/" < 0 ). 
Suppose that a farmer with utility function U2 is more risk averse than another farmer 
with utility function Ul (Pratt, 1964). U2 is a concave transformation of £/,. Then, there is 
an increasing and concave function g such as U2{.) = (g°U])(.). We define x}(x2) as the 
optimal level of input for farmer with utility Ul (U2). Then, xi for i = l,2 is the solution 
to: 
E[U;(W(Xi,S))(fx(Xi^)-p)] = 0 (2') 
We assume that both farmers have the same beliefs about the distribution of the random 
variable m. We are now ready to state and prove our first result. 
Proposition 1 
Let x, =argmax£[/;(W7(x,co)) for i=l ,2 . Given two utility functions L^and U2 such that 
x 
U2 is more risk averse than C/,, 
(i) If for all levels of input x and prices p, there is ÖJ° e [ÖJ,;Ö)2] such as 
(fx(x,w)-p)(û)-a>0)>0 y co e [Ö),;<Ü2], then x[ > x2 ; 
(ii) If for all levels of input x and prices p, there is co0 e [U),;ÖJ2] such as 
(fx(x,a>)-p)(co-w0) < 0 V co e [ Ö ; , ; « , ] , then x,<x2. 
Proof 
We prove result (i). We can write U2(.)=(goiî])(.) with g'>0 and g" < 0 . To prove (i), 
we must show that: 
£{t/2 ' (^(x,,5))[A(x,,5)-p]}<0 with E{u;(W(Xl,S))[fx(Xl,S)-p]} = 0 
We can write: 
E{U'(W(xl,S)lfM,u)-p]}=E[gpimxl,S))^ 
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For Û)<CO°, we have fx(x^co)-p<Q. We have also ff(x,,cû) < W(x^a>°) because 
fa>0, then g'(C/1(ff(x,,ai)))>g'((71(W(xl,a)0))) because U] is increasing and g is 
concave. Thus, V w < a" 
For w>co°, we have ƒ,(*,<»)-ƒ?> 0 , and ^ ( ^ ( ^ ( x , , ^ ) ) ) ^ ' ^ , ^ , , © 0 ) ) ) 
thus, VÛ>>Û)° 
^ ( ^ „ C Û ) ) ) ^ ; ^ , ,©))][ƒ, (x,, co) - p] < g'(Ut (W(Xl ,n0)))[U;(W(Xl ,©))][ƒ, (x,,a>) - />] 
Consequently, 
^{^(^(x^S^Cx,^)-^}^^'^^^^^0)))^^;^,^)!/^^^)-^} 
But the right-hand side of this inequality equals zero because of the first-order condition. 
The result (ii) follows in a similar manner. 
We can note that the marginal productivity of input must verify the single crossing 
condition. If fx is monotonie in co, then the single crossing condition is verified because of 
equation (2). From proposition 1, we can deduce the following corollary. 
Corollary 1 
(i) If the input is risk increasing, then the more risk averse a farmer, the smaller his/her 
optimal level of input use; 
(ii) If the input is risk decreasing, then the more risk averse a farmer, the greater his/her 
optimal level of input use. 
A particular case of this corollary is that the optimal application of a risk-increasing 
(decreasing) input under risk-averse preferences is always less (more) than the risk-neutral 
level of input use (Quiggin, 1993; Ramaswami, 1993). 
3 Self-insurance with an independent background risk 
The literature on self-insurance and self-protection mostly has considered individuals facing 
a single source of uncertainty. The optimal application of input is determined by the first-
order condition (2). However, agricultural activities are framed by a multiplicity of risks. 
To capture this reality, we introduce an undesirable background risk, e , verifying 
EU(W+e)<U(W) (3) 
This background risk is undesirable for an individual with utility U and wealth W. If 
background risk is 'universally undesirable' (Kimball, 1993), i.e., undesirable for all risk 
averters, its expectation is nonpositive. Individual beliefs about the distribution of the 
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random variable e are represented by the arbitrary cumulative density function *¥ defined 
over the interval [a,b] where a < b. The farmer has no preventive means for this risk. To 
keep matters simple, we assume that £ is independent of production risk 5 . The farmer's 
expected utility of profit becomes 
(o1 b 
E[u(W0+f(x,bj)-px+£)]= ^U(W(i+f(x,(a)-px + £)d<î>{û})(Hl{£) (4) 
Following Nachman (1982), the farmer's objective can be rewritten by defining the derived 
utility function as 
* 
Û(W) = E[U(W + £)] = JU(W + e)dV{s) (5) 
The farmer's maximization problem becomes 
Max £•[{/(»;+ƒ (X,S)-J3JC)] (6) 
This is the standard formulation of the single-risk model with U replacing U . 
Let x* denote the optimal application of input without background risk (the solution to 
(2)) and x" the optimal application of input in the presence of background risk (the 
solution to (6)). Moreover, let xN denote the risk-neutral level of input use. This optimal 
level is the same with or without background risk. The optimal application x" can 
generally be higher or lower than the optimal application x'. However, this ambiguity is 
resolved if the underlying utility function, U , exhibits standard risk aversion. This notion 
is defined below. 
Kimball (1990) defines prudence as the propensity to prepare oneself in the face of 
uncertainty. For instance, in a model of saving under uncertainty, prudence represents the 
intensity of the precautionary saving motive. An individual is prudent if the third derivative 
of their utility function is positive (£/'" > 0). 
U"(W) As we define the degree of absolute risk aversion as A(W) = —-, we note 
U'(W) 
U'"(W) P(W) = the degree of absolute prudence. 
U"(W) 
Kimball (1993) develops the concept of standard risk aversion as 'a specific formalization 
of the notion that bearing one risk makes an agent less willing to bear another risk, even 
when the two risks are independent.' Thus, standard risk aversion holds if 'any risk that 
makes a small reduction in wealth more painful also makes any undesirable, statistically-
independent risk more painful,' where 'pain' is measured as utility loss. He shows that this 
condition holds if and only if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) 
and decreasing absolute prudence (DAP). This concept is a natural generalization of Pratt 
and Zeckhauser's proper risk aversion (1987): two independent risks that are individually 
undesirable are also jointly undesirable. The property of standard risk aversion is satisfied 
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by preferences exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), or constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) in the weaker version of standardness which requires only nonincreasing 
absolute risk aversion and nonincreasing absolute prudence. Kihlstrom et al. (1981) have 
shown that the derived utility Û inherits properties of the original utility function : it is 
monotone and concave ; it exhibits DARA if U is DARA ; it exhibits DAP if U is DAP. 
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1991) have shown that if preferences exhibit standard risk 
aversion, then the derived utility function U is more risk averse than the utility function 
U . Proposition 2 follows from applying corollary 1. 
Proposition 2 
Given an undesirable, nondegenerate, independent background risk, and preferences 
satisfying standard risk aversion, 
(i) x" <x' <xN if the input is risk increasing; 
(ii) xN < x' < x" if the input is risk decreasing. 
Note that, with an undesirable background risk, standardness is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition on the utility function. If background risk is universally undesirable, 
risk vulnerability (Gollier and Pratt, 1995) is a necessary and sufficient condition. This 
concept includes proper risk aversion but it is more demanding than DARA. It is exhibited 
by all hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) functions. 
Define overconsumption as the difference between the level of input use of a risk- averse 
farmer and the level of input use of a risk-neutral farmer, and define underconsumption as 
the opposite of overconsumption. The proposition above suggests that background risk 
increases overconsumption (underconsumption) if the input is risk decreasing (increasing). 
In other words, the presence of an undesirable and independent background risk increases 
(in an absolute sense) the difference between the level of input use of a risk-averse farmer 
and the level of input use of a risk-neutral farmer, if preferences exhibit standard risk 
aversion. 
Choices regarding endogenous risk must sometimes be made while simultaneously facing 
one immuable exogenous risk that is beyond the control of the agent, and that is 
independent of endogenous risk. At first, we assumed that each farmer was endowed with a 
certain monetary wealth W0. In the real world, besides his/her production activity, a farmer 
will have other sources of income (off-farm earnings, financial assets, etc.), which are 
random. We can also consider that human capital is random. So, we can define random 
initial wealth as W = W0 + s . 
In the standard model of self-insurance, one production function is generally introduced. 
Thus the farmer is assumed to manage only one risky output. In the real world, his/her 
business is diversified, so (s)he may have to manage two risky yields or more. If farmers 
choose their optimal level of input use as to endogenous risk of the first output, the second 
output may face exogenous risk which is beyond the farmers' control. In our static model, a 
risk can be considered exogenous if choices regarding this risk and those regarding 
endogenous risk are not made simultaneously. This second source of risk is also exogenous 
if farmers have no means of defense against it: such a risk can be called a natural disaster 
(hurricanes, epidemics, etc.). This is also the case if there are means to prevent such 
disasters, but to make use of them is prohibited by the authorities. For example, 
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prophylactic vaccination against Foot-and-Mouth disease is available, but it was stopped in 
the European Union in 1991. We suppose that both risks are independent. Thus, the 
random wealth ^characterizes this risky output. Consequently, not taking this background 
risk into account can lead the theoretical model to mis-estimate optimal risk-taking. This 
would lead an overestimation or an underestimation of the farmer's optimal level of input 
use. 
4 Changes in background risk and self-insurance 
It is well known that the government is able to influence farmer's optimal consumption of 
input through output and/or input prices (Leathers and Quiggin, 1991) by proposing an 
actuarially fair crop insurance (Ramaswami, 1993) or public financial compensation (Lewis 
and Nickerson, 1989). Proposition 2 proves that the presence of an independent and 
undesirable background risk can modify farmer's optimal level of input use. But how does a 
change in the riskiness of an exogenous random variable affect his/her optimal 
consumption? 
Let us consider any couple of random variables (2,, e2 ) distributed in the range [a, b\, 
and with cumulative distribution functions vFl(£')and x¥2(£)- Denoting the monotone 
likelihood ratio (MLR) dominance criterion by >- , we have: 
Ml.ll 
Definition 1 (Ormiston and Schlee, 1993) 
s2 y e{ if there are a scalar ce[a,è] and a nonnegative nonincreasing function h(e) such 
that T2(f) = 0 for \/e<c and d¥x(£) = h(£)<N1(s)foi V f>c . 
The farmer, facing background risk £ with distribution T,, i = 1, 2 , will select the 
level of input use which maximizes his/her expected utility given in (4). 
Proposition 3 
If preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and the independent and 
undesirable background risk becomes less risky in the sense of MLR criterion, then (i) the 
optimal application of risk-increasing input increases and (ii) the optimal application of risk-
decreasing input decreases. 
Proof 
We define the derived utility function as: 
Û, = EU(W + £,) = JU(W + £)cW,(£) 
and the degree of risk aversion as: 
U"(W) - U"(W) 
Aa(W) = - ^ - ^ and A,(W) = - ^ A ^ - for i = 1,2 U'{W) U;(W) 
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First, we must prove that if s-, >- s, then L', is more risk averse than U1 at W, i.e. 
- MLR 
À,(W) > A2(W). Observe that: 
ÂI(W)-Â2(W)= ƒ• Aa(W + e) U\W + c)d
xV,(c) U'(W + £)dV2(£) 
\U'(W + x)d"V,(x) JU'(W + x)dV2{x) 
Aa(W+E) WiW+eyfV^e) 
ju'iw+xywxx) 
+ ^<Aa(W+£)U'(iV+£) He) 
]u,(fV+x)d¥l(x) \u'{W+x)d¥2(x) 
dV2(s) 
Since h > 0 and h is nonincreasing, e* > c, such that the expression in brackets above is 
negative for all e > s*. Consequently, since we assume DARA, 
Â{(W)- Â2(W) > Aa(W + e*) j U'(W + t ')cW|U') U'(W + £)d
x¥2(e) 
\U'(W + x)dH',(x) \U'{W + x)dV2{x) 
We deduce proposition 3 by applying corollary 1. 
If the random variable of background risk has two intervals (-W0 < 0 with probability p 
and 0 with probability \-p), a decrease in the probability of the bad state is an MLR 
improvement. T, puts more probability mass on the lower outcome than 4^. Hence, we 
can deduce the following corollary. 
Corollary 2 
Given a farmer whose utility function is DARA facing an independent background risk with 
probability of loss p. If this probability decreases, then (i) the optimal application of risk-
decreasing input decreases and (ii) the optimal application of risk-increasing input increases. 
Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) have highlighted the consistent and apparent 
overestimation of subjective low probability. The farmer may overestimate this probability 
because of a lack of information about his/her probability distribution. If the government 
has a cost advantage in collecting and processing information about these phenomena, the 
dissemination of the information may decrease farmer's subjective probability of loss and 
then modify his/her optimal level of input use. If this exogenous risk is a natural disaster 
affecting another output, a decrease of the probability of loss can affect the optimal level of 
input use. Such a policy might serve as an alternative to the direct regulation of input use. 
Suppose that? represents the random losses on initial wealth W0 due to a natural 
disaster. Its interval is [ - ^ ,0 ] . In most of the countries, individual liability for financial 
loss due to natural disaster is limited by compensation from programs of public disaster 
relief. In France, such a program is called 'Fonds national de garantie des calamités 
agricoles' and has existed since 1964. Lewis and Nickerson (1989) have shown that the 
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introduction of this program for the endogenous risk modifies farmer's optimal application 
of input. Suppose that this public insurance program affects the exogenous random 
production W = W0 + e . It ensures that the value of exogenous property after the occurrence 
of a disaster does not fall below some minimal value W =W0 + s with ~e < 0. The absolute 
value\s\ can be considered a deductible. The burden of this program is not borne by the 
farmers. The background risk becomes?, = ï , A ^ +~è/[-^ where / is a dummy 
variable. Its cumulative function is 
|¥,(*) Ve>£ 
This institutional arrangement on the exogenous risk can be interpreted as a special 
monotone probability ratio (MPR) change in the distribution of background risk (Eeckhoudt 
and Gollier, 1996). Notice that the ranking between the two random variables 2, and e2 
cannot be achieved by the MLR criterion since c^ F, I dV1 at e = e is zero, so that this ratio 
may not be decreasing. Consequently, we cannot apply proposition 3. But we deduce the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4 
Given an individual whose utility function is DARA. If the government introduces a limited 
liability for loss on the independent background wealth by implementing a compensation 
program based on a deductible, then (i) the optimal application of risk-increasing input 
increases and (ii) the optimal application of risk-decreasing input decreases. 
Proof 
The degree of risk aversion of the derived utility functions is defined by 
* /> 
^U"(W+£)cN{(£) U"{W+ £)%(£)+ \U"(W+£)d¥{{£) 
MW) = -H and Â2(W) = f 
\U'(W+£)(H>X(£) U'(W + £)%(£) \U'(W + £)cH']{£) 
Following the proof of proposition 3, it is straightforward to show that ÂI(W)>Â2(W). 
Then we apply corollary 1. 
Of course, this result is also valid if the government imposes a minimum price for the 
exogenous production by implementing a trading program when the price goes below a 
minimum price. Suppose the farmer has a pig farm and a corn field. Proposition 4 says that 
(s)he will be forced to decrease his/her use of pesticides if a minimum price of pigmeat is 
guaranteed by the authorities or if the losses due to a disease (against which there is no 
prophylactic vaccination) are limited by a compensation program. 
Suppose now that the government replaces this insurance program with a deductible by a 
co-insurance program. The farmer bears a percentage of total losses. It is called 'rate of 
retention'. 
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Proposition 5 
Given a farmer whose preferences satisfy: 
Pa(W + s)>Aa(W + s') V e,£'e[-W0;0] (8) 
If the government introduces a system of co-insurance for loss on the independent 
background wealth, then (i) the optimal application of risk-increasing input increases and 
(ii) the optimal application of risk-decreasing input decreases. 
Proof 
Note a e (0,1) the rate of retention. The background risk becomes s2 = aex. Thus we have 
%(e) = Prob[?, < s ] = Prob[a?, < as] = Prob[ s2 < as] = % (as) for all s e[-W0,0]. Conse-
quently, v¥2(s)<K¥](s) for alls E [ - ^ 0 , 0 ] since cumulative functions are nondecreasing and 
s < 0. The introduction of the co-insurance is a shift in the distribution of the background 
risk s from T, to ^ , where x¥l is dominated by T, in the sense of the first stochastic 
dominance (FSD). Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) show that: 
*¥2 >- T, implies AX{W)> A2(W) <=> utility f/ verifies proposition (8). We obtain proposi-
tion 5 by applying corollary 1. 
If preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the derived utility function is also 
CARA and the introduction of a co-insurance system does not modify the optimal level of 
input use. The inequality of property (8) is strict if U is the 'one switch' utility function, 
U(W) = k1W-e'klW,k, >0,k2>0 or if U is CRRA with relative risk aversion parameter y 
satisfying W>(l + y)tV0. Note that this proposition deals only with risk aversion of the 
derived utility function at a particular value of W. To obtain definitive comparative static 
results we would need to apply proposition 5 at each relevant level of wealth. 
Propositions 3, 4 and 5 show that a change in the riskiness of the exogenous risk can 
force the farmer to modify his/her level of input use regarding an endogenous risk, even if 
both risks are independent. 
5 Conclusion 
The literature on self-insurance has considered an individual facing a single source of 
uncertainty. We have focused on the influence of two important factors on the level of input 
use selected by an expected utility maximizing farmer. This first factor is farmer's degree 
of risk aversion. The second factor is the nature of technology characterized by the single 
crossing condition of production function. They lead to the well-known result: the optimal 
application of a risk-decreasing (increasing) input is higher (lower) the more risk averse is 
the farmer. 
But the single risk assumption imposes severe limitations upon the relevance of the 
model. Thus, this paper has examined a simple model of the individual decision to self-
insure when we introduce a background risk that is beyond the control of the agent, and 
that is independent of endogenous risk. Two important implications arise from our model. 
First, the presence of a background risk increases (decreases) the optimal level of risk-
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decreasing (increasing) input use if preferences exhibit standard risk aversion. Thus, the 
level of input use selected by a risk-averse farmer can be explained in part by the presence 
of background risk. Second, a shift in the distribution of background risk, in the sense of 
MLR criterion, MPR criterion or FSD criterion, affects the optimal application of input. 
Hence, the introduction of a public relief program characterized by a deductible or co-
insurance, or a change in the farmer's subjective probability of loss, modifies the optimal 
input decision. 
While the simplicity of our model requires our results to be viewed as exploratory, our 
analysis suggests that a change in the riskiness that affects output which is exogenous when 
farmers make choices regarding endogenous risk can force them to modify their optimal 
level of input use. 
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Summary 
This paper mainly deals with possible adaptations of risk management of a single decision 
maker to changes in subjective probabilities and risk preference. Results of a survey of 
Northern German farmers' attitude towards risk and risk management indicate that, in a 
situation where repeated decisions are involved, risk preferences of a decision maker do not 
seem to be determined only by his/her attitude towards risk, but also by 'experience' with 
this situation. The empirical findings as well as the model calculations in the paper show 
that risk management cannot be understood in a static context, since the subjective 
perception and the evaluation of risk may alter in the course of time. The inclusion of 
learning and changing risk preference in the model is relevant, in general but, apart from 
the computational burden, a serious estimation problem arises with regard to time-
dependent risk aversion. But even if it is not possible or appropriate to include dynamic 
aspects of risk management directly in formal decision models, the results may at least be 
useful for decision support and advisory work and might also stimulate further 
developments of decision theory in agriculture. 
1 Introduction 
Risk management can be divided into four fields namely (1) identification of risks, (2) risk 
assessment, (3) risk reduction and (4) managing costs of risks. Changes in risk management 
practice of a firm over time can be caused by changes in each of the fields. This paper 
mainly deals with possible adaptations of risk management of a single decision maker to 
changes in the second field (risk assessment). The focus of interest is on subjective 
probabilities and attitude towards risk as the key elements of risk assessment as well as on 
their changes over time caused by learning processes and changes of individual preferences. 
Results of a survey of Northern German farmers' attitude towards risk and risk 
management (Petersen, 1995; Petersen and Noell, 1995; Noell and Petersen, 1995) indicate 
that in a situation where repeated decisions are involved risk preference of a decision maker 
does not only seem to be determined by his/her attitude towards risk, but also by 
'experience' with this situation. It is quite possible to find farmers who have the same 
attitude towards risk and, all other factors being equal, exhibit different risk behaviour or 
show different risk preferences. The same is true for a single farmer who shows different 
risk preferences in different risky situations although the risks involved are about the same. 
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Results also indicate that the individual attitude towards risk might not be an innate and 
unchangeable characteristic of a decision maker, but is subject to changes over time. 
Changes in goal preferences caused by age could be one explanation for this; a change of 
attitude towards risk by long-term experience with certain risky situations could be another 
one. Altogether quite a few results of the study seem, at least on the face of it, to be 
inconsistent with the assumptions of risk theory. 
In Section 2 the most important results of the survey are discussed briefly. Factors 
affecting risk assessment are discussed in Section 3, with a focus on 'learning' as the 
central process of the revision of probabilities. Subsequently, a simple model of changes in 
risk behaviour, which aims to explain some findings of the survey, is presented (Section 4). 
In section 5 starting points for model expansion are discussed. Some conclusions are 
provided in the final section. 
This paper is intended as a contribution to the clarification of the phenomenon that 
consistent risk behaviour of an individual decision maker in line with risk theory can only 
be found in special circumstances (Smidts, 1990). In other words: inconsistencies in the risk 
behaviour observed might be due to behaviour itself as well as to the underlying 
assumptions of the observation. 
2 Results of a survey of risk behaviour of farmers in Northern Germany 
The main purpose of the survey (Petersen, 1995) was to gain some insight into farmers' 
conceptions of risk, in their perception of probabilities, in factors affecting their willingness 
to bear risks, and in the way farmers respond to risk in planning and decision making. The 
main goal of the investigation was to obtain a general view of farmers' risk behaviour as a 
basis for further research. The study was designed as an explorative study and conducted 
over a period of six months from autumn 1994 to spring 1995. Mainly qualitative and semi-
quantitative results were expected, which would allow descriptive interpretations of 
farmers' risk behaviour. 
A sample of 150 randomly chosen farmers was drawn in the states of Schleswig-Holstein 
and Lower Saxony. Using a structured questionnaire each farmer was interviewed for 
between one and two hours about their attitude towards risk, their risk perception, their risk 
behaviour and risk management. The data from the interviews were coded, entered into a 
computer and statistically analysed (SPSS). All results shown here originate from bi- and 
multivariate analyses (analysis of variance, contingency tables, analysis of regression) with 
a significance level of a < 0.05. The results presented below concern the most important 
and most interesting findings regarding attitude towards risk, willingness to bear risks and 
risk perception: 
1. Perception of yield variations in grain production was influenced by farm type. 
Average variation coefficients were highest for dairy farms (0.25) followed by crop 
farms (0.22), hog farms (0.19) and mixed operations (0.19). 
2. Perception of yield variations in grain production was influenced by age. The under-35 
age group showed an average variation coefficient of 0.25, the under-50 age group had 
a coefficient of 0.23 and the over-50 age group had a coefficient of 0.20. 
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3. Preferences for and experience with certain production processes {e.g., pig fattening) 
had an influence on the ranking of risks involved in the production processes. The 
more experience with and the higher the preference for a single production process, the 
lower the ranking relative to the other processes and vice versa. 
4. Socioeconomic variables were not correlated with attitude towards risk. 
5. The personal characteristics 'performance orientation', 'willingness to trust other 
people', 'willingness to change', 'optimism' and 'self-confidence' were positively 
correlated with the attitude towards risk and 'anxiety' was correlated negatively. 
6. Risk preferences were correlated negatively with age. The willingness to bear risks 
decreased with increasing age of the farmers. 
7. Subjectively sensed attitude towards risk and risk preferences of the farmers were 
consistent only for 43.3% of the respondents. The other 56.7% showed risk 
preferences which deviated positively or negatively from their attitudes towards risk. 
8. The willingness to bear risks was correlated with the goal preferences of the farmers. It 
was highest when the main goal preference was 'profit' and decreased with the main 
preferences being 'security', 'zest for work' and 'indifference'. 
9. The frequency of applying risk management activities was positively correlated with 
attitude towards risk. 
10. The frequency of applying risk management activities was positively correlated with the 
goal preferences. Farmers with a clear 'profit orientation' took risk-reducing actions 
more often than farmers with the preference 'security', who were followed by those 
with 'zest for work' as main goal preference. 
Altogether the results indicate—at least for the sample of farmers under investigation-
correlations of risk behaviour between (1) experience and expertise in certain areas of 
decision making, (2) age and (3) goal preferences. Furthermore, there seem to be 
correlations among the three groups of factors. At least age seems (with opposite impacts 
on risk preference) to be correlated not only with the factor-complex 'experience', but also 
with 'goal preference'. Subject to further investigation, the preliminary conclusion can be 
drawn that individual risk behaviour is not constant over time, but changes over time 
systematically with age as well as with experience gained in repeated decision situations. 
This 'process of gaining experience' can be understood as learning about probabilities of 
uncertain states of the environment and uncertain expectations of the future. 
3 Changes in risk assessment over time 
Risk assessment of a decision maker is based on subjective probabilities and attitude 
towards risk. Information collection and processing is, among other things, an important 
risk management activity. A decision maker applies information in order to reduce his/her 
uncertainty about future outcomes of specific activities, which means that (s)he specifies the 
(subjective) probability density function of the activity. Information processes can be of low 
intensity with usually low or no costs involved or of high intensity incurring higher 
information costs. Search for information (see e.g., Stigler, 1961; Rothschild, 1974; Hey, 
1993) or experiments carried out to produce information (Pekelman and Rausser, 1978; 
Rausser and Hochman, 1979) are typical information processes of relatively high costs and 
high intensity. In contrast to this there are information processes with low costs and low 
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intensity, which are characterized by a more or less passive gain of experience. Whatever 
type of information process is applied, each new level of information influences decision 
making and affects at the same time the efficiency of other risk management activities. 
Therefore, a decision maker's learning about subjective probabilities can change his/her 
risk management behaviour over time. As demonstrated below, the assumption of a learning 
decision maker can also explain, for example, why two decision makers in the same 
situation with equal attitudes toward risks can arrive at different decisions on risk 
management activities. 
Learning in economics (see e.g., Morgan, 1968; Box and Tiao, 1973; Griffith, 1986) is 
usually referred to as Bayesian learning or inference: the parameters /iapri and erapri of an 
apriori normal probability density function of an uncertain parameter are updated with the 
parameters x and s2 of a sample which results from an information activity. The weighting 
process shown below which combines 'old' expectations and 'new' experience results in the 
aposteriori parameters ,uapos and crapos. 
W
„/V + > V l .,. l . l 
Hap* = 7 . (Tape = — with: w = - r - and w = -
w
0 +
 w
, VWo + Wi a"P" s 
In passive learning processes the new information comes from results of repeated 
decisions or actions. In active learning processes the new information comes from search 
processes or experiments. Active learning processes are more costly, but at the same time 
faster than passive learning processes. There is a trade-off between costs and profits of 
active learning processes, though active learning is subject to optimization. 
It takes a decision maker about five to ten steps or time periods in a passive learning 
process, where the sample size of the incoming information is 1, before an unknown 
parameter is learnt (Noell and Hanf, 1990); that is, the parameter is asymptotically 
converging to the true value. The learning speed mainly depends on the {apriori unknown) 
difference between the values of the initially assumed parameters and the true values of a 
probability density function. The sequence of randomly incoming information has also an 
impact on the speed of learning. 
4 A simple model of changes in risk behaviour 
Model description 
This section aims to demonstrate and analyse possible impacts of learning and changing risk 
preference by means of a simple model. We start with a description of the underlying 
assumptions. Think of a farmer faced with the following decision problem: (s)he intends to 
introduce a new production activity that yields uncertain revenues X,. The revenues are 
identically and independently distributed in each period t with a distribution function 
N(E,V). The true parameters E and V are unknown to the farmer, but prior 
(subjective) information £0 and V0 exists. This starting information is revised in light of 
increasing experience, i.e., E0 and V0 are updated when new observations x, are available. 
The mechanism of learning is not modelled explicitly. Rather we assume that the result of 
this learning process can be approximately described by the functions 
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£ , = £ , _ , + « ( £ - £ , _ , ) (1) 
¥,=¥,_,+ß(V-V,^), t = l,-,T (2) 
The speed of learning is expressed by the coefficients a and ß e [0,1]. (One should be 
aware that in reality the adaptation process will not be as smooth for a single individual, but 
rather exhibits a more stochastic behaviour.) In each period the decision maker has the 
opportunity to choose a risk reducing activity, for example, insurance. This activity incurs 
expenses c and the risk is lowered by A Vt = y Vt. Moreover, assume that the farmer's risk 
attitude in period t is represented by an exponential utility function 
«,(*,) = -e-À'x- (3) 
The absolute risk aversion increases over time according to 
Â, =Xt_x + 5,5 >0 (4) 
Though the age of the farmer is not directly mentioned in the model, the differences in risk 
attitudes between young and old farmers can be taken into account by an appropriate choice 
of Â0 . The objective of maximizing subjective expected utility with respect to adoption of a 
risk reducing activity in period t can now be written (see Chipman (1973) for the 
equivalence of the EU and the EV models under the postulated conditions): 
(5) max jz, 
where: 
',°=E,-
.*,'} 
2 ' 
and z,1 =Et - c - — ( F , - AVt) (6) 
are the objective function values without and with risk reducing activity respectively. For 
the moment we ignore intertemporal dependencies of decisions, i.e., we assume a myopic 
one-step maximization of expected utility. 
Model results 
Â Obviously, the use of insurance is favourable if c< — AVt. Perhaps more interesting is 
investigating risk behaviour through time. At least five basic behavioural individual patterns 
can be imagined (Figure 1): 
i) the farmer never takes out insurance (Figure la) 
ii) insurance is applied permanently 
iii) the farmer initializes production with insurance, but refrains from it later (Figure lb) 
iv) the farmer starts without insurance, but takes out insurance after some time 
v) the time span of insurance is interrupted once (Figure lc) 
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Figure 1. Types of risk behaviour in a situation with learning and changing risk preference 
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c) Multiple changes in risk behaviour 
Which type of risk behaviour can be expected depends on the function 
•z.l=c-±Lv. (7) 
Inserting (2) into (7) and solving the difference equation yields 
rf/=c_(v^((1_Ä,(ro_F)+F) (8) 
This function may have no root (cases i) and ii)), one root (cases iii) and iv)) or two roots 
(case v)) in the interval [l,T]. We are now in a position to investigate the influence of 
several model parameters on this function and thereby on the risk behaviour of the decision 
maker. The following conclusions can be drawn within the framework of this simple model: 
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1. As long as the expenses c for risk reduction are constant, learning with respect to the 
mean of the production activity does not affect the insurance decision. 
2. If insurance costs c increase, the farmer will refrain from measures of risk reduction 
earlier or will resort them later. 
3. An increase in the levels A$ and the change rate 6 of risk aversion have opposite effects. 
4. The insurance will be in effect longer as true variance V , primary guess V0, and 
effectiveness of insurance/ are higher. 
5. The influence of the learning rate/? is not ambiguous. This can be seen from the partial 
derivative of d, with respect to/7 : 
âd,
 = yt(y0-V)(St + l)(l-ß)' 
aß 209-2 ) >(<)0<=>F0>(<)K (9) 
Apparently, the sign of the derivative depends on the relation between V and V0. If the 
true risk of the new technology is initially overestimated, a smaller learning rate 
prolongs the period of the insurance and vice versa. 
6. Due to our simple model assumptions, which lead to monotonous shapes of E„ Vt and Ä,, 
a multiple change in risk behaviour can only be brought about if learning and changes in 
risk preference are both allowed at the same time. In this situation, the gradual finding 
that the variance of the process is smaller than initially assumed—and hence the 
insurance is less valuable—may be overcompensated by increased risk aversion. As we 
mentioned above, such fluctuating behaviour might, of course, also be explained by the 
randomness of additional sample information. 
5 Starting points for model expansion 
In this section we discuss some relaxations of our model assumptions in a qualitative 
manner resorting to approaches that can be found in the literature. The objective is to 
explore the theoretical background in greater detail and to provide additional explanations 
for some of our empirical findings. 
Changes of wealth 
In the previous section we considered risk management of a certain production activity 
independently of the context of the whole enterprise. In particular, the development of the 
decision maker's wealth was not taken into account. But, of course, inflows from other 
business areas as well as the accumulated capital of the farm serve as a kind of insurance 
and have, in general, an influence on risk management of a single process. From a 
theoretical viewpoint, increasing or decreasing wealth are only negligible, if the utility 
function of the decision maker exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, and this property 
indeed applies to the exponential utility function (3) we have assumed. Nevertheless, there 
is widespread agreement that the premise of decreasing absolute risk aversion is more 
appropriate to describe actual risk behaviour (e.g., Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). In that 
case one should expect that farm managers, ceteris paribus, show an increasing tolerance 
towards risks of the same magnitude when their farms are prosperous and wealth increases. 
Sinn (1986) argues that capital accumulation over time creates the precondition to intensify 
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the use of the production factor 'risk' and offers an additional explanation for different 
growth rates of firms. 
However, it would be too simple to postulate the existence of a unique relationship 
between risk behaviour and changes of the wealth position of the decision maker. In 
contrast to the line of reasoning just presented, for example, Odening (1991) showed in the 
context of a multiperiod investment model that it might be rational for jeopardized rather 
than for prosperous farms to resort to risky measures. The approach used there differs from 
ours insofar as the objective is not to maximize expected utility but to minimize the 
probability of bankruptcy during T time periods. It turns out that in a situation in which 
high withdrawals lead to permanent equity losses, which will place the farm in jeopardy, 
even a very risk-averse decision maker will prefer to take up credits, although the financial 
risk will thereby be increased. In some circumstances this means that the choice of 
alternatives with high variability of outcome might be reasonable. In particular, this 
strategy is promising if it is possible to take benefits from the upper side of the distribution 
of profits while negative consequences can partly be shifted away (perhaps to the creditors) 
so that the relevant distribution is truncated. At first glance these findings contradict the 
commonly held opinion, supported by traditional static EV-analysis, that the optimal 
financial leverage is inversely proportional to the degree of risk aversion. 
Active learning and derived utility 
The model described in Section 4 suffers at least from the assumption of myopic 
optimization and the fact that only passive learning has been considered. It is well known 
from the stochastic control literature that in repetitive decision problems the choice of a 
certain action in period t has two effects. First, the direct contribution to the objective 
function in that period, and second, an indirect contribution to forthcoming decisions via 
improvement of the informational basis, since unknown model parameters may be estimated 
with higher precision (e.g., Kendrick, 1981). Consequently, the potential learning effect 
must be taken into account in period t. This is indeed the key argument to understand why 
decision makers sometimes behave 'seemingly risk-loving', i.e., prefer to participate in an 
unfair gamble. To make this point more concrete, consider again a farmer who is risk 
averse with respect to terminal wealth wT, i. e., who has a concave utility function. (S)he 
has to decide to what extent a,, a new production process to adopt. In contrast to our 
former example, the distribution of returns X, additionally depends on parameter 9. 
Conditional on this parameter the distribution of returns ƒ(x, \ff) is more or less 
favourable. Let the farmer be endowed with an initial wealth wQ, which develops according 
to wt = w, , + X, a,. His/her desire is to maximize expected utility of terminal wealth: 
max Eu(wT) (10) 
a l ' " " ' a 7 -
Define the so-called derived (or induced) utility function for the period T-\ by 
H(w ) = max \u(w)-f{x \x )dx (11) 
' - ' are [ 0 . V | ] ^ ' I l-\ I 
so that the maximization problem in period T-\ using (10) can be written as 
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max \ H(w )-f{x \x )dx (12) 
A similar argument holds for each period t. Whenever 8 is known exactly, the distribution 
of X, is constant, and the derived utility is a concave in w, (see Baron (1974) for proof). 
Hence, risk-averse behaviour is expected in that period (as well as in any other period). But 
if 0 is unknown, observing wt offers the chance to learn, perhaps in a Bayesian manner, 
about 6 and to improve forecast Xl + I. However, the choice of a, and the updating of 
ƒ (x, \6) are interrelated, since learning about the distribution of returns requires a positive 
stake in the new production process. Otherwise wt is not conclusive with regard to Xt. An 
implication for the decision problem described above is that the new technology might be 
adopted by a risk-averse farmer, though expected returns in that period are negative. This is 
possible, if the value of (imperfect) information contained in w, compensates for expected 
losses due to the choice of a,. Strictly speaking, the derived utility for a period t is not 
always strictly concave in w,. A characterization of situations in which a nonconcave 
derived utility function may appear as well as numerical examples can be found in 
McCardle and Winkler (1992) and Baron (1974). 
Adaptive utility 
A final step for expansion of the model may consist of a more subtle description of the 
change in risk preference. Until now we have understood the changes in attitude towards 
risk as being a result of general shifts in the goal structure of the decision maker that appear 
with increasing age. These changes were given exogenously. On the other hand, learning 
was only possible as regards the subjective probability distributions of the consequences 
which are connected with a certain action. In other words, the evaluation of the 
consequences and their variances were not affected by experience gained by the decision 
maker while carrying out the action repeatedly, i.e., no feedback regarding learning about 
the consequences of a risky choice and the utility function applied to these consequences 
was allowed. This assumption is at the heart of classical utility theory, where preferences 
for something and the subject to be evaluated are treated separately and are not interrelated. 
Nevertheless, modern consumer theory relaxes this premise within the- adaptive utility 
approach and admits that trying out a product can alter the utility that had been expected 
before the trial. Consumption offers a chance to learn about preliminary utility. Cyert and 
DeGroot (1987, p. 139-140 ) give an illustrative example. 
[...] Assume two commodities with prices p and q and consumptions x and y. Let the 
utility function be: 
U(x, y I a) = a log x + (1 - a) log y where 0 < a < 1 
Suppose that the consumer is uncertain about the exact value of a and assigns a prior 
probability density function Ç(a) to this value. Thus, although it is unrealistic, we 
assume that the learning process [...] has resulted in the consumer's knowledge of the 
general form of his utility function but not the exact weights. If the consumer is going to 
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choose x and y in only a single period, then he should choose the values for which the 
expected utility E[U(x, y / a)] is a maximum. Since 
E[U(x, y I a)] = E(a) log x + (l - E(a)) log y 
the ~onsumer can simply replace the uncertain value of a in his utility function by his 
expectation E (a). The optimal choices of x and y would, therefore, be 
x = (E(a) Ip) Mandy = ((1 - E(a)) I q) M [M = income] 
We shall now consider a process with more than one period. After the consumer chooses 
the values of x and y in a given period and consumes those amounts of the two 
commodities, his experience will lead him to formulate a new posterior probability 
density function of a. [. . .] 
If this process is repeated several times, the consumer is able to learn about his 
preferences for the commodities x and y. 
Now it seems legitimate to ask whether the same effect holds in the case of risk 
preference. Is it not possible that a decision maker appreciates an unsafe alternative more 
after (s)he has chosen it several times and when (s)he has learned to handle it and got more 
confidence in it? Going back to our model, the change in risk preference then should not be 
described by equation (4) but rather by a function that also includes the increased 
experience of the farmer concerning risk management in general (1,m) as well as his/her 
experience with the management of the decision problem (1.d) under consideration. 
What follows from this expansion? First, a greater variety of development possibilities of 
the farmer's risk attitude would arise. Second, similar to the updating of probabilities, the 
distinction between prior and posterior utility does not matter in the case of myopic 
maximization with regard to current decisions. But in a multiperiod model, anticipating 
possible changes in the evaluation of risks may result in different decisions. A formal 
description of both learning about probabilities and about utility is developed in Cyert and 
DeGroot (1987). However, although one might be convinced that risk aversion is not only 
varying in time, but is also affected by the choice result itself and consequently by accident, 
it will be difficult to prove such a hypothesis, because,_it is difficult to separate the different 
aspects of learning in a testable model. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper was induced by an empirical investigation of risk perception, risk attitude and 
risk response of German farmers. First, it turned· out that many of the results were affected 
by age and vocational experience of the people interviewed. Second, some of the answers 
seemed to be inconsistent in such a way that the risk attitude declared and the observable 
risk management action did not completely coincide. Introducing the category 'time' into a 
simple model allowed us to study possible effects of learning and changing risk attitudes. 
The empirical findings as well as the model calculations showed that risk management 
cannot be understood in a static context, since the subjective perception and the evaluation 
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of risk may alter through time. The fact that we were able to produce a more differentiated 
risk response by means of rather slight extensions of the basic concepts of decision theory 
may, on the one hand, strengthen confidence in the flexibility and the explanatory power of 
the decision-theoretical approach. On the other hand, the view that the actual risk response 
reflects only the momentary personal situation and is often embedded in a complex of 
interrelated decisions might give rise to some mistrust of the empirical results (e.g., 
estimated utility functions) of studies in behavioural decision theory. In particular, if the 
design of experiments and questions is 'context-free', i.e., does not take into account the 
possibility of learning, the decision maker's age, level of knowledge etc., one should be 
careful in generalizing these results and in using them in various decision problems. For 
instance, it could be misleading to specify overall utility functions on the basis of short-term 
risk behaviour, which is perhaps seemingly risk prone, and to apply the estimates to 
repeated or long-term decisions. 
What are the implications for the specification of decision models? As we have seen, the 
inclusion of learning and changing risk preference in the model is relevant, in general, and 
the model results are sensitive to the magnitude of the corresponding model parameters. It 
would be straightforward now to recommend the inch1sion of these aspects in decision 
models, but this is, of course, more easily said than done. Apart from the computational 
burden, a serious estimation problem arises with rf!gard to time-dependent risk aversion. 
Obviously, this is a new variation on the old theme of optimal model complexity. Even if it 
is not possible or appropriate to include dynamic aspects of risk management directly in 
formal decision models, the results may at least be useful for decision support and advisory 
work. More specific support could be provided if apriori assumptions of the risk preference 
of farmers with regard to age, experience in certain areas of the farm business etc. could be 
used to classify farmer's expected risk behaviour. The great demand for information on 
management behaviour of farmers currently expressed by public organizations and private 
firms shows that the type of qualitative and semi-quantitative research results presented in 
this paper is of high practical value. 
As a next step in research the results presented above could be employed in hypotheses 
about risk behaviour of farmers in further empirical investigations. It will be important to 
find out whether changes in risk preference of decision makers can be proved. Another 
interesting task would be to formulate an overall dynamic behavioural framework of 
farmer's response to risk. Although the framework would possibly be too complex to be 
applied to quantitative modelling, it could lead to a better understanding of risk 
management processes and stimulate further developments ofliecision theory in agriculture. 
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CHAPTER 13 
A FUTURES MARKET OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION RIGHTS: 
AN APPLICATION TO THE DUTCH, ENGLISH AND WELSH 
MILK QUOTA MARKETS 
J.M.E. Pennings and M.T.G. Meulenberg 
Wageningen Agricultural University, Wageningen, The Netherlands 
Summary 
Farms are increasingly being affected by policies that involve production rights. Because 
fluctuation in prices of these rights in the cash market, farmers face a price risk. A futures 
market would enable them to hedge against this price risk. Rights futures have some -features 
that differ from those of traditional commodity futures, which make them very suitable for 
futures trading. One such a feature of rights futures contracts is that, unlike traditional 
commodity futures, rights futures have no residual risk at maturity. The underlying 
commodity is identical to the commodity in the cash market, which is seldom the case with 
traditional commodities. Nor is the place of delivery of importance because delivery takes 
place by book entry and hence will not adversely affect the hedging effectiveness. In this 
article it is shown that, because of this nature of rights, relatively more will be hedged than in 
the case of traditional commodities. We argue that a futures market ofrights can be an 
effective and efficient tool for managing price risk, and will illustrate this for milk quota. To 
provide insight into its viability, some indication is given what might happen if such a futures 
market was established in the Netherlands, England and Wales. 
1 Introduction 
Between 1973 and 1983, milk production in the European Union (EU) rose by 30% while. 
consumption only rose by 9% (Braatz, 1992). This resulted in very large stocks of butter and 
milk powder, which put a strong pressure on the EU-budget dlie to the Common Agricultural 
Policy guaranteed price system. As a result a milk quota scheme was put into practice on 
April 2 1984. All EU-members had the right to produce a certain quantity of milk. Within a 
large framework, states were free to implement the policy at their own discretion. The EU has 
allowed the transfer ~f quotas within country borders. National governments must add their 
own rules to the framework of EU-regulations. Despite the fact that these EU-regulations 
require milk quota to be linked to lii.nd when buying or selling milk quota, in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom there are ways to circumvent this requirement. In 1987 member 
states were given the option to introduce quota leasing as a possibility of transferring quotas. 
The trade in milk quota is increasing every year, most of which occurs in the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. The underlying value of this trade in these two countries exceeded one 
billion US dollars in the milk year 1993/94 (Van Dijk and Pennings, 1995). For that reason 
our attention has been focused on England, Wales and the Netherlands. 
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2 Cash market of milk rights: need for hedging 
In the EU most cash markets of milk rights have not been structured or developed well. 
Canada, on the other hand, developed a centralized spot market in the 1980s. There have been 
centralized spot markets of milk rights in Ontario since 1980 and in Quebec since 1985. In the 
EU such centralized spot markets have not been established yet. 
England and Wales 
As can been seen from Figure 1 total quantities transferred have grown continuously in 
England and Wales, and so has the quantity being put to lease. 
1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
-LEASE PURCHASE 
Figure 1. Milk quota being transferred in England and Wales 
Source: National Dairy Council, 1995 
The prices of milk quota have reached higher levels each year during the first five years of the 
scheme. Prices have fluctuated considerably, mainly at the end of the year. 
The Netherlands 
The development of the milk quota market in the Netherlands was given an additional boost 
by the introduction of leasing in 1989/90. Leasing is still gaining popularity. In 1988/89 about 
300,000 tonnes of quota were transferred permanently among farms. The next year, after 
leasing had been introduced, total quantity transferred remained roughly the same; however, 
only 180,000 tonnes were transferred permanently, the rest was put to lease, indicating a shift 
towards temporary transfers. Figure 2 shows a rapid growth in leasing and a much slower 
growth in permanent transfers in succeeding years. In the quota year 1994/1995 18,078 lease 
contracts were concluded, an increase of 47% compared with the year before. Contracts for 
permanent transfers were 6,243 in number, an increase of 6% compared with the year before. 
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-LEASE PURCHASE 
Figure 2. Milk quota being transferred in the Netherlands 
Source: Product Board for Dairy Products, 1995 
The distributions of milk quota prices in the milk price year 1993/94 for both buy/sell and 
lease are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The farmers are classified by the level of the milk quota 
price into five almost equal (in amount) dairy farm groups. 
Table 1. Distribution of milk quota purchases/sales prices in Dutch Guilders in 1993/94 
Number of dairy 
farms in class % 
20.2 
17.8 
21.9 
20.5 
19.6 
100.0 
Price per kilogram 
of milk quota 
2.81 
4.06 
4.22 
4.38 
4.85 
3.96 
Minimum price 
in class 
0.56 
4.00 
4.16 
4.32 
4.49 
0.56 
Maximum price 
in class 
3.99 
4.15 
4.31 
4.45 
5.84 
5.84 
Source: LEI-accounting, 1995 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 have been obtained from a sample of 500 dairy farms. The 
price differences, in both buy/sell and lease, among the different classes are great, because in 
the Netherlands the spot market for milk quota is not transparent. 
Risks 
In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom most transactions are conducted with the help of 
intermediaries. Official brokers normally charge fixed mark up commission, so the largest 
share of the price risk is borne by the farmers. Traders in milk quota do take price risk and 
make cash forward contracts with farmers. 
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Table 2. Distribution of milk quota lease prices in Dutch Guilders in 1993/94 
Number of dairy 
farms in class % 
20.5 
17.9 
22.6 
18.9 
20.1 
100.0 
Price per kilogram 
of milk quota 
0.3250 
0.3808 
0.4028 
0.4299 
0.4681 
0.4013 
Minimum price 
in class 
0.2074 
0.3576 
0.4000 
0.4101 
0.4421 
0.2074 
Maximum price 
in class 
0.3538 
0.3999 
0.4100 
0.4401 
0.6170 
0.6170 
Source: LEl-accounting, 1995 
For both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands we have observed an increased trade in 
milk quota and considerable price differentials among regions and periods of time. This 
presents management problems for farmers. First, if the farmer intends to sell or buy milk 
quota, (s)he does not know the price at the end of the milk price year, so faces a price risk. 
Second, dairy farmers who sell milk quota at the end of the milk price year have to sell their 
dairy cows within a very short period, theoretically, within an infinitely short period of time, 
because after selling the milk quota they are no longer allowed to produce milk any longer for 
the next milk price year. Because of the farmers having to sell all dairy cows at once, they are 
not able to receive the best price for the herd. For the same reasons, problems will exist for 
farmers who want to expand their farms. Milk quota futures will provide an efficient tool for 
managing this price risk. 
Futures markets provide participants with opportunities for hedging, and make the market 
transparent. On average, only 3% of the trade that is conducted is actually delivered (Catania, 
1989). In the case of a futures market in rights, the actual delivery will be greater at the 
beginning of such a market, because the cash markets of most rights are not sufficiently liquid 
yet. Hedgers who fail to make a deal on the cash market will not offset their futures market 
position. As will be demonstrated in the next section, this higher frequency of delivery will 
not pose a problem in the case of a futures market in rights, because of their characteristics. 
3 Optimal hedging ratio and hedging effectiveness 
Futures contracts are standardized with respect to time of delivery, delivery location, quality 
and unit of trading (Sandor, 1973). This standardization process is very complicated for 
commodities, especially with respect to location of delivery and commodity characteristics 
(such as sort and form), causing basis risk. A right, however, is a perfect homogeneous 
'commodity', i.e., the underlying commodity of a rights futures contract is identical to the 
commodity in the cash market, implying that there are no problems with respect to delivery, 
because delivery takes place by transferring book entries between accounts (Pirrong et al., 
1994). Nor are there any problems with respect to quality. 
Consider a fanner who can lock in the price risks regarding milk rights with the help of 
milk rights futures. We assume that the only production costs are the costs of acquiring milk 
rights, which will not affect our conclusions. Given that the farmer wishes to maximize the 
expected revenue in the next time period adjusted for risk, where risk is measured by the 
variance of the expected revenue, the objective function can be based on the expected value-
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variance (EV) model (Peck, 1975; Kahl, 1983; Barry and Robison, 1987). The EV approach 
is justified because we use this model for determining the relationship between the variables 
and for showing the direction of change in relevant variables if changes occur in other factors 
that comprise the decision environment. We do not use the EV model for its measurability. 
The objective function can be expressed as: 
n„ = E(Tl)-AVAR(n) (1) 
where nce is the certainty equivalent, E(U) is the expected revenue and VARiYl) represents 
the variance of the revenue. A denotes the risk parameter which, for risk-averse decision 
makers, is positive, thus providing compensation for risk bearing (Pratt, 1954). At time t the 
farmer wishes to maximize the certainty equivalent for the next period f+1. Given that the 
cash positions are predetermined, the expected processing margin at time f+1 equals the 
revenue from selling the main product minus the cost of buying the milk rights in the cash and 
futures markets, corrected for the transaction costs and the basis, where the basis is defined as 
the local cash price minus futures price. The expected revenue can now be written as: 
E(n) = pß-[a(fl-flJ + ß(flU + b„o+\a\TC] (2) 
where pl+\ is the price of milk, a the amount of milk quota being hedged, ß the total 
amount of milk quota needed, which equals the total amount of milk produced, f, the futures 
price at which the contract is opened, fl+l the expected settlement futures price, bt+l is the 
expected basis at maturity and TC the transaction costs. 
Let o>(+1, o'f,^ and ahl,x be the variance of the milk price, the variance of the settlement 
futures price and the variance of the basis, respectively. The variance of the revenue is now 
given by: 
VAR{U) = {a - ß)2aL, + ß'crl, + ß1 a\., - 2ß(a - ß)a,,„»,., + 2ß(a -ß)OJMP - 2ß2aPltl,,tl 
(3) 
where pl+l, ft+l and bt+l have a constant variance conditional on the information available at 
time t given by: 
CT^,., = £ ( ƒ > , • , - £ , ( / > , • , ) ) 2 
ff}„, = £(ƒ,., -£-(ƒ,. ,) )2 
<rl,t=E(b,^-El(bl+i))2 
The optimal hedging amount can be derived by taking the first derivatives from l\ce with 
respect to a . Hence, the optimal hedging amount can be expressed as: 
For the conditions that justify the use of the EV model and the discussion on the use of the EV model and the 
general expected utility model the reader is referred to Bigelow (1993), Pulley (1981), Tew et al. (1991) and 
Robison and Hanson (1997) (this volume). 
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-f,
 + f,+rTC ß ^ g^, 
0 2 2 " 2 r r _ a = -
Ji;/'t' - + ß - ^ ^ + ßp^ (4) 
where p is the correlation coefficient between the basis and the futures price at maturity. 
Castelino (1992) showed that usually this correlation is negative. As a result equation (4) 
implies that, if the variance in the basis increases, less will be hedged. Because of the 
characteristics of rights, as explained in the beginning of this section, the variance of the basis 
will be small. So, normally more will be hedged in the case of rights than in the case of 
hedging traditional commodities, since the latter introduces basis risk. 
Not only by the optimal hedging ratio, but also by the minimum-variance hedge ratio are 
we able to show that more rights will be hedged than traditional commodities (Ederington, 
1979; Paroush and Wolf, 1989). Theoretically, if basis risk is zero, the minimum-variance 
hedge ratio is unity and residual risk is zero (Castelino, 1992). 
In looking for viability of such a futures market, it is not only interesting that rights 
themselves can be hedged effectively, but also that rights futures lend themselves to cross 
hedging the revenue capacity of the farm. In theory, farmers affected by rights will purchase 
or sell rights, depending on their initial cost structure, up to the net benefit (Varian, 1990). 
The total rights allocated by the government are fixed. So: 
Q=<t>Rt and YRJ = RO 
where ß, are the units of output used by firm i, /?, are the units of rights used by firm /, N is 
the total number of firms and R0 is the total number of rights allocated by the government. 
For reasons of simplicity, assume that the firm needs one right in order to produce one unit of 
output2, i.e., 0=1. Assume further that the only entry barrier to the industry is the fact that 
rights are needed in order to produce, i.e., the only limiting factor is the rights. The fact that 
the only limiting factor is the rights implies that the price of rights can be seen as an economic 
rent. The economic rent generated in the production process is allocated to the rights. Even 
with a fixed number of rights allocated, it will always be possible to enter the industry by 
buying rights. The competition for rights among potential entrants will force up the prices of 
the rights to the point at which the net benefit of producing equals the price of rights (Varian, 
1990). 
The value of the rights at industry level can be expressed as: 
PRRO = PR0-C(RO) (5) 
where PR is the price of rights and C(RQ) is the cost of production excluding the cost of buying 
the rights. The cost concept used in equation (5) is broad, i.e., these costs include the reward 
for the factors of production (of land, labour and capital (including capital reserves), as well 
as other costs). 
Equation (5) shows that the price of rights reflects the possibilities of marketing the output 
(i.e., the output price) and the cost structure of the production process (excluding the cost of 
rights). Hence, the price of rights is a proxy for the performance of the industry. If the 
Relaxing this assumption will not change the conclusions of the analysis. 
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industry's performance is good, then buyers are willing to pay a high price for the right, and 
vice versa. So, futures rights are not only an efficient tool for hedging against adverse price 
fluctuations of rights, but also for hedging against adverse fluctuations in the revenue capacity 
of the production process (Anderson and Danthine, 1981; Black, 1986; Ames and Myneni, 
1992). 
4 Viability of a futures market of milk rights 
From the list of criteria other authors have considered necessary for selecting commodities for 
futures trading (Carlton, 1984; Black, 1986; Brorsen and Fofana, 1995), the following 
characteristics can be selected for success or failure of futures contracts. 
1. One's own hedge should bear less risk than the existing cross hedge contract. 
2. Volatility of price of the commodity in cash market. 
3. The liquidity cost of using one's own futures markets should be lower than that of using 
the existing cross-hedge futures markets. 
4. The cash market must be large. 
5. The marketing channel must not be vertically integrated nor highly concentrated. 
6. The cash market must be active. 
7. The commodity traded must be homogeneous. 
These criteria are all satisfied for milk rights, but because of space limitations, they are not 
elaborated upon. 
We propose two kinds of contract specifications. Futures (1) is defined as the right to 
produce an amount of milk each milk year as long as the EU milk policy is maintained. 
Futures (2) is defined as the right to produce an amount of milk for a particular milk price 
year. The first contract is connected with the milk quota buy/sell market, the latter with the 
lease market. Farmers who intend to quit dairy production or want to expand their milk quota 
in the long run can use contract 1. Contract 2 is suited for short-term quota sales or 
acquisitions. 
The following assumptions apply: 
1. A futures contract represents 7000 kilograms of milk quota (this amount equals the average 
yearly production of a dairy cow) with a specific fat percentage; 
2. The dairy farmer uses the minimum variance hedge which, in the case of milk rights, 
means that (s)he hedges 100% of his/her spot market transactions; and 
3. The turnover of the futures contract is, because of a lack of empirical insight into the cash 
market and futures market of milk rights, cautiously set at one, i.e., hedgers trade only 
with hedgers on the futures market. 
In order to calculate the volume generated by hedgers, the size of the cash market is 
divided by that of the futures contract. 
The amount of milk quota that is bought and sold in the spot market is not expected to 
increase. This in contradistinction to leasing of milk quota. The reason is that dairy farmers 
who sell their quota will, in general, go out of business. Farmers who continue to be in 
business will use futures contract 2, because of the high fixed cost involved in buying milk 
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quota. The group of dairy farmers with the smallest production scale, i.e., potential sellers of 
quota, is decreasing. This phenomenon will have an impact on the future of futures contract 
1. This group of farmers will use the futures market to manage their price risk, which consists 
of two components: the price of their herds and of the milk quota. The volume in hypothetical 
futures market 1 is therefore expected to decline steadily. 
We are aware of the fact that the procedure followed is a simple one and omits some 
important variables. Research is being conducted, built upon work of Black (1986) and 
Brorsen and Fofana (1995), which includes variables, such as spot price variance, vertical 
integration and so on. 
The estimates in Table 3 show that the idea of establishing a futures market of milk quota 
in the Netherlands and England and Wales would be an interesting one, if compared with the 
existing European agricultural futures markets. Note that the estimates in Table 3 are the 
volume generated by hedgers; we did not incorporate the volume generated by scalpers and 
speculators. Further research is being conducted. It includes the volume generated by 
speculators and a model with variables, such as cash price variance, vertical integration and 
so on, in order to estimate futures contract volume. 
Table 3. Volume of contracts generated by hedgers on the (hypothetical) futures markets in 
the Netherlands (NL) and England and Wales (E&W) 
Year Hypothetical futures contract 1 Hypothetical futures contract 2 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
NL 
25,714 
27,857 
30,857 
28,571 
28,571 
E&W 
59,680 
101,966 
133,367 
149,097 
180,543 
NL 
18,000 
30,142 
42,714 
57,149 
67,143 
E&W 
68,871 
88,695 
101,598 
103,866 
130,543 
Source: our own calculations, 1995 
The volumes calculated strongly depend on the assumption that farmers hedge all of their 
cash position, which is an optimistic assumption. They also depend on whether turnover of 
the futures market is one, i.e., that hedgers trade with hedgers, which is a pessimistic 
assumption. Therefore, we calculated the volumes for 1994 for different levels of turnover 
and hedging ratios, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Summary 
An ex post evaluation of the 1987-94 marketing years is conducted for Texas rough rice. Six 
categories of strategies are considered: Fixed Sales, Average Price Contracts, Green Rice 
Contracts, Scaled Sales, Adaptive Hedging, and Adaptive Technical Hedging, resulting in a 
total of 295 individual strategies. LOTUS 1-2-3 budgeting simulation and E-V analysis in 
GAMS are used to conduct the research. Beyond underscoring various price risk management 
possibilities and the value of a portfolio approach to marketing, the findings of this study 
portray the potential value of using the futures market, of considering use of Green Rice 
Contract strategies, and of evaluating marketing opportunities during both pre- and post-
harvest months. 
1 Introduction 
Numerous surveys of Texas rice producers during the past decade have repeatedly indicated 
their desire for additional market research and/or information. Recent developments within 
the US rice industry, and more particular, the Texas rice industry, have increased the need for 
additional market-oriented information. This paper studies the predominant alternatives 
available to Texas rice producers in an attempt to assist them in achieving an improved risk-
adjusted return. Cooperative pools and options markets are excluded from the study. The 
literature abounds with research, capsulated summaries thereof, and material for producer 
audiences relevant to this study. Interested readers are referred to Anderson et al. (1977); 
Barry (1984); Fleisher (1990); Futrell and Wisner (1987); and Taylor (1994). 
2 Texas rice marketing situation 
For a particular Texas rice crop, marketing opportunities can begin as early as the late 
summer/fall prior to planting during the following March-May (if futures or forward contracts 
are available), extend through the spring planting season, into the summer up to harvest in 
August, and on through a storage period until the following July. By considering both pre-
and post-harvest alternatives, producers are able to spread their marketing horizon. Delaying 
sales until the post-harvest December/January time frame allows producers to evaluate the 
Thai and Vietnamese rice harvests, and market conditions associated with the rice crop in the 
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Far East. A major problem facing Texas rice producers in marketing their rough rice is their 
lack of knowledge regarding alternative strategies and their relative net performance. This 
situation is partially a drawback of their current marketing environment compared with the 
dominant cooperative marketing environment that existed prior to 1988, since the cooperative 
handled virtually every aspect of the rice marketing process for the producer. This study seeks 
to examine the past (1987-1994 crops) performance of six distinct categories of strategies: 
1. Fixed sales. A group of strategies which involve selling a portion or all of the crop at a set 
time at or following harvest, regardless of prevailing market price, apparent price trend, 
cost of production, or any other fundamental or technical market considerations. 
2. Average price contracts. Forward contracts offered by rice millers during and following 
spring planting which generally offer a base premium plus 90% of specified premiums 
above the base during designated post-harvest marketing months, among other contractual 
terms. Once agreed to, producers have no marketing decisions at their discretion, but 
rather realize their gross receipts dependent on the course of the market. 
3. Green contracts. These contracts reflect some Texas rice mills procuring a part of their 
rough rice needs on a 'green,' undried basis for their parboil milling process. 
4. Scaled sales. A set of strategies involving adaptive, reactionary cash sales, dependent upon 
market prices reaching pre-specified target levels. 
5. Adaptive hedging. These strategies involve use of the futures market, during pre-harvest 
and/or post-harvest periods, with pre-specified target cash price objectives used to gauge 
appropriate times to execute the hedging transaction. 
6. Adaptive, technical hedging. These strategies are basically a repeat of the 'adaptive 
hedging' strategies, coupled with satisfying some technical moving average criteria. 
The study examines the profitability of a total of 295 strategies comprised across the six 
categories noted above, including eight base strategies used in comparative analyses: six in the 
Fixed Sales category (i.e., (a) 100% cash sales at harvest (August), (b) 100% cash sales in 
November; (c) 100% cash sales in January; (d) 100% cash sales in May; (e) 100% cash sales 
in July; and (f) equal, proportionate cash sales in August, November, and January), one 
Average Price Contract (with $0.75/cwt base premium, 90% of average premium ups during 
August-November, and no storage expense), and one green Rice Contract ($7.35/cwt on wet 
weight, F.O.B. mill, no ups, no storage expenses, no drying expenses). These specified base 
strategies are among the more frequently mentioned tactics used by Texas rice producers, 
providing a forum for evaluating the potential for increasing absolute net prices and/or 
reducing the variability of net prices received. 
LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheets are used to identify the net, harvest-time discounted return for 
each strategy during each market year of the 1987-94 study period for subsequent evaluation 
within an E-V framework using GAMS. Additional documentation of the data, mechanics of 
analysis, and specifics of the individual set of strategies investigated are provided in Rister et 
al. (1996). 
Admittedly omitted in this study is any consideration of yield risk, i.e., it is explicitly assumed that producers 
are capable of perfectly forecasting the amount of crop to be marketed and/or that any contractual terms are 
acreage based rather than volumetric based. The most glaring oversight, or potential source of error, in this 
assumption seems to be with respect to the use of the futures market as the assumptions are largely valid for the 
other strategy categories. 
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The price data utilized in the course of this study were obtained from public information 
sources, primarily Texas rough rice sales offices, the Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange 
(CRCE), and the US Department of Agriculture. Cash rough rice prices were collected from 
five representative Texas sales offices for the 1987-94 marketing years (at harvest in August 
to the following July2) (Rister and Waller, 1987-95). Daily futures prices for the September 
and July CRCE rough rice futures contracts were obtained for each of the 1987 to 1994 
marketing years. Announced World Market Prices, deficiency payment rates, and annual loan 
rate information were obtained from various USDA sources, including Broussard (1995, pers. 
comm.). 
In comparing results of market prices received across different strategies, it is appropriate 
to use discounted, harvest-time equivalent prices, net of all handling fees, marketing costs, 
and other post-harvest expenses in order to have a common benchmark. The discount rate 
should be a market, opportunity cost of capital, such that the units of comparison are 
comparable across strategies. Targeted market pricing objective (TMPO) levels are stated in 
harvest-time equivalent dollars. An annual 12% nominal discount rate is assumed. 
Producers' TMPO is a critical factor in evaluating the performance of different strategies. 
As far as adaptive or flexible strategies are concerned, how it is determined when one 'pulls 
the trigger' and sells substantially influences the potential success/failure of a strategy. Based 
on economic theory, marketing objectives, and the authors' familiarity with the Texas rice 
industry (Rister et al., 1989), many of the strategies evaluated in this study use a Cost of 
Production (COP) plus desired profit level [$/cwt] in determining whether or not current 
market offerings are of sufficient magnitude to warrant a sale. A range of such objectives are 
used (i.e., $10-$13/cwt, on $1 intervals), in recognition of the wide breadth of Texas rice 
producers' COP (Grant et al., 1989) as well as to allow evaluation of the performance of 
different objective-based strategies over the apparent $2-$3/cwt band of seasonal price 
movements present in Texas rough rice cash prices. Resultant adjusted TMPO (i.e., ATMPO) 
levels used in the study are calculated as: 
ATMPO = TMPO - e(MDP) + PHfees + Storage (1) 
where e(MDP) is expected marketing deficiency payments, discounted to harvest-time 
equivalents and accounting for farm program yield being 75% of expected production yield; 
PHfees are post-harvest handling fees in the form of hauling, drying, sales commission, and 
research and sales promotion checkoffs; and Storage refers to maximum expected post-harvest 
storage costs, all in $/cwt. 
Derivation of a target hedge price (THP) to determine the minimum price for initiating a 
hedge position is achieved by: 
THP = ATMPO - Basis + Fees (2) 
where Basis is the expected monthly basis ($/cwt); and Fees are brokerage fees, and interest 
on margin monies; all in $/cwt. 
This is the designated US rice marketing year as defined by USDA. Coincidentally, this corresponds to the first 
availability of new crop Texas rice, that being harvested and dried during the latter days of July. 
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'Technichart,' a technical analysis charting and simulation program, is used to identify the 
optimal combination of short- and long-term moving averages (i.e., those that generated the 
highest cumulative profits in simulated trading during the study period) (Harvest Computer 
Systems, 1988). The optimization was run using daily closing futures prices, with 18- and 34-
day moving averages selected for use in this study. 
4 Portfolio methodology 
It is hypothesized that the defined strategies offer opportunities for Texas rice producers to 
realize different levels of average net receipts as well as differences in associated variability 
thereof. E-V portfolio analysis via quadratic programming (QP) offers an opportunity to 
identify an efficient frontier of strategy combinations which maximize returns for a given level 
of risk or alternatively, minimize the risk (variance) for a given level of expected returns. In 
this study, QP is used to identify such a marketing frontier. Also designated are the maximum 
and minimum returns that could have been realized over the respective marketing periods if a 
producer had possessed perfect knowledge regarding each strategy's outcomes and picked the 
best (worst) strategy in each year and marketed accordingly. These calculated extremes define 
the range of possibilities for more flexible, adaptive year-to-year marketing strategies. 
5 Results 
More definitive identification of the individual strategies appear as results are discussed, but a 
brief interpretation of the strategy code names is as follows: 
1. The initial letters signify strategy category—FIX represents FIXED sales; CONF represents 
Average Price Contracts (F indicates forward contracts); CONG represents Green Rice 
Contracts; SCA represents Scaled Sales; H represents Adaptive Hedging; and M represents 
Adoptive Technical Hedging (M represents moving average). 
2. Letters after FIX refer to month of sale (a = January, b = February, etc.) and number of 
sales split across months. 
3. For the contract categories, the accompanying letters relate to specific contractual terms. 
4. The pattern of definitive information is the same for the two hedging categories. PR relates 
to pre-harvest hedges or cash sales at harvest; PS denotes post-harvest hedges or post-
harvest storage sales; and B indicates a combination of all of the above. For post-harvest 
hedges, M relates to terminal close out sales in May while J corresponds to the same in 
July. A, B, or C denotes the assumed LDP projection scenario. Finally, 10, 11, 12, or 13 
indicates the simulated level of TMPO. 
Sorting of the budgeting simulated results by average net receipts produces the information 
contained in Table 1 and Figure 1. The top nine such strategies are either Adaptive Hedging 
(H) or Adaptive Technical Hedging (A/). The tenth highest-ranked strategy is a Green Rice 
Contract. The top H and M strategies are all a combination of pre- and post-harvest strategies. 
Extending the marketing period to July yields the highest returns. TMPOs of 10, 11, 12, and 
13 are sprinkled throughout. The range of variance of annual returns for the top ten strategies 
is considerable, with coefficients of variation (CVs) varying from a low of 3.26% for 
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CONGSET to a high of 19.10% for HBJB12. A risk perspective of the simulated results is 
contained in Table 2, which presents the ten strategies with the lowest CV. The CONGSET 
strategy has the lowest CV, 3.26%. The remainder of the 'top ten, low CV' lists includes 
strategies from all categories except the Average Price Contract. Notable are (a) the less than 
$10/cwt results for all but the Green Rice Contract, (b) the inclusion of 100% sales at harvest 
(FIXH) and in September (FIXT), and (c) the presence of two Scaled Sales strategies. 
Table 1. Top ten performing strategies across all categories, ranked according to 
highest average net receipts, 1987-94 marketing years 
Strategy 
HBJC13 
HBJA11 
MBJA10 
MBJB10 
HBJB12 
HBJA12 
MBJB11 
MBJC12 
HBJB13 
CONGSETUPS 
Average ($/cwt) 
11.79 
11.34 
11.22 
11.19 
11.13 
11.10 
11.07 
11.03 
11.03 
11.00 
Std Dev ($/cwt) 
2.1735 
2.0704 
1.5195 
1.4705 
2.1261 
1.8561 
1.8458 
1.7882 
1.5818 
1.0664 
CV (%) 
18.43 
18.26 
13.54 
13.14 
19.10 
16.72 
16.67 
16.22 
14.35 
9.69 
> ' • . 
y i.oo 
«10.00 
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Figure 1. Scatter plot of budgeting simulation results for individual rough rice marketing 
strategies, 1987-94 marketing years 
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Table 2. Top ten performing strategies across all categories, ranked according to 
lowest coefficient of variation, 1987-94 marketing years 
Strategy Average ($/cwt) Std Dev ($/cwt) CV (%) 
CONGSET 
HPRB11 
FIXI 
SCA7525Z2 
MPRB11 
MPRA13 
MPRC13 
FIXH 
HPRA13 
MPRB12 
10.88 
9.36 
9.48 
9.77 
9.24 
9.18 
9.18 
9.18 
9.18 
9.40 
0.3548 
0.4636 
0.6101 
0.6738 
0.6383 
0.6390 
0.6390 
0.6390 
0.6390 
0.6685 
3.26 
4.95 
6.43 
6.90 
6.91 
6.96 
6.96 
6.96 
6.96 
7.11 
.00 2.00 
S tandard Deviation, S/cwt 
Figure 2. All rough rice E-V frontiers superimposed on scatter plot for select base strategies, 
1987-94 marketing years 
The E-V analysis considering all strategies yields the upperleft E-V frontier results 
illustrated in Figure 2 and the associated portfolios reported in Table 3. The dominating role 
of the Green Rice Contract CONGSET (lowest CV and twelfth highest average) is evidenced 
by its inclusion in each portfolio point. Note, however, its proportion takes on a bell-shaped 
form over the range of the E-V frontier, from a level of 10.3% at the lowest $9.563/cwt 
return point, up to 86.6% at the $11.00/cwt, and then down to 1.4% at the high end of the 
frontier, $11.78. At the lower end of the E-V frontier, the strategies included are comprised 
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of, in addition to CONGSET, four hedging strategies consisting of either pre- or post-harvest 
hedging action, but no combinations of both. The only adaptive technical hedging strategy 
included is MPRA12, with the other three being simpler Adaptive Hedging strategies. The 
$10.50/cwt pricing point is a break point in that at that average receipt level, combined pre-
and post-harvest hedging strategies begin to be included in the optimal portfolios. All such 
strategies are assumed to terminate in July, with the dominant strategy, HBJC13, using the 
one-month lagged LDP projection and a $13 TMPO. Standard deviations of the E-V frontier 
range from $0,243 to $2.295/cwt, a noticeable increasing range of price risk. The $2.217/cwt 
differential in average receipts along the frontier ($11.78 to $9,563) translates into a 
substantial range of differences in revenues realized, e.g., $57,642 for a 400-acre producer 
with 65 cwt/ac yields. 
Table 3. Optimal E-V portfolios when all strategy categories considered, Texas rough rice, 
1987-94 marketing years 
Average net receipts ($/cwt) 
9.563 9.75 10.00 10.25 10.50 10.75 11.00 11.25 
Std. dev .243 .244 .252 .266 .289 .327 .578 1.102 
11.50 11.75 11.78 
1.660 2.227 2.295 
Strategies included in portfolio and respective %'s 
CONGSET 
HPSJC10 
HPRB11 
HPRC11 
HBJC11 
HBJB13 
HBJC13 
MPRA12 
.103 
.251 
.284 
.199 
.163 
.222 
.215 
.245 
.196 
.122 
.383 
.167 
.192 
.192 
.066 
.544 
.119 
.140 
.188 
.010 
.696 
.073 
.047 
.174 
.009 
.842 
.122 
.033 
.003 
.866 .543 .320 .046 .014 
.134 .407 .680 .954 .986 
The remaining E-V frontiers illustrated in Figure 2 provide for evaluating the marginal 
value of using the different strategy categories. Because of its apparent dominant role and due 
to the industry's constraints on handling use of such rice (i.e., maximum of 7.5% of annual 
crop statewide), the Green Rice Contracts category is the first to be excluded. The position of 
the next highest E-V frontier relative to the optimal frontier indicates increases in price risk 
for specific price levels over the mid-range of the E-V frontier, i.e., the new 'no Green Rice 
Contract' E-V lies to the right of the 'all strategy' E-V frontier. Disallowance of use of the 
Green Rice Contract category strategies prompts inclusion of a two-sales-point Scaled Sales 
strategy with a $2 trading range, SCA7525Z2, in the lower range of the E-V frontier. The 
other strategies comprising the various portfolios are similar to the prior results, with added 
dispersion in LDP projection methods. Next, the value of the Adaptive Technical Hedging 
strategies were tested by removing them as a possibility. Little difference from the prior E-V 
frontier is evident, except that the Adopting Hedging strategies now have different weights. 
At first glance, the results discussed thus far might lead one to erroneously conclude that 
the futures market does not have much to offer the rice industry in terms of price risk 
management. The results of eliminating the Adaptive Hedging strategies, leaving only the 
Scaled Sales, Average Price Contract, and Fixed Sales categories' strategies, quickly dispel 
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this conclusion. There is a reduced range of possible average receipts (reduced on both ends 
of the frontier, with the greatest implication being the new, upper limit of $10.25/cwt), but 
the range of standard deviations is also reduced to $0.538 to $1.569/cwt. The strategies 
comprising the portfolios include the familiar Scaled Sales strategy SCA7525Z2, one Average 
Price Contract (CONGFBPUPS), and four Fixed Sales, 100% sales in a single month, 
strategies. These strategies all resemble tactics currently being used by Texas rice producers, 
signifying the upward potential for increasing average returns while simultaneously managing 
price risk. For example, the $0.75 to $1.00/cwt greater average returns for the E-V frontier 
involving portfolios which include use of Adaptive Hedging strategies represent $19,500 to 
$26,000/year for a 400-acre rice producer realizing yields of 65 cwt/ac. 
The lower two E-V frontiers in Figure 2 are indicative of the results when allowed 
strategies are limited to first only Average Price Contracts and Fixed sales and then only 
Fixed sales. While some reduced performance is evidenced in the slightly downward shift to 
the right of the E-V frontiers, the greatest magnitude in difference of results still is 
attributable to the eliminated use of Adaptive Hedging strategies and non-use of Green Rice 
Contracts. 
Figure 2 also provides a perspective of the various E-V frontiers discussed above in 
relation to the eight base individual strategies. Also depicted are the position of (a) always 
using the best (highest net return) strategy in each individual marketing year ($12.54/cwt 
average net receipt, standard deviation of 2.06, and a 16.39% CV), and (b) always the worst 
(lowest net return strategy in each individual marketing year ($8.18/cwt average net receipts, 
standard deviation of 0.65, and a 7.99% CV). The relative superiority of the CONGSET 
strategy is readily apparent by its position in the upperleft quadrant of the plotting area (i.e., 
high average, low standard deviation). The Average Price Contract also offers improved price 
risk management opportunities relative to all of the other selected base strategies except for 
the 100% sales in August strategy. The relative higher position of the frontiers to the base 
strategies indicates their superior performance. A visible discrepancy to this observation is the 
slightly dominant position of the Green Rice Contract CONGSET above the all strategy E-V 
frontier, this occurrence is due to the use of $0.25/cwt increments in developing the frontier— 
a more continuous E-V frontier would pass through the CONGSET point. 
The stability of the optimal E-V frontier for all strategies across years is preliminarily 
investigated by developing frontiers for the 1987-91, 1987-92, and 1987-93 marketing year 
horizons and then comparing their results to those with the 1987-94 horizon. The results are 
largely supportive of a stable portfolio. Some discrepancies are evident, but there is continued 
inclusion of relatively similar type strategies. 
6 Implications 
Results of this study highlight the potential for Texas rice producers to use portfolios of 
marketing strategies in order to generate higher prices, and/or lower variation of prices, when 
compared to cash sales at harvest and several other base strategies. In addition to offering 
price risk management possibilities, the findings of this study portray the potential value of 
using the futures market and in considering use of Green Rice Contract strategies. 
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7 Limitations and other caveats 
Several concerns and limitations of the study must be acknowledged. First, looking backwards 
does not always direct one forwards in the proper direction. However, one can often learn 
from the past. It is on this premise that we can study ex post the 1987-94 rough rice marketing 
years. 
An additional shortcoming of the study emanates from limitations imposed by the data. The 
analysis presented herein examines marketing strategies relative to monthly average prices. 
This can present problems in that averaging prices over such a long time frame can obscure 
market information and/or signals. Ideally, one would like to examine marketing strategies 
with daily and/or weekly cash and basis values. This is not possible given the limited scope of 
cash rough rice sales data available. In light of this limitation, the next best alternative was 
utilized, averaging rough rice prices to obtain a monthly average price and basis. An 
additional shortcoming resulting from the limited data was that the analysis was done on an 
in-sample basis and not tested out-of-sample. That is, the expected basis and optimal MA 
models were identified using in-sample data, given the relatively short eight-year data series. 
Related to the short data series is the question of symmetric variance for the E-V analyses. 
The influence of government programs and the fact that two of the eight marketing years were 
bullish, short-supply years while the remaining six were more 'average' supply/demand 
situations, suggest that this assumption may be worthy of further study. In addition, the 
increasing probability of changes in the government program provisions for US rice causes 
concern for the relevance of these results to future marketing environments. 
There are several logical research extensions. One area planned for investigation is an 
expanded scope of marketing strategies considered, e.g., additional contracts, alternative 
expectations regarding the Market Deficiency Payment, playing the 'LDP game,' etc. 
Introduction of options on rough rice futures contracts adds another dimension worthy of 
analysis. Out-of-sample tests, discrete analyses, and a MOT AD formulation are other 
considerations of interest. 
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Summary 
This paper begins with a brief survey of the development of agricultural decision analysis 
since 1980, which reveals that few attempts have been made to apply a dynamic stochastic 
framework in the analysis of investment decisions. The remainder of the paper is devoted to 
identifying and analysing the difficulties that have limited the ability of researchers to address 
investment decisions in such a framework. Section 2 deals with the problems of applying 
modelling techniques to complex dynamic stochastic conditions. Section 3 discusses the 
conformity of the standard expected utility approach to investment decision problems. Section 
4 examines the substantial difficulties involved in attaching meaningful subjective probability 
distributions to events occurring in the distant future. The paper concludes with a discussion 
of promising areas for future research and important considerations for application of decision 
analysis to actual farm investment problems. 
1 Introduction - The state of the art 
Decision analysis under risk was a main research subject in agricultural economics during the 
late 1960s and the 1970s. The state of the art in theory and methodology at the end of the 
1970s is comprehensively reflected in the two books: Agricultural Decision Analysis by 
Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) and Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development 
edited by Roumasset, Broussard and Singh (1979). 
Over the past two decades both books have served as central references in agricultural risk 
analysis. Rereading them and reviewing the agricultural economics literature since 1980 
reveal that there have been no dramatic changes in level of debate since publication of the 
books, and that most of the problems they raised remain unresolved. 
Certainly, the theoretical framework, the methodology applied and the computational 
techniques have advanced. For example, stochastic dominance techniques have become more 
efficient due to convex set stochastic dominance analysis (Cochrane et al., 1985), more 
efficient safety-first rules have been developed (Berck and Hihn, 1982), the usefulness of 
mathematical programming in agricultural risk analysis has been expanded considerably as a 
result of widespread availability of powerful nonlinear programming software like MINOS, 
This paper was prepared while the author was a visiting scholar in the Department of Agricultural and Resource 
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LINDO, etc., and the development of new variants of risk-incorporating linear and nonlinear 
programming formulations have facilitated adaptation to specific planning situations, such as 
target MOTAD (McCamley and Kliebenstein, 1987), mean-Gini efficient planning (Okunev 
and Dillon, 1988) and utility efficient programming (Patten et al., 1988). 
The most striking development, however, is the broad application decision analysis has 
found in agricultural economics. Examples include the incorporation of risk and risk 
behaviour in farm-household models (Witzke, 1993; Henning, 1994), in analysing and 
modelling fertilizer and pesticide application (Krayl et al., 1990; Saha et al., 1994; Feder, 
1979; Auld and Tisdell, 1987), in explaining lagged adoption of innovative technologies 
(Feder, 1980; Zilberman and Just, 1984; Kim et ai, 1992), in agricultural supply analysis 
(Hazell and Scandizzo, 1974; Hanf and Müller, 1979) and in aggregative regional models 
(Mapp et al., 1994; Duffy and Taylor, 1994; Pomarici and Hanf, 1996). There have even 
been a few noteworthy attempts to develop interactive decision analysis tools for use at the 
farm level (Götz, 1991; Kühl, 1992). 
In the past decade, there has been particular interest in decision analysis in a risky, 
dynamic framework. While the methodological tools to solve dynamic decision problems were 
developed in the late 1970s, application to farm problems was restricted due to the high 
computational demands of dynamic stochastic programming. 
The appearance of powerful personal computers in the mid-1980s allowed for dramatic 
expansion of the utilization of dynamic programming to address farming problems (Lentz, 
1993). Most studies analyse the distribution of divisible input usage over time in a stochastic 
environment. The most popular fields of application are pesticide control (e.g., Carlson, 
1970; Pannell, 1991; Pandey and Medd, 1991; Swinton and King, 1994; Brodersen, 1995); 
herd management (e.g., Kennedy, 1986; Tronstad and Gum, 1994; Frasier and Pfeiffer, 
1994); water management in irrigation schedules (e.g., Bosch and Eidman, 1987; Yaron and 
Dinar, 1982; Bryant et al., 1993) and inventory control (Berg and Weindlmaier, 1984; Hanf 
and Kühl, 1986; Drescher and Hanf, 1995). 
In contrast to the abundance of dynamic stochastic studies concerned with the timing of 
divisible production factors, the number of studies employing a dynamic stochastic approach 
to analyse investment decisions is rather limited. The most comprehensive approach is the 
contribution of Featherstone et al. (1990). They capture the stochastic and dynamic linkages 
between liquidity, capital structure and investment decisions by applying a discrete stochastic 
programming model. Most other studies concerned with investment decisions are less 
ambitious, reducing the set of possible outcomes to a probability distribution of the present 
value of the induced cash flow and then applying the expected utility decision rule (Hillier, 
1969). 
An alternative approach is the use of the sum of the discounted single-period certainty 
equivalents (Jean, 1970). Another way of considering risk in farm investments is the analysis 
of optimal capital structure, or the empirically preferred debt-equity ratio. Most of the 
investigations in this field are based on the rather simple, static models of Barry et al. (1981) 
and Collins (1985). Recently, Collins and Karp (1993) published a stochastic optimal control 
model which considers more of the complexities of the real world. 
The main reason for this lack of publications concerned with risky investment decisions is 
certainly the large number of difficulties associated with the analysis of long-term investment 
decisions. I shall discuss three categories of these problems in the sections that follow: 
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1. complexity of investment decisions; 
2. definition of the optimization rule; and 
3. informational inadequacies. 
2 Problems in modelling the complexity of dynamic stochastic conditions 
Frequently disregarded features 
The complexity of any real-world decision cannot be entirely reflected in a model. The usual 
instruments used to make complex decisions tractable and computable are simplification by 
aggregation and defining events and possibilities in a manner that will allow for their 
incorporation in the intended model structure. Hardaker et al. (1991, p. 21), therefore, call 
modelling an artistic process whose performance heavily depends on the researcher's 
experience. The art of modelling consists of distinguishing the features relevant to the 
problem being investigated from those that are less relevant. In modelling risky investment 
decisions this selection procedure becomes extremely involved because of the large number of 
relationships that may warrant inclusion and because of the difficulty of determining inclusion 
on a priori grounds. In this paper, only a few of the features specifically related to dynamic 
and stochastic problems and often neglected in modelling will be addressed. In principle, all 
the following features may be modelled by employing dynamic stochastic programming. 
However, this approach still suffers from the 'curse of dimensionality' (Featherstone et al., 
1990, p. 80). 
Embedded risks: The probability distribution of the state of a variable in a given period is, 
in many cases, not independent of the realized state in previous periods or of the activities 
carried out in previous periods. In this case, the expected value of the outcome in period t+1 
depends on the realized states of the stochastic variables in t. As a consequence, the expected 
value of outcomes in t+1 calculated only considering the expected values of stochastic 
variables in t generally deviates from the expected value of outcomes in t+1 calculated 
considering all possible states of the stochastic variables. Although the shift of the probability 
distribution of the respective variables in the subsequent period usually goes to both sides, a 
negative impact on the outcome is much more likely. Hence, not considering embedded risk 
often results in an overestimation of the objective value of the decision problem. Hardaker et 
al. (1991) even presume that the exclusion of embedded risks from consideration is one of the 
main reasons of the persistent overestimation of project outcomes in developing countries. 
Information collection and processing: Information collection and processing is often 
considered a means to reduce risk and uncertainty in a dynamic setting. Rausser and Hochman 
(1979) discuss two types of information collection and processing: passive learning and active 
learning. Passive learning refers to the updating of planning data with newly available 
information while active learning refers to engaging in specific information collection 
activities. 
The use of Bayes' Theorem allows incorporation of information updating and information 
search activities in decision models (Hanf, 1986), and the analysis of their impact on firm 
development (Kühl, 1992, p. 80 ff). Incorporation of both types of learning in dynamic 
stochastic models not only contributes to completion of the full theory of decision making 
(Dillon, 1979, p. 5), but may also be of fundamental importance in modelling investment 
decisions. Recently, Chavas (1994) has pointed out the importance of information and 
learning in cases involving temporal uncertainty and investments with sunk costs. 
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Adjustment costs: Changing the production portfolio usually results in adjustment-specific 
costs, as the change from one activity to another causes periods of non-use of capacities and 
makes adjustment-specific investments necessary. These additional costs are not considered in 
most investigations, but they may have a pivotal role in determining the expected outcome. 
In addition, it must be recognized that mastery of new production processes requires time. 
The industrial organization literature attaches a good deal of importance to these learning-by-
doing effects and considers a firm's time of experience with a new technology a key 
determinant of firm profitability (e.g., Carlton and Perloff, 1994, p. 407; Spence, 1981). For 
example, Noell and Diers (1994) analyse the net profit development of farms changing from 
conventional to biological production. The switch results in temporary net revenue losses of 
up to 20% during a four- to five-year period due to internal adjustment problems. 
Sunk costs, the value of waiting and path dependency 
Most investments are partially or even completely irreversible, i.e., the initial cost of the 
investment is at least partially sunk. In consequence, the value of the capacity in production 
and the sale value may considerably differ causing a 'path dependency' of the firm (Arthur, 
1989). Further, in many cases, while it is possible to undertake investment immediately, it is 
also possible to put off the investment decision until a later period. It may be that postponing 
the investment decision increases profits if the postponement allows one to learn about the 
future development of profit-determining variables. 
The value of waiting: Given an investment with sunk costs and the possibility of postponing 
the decision, decision makers not only have to choose between the two alternatives 'invest' or 
'do not invest' as is usually assumed in investment models, but they are confronted with a 
third alternative, 'wait and then decide'. 
This third alternative is usually neglected in investment theory. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 
p. 6) argue that the consideration of the possibility of waiting to invest is not merely a 
theoretical nicety, but may have an important impact on investment decisions. They even 
assert, 'The orthodox theory of investment has not recognized the important qualitative and 
quantitative implications of the interaction between irreversibility, uncertainty, and the choice 
of timing. We will argue that this neglect explains some of the failures of that theory' (ibid., 
p. 4). The introduction of the concept of 'waiting' is usually attributed to McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) and Pindyck (1988). Interestingly, one can easily find this idea of postponing 
decision making in any operations research textbook of the 1950s. Flexible planning, or 
flexible dynamic programming are the terms used to describe the implementation of 'decision 
postponement' in operations research procedures. Nevertheless, despite the availability of the 
appropriate methods, there are few applications explicitly considering the 'wait' alternative. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 27 ff) convincingly demonstrate the possible effect of post-
poning an investment by a very simple example assuming a risk-neutral decision maker who 
must choose whether or not to invest into a facility that has no resale value and that can only 
be used to produce a given product. They consider the option to postpone the decision until 
the price in period 2 is known and show that the expected net present value of utilizing the 
option to wait for one period is much higher than the expected present value resulting from 
conventional investment appraisal. The difference between the values is referred to as the 
value of waiting (McDonald and Siegel, 1986) or the opportunity cost of 'killing' the option 
to invest (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 6). 
Their simple example illustrates that waiting and postponing investments may result in 
higher expected returns to investment capital. For this possibility to exist, however, four 
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conditions must be satisfied: 1) the investment is at least partially irreversible, 2) postponing 
the decision is technically feasible, 3) there exist conditions in which 'not investing' is an 
optimal decision, and 4) the information acquired during the waiting period can be expected to 
improve the knowledge about the future. 
In European farming conditions two types of investment decisions are particularly affected 
by irreversibility: investment in farm buildings and investment in education or human capital 
formation. Farm buildings such as cow barns and milking parlours cannot be utilized for other 
productive activities, and generally cannot be used on any farm other than the one on which 
they were originally located. Hence, the market value of such buildings is more or less zero. 
Human capital specific to farm management also has very little value outside of agriculture. 
As a consequence, investments in farming abilities have to be considered sunk costs. 
The second condition—feasibility of postponing—is usually fulfilled in the two types of 
investments mentioned above. While it is reasonable to assume that the third condition is also 
usually satisfied, the fourth condition—that waiting contributes positively to the assessment of 
the future—is not always true. Many of the forecasts used in the farming sector are based on 
econometric models assuming stationary processes, for which it is assumed that the actual 
values randomly fluctuate around a trend value. The observed values of one additional period 
therefore do not contribute to the assessment of the future, or only to a very marginal extent 
by a possible revision of the estimated statistical parameters of the underlying projection 
model. 
The value of an additional period of observation is much more important if the forecast is 
based on a difference stationary process or a Brownian motion process with drift (Cox and 
Miller, 1965). In this case, the probability distribution of future states strongly depends on the 
state occurring in any subsequent period. Hence, waiting may provide the possibility of 
improving the forecast of the future. Prices in a market economy are often difference 
stationary processes (Berck and Roberts, 1995, p. 8). 
In cases where the forecast of important variables is partly or fully determined by a 
discrete stochastic variable, waiting may considerably improve insight into future 
developments. Such situations are particularly relevant to the agricultural sector where many 
economically important variables are strongly affected by policy decisions, which are viewed 
by farmers as probabilistic events. For example, such an investment situation existed in the 
late 1980s when the political debate over the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was 
featured prominently in the editorial pages of agricultural journals, or in the beginning of the 
1980s when introducing a milk quota system was the main subject of agricultural policy 
debates. In the latter case, uncertainty over future dairy policy actually induced anticipatory 
investments in cow barns and postponing the abandonment of milk production (Missfeld, 
1987; Hanf, 1989). 
Path dependency: As discussed above, a specific feature of many (if not all) investments in 
capital goods is that at least a part of the cost of investment should be considered a sunk cost. 
This is particularly true for investments in farm buildings. Hence, the market value is almost 
zero, even if the building has just been completed and never been used. This discrepancy 
between the depreciated value of the investment and its liquidation value has two effects with 
respect to the economic appraisal of investments. First, discontinuing production causes an 
equity loss not generally considered in simple corporate finance models which assume perfect 
capital markets. 
Second, and more importantly, the difference between the value of the capacity in 
production and the sale value causes the internal interest rate of supplementary investments to 
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increase. As a consequence, the farm firm may be caught in a production path which is not 
profitable from a general viewpoint. Brandes and Odening (1992) demonstrate with a simple 
example that such a lock-in situation might result if two investments dependent on one another 
are undertaken at different times and have to be repeated in cycles. In this case, an alternating 
path dependency may occur. 
Path dependency may become so strong that a path must be followed ad infinitum even 
though the path is not profitable (Arthur, 1989). Balman (1994) argues that the dominance 
and persistence of relatively small farms in Germany may be explained by path dependency, 
as a result of investment in 'sunk cost burdened' assets. Johnson and Quance (1972) present 
an early example of the analysis of path dependency in agriculture, in this case the 
'overproduction trap' of US agriculture. 
Considering the possible negative effects of path dependency resulting from the acquisition-
salvage differential of asset prices (Johnson, 1982), the possibility of being 'locked in' should 
be accounted for in investment appraisal. In principle, dynamic stochastic programming 
allows for incorporation of this risk, providing that reasonable probabilities can be defined. 
However, this incorporation requires a dramatic increase in model size. Simulation 
experiments might provide a more tractable alternative for approximating these effects 
(Balman, 1994; Kühl, 1992). 
3 Decision rules in long-term risk analysis 
Incorporation of uncertainty in a decision model requires choice of the decision rule to be 
employed (Selley, 1984, p. 53). In principle, risk attitudes may be reflected in the analysis in 
different ways. There is a relatively broad consensus among economists that the concept of 
maximization of subjective expected utility offers a reasonable alternative (Hardaker et ai, 
1991, p. 10). The following discussion of problems thus focuses on the expected utility 
approach. 
Intra-year and inter-year risk: Carrying out a decision in a dynamic stochastic context can 
affect risk in two ways: 1) the decision variable may influence the probability distribution of 
the outcomes in the same period the decision is taken and 2) the decision may alter the 
probability distribution of the states in the subsequent period and thereby alter the probability 
distribution of outcomes. The first effect changes the intra-year risk, the second the inter-year 
risk. Most studies employ an intertemporal additively separable utility function, e.g., Karp 
and Pope (1984) and McGuckin et al. (1987). Krautkraemer et al. (1992) argue that two 
objections may be raised against the use of these functions: 1) they violate the independence 
axiom of expected utility theory and 2) they evaluate intra-year and inter-year risks differently 
(p. 876). They do not attribute much importance to the first objection in light of Machina's 
(1984) demonstration that expected utility can be approximated locally by linearity 
assumptions. They see a greater problem in the asymmetric preferences assumed for intra-
year and inter-year risks by employing a separable utility function. They interpret inter-year 
risk aversion as a timing problem by arguing that 'some farmers are likely to be more 
concerned about surviving the next year' (p. 875). Hence, the assumption of inter-year risk 
aversion should properly be discussed in close relationship with the time preference 
assumption captured in the discount rate. 
Liquidity and bankruptcy: Making a heavy investment in a family farm often creates 
considerable financial stress in the first years after investing. Hence, adequate consideration of 
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liquidity in farm decision models under uncertainty should be an important concern. 
Featherstone et al. (1990) utilize a rather stringent constraint by requiring that total assets 
equal total equity, with borrowing being a function of current equity. This relationship must 
be satisfied in all periods and all states. If sequences of financially unfavourable states with a 
small probability are included in the model calculation, such a rigorous constraint may, in 
fact, be overly restrictive in terms of the feasible set of alternatives,. A probabilistic constraint 
is therefore recommended. This constraint allows for a small probability that the liquid 
reserves to fall short of a minimum level. 
It must be recognized, however, that including a probabilistic constraint in a model which 
considers risk aversion in an expected utility framework results in coherency problems in 
model assumptions. The probability level chosen for the liquidity constraints implicitly 
reflects an underlying safety-first rule expressing a certain degree of risk aversion. It is 
unclear which relation exists between the assumed risk aversion in the utility function and the 
safety-first rule. 
A second problem arises: Allowing liquidity reserves to fall short of a minimum level 
implies an increased risk of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy due to temporary insolvency is not 
correctly considered, however, if only the negative liquidity is included in expected income, 
as bankruptcy involves a discrete and considerable utility cost apart from the liquidity 
shortfall. In farming, it is difficult to determine the value to be assigned to bankruptcy as 
many social and psychological problems are associated with it (Jones and Hefferman, 1987). 
Collins and Karp (1995) emphasize the importance of bankruptcy by posing the question, 
'What does the farmer think is 'risk'?—the year-to-year variation in income, or the possibility 
that the business might fail before retirement age?'. They assert that farmers are likely 
concerned with both. 
Risk attitudes and time preference: Another open question in employing expected utility 
analysis for investment decisions is the relationship between risk aversion and time preference 
usually incorporated in the discount factor. Quiggin and Horowitz (1995) investigate the 
relationship between risk and time and show that 'numerous analogies between the two fields 
may be identified and exploited. The key result is the derivation of a natural analogy between 
risk aversion and impatience' (p. 37). They focus on formal analogies, but some of these 
analogies obviously result from a common utility concept. Hence, time preference might not 
be assumed independently of risk attitude assumptions and vice versa, i.e., time preference 
may at least partially express risk aversion (see also Hertzler, 1997, this volume). 
Risk and ambiguity: Recently several authors have criticized subjective expected utility 
theory (SEU) because SEU does not distinguish between decision situations under risk and 
ambiguity. Many analysts are convinced that decision makers respond to them differently 
(Camerer and Weber, 1992). 
The term 'risk' is used to characterize a decision situation where the decision maker is 
strongly convinced that the assigned subjective probability coincides with objective 
probability, whereas the term 'ambiguity' refers to the situations where the decision maker is 
quite uncertain that the attributed probability is in accordance with reality (Camerer and 
Weber, 1992, p. 326). Alternative terminologies are 'precise' ('sharp') and 'vague' 
probabilities (Savage, 1954), and 'unambiguous' and 'ambiguous' probabilities (Ellsberg, 
1961). 
In the context of farm decisions, ambiguity will be most relevant in cases where decisions 
result in the tying up of the farm organizational structure over a long period. In short-run 
(one-period) decisions, it is usually assumed that the historical variability of the respective 
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variables is an appropriate base from which to predict their future variability (Ford et al, 
1995, p. 25). Long-run uncertainty is much more influenced by factors which cannot easily be 
inferred from past developments. As a consequence, decision makers might be rather 
uncertain about the accuracy of their own subjective appraisals, i.e., they have to undertake 
decision making under conditions of ambiguity. 
Loss aversion: Another major objection to SEU is the empirical evidence suggesting that, 
at a given level of utility, decision makers value likely losses differently from likely gains. 
'The observed asymmetry between gains and losses is far too extreme to be explained by 
income effects of decreasing risk aversion' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p. 298). A recent 
investigation comparing willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept measures for risky and 
ambiguous lotteries carried out by Eisenberger and Weber (1995) supports the view that gains 
and losses are valued differently in both kinds of lotteries. If 'loss aversion' actually plays an 
important role in farmers' behaviour, investment analysis should be redesigned as mistakes in 
investment decisions may result in considerable and long-lasting income losses, or even the 
loss of the farm. 
Fuzziness of subjective probabilities and risk attitudes: Empirical and experimental studies 
suggest that individual preference structures are not completely stable. Decision conditions, 
the mood of the decision maker and many other factors may change the preference order 
(Musser and Musser, 1984, p. 82). The same is true of subjective probabilities. Although 
these findings are often mentioned, they have not yet received explicit consideration in 
agricultural risk analysis. 
A rather simple way to consider the instability or fuzziness of preferences might be to 
replace a strict utility function with a range functional assigning a small range of possible 
utilities to any income, wealth or profit. The implementation of such an 'extended' decision 
rule in a dynamic stochastic framework might cause considerable interpretation difficulties, 
however. The fuzzy range of the certainty equivalent of a fuzzy utility functional would 
increase with increasing variance to be expected with increasing length of the forecast period. 
The consequence would be that a large number of investment alternatives with long horizons 
might become indistinguishable. As a result, the usefulness of mathematical tools in the 
analysis of risky investments would vanish. On the other hand, this loss of usefulness would 
only reflect the increasing difficulties of decision makers in discriminating sensibly between 
probability density functions with substantial overlap. 
4 Credibility of long-term forecasts 
In spite of the discounting of future cash flows, the usefulness of the economic evaluation 
criteria of investments are critically dependent on the accuracy of the forecasted outcomes in 
the later periods. For example, assume a constant cash flow surplus per year in a project with 
an infinite time horizon. With a discount rate of 5% per year, the first year's surplus 
contributes 4.8% to the present value of the project, the 11th year's surplus 2.9% and even 
the 31st year's surplus contributes more than 1%. Considering that most investment 
calculations in farming employ a real interest rate below 5 %, the importance of adequate and 
credible forecasts is evident. 
While the demand for reliable long-term forecasts is high, the agricultural economics 
literature includes few reliable long-term forecasts. Berck and Roberts (1995) analysed the 
price development of natural resources with different statistical methods and found 
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significantly different 10-year forecast results. The imprecision in long-term forecasts is partly 
caused by nature, but it is also partly attributable to the shortcomings of the dominant 
research direction in quantitative agricultural economics. 
A generation ago, agricultural economists concentrated their econometric research efforts 
on determining reliable estimates of the parameters of the main economic relationships, such 
as demand and supply elasticities. More recently, however, the research focus has moved 
away from analysing the persistent structural economic relations that are likely to be the basis 
for extrapolation into the future (Just and Rausser, 1993, p. 77). By focusing on sophisticated 
and complex models explaining particular developments in the past as completely as possible, 
the model results are unlikely to be useful in forecasting because the parameters estimated are 
often fundamentally dependent on narrowly specified hypotheses. In consequence, the 
published confidence intervals of projection underestimate the actual expected variance, 
particularly when dummy variables explain a considerable part of the historical variance. The 
confidence intervals are calculated under the assumption that the future will be free of the 
shocks which occurred in the past and were captured by the dummies. Further, the forecasts 
are biased by the respective specific assumptions (hypotheses) (Alston and Chalfant, 1991, p. 
1175). The utilization of simpler and more robust models based on generally accepted 
hypotheses will certainly enlarge the resulting confidence intervals of projection, but it will 
also more adequately reflect the uncertainty of future developments (Just and Rausser, 1993, 
p. 77). Further, the more transparent the models are, the more likely it is that their results 
will be accepted. The implications for decision making about long-term investments are 
twofold. First, these more robust and more general approaches would facilitate acceptance of 
scientific estimates as personal subjective probability distributions. Second, the decision 
makers' beliefs in their subjective probability sets would increase thereby reducing ambiguity 
costs. 
In summary, it appears that the mistrust of scientific projection is justified. Nevertheless, 
the assumptions many researchers concerned with investment appraisal draw on are even 
more suspect. Many studies simply assume that nothing will change in the future and employ 
expected values and variances that are constant or trend linear. Imposing such assumptions is 
usually justified—if it is justified at all—with the argument that we do not know enough about 
the future to assume anything else. However, utilizing an assumption known to be false is 
certainly not an appropriate alternative. 
5 Conclusions 
The eclectic set of problems addressed in this paper do not lend themselves easily to brief 
conclusions and suggestions for further research. Hence, I will confine my concluding 
remarks to a few aspects that seem to me to be of major importance. 
The focus of the paper was the analysis of investment decisions under uncertainty. Many 
'empirical' investigations of long-term farm investments reduce the decision making 
environment to a world that never changes, in which uncertainty does not affect expected 
values and in which farmers are risk neutral. These simplifications result in biases in the 
'empirical' findings of such studies, making the findings of very little, or even negative, 
scientific or practical value. 
Uncertainty plays an important role even when risk neutrality can be assumed, e.g., if 
embedded risk is to consider, if deviations from the expected values of some variables must 
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be asymmetrically valued or if waiting is profitable, the expected value of farm income may 
be affected and downward shifted. Here, a vast field of promising empirical research presents 
itself. 
Further, there is strong empirical evidence that most farmers behave in a risk-averse 
manner. Considering long-term uncertainty and risk aversion relevant in farmer decision 
making raises a number of theoretical and methodological problems. In this context I regard 
four fields of research as particularly important and promising: 
1. The development of econometric models which are mainly oriented towards producing 
robust, credible and transparent long-term predictions is urgently needed to support 
decision makers. 
2. Although dynamic stochastic programming offers a tool well suited to investment 
decisions, there remains a large number of open questions with respect to optimal 
formulation and aggregation considering the 'curse of dimensionality'. 
3. Empirical evidence from research on decision behaviour calls into question the use of 
subjective expected utility analysis. While, at present, no better decision criterion is 
available, this should not lead to complacency. Instead it should be regarded as an 
incentive to investigate better areas such as ambiguity, the relation between time and risk 
preference, proper evaluation and integration of forced discontinuation of farming, etc. 
Prospect theory may be one possibility of integrating these decision 'anomalies' in decision 
analysis (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
4. In some cases, investment decisions must be carried out in circumstances where the 
available information about future periods is extremely poor. In such cases, subjective 
expected utility is not applicable and it is necessary to develop more useful decision rules. 
Possible starting points may be: Koopman's (1964) flexibility considerations as proposed 
by Day (1979, p. 404); strategic decision models following the business management 
literature (Porter, 1980); or meta-strategies (Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995, p. 28). 
In spite of the unresolved shortcomings, application of decision analysis to the choice 
among risky investment alternatives should not be suspended. However, the problems arising 
when decision analysis is applied in a dynamic framework should be more carefully 
considered. Above all, I would like to stress that: 
1. Much more attention should be given to a deliberate assessment of the probable 
development of those variables crucially determining the decision criteria. 
2. If sunk costs are induced by investments, the possibility of waiting should be evaluated, 
and the consequences with respect to path dependency should be recognized. 
3. Interdependencies between profit, liquidity and bankruptcy should always be taken into 
account. 
4. In the case of embedded risk or nonlinear valuation of deviations from expected values, the 
resulting down-side risk should be assessed. 
5. Incorporating risk attitudes into the discount rate should be avoided, as it might lead to 
results that are not logically interprétable. 
Having begun this survey with a reference to the Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker book on 
agricultural decision analysis, let me conclude with a relevant quote from that book's preface: 
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We do not believe that all the theoretical niceties discussed are relevant to all real-world 
agricultural decisions. How much effort should be put into any particular decision depends 
on the time available, the cost of analysis and the importance of the decision, (p. x). 
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BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
F.V. Jensen 
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark 
Summary 
This paper is a brief introduction to Bayesian networks, and software utilizing Bayesian 
networks. First Bayesian networks are defined and some examples are given. Then several 
automated tasks are presented, and lastly decision making is discussed and influence 
diagrams are introduced. 
1 Introduction 
Expert systems are systems which repeatedly give advice to an expert on decision making 
on a series of cases with a similar structure. 
A simplified view of the tasks of an expert is shown by the triangle in Figure 1. First of 
all (s)he observes his/her part of the world to establish the state of it. 
What is the state of the world? 
What can I learn from that? - ^ Which intervention? 
Figure 1. The task-triangle of an expert 
Based on the interpretation of the state of the world, the expert decides on a particular 
action, which can be considered an intervention in his/her part of the world. The expert has 
some expectations as to any action. Sometimes they are met and sometimes they are not; 
but in any case (s)he will learn from the results of the actions which may help him/her 
interpreting the future world. 
The first expert systems were constructed in the late 1960s. The building blocks for the 
systems were production rules. A production rule is of the form 'if condition 'then' fact, or 
'if condition 'then' action. Though the language is very simple, it turned out to be rather 
powerful when modelling expert's reasoning, and several impressive rule-based expert 
systems were constructed (for example, MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976) and Rl (McDermott, 
1984). 
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Rather soon after their first successes it became clear that rule-based systems have their 
shortcomings. One of the major problems was how to treat uncertainty. Various uncertainty 
calculi were proposed, but all of them had serious deficiencies with respect to coherent 
inference. 
Normative systems are alternatives to rule-based expert systems. Both types of systems 
deal with repeated decision making on cases, but instead of using a noncoherent uncertainty 
calculus tailored for rules, they use probability calculus and decision theory. Already in the 
1960s attempts were made to use classical probability theory in expert systems (Gorry and 
Barnett, 1968). However, due to the very heavy calculation load required, it was given up 
and considered an intractable task Gorry (1973). 
In the mid-1980s a revival of the principles could be observed. Pearl (1986a) introduced 
Bayesian networks into expert systems, Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988) and Jensen, 
Olesen and Andersen (1990) provided efficient calculation methods, and by the MUNIN 
system (Andreassen et al., 1989) it was demonstrated that the necessary calculations for 
very large networks are indeed tractable. 
2 Bayesian networks basic 
The basic knowledge when reasoning under uncertainty is whether information on some 
event influences your beliefs about other events. 
Wet grass 
Mr Holmes leaves his house in the morning and notices that the grass is wet. He reasons: 'I 
think it rained last night. Then my neighbour, Dr Watson's, grass must be wet also'. That 
is, the information that Mr Holmes' grass is wet has an influence on his belief about the 
status of Dr Watson's grass. Now, suppose that Mr Holmes has checked the rain gauge, 
and that it was empty. Then he will not reason as above, and information on Mr Holmes' 
grass has no influence on his belief about Dr Watson's grass. 
Next, consider two possible causes for wet grass. Besides the possibility of rain, Mr 
Holmes may have forgotten to turn off the sprinkler. Assume that the next morning Mr 
Holmes again notices that his grass is wet. Mr Holmes' belief about both rain and sprinkler 
increases. Then he observes that Dr Watson's grass is wet, and he concludes that it must 
have rained last night. The next step in the reasoning is hard for machines but natural to 
human beings, namely explaining away: Mr Holmes' wet grass could be explained by the 
rain, and thus there is no reason anymore to believe that the sprinkler had been on. Hence 
Mr Holmes' belief about the sprinkler is reduced to (almost) its initial size. 
Causal networks 
The situations above can be depicted in a graph. The events are nodes, and two nodes A and 
B are connected by a directed link from A to B if A has a causal impact on B. Figure 2 is a 
graphical model of Mr Holmes' small world of wet grass. Rain and sprinkler are causes of 
Holmes's grass being wet. Only rain can cause Watson's grass to be wet. 
Figure 2 is an example of a causal network. A causal network consists of a set of 
variables and a set of directed links between variables. Mathematically the structure is 
called a directed graph. When talking about the relations in a directed graph we use the 
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terminology of family relations: If there is a link between A and B we say that B is a child 
of A, and A is a parent of B. 
Rain? Sprinkler? 
Watson ? Holmes ? 
Figure 2. A Network model for the wet grass example 
The variables represent events (propositions). In Figure 2 each variable has the states 
'yes' or 'no' reflecting whether a certain event has taken place or not. In general, a variable 
can have any number of states. A variable may be, for example, the colour of a car (states 
blue, green, red, brown), the number of children in a family (states 0, 1, 2 ,3, 4, 5, 6, 
>6), diseases (states bronchitis, tuberculosis, lung cancer). Variables may have a countable 
or a continuous state-set, but in this article we only consider variables with a finite number 
of states. 
In a causal network a variable represents a set of possible states of affairs. A variable is 
in exactly one of its states; which one may be unknown to us. 
Probability calculus 
So far nothing has been said about the quantitative part of certainty assessment. Various 
certainty calculi on causal networks exist, but we shall only treat the so-called Bayesian 
calculus, which is a classical probability calculus. 
Conditional probabilities 
The basic concept in the Bayesian treatment of certainties in causal networks is conditional 
probability. A conditional probability statement is of the following kind: 'Given the event B 
(and everything else known is irrelevant for A), then the probability of the event A is *'. 
The notation for the statement above is P(A \B) = x. The fundamental rule for probability 
calculus is the following: 
P(A\B)P(B) = P(A,B) (1) 
where P(A,B) is the probability of the joint event A n B. Note that P(A,B) is a table of 
numbers. From Equation 1 it follows that P(A\B) P(B)=P(B\A) P{A) and this yields the 
well-known Bayes' Rule: 
P(B | A) = P(A | B) P{B) I P(A) (2) 
If A is a variable with states au...,an, then P{A) is a probability distribution over these 
states: 
P(A) = (*,,...,x„) withxt > 0 and XXl = 1 (3) 
where x, is the probability of A being in state a,-. 
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From a table P(A,B) the probability distribution P(A) can be calculated. Let a, be a state 
of A. There are exactly m different events for which A is in state ah namely the mutually 
exclusive events (ai,b1),...,(ai,bm). Therefore 
P(ai)=I.P(ai,bj) (4) 
This calculation is called marginalization and we say that the variable B is marginalized 
out of P(A,B) (resulting in P(A)). The notation is 
P(A) = ZP(A,B) (5) 
B 
Note: Probability calculus does not require the probabilities be based on theoretical 
results or frequencies of repeated experiments. Probabilities may also be completely 
subjective estimates of the certainty of an event. 
Bayesian networks 
Causal relations have also a quantitative side, which is their strength. This is expressed by 
attaching numbers to the links. Let A be a parent of B. Using probability calculus it would 
be natural to let P(B\A) be the strength of the link. However, if also C is a parent of B, 
then the two conditional probabilities P(B\A) and P(B\C) alone do not give any clue on 
how the impacts of A and B interact. They may cooperate or counteract in various ways. 
So, we need a specification of P(B\A,C). It may happen that the domain to be modelled 
contains feedback cycles. Feedback cycles are difficult to model quantitatively (this is, for 
example, what differential equations are all about), and for causal networks no calculus 
dealing with feedback cycles has been developed. Therefore we do not require the network 
to contain cycles. 
A Bayesian network consists of a set of variables and a set of directed edges between 
variables. Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. The variables together 
with the directed edges form a directed acyclic graph (DAG)1. To each variable A with 
parents Bu...,Bn is attached a conditional probability table P(A\Bu...,Bn). Note that if A 
has no parents, then the table reduces to unconditional probabilities P(A). 
Evidence and belief revision 
Let U be the universe for a Bayesian network. Evidence is information on the state of the 
variables of U. For simplicity, we will only consider evidence statements of the kind 'The 
variable X is in state x'. We shall let e denote a set of such statements. 
Belief revision consists of calculating the posterior distribution P(X\e) for all variables X 
in U. Various methods for belief revision exist. They do in fact calculate P(X,e) for all X, 
and then P(X\e) is calculated by normalizing P(X,e): 
P(X\e) = ^£^-, where P(e) = I.P(X,e) (6) 
P(e) x 
A directed graph is acyclic if there is no direct path A, -» ... -> A„, subject to At = A„. 
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In this article we shall not go into the methods for belief revision (for Bayesian networks 
belief revision is called propagation). The interested reader is referred to the literature. 
Fortunately, software exists for editing and running Bayesian networks. 
3 Examples 
Insemination (constructed) 
Six weeks after insemination of a cow there are three tests for the result: blood test (BT), 
urine test (UT), and scanning (5c). The results of the blood test and the urine test are 
mediated through the hormonal state (Ho), which is affected by a possible pregnancy (Pr). 
A model will be as the one in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. A model for test of pregnancy (Pr), and both the blood test (BT) and the urine 
test (UT) measure the hormonal state (Ho) 
BOBLO 
BOBLO is a system which helps to verify parentage of Jersey cattle through blood type 
identification. The introduction of embryo transplantation and the increasing trade of semen 
and embryos have stressed the importance of proper pedigree registration and therefore 
there is a need for sophisticated methods for individual identification and parentage control 
of cattle. For the blood group determination of cattle, 10 different independent blood group 
systems are used. These systems control 52 different blood group factors which can be 
determined in a laboratory. In eight of these systems the blood group determination is 
relatively simple (checking of one to 4 blood group factors only). However, systems B- and 
C- are rather complicated, checking 26 and 10 of the above-mentioned 52 blood group 
factors respectively. Heredity of blood type follows the normal genetic rules; however, the 
blood groups are attached to sets of loci rather than to single loci of the chromosomes, and 
instead of alleles the term phenogroup is used. So, for each blood group, a Bayesian 
network for inheritance will be as in Figure 4. From each parent one out of two phenotypes 
are chosen. This constitutes the genotype of the offspring, and the genotype determines a 
set of factors measurable in a laboratory (the phenotype). 
If nothing is known of the phenogroups of the parents they are given a prior probability 
equal to the frequencies of the various phenogroups. For the example let us suppose that 
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there are three phenogroups ƒ,, f2, /3 with frequencies (0.58, 0.1, 0.32) (this is the situation 
for the so-called F-system). However, we do not know the parents of the offspring—we 
only have a stated dam and a stated sire. If the stated parents are the true parents we have 
no problems, but what if they are not? Then we will say that the phenogroups of the true 
parents are distributed as the prior probabilities, that is (0.58, 0.1, 0.32). So, for modelling 
the part concerning possible parental errors, we can introduce a node 'Parental error' with 
states 'both', 'sire', 'dam' and 'no', and with prior probabilities to be the frequency of 
parental errors. This leads to the Bayesian network in Figure 5. Evidence is entered into the 
variables 'Factor' and 'Phenogroup Stated d/s'. Evidence from 'Factor' is transmitted to 
'Parental error' because 'Phenogroup Stated' has received evidence. 
Figure 4. Heredity of blood type 
Figure 5. The part of BOBLO modelling parental error 
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The network model in BOBLO has also a part that models the risks of mistakes in the 
laboratory procedures. For now, assume that evidence on factors is entered directly into the 
nodes 'Factor'. It is assumed that the stated parents are so well known that their genotypes 
are known, and therefore the state of the variables 'Phenogroup Stated d/s' is known. 
BOBLO is described in work by Rasmussen (1995). 
4 Use of Bayesian network models 
When you have the facilities for belief revision, you might ask for methods for further 
expert system facilities, and in this section we shall describe some of these facilities. They 
have all been implemented as extensions to the HUGIN system (Andersen et al. 1989), and 
some of them are publicly available. It should be noted that all features carry a cost in 
terms of time and space. In general, the larger the network, the more time and space a 
propagation requires. Usually the time for a propagation is less than a second, but you may 
also come across networks where it is practically impossible to carry out the task. Anyhow, 
for the considerations to come we consider a propagation to be the time unit. That is, we 
shall discuss how costly the various features are in terms of number of propagations. As a 
rule of thumb, you should avoid tasks requiring more than a thousand propagations. 
Probabilities for specific configurations 
Assume that for some reason in the wet grass example we want the probability for both rain 
and forgotten sprinkler, given that Dr Watson's and Mr Holmes' grass is wet. Belief 
revision only yields P(Rain?\e) and P(Sprinkler?\e). 
This can be achieved through a sideeffect of the propagation method. As mentioned 
above, belief revision yields P(e). Next, enter Rain? = y and Sprinkler? = y as virtual 
evidence. Belief revision then yields the probability of all the evidence entered, and 
n / n • o o • i, o i x P(Rain"?= y,Sprinklerl' = y,e) 
P(Rainl = y,Sprinkler ? = y\e) = — 'LLJ- ^2—L (7) 
So, to get the probability for a specific configuration requires only one propagation. 
Joint probabilities 
Assume that instead of the probability for a single configuration you want the joint 
probability distribution for several variables. You may in the wet grass example want the 
joint probability distribution for Rain? and Sprinkler?. 
This can be achieved through some overhead in time. The principle is that you enter the 
various configurations as virtual evidence and compute their probabilities. This requires one 
propagation for each configuration. There are smart methods which reduce the number of 
propagations, but in general the number of propagations is linear in the number of 
configurations. That is, if you want P(A, B, C, D), where all variables are ternary, then the 
time for achieving it is, in the worst case, close to the time required for 81 propagations. 
Configuration of maximal probability 
Instead of the entire joint distribution for a set of variables, you may only be interested in 
the configuration of maximal probability. In the wet grass example, you may be interested 
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in the most probable scenario explaining the evidence. This can be achieved through a 
special belief revision process called max-propagation. The complexity of max-propagation 
is similar to that of normal propagation (also called sum-propagation). 
In general, let e be the evidence entered, and let V be the remaining set of variables with 
unknown state. Then one max-propagation yields the most probable configuration in V. 
However, if you are interested in the most likely configuration of a subset W c V, then 
things become more complicated, and there is a risk that the number of required 
propagations is close to the number of propagations required for computing the joint 
probability distribution for the subset. 
Data conflict 
Findings may be flawed (e.g. red herrings), or findings might originate from a case not 
covered by the model. If the findings are not directly inconsistent, then a propagation will 
result in posterior distributions for all variables; so conflicting data cannot be detected this 
way. This is, for example, the task which BOBLO solves. In BOBLO, the network is 
particularly designed for detecting conflicts between the stated parents and the factors 
measured. If the possible conflicts are not modelled explicitly, there is another method. 
Jensen et al. (1991) suggest an index for mismatch between model and findings x,...,y: 
conf(X,....,y)loë^^l (8) 
P(x,...,y) 
The rationale behind the measure is that findings entered from a coherent case should 
conform to certain expected patterns, and therefore we would expect P(x,...,y) to be larger 
than the product of the probabilities for the individual findings. The probabilities needed for 
calculating the conflict measure are provided directly by the propagation. 
Sensitivity analysis 
Evidence e has been entered into the network, and some hypotheses hy,...,h„ are in the 
focus of interest. Sensitivity analysis will give answers to questions such as 
1. which evidence is in favour of/against/irrelevant for ft,? 
2. which evidence discriminates /z, from A- ? 
3. would it matter if finding x had been y instead? 
Let us consider the simple situation where a single variable H is in the focus of interest, 
and e has caused the state h to have a probability close to 1. We want to investigate how 
sensitive P{h \ e) is to the particular set e. 
A subset e' a e is sufficient if P(h\e') is almost equal to P{h|e), and e' is crucial if it is 
a subset of all sufficient sets. For a sensitivity analysis it is important to identify the set of 
crucial evidence as well as the minimal sufficient sets. 
To do this we need V{h\e') for all subsets of e. P{h\e') can be calculated by entering e' 
and propagating. However, the number of subsets is exponential in the number of findings, 
so this will take too much time even for sets of moderate size. There are special 
propagation techniques {e.g., cautious propagation, (Jensen, 1995a) which provide P(h\e') 
for a large number of subsets in one propagation, but for large sets of findings it is still not 
tractable to compute P(h\e') for all e'. 
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There is a way through if e is monotone: no sufficient set is a subset of a nonsufficient 
set. 
Dawid (1992) proposed a way of lazy insertion of findings. It is exploited in cautious 
propagation and provides the following: Let A be any variable, and let a, be a finding to be 
inserted into A. Cautious propagation yields P{A,e\{a^), and then P(e\{a,}) is obtained 
through marginalization. This is obtained for all variables A through the same propagation. 
If we enter h as evidence, then we also get P{h,e\{a^), and 
P(h\eHaà)=P{*;\\{aS (9) 
P{e\{at}) 
Now, if no proper subsets of e are sufficient, then e itself is crucial. Otherwise, by 
monotonicity the set of crucial findings is the intersection of all sufficient sets of the form 
e\{a,}. 
The last question above can also be answered using cautious propagation: when you have 
P(A,e\{at}) and P{A,h,e\{a^) then it is simple to get P(ay,e\{a,}) and P(h,aj,e\{ai}) for any 
alternative finding ay-, and 
DIU \ i w P(h,aj,e\{ai}) P(h\aj,e\{ai})=
 n/ . . ,. (10) P(aj,e\{ai}) 
Value of information 
Whenever decisions under uncertainty are to be made, there is a need for more information 
to reduce uncertainty. However, information is seldom free of charge, and therefore there 
is also a need for evaluating beforehand whether it is worthwhile to consult a source of 
information. Furthermore, if several sources are available there is a need to come up with a 
strategy for a sequence of data requests. 
Consider the insemination example. Before deciding on an action there is a possibility of 
acquiring information. A scan can be performed at a cost of 40 units; a blood test costs 10 
units, a urine test 10 units, and a combined blood and urine test costs 15 units (see Figure 
6). Should any tests be performed? And if so, in which order? 
First of all we will attach a value to the various information scenarios. The driving force 
for evaluating an information scenario is the information on the hypothesis variable Pr. We 
therefore call this kind of data request situation hypothesis driven. 
For our example, assume that 6 weeks after insemination there are two possible actions, 
na (wait another 6 weeks) and rp (repeat the insemination). Let U(Pr,A) be a utility table 
giving the outcome for each combination of action and hypothesis. 
The value of any information scenario is a function V of the distribution of Pr. In our 
case, Vis the expected utility of performing an optimal action. 
V(P(Pr)) = max Y.U{a,h)P{h) (11) 
A proper analysis of the data request situation should consist of an analysis of all 
possible sequences of tests (including the empty sequence). However, here we shall limit 
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ourselves to the myopic approach: If you are allowed to consult one information source at 
the most, which option should be chosen? 
Figure 6. The data request situation in the insemination example (double circled variable 
indicates that it is the driving hypothesis variable; a box indicates a test yielding 
the state of its parents) 
If test T with cost CT yields the outcome t, then the value of the new information 
scenario is 
V(P{Pr\t)) = max Y,U{a,h)P{h\t) (12) 
Since the outcome of T is not known we can only calculate the expected value 
EV{T) = YV{P{Pr\t))P{t) (13) 
The expected benefit of performing test T is 
EB(T) = EV(T) - V(P(Pr)) 
The expected profit is 
EP{T) = EB{T) - CT 
(14) 
(15) 
The myopic data request task is to calculate the expected profit for the various tests and to 
choose the one with maximal expected profit (if positive). To calculate the expected values 
in our example, one should determine P{Pr), P(UT), P(BT), P(Sc), P(BT,UT) as well as 
P(Pr\UT),...,P(Pr\BT,UT). 
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Adaptation 
When a system is at work you repeatedly get new cases, and you would like to learn from 
these cases. The situation may be that you are rather certain on the structure of the 
network. However, the conditional probabilities are dependent on a context which varies 
from place to place, and you want to build a system which automatically adapts to the 
particular context in which it is placed. The situation may also be that you have consulted 
several experts during the construction of the system, and they have not agreed upon the 
quantitative part of the network. So, the conditional probabilities are uncertain. This type of 
uncertainty is called second-order uncertainty. Second-order uncertainty calls for an 
automatic way of adapting the conditional probabilities to the real world, as it presents itself 
through the cases. 
Q & 
Case 1 Case 2 
A) B) 
Figure 7. Adaptation through a type variable T (the distribution of T is updated by case 1 
and used in the next case) 
In Figure 7 the variable A is directly influenced by B and C, and the strength is modelled 
by P(A\B,Q. The uncertainty in P(A\B,Q may be modelled explicitly by introducing an 
extra parent, T, for A (Figure 7). The variable T can be considered a type variable, for 
example, types of context or different experts' assessments. To reflect credibility of the 
experts or frequencies of the context types, a prior distribution P(T) is given. 
When a case is entered into the network, the propagation will yield a new distribution 
P*(T), and we may say that the change of the distribution for T reflects what has been 
learnt from the case. P*(T) can now be used as a new prior distribution. All variables 
whose tables are dependent on the context will be children of T. 
If the uncertainty of the conditional probabilities cannot be modelled explicitly as above, 
statistical methods can be used. Each entry in a table for a network is a parameter of the 
model, and the statistical task is to modify the estimates of the parameters gradually with 
the cases entered. This is an intractable task unless some assumptions on the dependencies 
between the parameters are added. Spiegelhalter and Lauritzen (1990) give a method for 
adaptation when the parameters are assumed to be independent. 
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5 Influence diagrams 
A Bayesian network serves as a model for a part of the world, and the relations in the 
model reflect causal impact between events. The reason for constructing these computer 
models is to use them when taking decisions. That is, the probabilities provided by the 
network are used to support some kind of decision making. In principle there are two kinds 
of decisions, test decisions and action decisions. 
A test decision is a decision to look for more evidence to be entered into the model, and 
an action decision is a decision to change the state of the world. In real life this distinction 
is not very clear; tests may have sideeffects, and by providing treatment for a disease, 
evidence on the diagnosis may be acquired. In order to be precise we should say that 
decisions have two aspects, namely a test aspect and an action aspect. The two aspects are 
handled differently in connection with Bayesian networks, and accordingly we treat them 
separately. 
We will treat decision problems within the framework of utility theory. The utility of an 
action may depend on the state of some variables, called determining variables. For 
example, the utility of a treatment with penicillin is dependent on the type of infection and 
whether the patient is allergic to penicillin. Let A = (al,...,an) be a set of mutually exclusive 
actions, and let H be a determining variable. What is required in order to specify the 
problem of deciding between the actions in A is a utility table U(A,H) yielding the utility for 
each configuration of action and determining variable, and the problem is solved by 
calculating the action which maximizes the expected utility: 
EU(a) = Y(a,H)-P(H\a) 
H 
(16) 
One set of action options 
If you have only one decision to make (see Figure 8), then the calculations are fairly 
simple: Insert the evidence and the various action options into a Bayesian network and 
calculate P(H\a). This requires one propagation for each action option. Using Bayes' Rule, 
more efficient methods can be constructed (Cooper, 1988). 
Figure 8. One set of intervening actions 
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Sequences of actions 
Very often you are in a situation where you have to decide on an action A now, knowing 
that later in time, when more evidence on the system has been acquired, you have to take a 
decision on actions in B. To analyse your present decision problem with A you have to 
imagine what you will do when deciding on B, and you have to imagine all possible 
information scenarios. 
Bayesian networks can also be extended to represent symmetric sequential decision 
problems. A sequential decision problem is symmetric if, at any given instant of time, the 
action options and the set of observed variables are independent of previous actions and 
observations. 
The graphical representations are called Influence Diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 
1984). Besides the chance nodes of Bayesian networks, influence diagrams also contain 
action nodes (usually displayed as rectangulars) and utility nodes (usually given a diamond 
shape). 
Figure 9 is an example of an influence diagram. It is a simplified version of a model for 
mildew management in winter wheat (Jensen, 1995b). It consists of weekly time steps, and 
in Figure 9 we have shown three of them. Each week the mildew attack is observed 
(M-obs) and a decision on a possible treatment is taken (Treatmt). During the week the 
weather has been observed, and now (in week 2) we have to decide on a treatment. 
Figure 9. Three time steps of a simplified version of an influence diagram for mildew 
treatment (the grey chance nodes are the ones whose states are known at the time 
of deciding on treatment 2) 
The links in Figure 9 are causal links. Traditionally, influence diagrams also contain 
information links. Each action node is given - as parents - the chance nodes which have 
been observed since the latest decision was made. Usually there is also a link between 
decision nodes indicating the temporal order. In Figure 9 we have avoided these links. 
Instead, the influence diagram is read temporarily from left to right, and nodes which 
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become observed are grey. This means that grey nodes at the left of an action variable A are 
observed at the time of deciding on A. 
There are methods for using the structure in an influence diagram to solve the decision 
problem (Shachter, 1986; Shenoy, 1992), and Jensen, Jensen and Dittmer (1994) have 
developed a method which is implemented in HUGIN. However, the problem may be 
exponential of nature, which makes it intractable. The dynamite for the combinatorial 
explosion is the unobserved chance nodes. If the state of an unobserved node in time step i 
has an influence on the decision in time step i + 2, then the decision problem may explode. 
In Figure 9 it can be detected graphically: there is a path from Mildew 1 to Mildew 3 that 
does not contain grey nodes. 
Therefore, the model of Figure 9 was changed to the (less correct) model in Figure 10. 
In Figure 10 it is assumed that the mildew observation is so precise that it can substitute the 
correct (but unknown) degree of mildew attack. Note that in Figure 10 all paths from time 
step 1 to time step 3 contain a grey node. 
For the structure of Figure 10, the methods for solving influence diagrams boil down to 
dynamic programming utilizing the efficient updating methods developed for Bayesian 
networks. 
Figure 10. A modified version of Figure 9, allowing for blocking between time steps 
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Summary 
In herd management, we face a hierarchy of decisions made at different levels with different 
time horizons and these decisions made at different levels are mutually dependent. 
Furthermore, decisions have to be made without certainty about the future state of the system. 
If, for instance, a decision has to be made at the tactical level, it is necessary to assume some 
policy to be followed concerning decisions at the operational level. This policy has to be 
optimal given the tactical decision and the present state of the system, which may very well 
deviate from the state observed at the time of the tactical decision. On the other hand, it is not 
possible to choose an optimal decision at the tactical level, unless a policy has been 
established at the operational level. A new notion of a multi-level hierarchic Markov process 
has been developed in order to be able to perform a simultaneous optimization of management 
decisions at the operational and tactical level in animal production. The application 
perspectives of the method are illustrated with an example referring to a sow herd decision 
problem involving decisions at several levels with different time horizons. The method also 
contributes significantly to circumventing the well-known curse of dimensionality in Markov 
decision processes. 
1 Introduction 
A general aspect of management under risk is that decisions have to be made without certainty 
about the future state of the system. The uncertainty increases with the time horizon of the 
decision, i.e., it is more prevalent at the tactical level than at the operational level. Having 
made a decision at the tactical level, the manager is restricted by the consequences for the 
duration of the time horizon. It may very well later turn out that the actual state of the system 
differs from the expected state at the time of the decision, but the only way the manager can 
adjust to the new situation is by making decisions at the operational level. These decisions 
should be conditionally optimal given the tactical decision made and the current state of the 
system. In other words, the decisions at the operational level may be regarded as a way of 
adjusting to risk to compensate for the incomplete knowledge about the future state of the 
system. 
In general, it must be assumed that if decision a, is made at the tactical level, then policy 
ax is optimal for decisions at the operational level (a policy is defined as a set of decisions 
relating to the set of possible states of the system). On the other hand, if decision a2 is made 
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at the tactical level, then policy «2 is optimal at the operational level. It will be an exception 
for ax to be equal to a^. In other words, it is not possible to choose an optimal decision a' at 
the tactical level, unless a conditionally optimal policy a' has been determined at the 
operational level (conditional given the tactical decision). 
In the case of a management problem with a limited time horizon (for instance, the 
duration of the tactical decision considered), the mutual dependency between decisions at the 
tactical and operational level is not really a problem. We just have to set optimal policies at 
the operational level given each of the alternative tactical decisions and, afterwards, choose 
the tactical decision maximizing the objective function. A problem corresponding to this 
situation has been discussed by Jensen (1995), who considered optimal mildew management 
policies in winter wheat under different nitrogen fertilization strategies. In that example, the 
decision at the tactical level was to choose a nitrogen fertilization strategy, and the decisions 
at the operational level were on treating the crop for mildew. The time horizon was limited to 
the growing season just as for the tactical decision. The problem was solved within the 
framework of a Bayesian network in combination with a usual backwards dynamic 
programming algorithm. 
If, however, the time horizon is unknown or at least very long, as is typically the case in 
animal production, the situation is far more complicated. Examples of tactical decisions 
include mating of a female animal with a male animal of a certain quality or choosing a 
certain feeding level for an animal. Such decisions have (depending on the animal species and 
other circumstances) a time horizon of a few months, but unlike the mildew management 
problem, the time horizon of the production is not limited to a growing season or the like. 
Instead the production is continuous, which is usually modelled by an infinite time horizon. In 
order to cope with such a situation, the decisions at the tactical and operational level have to 
be optimized simultaneously in order to ensure overall optimality. 
The terms 'tactical' and 'operational' are, of course, rather arbitrary. In general, we have 
to deal with decisions at several levels having different time horizons. A new notion of a 
multi-level hierarchic Markov process specially designed to solve dynamic decision problems 
involving decisions with varying time horizons has been developed by Kristensen and 
Jorgensen (1996). It is a generalization of the previously developed notion of an ordinary 
hierarchic Markov process presented by Kristensen (1988; 1991; 1993; 1994) and applied by 
Kristensen (1987; 1989), Broekmans (1992), Jorgensen (1993), Verstegen et al. (1994) and 
Houben et al. (1994, 1996). The original purpose of hierarchic Markov processes was to 
circumvent the well-known curse of dimensionality associated with Markov decision 
programming. The multi-level formulation allows for definition and optimization of models 
with more than two levels, and, furthermore, decisions may be defined at all levels (not just at 
the bottom-level as previously required). It is the latter characteristic that makes it possible to 
simultaneously optimize decisions with different time horizons. The multi-level formulation 
also further contributes to circumventing the curse of dimensionality. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the application perspectives of a multi-level 
hierarchic Markov process for herd management support under risk using a sow herd decision 
problem as an example. It should be emphasized that the model described has not actually 
been built. It only serves as a clarifying example. As far as the formal definitions and the 
optimization algorithm are concerned, readers are referred to Kristensen and Jargensen 
(1996). 
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2 The decision problem 
The conceptual framework and basic assumptions 
In the example we shall assume that risk is only due to biological variation, whereas prices 
are assumed fixed and known. The purpose of this assumption is only to keep the example 
simple, since a hierarchic model is indeed able to account for random variation in prices as 
discussed by Kristensen and Jergensen (1995) on the basis of an example described by 
Broekmans (1992). 
MiF iWlMiF :WiM;F ;WiR iMIF ;W;M:F ;WiR iM;F ;W;M;F iWJMJF IW;M;F ;W;R 
Figure 1. Event series of a process representing one sow and its future successors 
(M=mating, F=farrowing, W = weaning, R=replacement) 
A sow herd may be regarded as a (fixed) number of parallel courses or processes each 
representing one sow and its future successors. The total number of processes thus equals the 
herd size. Each process (chain of sows) may be represented by a series of recurrent events 
like mating, farrowing, weaning and replacement, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
At regular time intervals we have to decide on actions concerning the individual sows of 
the herd. We shall assume that the relevant actions are: 
1. to wean piglets at age Su 
2. to mate the sow with a boar of specific quality t\ 
3. to cull a sow if it is not pregnant after <5j^ , matings, 
4. to feed the sow at level <5,2 during the gestation period, 
5. to feed the sow at level <%
 3 during the suckling period, 
6. to feed the sow at level 5,4 from weaning until mating, 
7. to cull a sow if it does not show heat before <5^
 5 days after weaning, 
8. to keep/replace (S4J =0/1) the sow, 
9. to test/not to test (S42 = 0/1) the sow for pregnancy, 
10. to treat/not to treat (S43 = 0/1) piglets for diarrhoea, and 
11. to induce/not to induce (ö44 = 0/1) heat. 
In order to be able to decide on these actions we need some information on the traits of the 
sow in question (i.e., the state of the system). We shall assume that the relevant traits of a 
sow are: 
1. the genetic merit, 
2. the parity, 
3. the stage of the reproductive cycle (pregnant/suckling/open), 
4. litter size at farrowing, present parity, 
5. litter size at farrowing, previous parity, 
6. litter size at weaning, 
7. number of weeks since latest mating, 
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8. pregnancy status (open/mated/positive pregnancy test), 
9. number of piglets still alive, 
10. health status of piglets (diarrhoea/no diarrhoea), and 
11. heat status (heat/no heat). 
Formulation as an ordinary Markov decision process 
If we had to solve this decision problem within the framework of a standard Markov decision 
process, we would initially define a state as the set of combined values of all the traits listed. 
If all traits were represented at a realistic number of discrete levels, this would lead to a state 
space of tremendous size, and the matrix of transition probabilities would be impossible to 
handle. Furthermore we would define an action in the model as the combined set of values of 
the actions <5j,..., <J44. Thus, also the action space would be prohibitive. 
Even though such a model would be enormous it would not even suffice, because the 
actions have different time horizons. The action to wean at a specific age has a very long time 
horizon, since it defines the relative capacities of the various departments (gestation/ 
suckling/mating) of the herd. On the other hand, the decision to treat the piglets for diarrhoea 
has a very short time horizon. We therefore face a problem concerning the definition of time 
stages in the model. If we consider a decision with a short time horizon such as the treatment 
of piglets, we would like to define the stages of the model to be very short such as, for 
instance, a week. On the other hand, if we consider a decision such as, for instance, the 
feeding level, it does not make sense to define stage lengths to be a week, simply because the 
effect of feeding level will not manifest itself within a week. 
In order to deal with this dilemma within the framework of a traditional Markov decision 
process, we would have to extend the state space even further. Stage lengths would have to be 
defined according to the decision with the shortest time horizon. Decisions with longer time 
horizons would have to be defined as state variables ('traits') of the model. The decision to 
feed at level ^
 2 during the gestation period would then force a state transition to a state 
where the feeding level is <5,2 and the process would not be allowed to leave the subset of 
states having feeding level equal to S^
 2 before the end of the gestation period (the time 
horizon of this decision). This explosion of the state space clearly illustrates that this way of 
integrating decisions with different time horizons is certainly not appropriate. 
Formulation as a multi-level hierarchic Markov process 
A multi-level hierarchic Markov process has been specially designed to fit a decision problem 
such as the one described. If we consider the traits listed in first part of Section 2, we observe 
that some of them are necessarily constant over several time steps, while others vary more 
frequently. Thus the genetic merit is constant over the entire life time of a sow. It only 
changes when a replacement takes place. Others are constant over several months. The boar 
quality and the litter size at farrowing are examples of such traits. The trait having the 
shortest time horizon (a couple of days) is the heat status. 
The basic idea of a multi-level hierarchic Markov process is to take advantage of these 
traits being constant over a period of time. If, for instance, a trait is constant over 4 weeks, 
say the suckling period, a trait that varies weekly may be modelled as a separate Markov 
decision process with parameters depending on the permanent trait. Thus we end up with 
Markov decision processes running at different levels with different time horizons. At each 
level, actions with the relevant time horizon may be defined. They are referred to as level-
specific actions. 
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If the decision problem of the first part of Section 2 is modelled as a multi-level hierarchic 
Markov process, the event series of Figure 1, representing one sow and its future successors 
levels are defined as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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+ 
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Figure 2. The event series (M=mating, F = farrowing, W=weaning, R=replacement) 
modelled by a four-level hierarchic Markov process 
The characteristics of the processes at various levels are summarized in Table 1. At the 
top-level, the stage length is defined as the life span of a single sow in the chain. Accordingly, 
the state variable must represent a trait which is constant over time for the same animal. The 
genetic merit (for instance, low, average or high) is an example of such a trait. The level-
specific action must also have a time horizon equal to the life time of a sow. In the example, 
the decision to wean piglets at a certain age (for instance, 3, 4, or 5 weeks) has been defined 
as the level-specific action. In other words, the model will allow us to use an age at weaning 
which depends on the genetic merit of the sow. 
At level 2, the stage length is defined to be the duration of a reproductive cycle from first 
mating after farrowing until first mating after the following farrowing. Thus, the state 
variables and level-specific actions must have the same time horizon. Examples are the litter 
size at previous farrowing (for instance, 1,2,..., 18 piglets - or fewer classes), and the quality 
of the boar used for mating (for instance, low, average or high breeding index). When the 
boar quality is decided on, genetic merit of the sow, weaning age of piglets and litter size at 
previous farrowing are known. Thus, the action may depend on these traits and decision. 
At level 3, the stages represent three different periods of the reproductive cycle. The first 
stage is the mating and gestation period, the second stage is the suckling period and the third 
the period from weaning till first mating. At stage 1 no state variables are defined. 
Accordingly, the state space only contains one state. Two level-specific actions are defined. It 
has to be decided how many matings (for instance, 1, 2 or 3) we accept before the sow is 
culled for infertility (that may, for instance, depend on the genetic merit and the litter size at 
previous farrowing). The other level-specific action is to choose a feeding level (for instance, 
low, average or high) for the animal during the gestation period. The action chosen may 
depend on, for example, the litter size at previous farrowing and may, in turn, influence the 
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number of piglets born as well as their initial health status. At stage 2, we observe the current 
litter size at birth and decide on a feeding level. At stage 3, the first state variable is the same 
as that of stage 2 and a second variable is defined as the litter size at weaning, and the level-
specific actions are to decide on how many days we accept to wait for heat before the sow is 
culled and what level to feed at. A high feeding level in this period will typically result in 
many ovulations. In piglet production, this phenomenon is called 'flushing'. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the processes running at various levels of the sow herd model 
Level 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Time horizon 
Infinite 
Life span of a 
sow 
Reproductive 
cycle 
Process 1 : 
From first 
mating till 
farrowing 
Process 2: 
From farrow-
ing till weaning 
Process 3: 
From weaning 
till mating 
Stage 
Life span of a sow 
Reproductive cycle 
Stage!; 
From first mating 
till farrowing 
Stage 2: 
From farrowing 
till weaning 
Stage 3; 
From weaning till 
mating 
Process 1: 
One week 
Process 2: 
One week 
Process 3: 
One day 
State variables 
Genetic merit 
Litter size at birth, 
previous parity 
Stage 1 : 
-None 
Stage 2: 
-Litter size at birth 
Stage 3: 
-Litter size at birth 
-Litter size at weaning 
Process 1: 
-Weeks since last 
mating 
-Pregnancy status 
Process 2: 
-Number of piglets 
still alive 
Process 3: 
-Heat/No heat 
Level-specific actions 
Wean piglets at age Sx 
Mate with boar of 
specific quality <% 
Stage 1: 
-Accept 5$ i matings 
as a maximum 
-Feed at level <5,2 
Stage 2: 
-Feed at level £,
 3 
Stage 3: 
-Feed at level <^
 4 
-Accept Ô3
 5 days as a 
maximum to wait for 
heat 
Process 1: 
-Replace sow 
-Test for pregnancy 
Process 2: 
-Treat piglets 
Process 3: 
-Induce heat 
-Replace sow 
At level 4, three different processes representing stages 1, 2 and 3 of the process at level 3 
respectively are defined. In the processes representing the gestation and suckling periods, the 
stage length is defined to be one week, whereas it is one day in the process representing the 
period from weaning till first mating. In the gestation period (process 1), the state variables 
are defined to be the number of weeks since latest mating and the pregnancy status (pregnant 
or not pregnant). The actions defined are to replace the sow and to test for pregnancy. In the 
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suckling period (process 2), we observe at each stage the number of piglets survived and the 
health status of the piglets. The possible action is to treat the piglets medically (depending on 
the health status). In process 3, we observe for heat and we may decide to induce heat by 
hormone injections or to replace the sow. 
In the example, the model has the same number of levels all over. In other models, the 
number of child levels of a given process may vary from, for instance, stage to stage or from 
state to state of the process in question. 
A specific bottom-level process 
A process at level 4 is identified and defined by the combined values of all stages n, states i 
and actions d at higher levels. In Table 2, an interpretation of such an identification relating to 
the sow herd example is given. A specific bottom-level process may be identified as 
((3,2),(4,12,1),(2,11,3)). According to Table 2 and the model definition above, this would 
mean a sow with the following properties (since the time horizon of the top-level process is 
infinite, no stage number is defined at level 1): 
1. genetic merit: Level 3 (high), 
2. age of weaning: Action 2 (4 weeks), 
3. parity: 4, 
4. litter size at parity 3: Level 12 (12 piglets), 
5. quality of boar used for mating: Level 1 (low), 
6. stage in reproductive cycle: Suckling, 
7. litter size (at birth) at present parity: Level 11(11 piglets), and 
8. feeding level: Level 3 (high). 
Thus a process at a given level inherits the information contained in state variables and 
actions at higher levels. 
Table 2. Interpretation of a process identification r3 = (((1,^ 1),(n2,'2'<%)>(i3.'3>(%)) of a process 
at level 4 of the sow herd example 
Symbol Explanation Information passing on to lower levels 
Genetic merit of sow in question 
Decided age of weaning (age of piglets in weeks) 
Parity (age of sow measured as number of farrowings) 
Litter size at previous farrowing (parity) 
Quality of boar used for mating 
Stage in reprod. cycle (mating/pregnant, suckling, weaned) 
None if n3=l (mating/pregnant). 
Litter size at birth if n3=2 (suckling) 
Litter size at birth and at weaning (weaned) 
For all /23: Feeding level. In addition, if: 
/ij=l: Maximum number of rematings accepted 
«3=3: Maximum number of days open waiting for heat 
h 
$ 
«2 
h 
8, 
n-i 
h 
A 
Level 1 state 
Level 1 action 
Level 2 stage 
Level 2 state 
Level 2 action 
Level 3 stage 
Level 3 state 
Level 3 action 
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3 Discussion 
In herd management, we face a hierarchy of decisions made at different levels with different 
time horizons, and these decisions made at different levels are mutually dependent. 
Furthermore, decisions have to be made without certainty about the future state of the system. 
When, for instance, a boar quality for mating is selected, the result of the mating is unknown 
(no conception or conception with number of piglets born later). Neither is, for instance, the 
health status of the piglets in the suckling period known. When a feeding strategy is selected 
for the suckling period, the number of piglets born is known, but their health status during the 
period is still not known. The latter information is only available at the shortest time horizon 
when decisions concerning treatment for diarrhoea are made. 
In the sow herd example, the treatment policy followed at the lowest level will influence 
the value of the piglets at weaning. Because of the uncertainty of the health status of the 
piglets during the suckling period, we need to determine a treatment policy in order to be able 
to calculate the expected value of the piglets at weaning. It is very likely that the optimal 
treatment policy depends on the quality of the boar and on the feeding level. The optimal 
treatment policy therefore has to be determined conditionally given the decisions at the higher 
levels. When this has been done for all possible decisions with longer time horizons, we are 
able to compare the possible decisions at the intermediate level where the feeding strategy is 
chosen. Having decided the feeding strategy given all possible boar qualities, we have a 
correct basis for making a decision at the top-level. 
A new notion of a multi-level hierarchic Markov process especially designed to solve 
dynamic decision problems involving decisions with varying time horizons has been 
presented. The problem of uncertainty concerning the future state of the system when a 
decision with a given time horizon is made is solved by the determination of conditionally 
optimal policies concerning decisions with shorter time horizons. These conditionally optimal 
policies will ensure that no matter what states the system will transfer to during the time 
horizon of the decision considered, the economic result will always be the best possible in the 
circumstances defined by the decision made at the current level and the states observed at 
lower levels. The potential of the technique is to create a framework for general herd 
management support under risk instead of very specialized models only concerned with a 
single decision such as, for instance, replacement. 
In relation to risk management, the hierarchic formulation also has the possibility of taking 
random price fluctuations into account. 
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A POSSIBLE GRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT TO GENERALIZED STOCHASTIC 
DOMINANCE ANALYSES 
F. McCamley and R.K. Rudel 
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, USA 
Summary 
This paper suggests that graphs could replace or supplement the limited sensitivity analyses 
which sometimes accompany applications of generalized stochastic dominance (GSD). One 
graphical approach is suggested and illustrated for two versions of the GSD criterion. The 
approach is applied to a simple problem involving nine probability distributions. 
1 Introduction 
Generalized stochastic dominance (GSD) is frequently used by agricultural economists to 
compare risky alternatives. One limitation of some studies which use this technique is that 
the appropriate risk aversion coefficient (RAC) interval is not always known. RAC intervals 
estimated by previous studies and/or other arbitrarily selected intervals are frequently used. 
The arbitrary choice of RAC intervals is sometimes mitigated by providing an indication of 
the sensitivity of the efficient set to the RAC interval. Unfortunately, the sensitivity 
analyses are often rather limited. 
It is possible that graphical presentation of sensitivity analyses might help researchers 
understand and describe the relationship between RAC interval choice and efficient sets. 
This paper describes and illustrates one graphical approach. 
2 Approach \ 
There are several ways to represent RAC intervals in a two-dimensional graph. We let the 
coordinates of any point in the graph represent the lower and upper limits of a RAC 
interval. One alternative would Jet the coordinates of any point in the graph represent the 
lower limit and length, respectively, of a RAC interval. 
There are at least two strategies for identifying the sets of RAC intervals associated with 
sets of efficient distributions. One strategy would consider one efficient set and delineate 
the set of RAC intervals associated with it before considering other efficient sets which may 
be of interest. This seems like a good strategy for local sensitivity analyses. The strategy 
we adopt here is somewhat more global in nature. Instead of focusing initially on individual 
efficient sets, we begin by approximating a minimum upper limit function for each of the 
alternative probability distributions. 
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Consider distribution i. For each possible lower limit of the RAC interval, we determine 
(if it exists) the smallest upper limit of the RAC interval which is consistent with 
distribution i being a member of the efficient set. Combining the minimum upper limit 
functions for all of the distributions allows us to delineate the sets of RAC intervals for 
several, and often many, sets of efficient distributions. 
3 GSD criteria 
Several GSD criteria have been used by agricultural economists. The criterion which seems 
to be the most popular is slightly less general than the one discussed by Meyer (1977). It 
allows the absolute risk aversion coefficient to vary as long as it is not smaller than a lower 
bound or larger than an upper bound. The bounds are fixed and independent of wealth. The 
acronym VARA (variable absolute risk aversion) is used to identify this version of the GSD 
criterion in the balance of this paper. 
Some agricultural economists prefer to limit consideration to utility functions which 
imply constant absolute risk aversion. The acronym CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) 
is used for this version of the GSD criterion. Although it may not be obvious to all readers, 
the computer program described by Goh et al. (1989) assumes constant risk aversion. Our 
implementation of CARA differs somewhat from theirs because we do not 'smooth' the 
distributions. 
These two versions of the GSD criterion are usually employed in a pairwise fashion but 
are sometimes combined with the convex set stochastic dominance (CSD) approach. In this 
paper, only pairwise comparisons are used. A longer departmental paper (McCamley and 
Rudel, 1994) considers both pairwise and CSD variants of the two versions of the GSD 
criterion. It also presents more computational details. 
4 Example 
Our approach is illustrated by using nine probability distributions from a problem of 
interest to us. For each distribution, there are six possible outcomes, each of which has the 
same probability of occurring. To avoid considering distributions which could not possibly 
contribute to our graphs, first degree stochastic dominance (FSD) analysis was used to 
'screen' the distributions. All of the distributions are FSD efficient. 
The means of the distributions vary from about $69,500 for distribution 5 to about 
$78,000 for distribution 1. The overall range of outcomes is from about $16,400 to about 
$110,900. Both extremes are associated with distribution 5. Distribution 2 has the largest 
minimum outcome of about $47,300. 
For computational purposes, returns were measured in thousands of dollars. We consider 
RAC intervals with lower limits of -0.15 to 0.1. RAC interval upper limits of -0.15 to 
0.15 are considered. Raskin and Cochran (1986) have shown that the unit of measure has 
only a trivial effect on the results of GSD analyses. If we had used dollars to measure 
returns, we could have obtained the same graphs by considering RAC values with an 
overall range of-0.00015 to 0.00015. 
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Graphs associated with somewhat longer ranges of RAC values were also constructed but 
did not seem to illustrate our ideas as well. The advantage of the more global perspective 
which they provided was not sufficient to compensate for the loss of detail. 
5 The CARA criterion 
The CARA criterion presumes that each decision maker has a specific and constant RAC. 
Thus, if the decision maker's RAC is known, the preferred distribution(s) can be 
determined by simply computing (and comparing) the expected utility values for the 
distributions being considered. 
The notion of a RAC interval is relevant for the CARA criterion only if the decision 
maker's RAC is not known precisely and/or a class of decision makers is being considered. 
By contrast, the notion of a RAC interval is an integral part of the VARA criterion. 
Sensitivity analysis provides a way of examining the effect of alternative RAC intervals. 
For a 'global' sensitivity analysis, it is sufficient to know all of the RAC values, or roots, at 
which the expected utility functions for any two distributions cross and the ranking 
(preference order) of the candidate distributions between each pair of adjacent roots. A 
method similar to McCarl's (1988) can be used to obtain the information needed. 
Although it would be possible to present a global sensitivity analysis in tabular form, the 
table could be fairly long. The body of the table for our set of nine distributions would have 
48 lines. Table 1 presents 5 of those lines. From the complete table, it would be possible to 
determine the efficient set for any specific RAC interval. However, making this 
determination could be tedious. 
Table 1. Excerpt of CARA analysis 
RAC values Ranked distributions" 
-0.07384 to -0.06829 5,2,1,3,7,9,4,6,8 
-0.06829 to-0.06680 5,1,2,3,7,9,4,6,8 
-0.06680 to-0.06275 5,1,2,3,7,9,4,8,6 
-0.06275 to -0.05808 1,5,2,3,7,9,4,8,6 
-0.05808 to -0.05628 1,2,5,3,7,9,4,8,6 
a
 The distribution with the highest expected utility in the RAC interval is listed first 
To understand how it might be done, consider the following (arbitrarily selected) RAC 
interval, -0.072 to -0.057. Distributions 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are clearly not efficient. For 
each RAC value in the selected interval, each of these distributions is inferior to 
distributions 1, 2 and 5. Distributions 1 and 5 are easily identified as efficient since each of 
these distributions is preferred to all others for some RAC values. Distribution 2 also 
belongs to the efficient set because there is no distribution which is preferred to it for all 
RAC values in the selected interval. 
Figure 1 presents minimum upper limit functions for distributions 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8. The 
'D' numbers identify the functions associated with these distributions. Minimum upper limit 
functions for distributions 3, 4 and 6 do not exist for the CARA criterion. That is, there is 
no RAC interval for which any of these three distributions belongs to the efficient set. 
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To further illustrate the interpretation of Figure 1, consider the RAC interval, 0 to 0.1. 
Each distribution whose minimum upper limit function lies below the coordinate (0, 0.1) 
belongs to the efficient set. Thus, distributions 1, 2 and 7 are efficient. 
The numbers (inside the axes) in Figure 1 identify the members of the various efficient 
sets. Distributions 2, 7 and 8 belong to the efficient set associated with the very narrow set 
of RAC intervals towards the right side and near the top of Figure 1. All other efficient sets 
are labelled in the figure. 
For the criteria considered in this paper, the minimum upper limit functions are 
nondecreasing functions of the lower limit of the RAC interval. If they exist, CARA 
minimum upper limit functions must also be piecewise linear. Each linear segment can have 
only one of three possible slopes: zero, one or infinity. Although it may not be obvious, 
this is related to the fact that a global sensitivity analysis for the CARA criterion can always 
be completely presented in tabular form. 
The slope of a CARA minimum upper limit function can only be one if it is on the 45-
degree line. Indeed, the 45-degree line is formed by linear segments of minimum upper 
limit functions. Keeping this in mind can offset one of the illusions inherent in Figure 1 
(and to a slightly lesser degree in Figure 2). At first glance, it might appear that the 
minimum upper limit functions for distributions 5, 1 and 7 change directions by 90 degrees 
at A, B and C respectively. In fact, pairs of minimum upper limit functions change 
directions by 45 degrees at A, B and C. 
Some features of Figures 1 and 2 could have been predicted from the information given 
above about the distributions. The characteristics of the distributions imply that a) 
distribution 1 is a member of the efficient set for all RAC intervals which include 0, b) 
distribution 2 is a member of the efficient set for large RAC values and c) distribution 5 is a 
member of the efficient set for RAC intervals consistent with a strong preference for risk. 
Other properties of the CARA criterion are shown in Figure 1. One of them is related to 
an error in interpretation which is sometimes made. When describing the results of 
stochastic dominance analyses, we sometimes identify the efficient sets for two RAC 
intervals, (a, b) and (c, d). Then we are tempted to conclude that the efficient set associated 
with the union of the two intervals (which is {a, d) if a < c < b < d) is the union of the 
efficient sets associated with the individual RAC intervals. This is not always true. The 
RAC interval represented by F is the union of the overlapping RAC intervals D and E. (See 
Table 2 for coordinates of the specific points which are labelled in the figures.) The 
efficient sets for D and E are identical and consist of distributions 1 and 7. The efficient set 
for F consists of distributions 1, 2 and 7. 
The same area of Figure 1 demonstrates the fact that the set of RAC intervals associated 
with an efficient set need not be convex. In Figure 1, each set of efficient distributions is 
associated with a connected set. This is just a result of the set of distributions considered 
and is not a general characteristic. 
Table 2. Coordinates of points labelled in figures 
Symbol Coordinates Symbol Coordinates 
A 
B 
C 
D 
(-0.06275, -0.06275) 
(0.03047, 0.03047) 
(0.06553, 0.06553) 
(-0.055, 0.0371) 
E 
F 
G 
(-0.04, 0.0546) 
(-0.055, 0.0546) 
(-0.06829, 0.05808) 
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6 The VARA criterion 
Portions of the VARA minimum upper limit functions are shown in Figure 2 for eight of 
the nine distributions. To show part of the function for distribution 6 would require 
changing the scale of both axes by a factor of about 2 and would make the graph less 
understandable. The existence of minimum upper limit functions for all of the distributions 
is consistent with the fact that, for a sufficiently long RAC interval, the VARA criterion is 
equivalent to first degree stochastic dominance. 
We did not label all efficient sets. The labels on the minimum upper limit functions 
should help the reader identify most of the unlabelled efficient sets. 
The VARA criterion is less stringent than the CARA criterion. This implies that the 
VARA minimum upper limit function for any distribution can never lie above the CARA 
function for the same distribution and may lie below it for some lower limit values. 
Figure 3 demonstrates this for distribution 2. The CARA and VARA minimum upper 
limit functions for distribution 2 are identical at, and to the right of, C. They are either 
identical or nearly so at G. Elsewhere, the VARA minimum upper limit function is lower 
than the CARA minimum upper limit function. 
Distributions 3, 4 and 6 reflect this even more dramatically. In practical terms, the fact 
that there are no CARA minimum upper limit functions for these distributions is equivalent 
to having infinitely large minimum upper limits for every conceivable value of the lower 
limit. For many lower limit values, distributions 3, 4 and 6 have finite VARA minimum 
upper limits. 
For the VARA criterion, minimum upper limit functions can, and often do, have linear 
segments. However, the minimum upper limit functions are not always piecewise linear and 
tend to be 'smoother' than corresponding CARA minimum upper limit functions. This 
means that it is usually impossible to present complete sensitivity analyses for the VARA 
criterion in tabular form. 
Four of the linear segments in Figure 2 are on, or more accurately are, the 45-degree 
line. The portions of the minimum upper limit functions which constitute the 45-degree line 
are, and must be, the same as in Figure 1, since along the 45-degree line the lengths of the 
RAC intervals are zero, which makes the VARA and CARA criteria identical. 
Figure 2 shows that the sets of RAC intervals associated with efficient sets of 
distributions are not always connected. There are two unconnected areas in Figure 2, where 
the set of efficient distributions is 1, 2, 7 and 8. The set of RAC intervals associated with 
the efficient set 1, 2 and 7 is also not connected. This may not be obvious, since only one 
of the RAC interval subsets associated with this efficient set is labelled. 
7 Concluding remarks 
This paper illustrates one possible graphic supplement to GSD analyses. This and 
alternative approaches might be useful in several situations. As implicitly suggested at the 
beginning of this paper, a graph could be a useful component of published reports of GSD 
analyses. If it is not possible or useful to include a graph in the publication, constructing a 
graph for her/his own use might help the researcher more adequately design and describe 
the GSD analysis. 
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Graphs such as those presented here might also be useful for pedagogical purposes. All 
of the GSD criteria characteristics which we have observed in our graphs were already 
known. However, graphs do seem to be an effective way of exhibiting several of these 
characteristics. 
We used minimum upper limit functions. This seems to be appropriate for rather global 
sensitivity analyses. For local sensitivity analyses, the maximum upper limit function notion 
advocated by McCarl (1990), or an extension of it, could be more useful. It would seem to 
be particularly effective when identifying the set of RAC intervals associated with one 
efficient set. (If the set of RAC intervals for that efficient set is connected.) For example, 
identifying the RAC intervals for which only distribution 1 is VARA efficient. 
Figure 2 demonstrates a limitation of our graphical approach. With a large number of 
distributions, the graphs can be cluttered and somewhat difficult to understand. This 
problem is not quite as serious if the graphs are viewed on a computer screen. The use of 
colours for the minimum upper limit functions and the possibility of 'zooming ' can partially 
mitigate the cluttering. 
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Summary 
An application of risk analysis to two Identification and Recording systems for the Belgian pig 
industry is described. The systems considered are the revised Belgian system and a system 
based on electronic identification. Emphasis is placed on the major application of these 
systems, i.e., the use in the control of Classical Swine Fever. 
The results show differences in preferred choice between (assumed risk-neutral) decision 
makers at the (supra-) national level and farmers with various degrees of risk aversion. Within 
the group of farmers, the degree of risk aversion does not cause any significant preference 
shifts. 
It is concluded that inclusion of risk analysis in decision making on contagious disease 
control is a valuable extension of current simulation modelling. Currently, the most 
hampering issue is, however, the scarcity of usable information on preference and risk attitude 
of decisionmakers. 
1 Introduction 
Decision making in contagious disease control is subject to many uncertainties. The 
occurrence of outbreaks and the frequency of epidemics are almost impossible to predict. 
Furthermore, the epidemiological and economic impact of outbreaks and of various disease 
control measures is hard to estimate beforehand. One thing is sure, however: the economic 
losses due to contagious disease outbreaks can be very high. For example, total direct losses 
due to three epidemics of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Belgium in 1990, 1993 and 1994 
were estimated at BFr 12,300m (approximately US$ 350m). 
In recent years, simulation modelling has proved to be a valuable instrument in supporting 
decisions with respect to contagious disease control. Examples have been described for, 
among other things, Foot-and-Mouth disease (Miller, 1979; Berentsen et al., 1992; Garner 
and Lack, 1995) and Aujeszky's disease (Houben et ai, 1993; Buijtels et ai, 1997). 
However, no account was taken of the aspects of uncertainty and risk attitude of the decision 
makers, i.e., a risk analysis was not included. Nevertheless, inclusion of these aspects is 
important, for instance, to indicate preference shifts between decision makers with differences 
in risk attitude, as was demonstrated by Dijkhuizen et al. (1994). 
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The aim in this paper is to show how risk attitude and uncertainty can be taken into 
account in studying contagious disease control. As an example, a study will be presented 
which was directed towards the role of Identification and Recording (I&R) systems in the 
control of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Belgium. A detailed description of this study is 
provided by Saatkamp et al. (1997). 
2 The decision problem 
The decision alternatives 
National I&R systems aim at recording all relevant data regarding movements and inventory 
mutations to, from and within a particular animal population {e.g., births, deaths, removals, 
purchases, sales, imports and exports). It is obvious that information on these aspects can be 
valuable for contagious disease control, in particular if animal and personal contacts are 
important factors in the disease spread (Saatkamp et al., 1995a). This is so in the case of 
CSF. Currently, in Belgium, I&R systems are mainly used for CSF control. 
The decision problem dealt with is the choice between the following two I&R systems: 
EMDC: fiartags with in most cases Manual recording, user-friendly Documents and 
Computerized data storage, the revised Belgian system which has recently been 
introduced; and 
TEC: Transponders with Electronic recording and data transfer and Computerized data 
storage, an I&R system based on electronic identification, which is in its final stage 
of development. 
The TEC system is more sophisticated than the EMDC system. In disease control, utilization 
of the TEC system would most likely result in less severe epidemics in most circumstances, 
accompanied by a reduction in economic losses due to the disease (Saatkamp et al, 1995c, 
1996). Furthermore, it has more possibilities for additional applications, which would enable 
spread of operational costs (Saatkamp et al, 1995a). On the other hand, the estimated 
operational costs of the TEC system are considerable, i.e., BFr 922m/year. This is about four 
times higher than BFr 218m/year, the figure for the EMDC system. 
The nature of the decision problem 
With regard to large-scale investment projects (as, for example, replacement of the EMDC by 
the TEC system), two extreme situations are imaginable when considering risk. First, such 
projects can be considered to be entirely a public issue. Both the costs of the project are borne 
by and the possible revenues accrue to the public sector. Since, at this level, risks associated 
with various different projects are assumed to be pooled (Arrow and Lind, 1970), a risk-
neutral attitude is advocated (Little and Mirrlees, 1974). This implies that decisions should be 
based on expected monetary values or average outcomes. At the other extreme, the investment 
decision may be seen as relevant to only a particular group of society, for example, the pig 
sector. The investments are at the (collective) expense of the group members, and the 
revenues also accrue to them. However, various members can have different risk attitudes, 
depending on, for example, their economic backgrounds (large farms versus small ones). In 
such cases, inclusion of risk attitude, i.e., degree of risk aversion, in the decision-making 
process is clearly desirable. 
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With respect to the current decision problem on I&R systems, ultimate decisions are made 
at the (supra-) national level, while the costs are borne by the sector, i.e., the farmers. 
Furthermore, the possible revenues from improved I&R systems with respect to CSF control 
(i.e., reduced losses due to CSF epidemics) are currently not evenly distributed. From the 
total losses of a CSF epidemic, the farmers collectively account for about 20-25%, the 
national Belgian government about 5%, the European Union about 40-45% and Trade and 
Industry about 30-35% (Saatkamp et al., 1996). Therefore, the decision problem has been 
evaluated from two perspectives: the (supra-) national level and the farm level. 
3 Material and methods 
The evaluation included the above-mentioned I&R systems, i.e., the EMDC and the TEC 
systems. Two categories of application of the systems were considered: CSF control 
(currently the most important one) and others, so-called attributable co-use of the system. It 
was assumed that the current control practices were applied with both systems. Only 
regarding the transport restrictions in the 10-km Surveillance zone, two options were 
considered: (1) the current policy (10+), i.e., a general transport standstill in the entire zone 
and for the full duration of the epidemic, and (2) a less rigid policy (10~) which allows 
fattened pigs originating from the surveillance zone to be slaughtered and marketed. A 
consequence of the current policy is that considerable numbers of slaughter pigs and piglets 
have to be confiscated and rendered, which considerably increases the losses due to the 
disease. 
The evaluation criterion used was the total losses due to CSF and the total costs of I&R 
attributed to CSF control on a yearly basis (YLCCSF). Hence, YLCCSFn was used for evaluation 
at the (supra-) national level, whereas YLCCSFf refers to the evaluation at the farm level. 
The evaluation procedure included three subsequent steps (see Figure 1): 
1. Stochastic simulation of the losses due to single CSF epidemics. 
For every combination of basic inputs with respect to I&R system (EMDC and TEC), 
region (high-, medium- and low-density) and Surveillance zone policy (10+ and 10~), a 
CDF (cumulative distribution function) was calculated for the direct losses per single CSF 
epidemic (LCSF). Hence, CDFs were calculated for 2*3*2 = 12 combinations. The random 
elements used were related to the disease spread: the number of weeks between disease 
introduction and notification (the so-called pre-period) and the dissemination rates of the 
disease. These calculations were carried out, using two adapted and inter-linked 
epidemiological and economic simulation models described by Saatkamp et al. (1995b, 
1996). 
2. Stochastic simulation of YLCCSF. 
The yearly direct losses due to CSF (YLCSF) were calculated using stochastic simulation 
with the random elements frequency of CSF epidemics in Belgium and in the respective 
regions. Calculated losses were further treated in two ways. First, YLCSF were added to the 
total yearly operational costs of the I&R system attributed to CSF control (YOCCSF; this 
figure is made up of the yearly operational costs of the I&R system (YOC,&R) and the 
percentage of attributable co-use). Hence, YLCCSFn to the national pig sector was obtained. 
Because five levels of attributable co-use were considered (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% 
respectively), a total of 2*2*5=20 CDFs for YLCCSFn were obtained. Second, average 
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YLCSF were calculated per farm. These were added to the YOCCSFj for an average farm, 
calculated from the actual YOC!&Rf to the farmers and the percentage of these costs a farm 
attributed to the control of CSF. Again, five levels of attribution were distinguished. This 
resulted in 2*2*5=20 CDFs for the yearly losses and costs for an average farm, YLCCSFj. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the analysis procedure 
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3. Stochastic efficiency analysis of the CDFs for YLCCSFf. 
A pairwise analysis of Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function (SDRF) was 
carried out between the comparative CDFs for the EMDC and the TEC systems. This was 
done using the program developed by Goh et al. (1989), in which the bounds of the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient (RAC) were set. RAC bounds were found by assuming 
the following relative risk aversion coefficient (r'(y)) intervals for risk attitude (Anderson 
and Dillon, 1991): -0.5 to 0, 0 to 0.5, 0.5 to 1.5, 1.5 to 3.5 and 3.5 to 8 for normal risk-
preferring, risk-neutral, somewhat risk-averse, fairly risk-averse and extremely risk-averse 
decision makers respectively. Division of these bounds of r'iy) by BFr 800,000, i.e., the 
average return to labour and management of a typical Belgian pig farmer (Buyle, 1993), 
provided the following bounds of the RAC1: -0.0000006, 0, +0.0000006, +0.000002, 
+0.000004 and +0.00001. 
4 Results 
The descriptive statistics regarding the YLCCSFn are presented in Table 1. Comparison of the 
mean values for YLCCSFn between I&R systems shows that, with the current 10+ Surveillance 
zone policy, the TEC system is favourable when at least 50% of co-use can be obtained. With 
the alternative 10~ policy, the degree of co-use should be at least 75% for a decision in favour 
of the TEC system. Comparing the EMDC system with the 10" and the TEC system with the 
10+ Surveillance zone policy shows that the EMDC system is most favourable in all cases 
except when 100% of co-use for the TEC system and 0% for the EMDC system is presumed. 
Table 2 presents the results of the SDRF-analysis for YLCCSFj. Three main comparisons 
between the EMDC and TEC systems were made: (1) both systems with the current 10+ 
Surveillance zone policy (left part), (2) both systems with the alternative 10~ policy (middle 
part), and (3) the EMDC system with the 10" and the TEC system with the 10+ policy (right 
part). Furthermore, also two levels of losses due to CSF attributed to the farmers collectively 
(YLCSFf) were taken into account: (1) a default percentage of 20% and 25% of the total losses 
with Surveillance zone policies 10+ and 10" respectively (upper part) and 65% (lower part); 
the latter figure includes all losses due to CSF except those to Trade and Industry. Within 
each comparison, five levels of YOCCSFf to farmers were distinguished: 100, 75, 50, 25 and 
0% (100% means that all YOCI&Rf are paid by the farmers and attributed to CSF, whereas 
with 0%, all these costs are either paid by others (for example, through subsidies) and/or are 
attributed to other applications). Only results below the diagonal are presented, assuming that 
the level with respect to the EMDC system is always equal to or less than that of the TEC 
system. Finally, these comparisons were made for different intervals for RAC. 
Stricktly speaking, this is not correct. Theory prescribes that total wealth should be used instead of return, 
although examples are described in which the latter was used (see: Raskin and Cochran, 1986). A reliable 
estimation of total wealth, however, is sometimes even harder than the estimation of return. Moreover, the 
immediate availability of such wealth in case of calamities is questionable. Therefore, it was decided to use 
returns. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of YLCCSFn (yearly losses due to CSF and costs of I&R in 
mBFr1) for different combinations of I&R systems, percentage attributable co-use 
and Surveillance Zone policy 
I&R system 
EMDC 
TEC 
EMDC 
TEC 
Surveillance 
Zone policy 
10" 
10+ 
10" 
10" 
% attributable 
co-use 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
Minimum 
218 
164 
109 
55 
0 
922 
692 
461 
231 
0 
218 
164 
109 
55 
0 
922 
692 
461 
231 
0 
Mean ± 
standard error 
1,279 + 23 
1,225 + 22 
1,169 + 22 
1,113 ± 22 
1,069 ±22 
1,607+ 13 
1,370+13 
1,145+ 13 
911 ± 13 
688 ± 13 
726 ± 12 
685 ± 13 
622 ± 13 
581 ± 13 
510 ±12 
1,221 ±7 
994 ±7 
769 + 7 
538 ± 7 
310 ±7 
Maximum 
4,072 
3,891 
3,827 
4,732 
4,115 
3,692 
3,004 
2,952 
2,248 
2,127 
2,912 
3,294 
2,763 
2,424 
2,569 
1,962 
2,166 
1,779 
1,359 
1,344 
1 US$ equals approximately 35 BFr. 
The most striking result was that no significant preference shifts were observed when 
changing the RAC within the range from -0.0000006 to +0.00001. Therefore, separate 
results per RAC interval are not presented. A general picture that emerges is that, for a 
decision in favour of the TEC system, it is required that a maximum of only about 25 % of the 
YOC!&Rf could be spent on CSF control. If these YOCCSFf to the farmers are higher, then the 
EMDC system should be preferred. This figure is even less when a 10" Surveillance zone 
policy is considered. When a choice has to be made between the EMDC system with a 10" 
Surveillance zone policy and the TEC system with the current 10+ policy, all the YOC, 
should come from other sources for a choice in favour of the TEC system, 
would be zero. 
I&RJ 
.e., the YOC, &R,f 
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Table 2. Results of SDRF-analysis on YLCCSFf (yearly losses due to CSF plus costs of I&R to 
farmers) using fixed bounds of RAC. The composition of the table is explained in the 
text. Dominance of the TEC system is denoted by + , dominance of the EMDC 
system by -
TEC 
100 
75 
50 
25 
0 
Comparison of default percentages of YLCSFj 
EMDC/10+/20%' 
versus 
TEC/10+/20% 
100 75 50 25 0 
EMDC/10725% 
versus 
TEC/10725% 
100 75 50 25 0 
EMDC/10725% 
versus 
TEC/10+/20% 
100 75 50 25 0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + + 
+ 
+ + + 
TEC 
Comparison of situations with 65% YLCSFj 
EMDC/107655 
versus 
TEC/10+/65% 
EMDC/107655 
versus 
TEC/10765% 
EMDC/107655 
versus 
TEC/10+/65% 
100 75 50 25 0 100 75 50 25 0 100 75 50 25 0 
1UU 
75 
50 
25 
0 
_ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
_ 
2 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + + + 
this notion means: EMDC system, 10+ Surveillance zone policy, 20% of YLCSF are borne collectively by 
farmers 
with RACs (absolute risk aversion coefficients) between +0.000004 and +0.00001, no dominance 
occurred 
5 Discussion 
From the (supra-) national point of view, the results indicated that, for Belgium, with the 
current 10 Surveillance zone policy, an attributable co-use level of at least 50% would be 
sufficient for a preference for the TEC system. Such a percentage seems likely in the near 
future, given the additional application possibilities of the TEC system (see: Aarts et al., 
1989). With the 10' Surveillance zone policy, this percentage should increase to about 75%. 
Although this percentage seems questionable, cost reductions, subsidies and new technical 
developments could alter the direction towards a preference for the TEC system. In contrast, 
comparing the EMDC system with the 10" and the TEC system with the 10+ Surveillance 
zone policy shows an undeniable preference for the EMDC system. Only if the YOCI&R are 
fully attributable to other applications, should the TEC system be chosen. 
From the perspective of the average Belgian farmer, replacement of the EMDC by the 
TEC system is hardly feasible since at least 75 % of the YOCI&Rf should be accrued to others 
and/or other applications. This holds even if the farmers collectively were required to meet 
the majority of the losses due to CSF. This conclusion is not affected by the degree of risk 
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aversion of the farmers. This might be explained by the fact that, except in dramatic situations 
(i.e., if an epidemic is extremely severe), the average losses due to CSF are only a relatively 
small part of the average labour income (Note: this does not overlook the fact that, if a 
particular farm is affected by CSF, the losses can be dramatic; however, the probability of 
such an event is very low). 
These results imply that, for Belgium with respect to CSF control, replacement of the 
EMDC by the TEC system merely for CSF control is not economically feasible. Furthermore, 
results suggest that the best way to proceed is to improve CSF control in such a way that less 
expensive Surveillance zone policies become possible, i.e., that the transport standstill and 
intervention measures can be mitigated without affecting the disease control. This would have 
a considerable impact on the YLCCSFn. Currently, such measures are being discussed 
(Dijkhuizen and Davies, 1995) and advocated (Roberts, 1995). With such a policy, the TEC 
system would only be feasible if the costs attributed to CSF could be reduced to less than 
25%. This holds for the (supra-)national level, and to a lesser extent for the farm level. Such 
a reduction could be achieved through cost reduction and the use of additional applications. 
Although it remains questionable whether or not this could be achieved, it should be kept in 
mind that large-scale introduction of a TEC system could release new impulses to the pig 
sector, in particular because of its possibilities for automation. Additional benefits associated 
with this could justify the large investments for the TEC system. 
6 Concluding remarks 
The present example shows that in decision making with respect to large and complex issues, 
such as contagious disease control, differences in preferences can occur between parties 
involved {i.e., decision makers at the (supra) national level and farmers). These differences 
can result from differences in risk attitude on the one hand and economic impact of the 
decision alternatives (costs and benefits) on the other. Therefore, inclusion of a risk analysis 
which considers all parties involved is recommended in studying contagious disease control. 
This could contribute to a comprehensive insight into the consequences of various decision 
alternatives for the parties involved. 
Inclusion of risk analysis in simulation studies on contagious disease control can be done 
without serious problems. Application of software for SDRF-analysis on CDFs appeared to be 
rather easy. An alternative SDRF-approach, involving direct calculation of the so-called 
break-even risk aversion coefficients (BRAC), was proposed by McCarl (1988; 1990). 
Experience with this approach regarding the present study provided similar results. 
Different risk efficiency models have been described in the literature, varying from the 
First-Degree Stochastic Dominance technique, with limited discriminating power, to Convex 
Stochastic Dominance and SDRF, which have more discriminating power (see e.g.: Anderson 
et al, 1977; King and Robison, 1984). The major source of difference is the trade-off 
between the discriminatory power of the model on the one hand and the applicability on the 
other. The former is strongly determined by the availability of information on preference and 
risk attitude of the decision maker. In the agricultural area in general, and in the field of 
contagious disease control in particular, information on risk attitude and preference is rather 
scarce or absent. SDRF models can be applied if the analyst defines the various classes of 
decision makers according to risk attitude by estimating RACs, or by calculating BRACs. The 
outcomes, however, apply only to the class of decision makers defined by the analyst. To 
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improve the use of risk efficiency models in contagious disease control, therefore, more 
information on preferences and risk attitudes of various people involved is a prerequisite. 
Research in this field should be stimulated. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING MODEL TO 
INCLUDE THE EFFECTS OF CROP YIELD VARIABILITY ON 
ANIMAL PRODUCTION 
M.L.S. Carvalho, A.C. Pinheiro and M. de Castro Neto 
Universidade de Évora, Évora, Portugal 
Summary 
Animal production by either extensive or semi-extensive systems is based on seasonal 
vegetable production, especially in climates such as the mediterranean ones. 
Farmers' decisions, such as on optimal herd, marketing strategies for selling meat and 
adjustments in livestock feed-mix, are directly dependent on forage and pasture production 
and byproducts of cash crops. 
A model based on discrete stochastic programming (DSP) associated with a MOTAD 
(minimization of total absolute deviation) framework is developed in order: 
1. to evaluate the effects of forage and pasture and byproducts variability on farmer 
income; 
2. to identify the adjustments in livestock feed-mix; and 
3. to determine marketing strategies for selling meat. 
1 Introduction 
The assumption of an average year is the major restriction of mathematical programming 
models applied to dryland agricultural systems, because year-to-year variation in rainfall 
and production is an important feature of these systems. This subject was thoroughly 
studied by Carvalho (1994). 
The south of Portugal, the Alentejo region, has a mediterranean climate characterized by 
spring and summer seasons with very little rain. Mediterranean climate is characterized by 
rainfall concentrated in winter, and almost no rain and high temperatures during summer. 
Water is seldom available when it is necessary for the growth of plants. The climate is 
suitable for winter crops and some early spring crops, although the yields are low and not 
stable because of very irregular rain distribution. 
Animal production by either extensive or semi-extensive systems is based on seasonal 
production of pastures and forage, which is subject to great variability in climates such as 
the Mediterranean ones. 
Seasonal production of pasture and forage, together with year-to-year yield variability, 
leads to the necessity of adjustments in livestock feed-mix in certain periods of the year, by 
using hay and straw as well as concentrates. 
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Farmers' decisions, such as on optimal herd, marketing strategies for selling meat and 
adjustments in animal feed-mix, are also directly dependent on intermediate product 
availability. 
Rational farmer decisions on what, how and how much to produce, depend upon 
information on the availability of resources, costs, expected productivity, and product 
prices. These expectations, based on experience, affect his/her perspectives on possible 
gains or losses, taking into account the technology used. Income variability is the risk that a 
producer has to consider when (s)he takes production decisions. 
In this paper we describe a mathematical programming model suitable for: 
1. evaluating the effects of forage and pasture variability on farmer income; 
2. identifying the adjustments in livestock feed-mix; and 
3. determining marketing strategies for selling meat. 
2 Model description 
In order to achieve the objectives we developed a mathematical programming model that 
includes the significant features of a profit-maximizing model for an average year, growing 
season uncertainty, and farmer's response to such uncertainty. This model takes into 
account: 
1. the interdependence among crop and animal production systems; 
2. rainfall variability and its effects on yields; 
3. flexibility in farmers' decision making; and 
4. indirect aversion to risk of farmers. 
Whenever crop and animal activities are present they compete among themselves for the 
use of production factors, such as, labour, machinery and land. Moreover, in extensive and 
semi-extensive animal production systems, as is the case in the Alentejo region, crop and 
animal production systems are interdependent. Animal feed can be supplied either by forage 
and pasture or by cereal straw and stubble or from acorns of cork trees. 
Farmers' decisions related to crop and animal production technologies are taken before 
they have knowledge about the weather, thus they are made in advance. However, there are 
some other decisions farmers can make as the season unfolds which favourably alter the 
impact on production and profits (Anderson et al., 1977). Those decisions are concerned 
with the adjustments in animal feed-mix and also with marketing strategies for selling meat. 
The stochastic nature of the technical coefficients, namely those related to pasture and 
forage, and the resulting decision making justify use of discrete stochastic programming 
(DSP). This technique deals with growing season variation by considering a number of 
discrete states of nature. In effect, seasonal variation is approximated by a number of year 
types (states of nature), each represented in the model. DSP allows for sequential decision 
making, which characterizes the flexibility of farmers in modifying strategic decisions as 
the growing season unfolds. So, this technique, allowing the consideration of states of 
nature, is very useful for adjustments to the use and availability of the resources. 
In order to transfer the risks considered at the constraints level to the objective function 
of the model we used a MOT AD framework (Hazell and Norton, 1986). The MOT AD 
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framework captures the effects on farmer income due to (1) cash crop yield variability; (2) 
cost variability from adjustments in livestock feed-mix and purchases of feed concentrates; 
and (3) animal selling variability from adjustments in marketing strategies. This procedure 
permits us also to determine farmer income for each state of nature by algebraic summing 
to the objective function value of the respective deviation from the expected income. 
The farmer is assumed to operate in competitive markets for both outputs and inputs. 
(S)he has a finite set of production processes, each representing a given combination of 
owned and purchased production factors, used to produce one unit of product. The 
producer is assumed to be a price taker in all markets and to choose from the set of 
available technologies to maximize expected profits subject to risk and other constraints. It 
is also assumed that the producer is risk averse and that the model parameters have a 
multivariate normal distribution. 
Model formulation can be represented in the simplified matrix presented in Table 1. The 
model objective function maximizes expected farmer gross margin associated with 
production across states of nature. The activities draw upon the farm's limited resources of 
land, machinery and labour, and also feed availability. Included in the set of optimal 
activities are decisions about crop rotations, machinery and labour use, and also for each 
state of nature, livestock feeding procedures and marketing strategies for selling meat. 
The available activity options to the farm manager are represented as column entries in a 
data matrix (Table 1). The resource and logical bounds to activity selection are represented 
as row entries in the same matrix. 
The objective function (1) states that producers maximize the expected return to land, 
management, and other fixed factors. This is given by the difference between expected 
revenue and expected expenditure. Costs of concentrates purchased are separated from costs 
of other factors, because they vary across states of nature. Expected revenue from the 
selling of meat is separated from other revenues from animal production activities for the 
same reason. Those costs and revenues are weighted in the objective function by the 
probabilities of occurrence of each state of nature. 
Equation (2) defines the land uses (Table 1). Land is disaggregated by soil types, 
defining units of utilization. Each equation shows land requirements of different crop 
production activities. 
Equations (3) to (5) stand for the use of machinery, labour for crop activities and labour 
for animal activities, for each one of the periods established. These equations define that the 
amount used of each factor, by period, in each production activity times the respective 
activity level, summed over all the activities, must be less than or equal to the factor 
availability that is owned or hired. 
The livestock feed-mix problem for each state of nature is modelled by equations (6) 
through (8). Equation (6) ensures that forage and pasture consumption must be less than or 
equal to what is produced, Sß, in each state of nature. Equation (7) states that total nutrients 
supplied by forage and pasture, Glf, and by concentrates, Gln must meet the minimum 
livestock nutrient requirements of animal production activities, Flp, and of animals for 
selling according to marketing strategies, E,p, in each state of nature. Equation (8) requires 
that total consumption of dry material, per state of nature, given by pasture and forage 
demands, Hf, and by concentrates, Hn cannot exceed maximum livestock intake capacity in 
animal production activities, Ip, and marketing strategies, Jp. There is one set of these 
equations for each state of nature, because livestock feed production and consumption vary 
for different yield outcomes. 
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Equation (9) refers to the adjustments to be made in marketing strategies for selling 
meat, relating animal production activities to marketing strategies through the productivity 
rate of production minus the rate of animals for replacement, Kvp. There is also an equation 
for each state of nature. 
Equations (10) and (13) stand for purchases of concentrates. Equation (10) counts the 
cost of concentrates, Wn in each state of nature. These values are weighted by the 
probabilities of occurrence of each state of nature, in equation (13). This equation is for the 
weighted cost of concentrates. 
Equations (11) and (14) have the same structure as (10) and (13) respectively, but they 
stand for marketing strategies. So, equation (14) gives the expected income from animal 
sales. 
Equation (12) computes the sum of absolute deviations from expected gross margins of 
crop production activities, from expected cost of animal concentrates and expected income 
from animal sales for each state of nature. If this sum is positive, Yt takes a zero value, 
which is guaranteed by non-negativity constraints and by the parametric constraint (15). If 
this sum is negative, Yt takes an equal positive value to ensure that equation (12) is 
satisfied. This equation allows the respective gross margin to be found for each state of 
nature. Since the objective function value is the expected gross margin, it is enough to sum 
it algebraically to the deviation given by this equation to obtain the gross margin for each 
state of nature. 
Finally, equation (15) sums weighted negative deviations across states of nature, weights 
being the respective probabilities of occurrence. The parametrization of this sum from zero 
to A max, allows the trade-off between expected income and risk to be analysed. 
3 Application of the model 
The model was applied to a farm located in the south of Portugal in the clay land of Baixo 
Alentejo that is suitable for intensive grain crops. The total area of the farm is 566 ha, 
about 35% of which is clay. In this region farmers traditionally apply long crop rotations 
based on cereals. 
The data used were available from a farm survey done in 1991/92, just before the CAP 
reform. These data referred to resource availability, technical coefficients, and farmer 
objectives. Other data such as on product and factor prices, soil and alternative activities, 
were obtained from official statistics, experts and farmers. 
Crop activities in the model are cereals for grain (common wheat, durum wheat, 
triticale, barley and oats), protein crops (chickpeas, peas and broad beans), forage 
(oats*vicia, oats*lupines) and pastures (fallow, subterranean clover and fertilized fallow). 
Animal activities are different production technologies and marketing strategies for cattle 
and sheep. For these types of animals, the production activities are distinguished by 
different breeding periods, breeds, and crossings used. The livestock unity is defined 
according to the male/female ratio and to the replacement rate of males and females. This 
livestock unity for each production activity is composed of breeding and replacement 
animals. The several marketing strategies for selling meat represent independent activities 
related to the respective production activity through the production rate. The characteristics, 
productivity and feed production variability determine model selection of animal technology 
and marketing strategies. 
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Growing season variation is approximated by 16 states of nature. The criteria for 
classifying seasons assume that rainfall levels for different periods have influence on yield. 
Each state of nature represents a year type, different from one another, depending on the 
rainfall level during the critical periods associated to groups of crops (November-February 
for cereals in good soil and protein crops, October-February for cereals in bad soil, 
September-December and March-May for pastures and forages and March-May for spring 
crops). The probabilities of occurrence of rainfall levels during the critical periods were 
calculated from the monthly rainfall data for the region over the past 30 years (1961-1990). 
The probability of occurrence of each state of nature represents the joint probabilities of 
certain rainfall levels over the critical periods considered. 
To analyse the impact of different levels of risk aversion we parameterized the expected 
total sum of negative deviations, A, from A maximum to 50% of A, and to 10% of A max, 
reflecting increasing levels of risk aversion. Table 2 shows the models representing this 
parametrization and the results. Comparing the results of the three models, we can see that 
the value of the objective function decreases when the risk aversion increases. Results 
suggest that income risk can be considerably reduced with relatively small losses in 
expected income by shifting resource allocation from cash crop production to more 
pastures. Income risk can be reduced up to 50% with relatively small losses in expected 
gross margin. The 50% reduction in expected total negative deviation can be achieved with 
a drop in expected gross margin from 16,653 contos to 13,265.2 contos, representing a 
20.4% drop. For model 3 this trade-off increases. Expected gross margin has to drop 
45.7% for a 90% reduction of income risk. Shadow prices for the risk constraint reflect 
these trade-offs. A reduction of 1 conto in income variability requires an income loss of 
1,629 and 2,442 contos for models 2 and 3 respectively. 
Table 2. Optimal farm plans for different risk aversion levels 
Model 
AI A max 
Expected gross margin (contos) 
Risk shadow price (contos) 
Crop activities (ha): 
Cereals (grain) 
Protein crops 
Hay 
Pasture 
Animal activities (head): 
Bovines 
Ovines 
Cost and income: 
Weighted cost of concentrates (contos) 
Weighted income from animal sales (contos) 
1 
1.0 
16653.0 
0 
209.2 
48.3 
5.2 
303.3 
136 
1153 
7216.1 
20862.4 
2 
0.5 
13265.2 
1.629 
184.0 
48.3 
3.3 
330.4 
103 
1120 
8308.7 
18340.3 
3 
0.1 
9052.6 
2.442 
177.5 
48.3 
1.7 
338.5 
82 
1124 
10608.3 
16282.2 
1 conto « 5 ECUs 
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In model 2 income risk is reduced by decreasing the area for cash crops and increasing 
the area for intermediate products. Animal activities and the increase in the area of pasture 
reduce the drop in expected income when risk aversion level increases. 
Although there is a relatively large variability of gross margin, gross margin is negative 
in none of the states of nature. This is due to the diversity of the agricultural system. The 
largest negative deviation was obtained for the state of nature 16. This corresponds to an 
unfavourable year for all groups of crop production. However, animal activities that are 
responsible for the smoothing of the negative deviations are only possible with a great 
consumption of concentrates (Table 3). This is due to the type of soil of this farm. About 
35 % of the total area is good soil for cereal production, so animal production has to be a 
more intensive activity because cereal production yields less food for animals. 
Table 3. Cost of concentrates and income from animals by selling meat (model 1) 
State of nature Cost of concentrates (contos) Income from animals (contos) 
1 3372.0 24654.1 
7 4022.8 24654.1 
10 5617.1 18512.5 
16 12204.0 18512.5 
1 conto » 5 ECUs 
As far as buying concentrates is concerned, this takes place in all states of nature. The 
quantity of concentrates depends upon the state of nature and on the marketing strategies for 
selling meat. 
The differences in the requirements of concentrates are related not only to the yield of 
the intermediate products, but also to the type of animals that are more profitable in each 
state of nature (Tables 3 and 4). In states of nature 1 and 7 (favourable to the production of 
pasture) additional costs for the purchases of concentrates are compensated for by the 
production of heavier animals, namely male bovines of 18 months old. These additional 
costs are no longer compensate for in states of nature 10 and 16 (unfavourable to pasture 
production), where the marketing strategy chosen changes to male bovines of 9 months old. 
When comparing the cost of concentrates and income from animals for the same states of 
nature (Table 3), we can see that animal income decreases from states of nature 1 to 16. 
This is due to the substitution of heavier animals for less heavy animals, and to the need for 
more feed to compensate for less yield of intermediate products. 
The analysis of the optimal farm plans for different levels of risk aversion showed that 
the expected farm gross margin decreases when risk aversion increases, and cash crops are 
replaced by intermediate products. 
We have assumed that the farmer deals with seasonal variation through changes in 
livestock management, adjustmenting either the livestock feed-mix or the marketing 
strategies for selling meat. The optimal number of animals is defined by the model, and it 
depends on availability of intermediate products, prices of concentrates and on the gross 
margins of the animal production technologies considered. 
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Table 4. Marketing strategies for selling meat (model 1) (heads) 
State of nature 
Marketing strategies 
Bovines 9 months (May) 
Bovines 9 months (Jan.) 
Bovines 18 months (Feb.) 
Bovines 18 months (Oct.) 
Lambs 4 months (Jan.) 
Lambs 3 months (Apr.) 
Lambs 4 months (May) 
1 
-
-
22 
71 
66 
507 
322 
7 
-
-
22 
71 
66 
523 
306 
10 
22 
71 
-
-
66 
523 
306 
16 
22 
71 
-
-
66 
523 
306 
Animal stocking rate is defined, by the model, for states of nature favourable to the 
production of pastures and forage. This can be seen, because all the farm intermediate 
products are consumed in all states of nature, making the costs with concentrates higher in 
the states of nature unfavourable to the production of feeds. 
The farmer must decide to sell animals at low live weight in the states of nature 
unfavourable to the production of intermediate products. 
As long as risk aversion level increases, animal activities become more intensive, in 
order to diminish negative deviations from expected income. So, we can say that animal 
activities contribute to decreasing negative deviations from expected income, thus are less 
risky activities. 
The measures of the CAP reform of 1992, being direct payments to the producers of 
certain activities, are independent of the yields, so they work like a buffer for farm income. 
After simulating the situation forecasted for the 2000/2001 agricultural year where we 
assumed that EU prices are very close to world agricultural prices, the standard deviation of 
the expected gross margin decreases from 846 contos (before 1992) to 440 contos. 
4 Conclusions 
In building a model that captures the interdependencies among animal and crop production 
systems and the effects of rainfall variability on production, the characterization of typical 
years, that is, states of nature must be considered. The states of nature allow taking into 
account, simultaneously, favourable and unfavourable conditions for groups of crops, that 
is, a state of nature can be favourable to a crop or group of crops and not favourable to 
another crop or group of crops. 
We would have liked to consider more than 16 states of nature, but this would be very 
difficult for several reasons. First of all, the data for the definition of a great number of 
states of nature are very difficult to find because there has not been sufficient field research. 
On the other hand, the DSP matrix grows exponentially with the increase in the number of 
states of nature. This involves making a difficult trade-off between the expense of a larger 
and more complex model, and the benefit of greater accuracy. By increasing the size and 
complexity of the model, we increased the costs not only in terms of human and computer 
time, but also of the difficulties in understanding the model and to making it easy to use. 
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Although considering only 16 states of nature, our DSP model allows for adjustments in 
the animal feed-mix and in marketing strategies for selling meat, and led us to optimal 
solutions close to the real world. 
The MOTAD framework used to transfer the risks considered at the constraints level to 
the objective function permitted the trade-off among risk and expected gross margin to be 
analysed. 
The model flexibility can be increased, and the model can be used for other situations, by 
disaggregation of the gross margin, that is, by considering revenues on the one hand, and 
costs on the other. 
DSP proved to be appropriate for modelling sequential decisions in farming. In the 
present situation the sequential decisions considered to be relevant were animal feed-mix 
and marketing strategies for selling meat. The major difficulty of this approach was the 
large number of data needed and the matrix size. A non-linear format would have been too 
difficult given the huge size of the model. The MOTAD framework used to transfer all the 
risks in the constraint set fitted well to DSP and allowed farm plans at different risk levels 
to be analysed. 
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INCORPORATING AVERSION TO INTER-YEAR VARIATION OF 
EXPECTED UTILITY IN DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODELS 
J.O.S. Kennedy 
School of Economics, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia 
Summary 
Gilboa (1989) has argued that the use of an additively-separable utility function does not allow 
for aversion to, or preference for, variation in annual expected utility. The ordering of the 
expected utility stream may matter. To allow for this, with a modification of Savage's sure-
thing principle, Gilboa suggests an additive multi-year utility function which includes terms 
for weighted absolute change in expected utility between years. 
This paper demonstrates the incorporation of the Gilboa-type multi-year objective function 
into a stochastic dynamic programming model for a simple example problem in which a 
decision must be made whether to crop or leave fallow land at the beginning of each year, 
given knowledge of soil moisture. Soil moisture at the beginning of each year is a stochastic 
function of soil moisture at the beginning of the previous year and the previous year's 
cropping decision. The sensitivity of infinite-stage optimal policies to changes in the risk-
aversion coefficient and in the weighting on the absolute change in expected utility between 
years is tested. 
A method of eliciting aversion to risk and variation in returns is proposed. 
1 Introduction 
If the decision maker faces a sequence of risky decisions and is risk averse, what type of 
criterion function should be used for evaluating alternative decision sequences? If capital and 
insurance markets are imperfect, the decision maker may not be able to avoid bearing risk. A 
multi-period utility function U{I{J2,-..JT} allowing for risk aversion is required, where /, is 
income received in period t. Eliciting a multi-period utility function allowing for interaction 
between income received in different periods is a difficult assignment. It is much simpler to 
assume an additively-separable utility function, allowing for utility discounting at rate r, of the 
form: 
U{li,h,-,Ir}=I.(l+ry1u{ll} (1) 
where «{/,} is utility in period t. 
Appealing to the expected utility theorem, if income is stochastic, utility is: 
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where V{i} is the present value of following the optimal cropping policy across all future 
years given that current soil moisture is at the î'-th level; h = 2(i-l)+k; ij = 1.....5; k = 
1,2; and h = 1,...,10 (see Table 1). Because the return function a{h} and the transition 
probabilities Ptk are independent of year number, the problem is stationary and the same 
function V{} appears on both sides of the equation without a year subscript. General purpose 
routines were used to obtain solutions to this and subsequent problems (Kennedy, 1986). For 
the rate for discounting money returns (r') equal to 6% per year, it is optimal to leave the 
land fallow if soil moisture is the lowest of the five possible values, and to plant wheat 
otherwise. 
Table 1. Consequences of crop decisions by soil moisture state . 
Soil moisture Crop State transition probabilities 
state decision 
i (acre inches) k Pnk Pi2k Pi3k Pi4k Pi5k 
Expected 
income 
h ($/acre) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(0-2) 
(2-4) 
(4-6) 
(6-8) 
(>8) 
1 Fallow 0.050 0.250 0.350 0.350 
2 Wheat 0.391 0.304 0.304 
1 Fallow 0.050 0.250 0.700 
2 Wheat 0.391 0.304 0.304 
1 Fallow 0.050 0.950 
2 Wheat 0.391 0.304 0.304 
1 Fallow 
2 Wheat 0.391 0.304 0.304 
1 Fallow 
2 Wheat 0.391 0.304 0.304 
1.000 
1.000 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
-2.33 
4.52 
-2.33 
32.07 
-2.33 
36.26 
-2.33 
36.78 
-2.33 
47.63 
based on Burt and Allison (1963), Table 1 
To solve the DP problem allowing for variation aversion, an additional state variable is 
required. The variable at any stage must represent the stage return obtained at the previous 
stage. The additional state variable may substantially increase the computing load in obtaining 
a solution. For example, in the Burt and Allison problem, the potential number of values of 
previous-stage return is the product of the number of soil moisture levels (5) and the number 
of cropping decisions (2). Thus the number of combinations of discrete levels of the state 
variables to describe the system fully at any stage increases from 5 to (5x5x2) or 50. The 
recursive DP functional equation is: 
V{i,g} = max[a{h}-y(\a{h}-a{g}\) + {l + r)-l'Z,pl-V{i,h}] (8) 
where V{i,g} is now the present value of following the optimal cropping policy across all 
future years given that current soil moisture is at the i-th level and the previous return is at the 
g-th level, and pis the variation-aversion parameter (>0). 
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The objective function incorporated in (8) is a normalized version of (3) with p,= 1 for all 
t, and 8, = -y for t>\. To meet restrictions (4) to (6), the maximum value of y is 
(l+r)/(2 + r). In the current application, r=0.06, which implies a maximum value of /equal 
to 0.515. 
For larger problems, to avoid onerous computation, it would be worth using some 
approximation method. For example, the previous-stage return might be represented by a 
limited number of possible values, and V{} values of the system for intermediate values of 
previous-stage return, required in the DP solution procedure, determined by linear 
interpolation. However, it can be deduced from the structure of the problem shown in Table 1 
that the total number of possible combinations of current soil moisture level and previous-
stage return is only 19. The problem was therefore solved with total enumeration of all state 
values. 
4 Results 
The optimal crop policy and long-run state probabilities for the original Burt and Allison 
problem are shown in Panel 2a of Table 2 for all 19 accessible state combinations of current-
stage moisture content, and previous-stage soil moisture and crop decision, which determines 
the stage return of the previous stage. These can be compared with results if the variation-
aversion parameter y in equation (8) is set at 0.3016. Wheat is selected for all state 
combinations except 1,5/W (wheat is selected for state 1,5/W for y > 0.3016). This policy 
keeps soil moisture confined to the lowest three levels in perpetuity. 
Experiments were also conducted with utility instead of dollar returns, using an expo-
power utility function (Saha et al., 1994): 
!/{ƒ} = 0-exp(- /? / a ) (9) 
Some results are shown in Panels 3a to 3c of Table 3. The parameter 6 was set at 2, 
arbitrarily. The utility discount rate is 6% a year. For lack of information on the probability 
density function for wheat yield, returns are in terms of utility for expected income instead of 
expected utility for income. The expected return from fallow was raised from -$2.33 to $30 
per acre in order to increase the sensitivity of the cropping decision to the level of risk 
aversion, and so should be regarded as a set-aside payment in these runs. 
Panels 3a and 3b show results for a = 1.0 and ß = 0.001, consistent with constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). The effect of 
increasing the variation-aversion coefficient y from 0.2 (Panel 3a) to 0.4 (Panel 3b) is to 
increase the number of states for which the optimal decision is to plant wheat. Comparing 
results for Panel 3b with those for Panel 3c, a reduction in a from 1.0 to 0.5 (which changes 
the utility function from representing constant absolute risk aversion to decreasing absolute 
risk aversion, and also reduces absolute risk aversion) results in wheat instead of fallow being 
recommended for high current soil moisture levels following a fallow decision at the previous 
stage. Thus there is the perhaps unexpected suggestion that a reduction in absolute risk 
aversion can lead to the same type of change in policy as an increase in variation aversion. 
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Table 2. Optimal infinite-stage crop decisions and long-run probabilities by state combination 
for(l) maxI[£(/ , )-7 |£(/ , )- /•(ƒ,_,)!] ; and 
(2) expected income from fallow = -$2.33/acre 
Panel 2a. y = 0 (No aversion to year-to-year variation in expected income) 
Current Last (soil moisture / crop decision) 
soil moist. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(l-5)/F 
Wheat 
0.014 
Wheat 
0.070 
Wheat 
0.099 
Wheat 
0.099 
1/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
2/W 
Fallow 
0.091 
Wheat 
0.071 
Wheat 
0.071 
3/W 
Fallow 
0.113 
Wheat 
0.088 
Wheat 
0.088 
4/W 
Fallow 
0.039 
Wheat 
0.030 
Wheat 
0.030 
5/W 
Fallow 
0.039 
Wheat 
0.030 
Wheat 
0.030 
Panel 2b. y = 0.3016 (Aversion to year-to-year variation in expected income) 
Current Last (soil moisture / crop decision) 
soil moist. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(l-5)/F 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
1/W 
Wheat 
0.154 
Wheat 
0.119 
Wheat 
0.119 
2/W 
Wheat 
0.119 
Wheat 
0.092 
Wheat 
0.092 
3/W 
Wheat 
0.119 
Wheat 
0.092 
Wheat 
0.092 
4/W 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
5/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
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Table 3. Optimal infinite-stage crop decisions and long-run probabilities by state combination 
for(l) max I [£/(£(ƒ,))-y|î /(£(/ ,))-^(£(//-i)) |] ; and 
(2) expected income from fallow = $30/acre 
Panel 3a. Stage return parameters: a=1.0, /2=0.001 (CARA, IRRA); 7=0.2 (var, aversion) 
Current Last (soil moisture / crop decision) 
soil moist. 
~ 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(l-5)/F 
Fallow 
0.010 
Fallow 
0.056 
Fallow 
0.109 
Wheat 
0.339 
1/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
2/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
3/W 
Fallow 
0.058 
Fallow 
0.045 
Wheat 
0.045 
4/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
5/W 
Fallow 
0.133 
Fallow 
0.103 
Wheat 
0.103 
Panel 3b. Stage return parameters: a=1.0, /?=0.001 (CARA, IRRA); /=0.4 (var. aversion) 
Current Last (soil moisture / crop decision) 
soil moist. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(l-5)/F 
Fallow 
0.012 
Fallow 
0.060 
Fallow 
0.089 
Wheat 
0.237 
1/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
2/W 
Fallow 
0.072 
Wheat 
0.056 
Wheat 
0.056 
3/W 
Fallow 
0.072 
Wheat 
0.056 
Wheat 
0.056 
4/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
5/W 
Fallow 
0.093 
Wheat 
0.072 
Wheat 
0.072 
Panel 3c. Stage return parameters: a=0.5, /?=0.001 (DARA, IRRA); /=0.4 (Var. aversion) 
Current Last (soil moisture / crop decision) 
soil moist. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(l-5)/F 
Fallow 
0.014 
Wheat 
0.070 
Wheat 
0.101 
Wheat 
0.107 
1/W 
Fallow 
0.000 
Fallow 
0.000 
Wheat 
0.000 
2/W 
Fallow 
0.084 
Wheat 
0.066 
Wheat 
0.066 
3/W 
Fallow 
0.112 
Wheat 
0.087 
Wheat 
0.087 
4/W 
Fallow 
0.040 
Wheat 
0.031 
Wheat 
0.031 
5/W 
Fallow 
0.042 
Wheat 
0.033 
Wheat 
0.033 
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5 Eliciting variation aversion 
For the criterion functions used in the example problem to be useful in aiding decision making 
in practice, it is necessary to be able to estimate four criterion parameters for the decision 
maker, namely: a and /?, the parameters of the single-period utility function; y, the variation-
aversion parameter; and r, the utility rate of discount. It would be desirable to avoid lengthy 
interviewing procedures. One possibility would be to use contingent ranking or rating 
methods which have been used to estimate the value of non-market goods from the analysis of 
individuals' rankings or ratings of alternative sets of levels of criterion variables (see 
Mackenzie, 1993). Thus the decision maker might be asked to rank alternatives such as 
($400, $400, $100, $100), ($100, $400, $400, $100), and ($500, $400, $300, $200), each 
alternative representing a sequence of returns at the beginning of successive years. For any 
postulated criterion function, for a sufficiently large number of alternatives presented, 
maximum likelihood methods could be used to estimate the parameters. 
6 Conclusions 
Gilboa has pointed out one reason why the use of additively-separable multi-year criterion 
functions may be unsatisfactory for multi-year decision making. Individuals may have 
preferences for different orderings of a set of elements, and in particular may be averse to 
variation in returns from one period to the next. Empirical information on individuals' relative 
strengths of risk aversion, variation aversion, and utility discounting is needed. As the results 
of the example problem indicate, optimal policies may be quite different, depending on 
whether the decision maker is modelled as risk averse or variation averse. 
A judgement is required as to whether an axiomatic approach to the formulation of 
criterion functions is necessary. If a nonaxiomatic approach is taken, the range of criterion 
functions is much larger. For example, to allow for aversion to variation in period-to-period 
returns, the criterion function might be charged with squared rather than absolute values of 
changes in return. Markowitz (1959, p. 246) gives the example of: 
£/{•} = log I, + 0.9 log ƒ2 + 0.8 log /3 - 0.5 log[max(l, ƒ, / ƒ2)] - 0.45 log[max(l, /2 / ƒ3)] (10) 
By incorporating an additional state variable, it is straightforward to adopt criterion 
functions in DP models that allow for preferences in period-to-period changes in return. 
Markowitz (1959, Ch. 13) commented that in trying to solve a DP problem with criterion 
function (10), 'we pass from the realm of uneconomical to the realm of currently infeasible 
problems'. Fortunately, increased computing power makes this less of a concern today. 
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Summary 
This paper describes a model in which a farmer has to decide on optimal investments with a 
time horizon. The price is assumed to follow a binomial process. At each time step there is a 
probability for the price either to increase or to decrease. Also the adjustment costs of 
investments are assumed to be stochastic following a specific right-skewed distribution. At 
each time step the expected value of adjustment costs is calculated. 
1 Introduction 
This paper was prepared within the Nordic Risk Program, in which the Danish project 
focuses on dynamic models in agriculture. 
The aim of the paper was to show how to introduce randomness into a standard economic 
model. I emphasize that the numerical data in the model presented in this paper do not 
resemble real data. 
2 The model 
The production function of the farm is a Cobb-Douglas function. The output, Y„ depends on 
capital, K„ and labour, L„ i.e.,: 
Y, = Kl Ü, (1) 
The value of the output minus labour costs is maximized with respect to labour and 
represented by a function psi, if/„ which is then a function of the state variable, K„ the 
stochastic output price, P, , and the wage level, W, (Hsu and Chang, 1990; Blanchard and 
Fisher, 1989). 
Vt {Kt ,P,,W,) = max [P, {KÎ Lb,) - W, L,] (2) 
L, ao 
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This equation is strictly concave in L, when Q<b<\ and the first-order condition 
determines a unique optimal level for labour. Substituting this level of labour for Lt in the yt 
function yields: 
Vl(Ki,P,,W,) = PlKï[}^K7a-bj -W'lj-Kaj) (3) 
The farm obtains price, P, , per output unit sold on the market. The initial price is given 
and all future prices are uncertain. The output price follows a stochastic process known as 
Brownian motion with drift: 
dP = adt + a-idt
 £, (4) 
where a is the drift parameter and a the standard deviation, dt is the time step and e, is a 
normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In 
work by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) it is shown that Brownian motion can be reached in the 
limit from a binomial method where the price is taken in grid points (cf. Figure 1) with a step 
of 
AP = 0-VÄ7 (5) 
At each stage there will be a probability of p for the price to increase by AP and a probability 
of q = (l-p) for the price to decrease by AP. The probability is given by: 
/> = ! 
2 
\
 + ^4dt 
a 
(6) 
The possible combinations of prices at each stage within a time horizon of five periods are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
The price level will change over a period according to the drift. The wage level is 
deterministic and it is assumed to increase by a percentage equal to the drift of the Brownian 
motion in the output price. 
Government guaranteed minimum prices can easily be introduced into the model by letting: 
P* = max(pmin,/>,) (7) 
where Pt is a price in the diagram shown in Figure 1, Pmin is the minimum price and P* is the 
effective price. 
Assuming that the investments /, at time t become productive in the current period and 
ignoring capital depreciation, capital accumulation is given by: 
K, = K,-i + I, (8) 
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' I M E 
q3 q 4 p q 3p 2 q-'p3 qp" 
Figure 1. Possible price evolutions of the binomial method with a time horizon of five 
periods. At each time step the price will either decrease by probability q or increase 
by/7 
In reality an expansion process may be difficult to manage and control. Considerations on 
planning the adjustment process are discussed in work by Lund et al. (1995). 
The adjustment costs amount to a fixed proportion of the level of investments. Thus, the 
distribution of the adjustment costs is independent of the level of investment. The costs of 
adjustment are also independent of the investment levels at different stages, i.e., it does not 
matter whether investments were made in the previous period or not. The possible outcomes 
of the adjustment costs in proportion to the investment levels and the corresponding 
probabilities of occurrence are represented by the vectors rAc and pAc, respectively. The 
probabilities should form a right-skewed distribution of the costs of adjustment due to the fact 
that these costs generally seem to be underestimated. The expected adjustment cost proportion 
of investments is: 
Ac= "ZpAc, rAc, (9) 
where n is the number of discrete adjustment cost proportions, i.e., the dimension of rAc and 
the corresponding probabilities pAc. The deterministic equivalent of the adjustment costs 
specified here is a linear adjustment cost function. If investments were free in each period 
they would be clustered in the first period only so as to reach the optimal capital level 
immediately (Hsu and Chang, 1990). 
A realistic case may be that adjustment costs connected with investments in one period 
could also be transmitted to succeeding periods. This could be allowed for by defining 
transition probabilities from the state in the current period given the decision of the investment 
level to a state in the following period. 
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The profit function nt of the farm can now be defined by the maximized output with respect 
to labour, i.e., the function y/t from (3) subtracted by the expected total costs of investments. 
These costs consist of the expenditures of investment, Pk, /„ where Pk, is the price of one 
investment unit and the expected adjustment costs, Pk, Ac I,. 
7r,(K,,P,,W,,I,) = yl(K,,P,,W,)-PklIl- Pk.AcI, (10) 
For a farm it is of interest to maximize future profits, nt, discounted by the interest rate, r„ 
choosing optimal investments in each period, i.e., an optimal path of investments. The control 
variable is the decision of how much to invest. The investment decision only affects future 
levels of the state variable capital. The control problem is: 
(11) max E 
U..K,) 
' T 
_'=i 
subject to 
K, = K,_{ + I, 
I, e m 
K,>0 
K0, PQ 
(r„ Wt),._ = 1 T 
(K, P, 
~ 
,W,,I<)(\ + r<y' 
V t=\,...,T 
vi=i , . . ,r 
Vf=i , . . . , r 
given 
given 
At the beginning of the time horizon all variables are given. It corresponds to the origin of 
the stochastic tree in Figure 1. All decisions are planned with respect to this point in time. 
The first decision is planned at time t = 1. If investments are made, total capital costs 
increase as well as the capital level itself. An increased capital level increases the output of the 
farm. The profit also depends on the outcome of the stochastic price. The next decision is 
taken at time t = 2. In Figure 1 five time steps are shown where decisions have to be taken. 
The last one is at time T = 5. There is no scrap value at the end of the time horizon. 
A method called scenario aggregation is applied (Kail and Wallace, 1994). It allows 
accepted risk levels to be introduced. Investments in each period are assumed to be made in 
discrete portions. All possible combinations of investments are examined and each 
combination is called an investment alternative in the following. For each alternative annual 
profits for all prices at all times are calculated. To each possible price evolution path in the 
price/time diagram (cf. Figure 1 with 32 paths) a total sum of profits and a probability for this 
path to be realized are attached. For each investment alternative all possible profit outcomes 
are ordered by size together with the probability for that outcome. In Figure 2 a cumulative 
distribution function of all the possible profit outcomes for an investment alternative is shown. 
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PROFITS 
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution function of an investment alternative 
The figure makes it possible to evaluate risk at the farm level. Given an investment 
alternative, the value at an x percentile gives the information that the profit will be higher than 
that level with a probability of l-x. A risk-averse farmer may want to have a large probability, 
say 90%, for the profit to be higher than a given profit level. Then it can be read from the 
10% percentile whether the profit level meets the criterion. It is also possible to maximize the 
profits at an x percentile. This resembles a maximin strategy, where it is preferred that the 
worst thing that can happen is minimized (Hillier and Lieberman, 1990). 
3 Experiments 
Model data 
The model parameters have not been estimated from real data, so the following experiments 
must be seen as model tests rather than realistic, empirical results. 
To obtain a numerical solution requires a specification of a discrete decision variable. The 
investment level at each time step is specified to belong to the following set of possible 
decision levels, I, e{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. With five time steps the enumeration method has 65 
investment alternatives to be calculated. The structure of the computer code is shown in 
Appendix 1. 
The following model parameters are used: 
1. the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas function: a and b are 0.2 and 0.5, respectively, 
2. the initial price, p0 , is 10, 
3. the initial wage level, WQ , is 1, 
4. the initial capital level, KQ , is: 100, 
5. the drift parameter in the price, a, is specified in the text, 
6. the variance parameter of the price a is also specified in the text, 
7. the adjustment cost probability vector, pAc, is: (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1), 
8. the adjustment cost proportions vector, rAc, is: (0.005, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.10), 
9. the interest rate is assumed to be constant equal to 0.1 in each period, and 
10. the price of capital per unit is Pk, = Pk = 2. 
Below some model experiments are performed. The purpose is to check whether the 
induced changes in the optimal level of investments correspond with a priori expectations. 
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Sensitivity to the drift in the price 
In Figure 3 consequences for the decision of investments are shown when the drift in the 
price, the parameter a, changes from 0 to 1.0 by steps of 0.1. The drift parameter is the 
absolute increase in price, on average, at the next time step. It follows from equation (6) that 
a positive drift parameter yields a larger probability for a price increase than for a price 
decrease at the next time step. A drift parameter equal to zero gives equal probabilities for a 
price increase and a price decrease, i.e., constant or naive expectations. 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
LU 
y 0.6 a. 
z0.5 
to.4 
a. 
°0.3 -
0.2 -
0.1 -
0.0 -
Invest 
3 1 
Stop Investing 
2 3 t 
Tl ME 
Figure 3. Investment pattern as a function of the drift parameter a 
It appears from Figure 3 that investments continue for a longer period when there is an 
upward drift in output price over time. This is in agreement with what could be expected. 
Sensitivity to the standard deviation of the price 
Increases in the standard deviation parameter alone have no influence on the optimization 
result as long as the behaviour towards risk is neutral. The reason is that, on average, the 
output price still increases according to the drift in the output price. From equation (6) it can 
be seen that an increase in the standard deviation yields a larger probability for the price to 
decrease and a lower for the price to increase. However, the step size of the output price 
increases, too (cf. equation 5). 
Sensitivity to the standard deviation and the minimum price 
Introducing a state guaranteed minimum price for the farmer may, however, make the optimal 
investment dependent on variance. Increasing the standard deviation parameter yields more 
widespread prices. If the prices are secured a lower limit as a minimum price, the effective 
prices are asymmetric with a chance of greater upward returns. In Figure 4 it can be seen that 
the greater the standard deviation parameter, the more investments will take place. 
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Figure 4. Investment pattern as a function of the standard 
deviation parameter with a minimum price 
Changes in the capital level 
Investments made in the beginning of the period tends to yield the most in return. Thus, the 
advantage of the dynamic model compared with a static model is apparent here. Even if initial 
capital is increased by the amounts of investments from the first two or three time steps, new 
investments will be made in these periods anyway. However, if initial capital increases above 
a certain level, no investments will be made at any time step due to the non-linearity of the 
profit function, i.e., marginal returns of the Cobb-Douglas type of production function 
decrease with increasing capital given the parameter specification above, indicating decreasing 
returns to scale in the production function (cf. equation 1). At some level of capital, the 
marginal returns will not exceed the expenses of investments. 
The nonlinearity of the profit function also shows up when all possible investments are 
multiplied by a factor. Multiplying the set of possibilities by 2, i.e., I, e {0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} 
causes the drift in the price to be increased from 0.5, (cf. Figure 3), to 0.7 before investments 
are made at the third time step. 
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1 Introduction 
Agricultural production is typically a risky business. Farmers face a variety of price, yield 
and resource risks that make their incomes unstable and unpredictable from year to year 
(e.g., Anderson, 1979). In many cases, farmers are also confronted by the risk of 
catastrophe. For example, crops may be totally destroyed by hurricane, fire, drought, pests 
or diseases, and product prices may plummet because of adjustments in world markets. 
The type and severity of the risks confronting farmers vary with the farming system and 
with the climatological, policy and institutional setting. Nevertheless, agricultural risks 
seem to be prevalent throughout the world. They are particularly burdensome to small-scale 
farmers in less developed countries (LDCs). There is also strong evidence that farmers are 
universally risk averse (e.g., Binswanger, 1980) and that they seek to avoid risk through 
various risk-management and risk-sharing institutional mechanisms. 
The incidence of risk and risk-averse behaviour in farming is perceived to be important 
to policymakers for a number of reasons. First, fluctuations in farm incomes, particularly 
the risk of catastrophic loss, may present difficult welfare problems for farmers. There are 
also important spillover effects on other rural households. Destroyed crops reduce 
employment opportunities for the landless, and a lower output also reduces sales by 
agricultural merchants and agroprocessors. Reduced farm incomes have negative multiplier 
effects on income and employment for many rural nonfarm businesses and towns (e.g., 
Powell and Mandeville, 1978). 
Second, exposure to severe risks increases the likelihood that farmers will default on 
loans, particularly in years of natural catastrophe. The performance and long-term viability 
of rural banks can be severely impaired by poor loan collection, particularly if many 
farmers default at the same time because of a shared catastrophe. 
Third, farmers' efforts to avoid risks through on-farm management practices tend to 
reduce the average returns to their resources. This not only reduces average farm incomes, 
with immediate welfare ramifications, but also leads to smaller supplies of the 'riskier' 
agricultural commodities. If these are important food or export crops, curtailment of their 
production can affect consumers' welfare directly, as well as reducing foreign-exchange 
earnings. It also leads to a lower national income and to reduced long-term productive 
investments in agriculture. 
Fourth, because of the time required for agricultural production, most farm inputs have 
to be allocated well before yields and product prices can be known. Farmers must allocate 
resources each year on the basis of their expectations about yields and prices. If these 
expectations are wrong, their resource allocations will be less than 'optimal.' Such errors 
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may be costly to national income. Typically they are costly to farmers, when judged by 
comparing their average incomes with the incomes that could be achieved given more 
perfect foresight. 
Fifth, yield variability leads to unstable supplies of agricultural commodities. The 
problem is accentuated as farmers adjust input use and the area they sow to different crops 
from year to year in response to changing expectations about uncertain prices and yields. 
Instability in national food production tends to increase domestic price variability, 
presenting food-security problems for the poor and increasing uncertainty for farmers. 
Instability in export-crop production leads to more volatile foreign-exchange earnings, 
which can destabilize the national economy. 
Given these concerns, it is hardly surprising that governments around the world have 
intervened in order to try to help farmers and consumers cope more efficiently with risk. In 
this paper we review the conditions under which government interventions can be justified, 
and seek to evaluate the experience with the more popular risk-oriented policy 
interventions. A conclusion that governments should focus more on creating enabling 
conditions for private-sector solutions to risk management, and that risk should not be a 
major factor in setting agricultural policies will not surprise readers. 
2 Risk and market failure 
In the sort of ideal world conceived by economists, a full range of costless contingency 
markets would exist that enable economic agents to neutralize risks. In such a world, 
resources would be allocated in agriculture as if risk did not matter, and all individuals 
would be able to smooth their consumption over time, regardless of income and price 
fluctuations. 
In reality, an array of risk-spreading mechanisms exists, but these are neither costless 
nor as widely available as is seemingly desired. A key question is the extent to which there 
is market failure: how inadequate are the risk-management options already available, and 
how costly is this failure to social welfare? The answers to these questions provide a basis 
for evaluating the need for government intervention. 
From the farmers' perspective, risk can reduce welfare in several important ways. It can 
lead to a reduction in average productivity (and hence average income) because of 
forecasting errors that lead farmers to use resources sub-optimally, in part because they 
may need to adopt on-farm risk-reduction strategies (e.g., crop diversification) that are less 
productive on average than are strategies that can ignore risk per se. Farmers may also be 
concerned about their ability to repay loans, and their ability to meet family food and living 
expenses in catastrophic years. 
Risk-sharing institutions are widely available in more developed countries (MDCs) to 
help farmers overcome these risk problems. Farmers can borrow for production or 
consumption purposes to ease the transition from bad years to good. In many cases, they 
have access to a variety of privately provided insurance against specific types of risks, and 
they can trade in commodity futures and options markets. In LDCs these kinds of 
institutions are usually much more rudimentary, and may not be available at all for small-
scale farmers. Nevertheless, a wide range of informal risk-sharing arrangements has 
evolved. These include share tenancy contracts, traditional moneylending, and risk sharing 
within extended family networks. A major limitation to these arrangements is that the 
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participants tend to come from the same region, or even the same village, and hence often 
face much the same risks. The arrangements, therefore, do not pool risks as efficiently as 
they would if they spanned regions or broader sectors of the national economy, as do 
nationwide crop-insurance or credit schemes. 
Consumers also have options for managing fluctuations in food prices. In addition to 
substituting different foods in their diet, they can smooth consumption through use of credit 
and food storage. Food storage will be undertaken commercially in response to demand 
where governments do not undermine storage incentives through poorly designed price-
stabilization interventions. 
How effective are farmers and consumers in managing risk, and how high are the social 
costs that remain? The available empirical evidence is too patchy to provide definitive 
answers. Estimated welfare losses (measured as the sum of producer and consumer 
surpluses) arising from risk-averse behaviour can be quite large at the sectoral level, e.g., 
5-10 per cent in a model of irrigated agriculture in Mexico (Hazell and Scandizzo, 1977) 
and even larger for some types of individual farms, as noted elsewhere in this conference. 
But these estimates, often based on mathematical programming models, typically ignore 
risk-sharing strategies that farmers use other than crop diversification, and hence are 
undoubtedly biased upwards. 
The welfare losses arising from forecast errors will be minimal and probably small if all 
farmers held 'rational' price expectations (Muth, 1961; Kantor, 1979; Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981; Williams and Wright, 1991). But they can be much larger if farmers hold 
more naive forecasts, such as single-year lagged prices, particularly if yield risks are also 
large (Scandizzo, Hazell and Anderson, 1984). The literature on attempts to assess whether 
farmers do indeed hold rational price expectations is growing but is still rather slender 
(e.g., Fisher, 1982; Helmberger, Weaver and Haygood, 1982; Eckstein, 1984; Ravallion, 
1985). Scandizzo, Hazell and Anderson (1984) provided evidence that farmers in western 
industrial countries tend to use revenue expectations (the rational expectation in the model 
used), whereas farmers in LDCs and centrally-planned economies do not. Recent studies 
find increasingly optimistic results about farmers' ability to forecast probabilistically (Holt 
and Johnson, 1989; Pluske and Fraser, 1995), perhaps reflecting accumulating experience 
as well as more relevant education. 
Market failures seem to be most evident when catastrophic events, such as droughts, 
occur, largely because of the 'covariation problem.' This is claimed to be a major reason 
for default on bank loans, even in some MDCs such as the USA, though it is often difficult 
to determine whether loan defaults are really driven more by an inability to pay, or by the 
expectation that governments, under political pressure, will provide debt 'relief' (too often 
'forgiveness') in drought years (Anderson and Dillon, 1988). 
Price instability does not appear to be a serious problem for consumers in countries 
where food expenditure is only a small share of household income. This is even true of 
some less developed countries such as Costa Rica (Hazell and Stewart, 1993). More serious 
problems arise in low-income countries, and with poor people more generally, where 
options for managing high food prices are much more limited (Sahn and Von Braun, 1989). 
Despite the lack of adequate quantitative assessments of the costs of market failures in 
risk management, and hence of the potential benefits from public interventions, 
governments around the world have implemented various forms of risk-management 
policies. We turn now to an assessment of experience with these interventions. 
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3 Experience with public risk-management policies 
Given the diversity of their nature, and their proliferation over time and geopolitical 
boundaries, the experience of risk-intervention policies is, unsurprisingly, diverse and 
varied. Much of the focus of the profession of agricultural economics has been on dealing 
with the inherent instability in the sector, especially following the US-oriented writings of 
Nobelized Schultz (1945) and unNobelized Heady (1952). Our resources do not permit a 
comprehensive examination of this rich tapestry of experience, fortunately for us well 
reviewed by authors such as Fackler (1988) and Rausser (1988), so the generalizations we 
present here represent our quick and partial synthesis of some cogent studies in the field. 
Investment in public goods 
Public investments aimed at risk reduction in farming have been considerable, although not 
always intended only or explicitly for this purpose. Irrigation investments are one such case 
in point, where the explicit intention has been to boost the productivity of the land and 
water resources involved, along with increased rural employment and greater food self-
reliance. Indeed, such investment formed the core of the Green Revolution in South Asia 
and elsewhere in the 1960s. An important associated benefit, however, was the considerable 
reduction in the inherent variability of the local agroecosystem because of the less direct 
reliance on local rainfall amount and timing relative to the crop-growing seasons (Pandey, 
1989). 
Analogous risk-reduction effects arose from plant breeding targeted at such attributes as 
resistance to pests and diseases and to abiotic stresses associated with such natural 
phenomena as droughts and floods (Anderson, 1991). To the extent that such work has been 
concentrated on self-pollinating crops such as rice and wheat, these risk-reduction benefits 
(along with the corresponding productivity gains) are classic public goods for which 
investment via public research agencies has been the necessary source of invention. As 
Anderson and Hazell (1994) have argued, this process has not been uniformly successful in 
spite of some notable achievements, and constitutes a continuing need. Filling the need 
faces contemporary risks because of the crisis in funding of public R&D, in countries rich 
and poor. The private sector surely has a role to play in providing at least some of these 
needed agricultural services, and indeed is already doing so in crops that lend themselves to 
efficient production of hybrids, such as of maize, where the property rights surrounding the 
more productive germplasm can be protected at low cost. 
Price stabilization 
Price stabilization is the major 'traditional' intervention in the agricultural sector. Various 
mechanisms have been used to pursue such stabilization objectives, with varying degrees of 
success and many failures. Price supports, buffer stocks, variable tariffs and the like have 
been among the most popular instruments (Quiggin and Anderson, 1979). Theoretical 
justification of the concept of stabilization has been long-standing in development and 
detailed in rationalization {e.g., Wright, 1979; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Quiggin and 
Anderson, 1981). An important frequent finding, however, is the relatively small 
magnitudes of welfare gains that are possible (Anderson et ai, 1981; Myers and Oehmke, 
1988; Wright, 1988). The practical implementation of stabilization schemes raises many 
thorny problems to be overcome by program administrators (Anderson, Hazell and 
Scandizzo, 1977; Scandizzo, Hazell and Anderson, 1984). These include the difficult-to-
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assess supply responsiveness to induced stability (Just, 1974; 1975; Griffiths and Anderson, 
1978). Life would be so much simpler if storage was indeed costless! But it is not, as 
extensive experience in the European Union commodity mountains and lakes and, say, the 
Australian wool stockpile attests. 
The improved understanding of the economics of storage, including the complex effects 
of different rules on the behaviour of the various agents involved, came somewhat later in 
the theoretical and empirical developments but, now that it is so well synthesized by Wright 
(1988) and Williams and Wright (1991), there is less excuse for the public blunderings into 
ill-conceived schemes such as have littered the past. One concerned agency, the World 
Bank is now reluctant to support commodity stabilization ventures in its borrowing 
countries, a considerable departure from past practice (Braverman et ai, 1992). Among the 
important reasons for discouraging such activities is the tendency for political forces to 
intrude into the management of schemes virtuously put in place, and to modify the rules 
{e.g., concerning parameters such as trigger prices) in ways that benefit particular groups 
and inevitably bankrupt the scheme itself, or cause it to be such a drain on the public purse 
that it becomes impossible to sustain (Gilbert, 1995, 1996). 
Crop insurance 
Crop insurance is provided by the public sector in both MDCs and LDCs. The impetus for 
such programs often originates in governmental concern about catastrophic risks such as 
drought, or the desire to reduce the incidence of loan defaults to banks. 
With few exceptions, the financial performance of public crop insurers has been ruinous 
(Hazell, 1992). To be financially viable without government subsidies, an insurer needs to 
keep the average value of its annual outgoings—indemnities plus administration costs— 
below the average value of the premiums it collects from farmers. In practice, many of the 
larger insurance programs pay out $2.50 or more for every dollar of premium they collect 
from farmers. The difference is paid by governments, at costs varying from $10 to $400 
per insured hectare. Even at these levels of subsidy, many farmers are still reluctant to 
purchase insurance. As such, many crop-insurance programs are compulsory, either for all 
farmers growing specified crops (e.g., Japan), or for those who borrow from agricultural 
banks (e.g., Mexico). 
The primary reason for the high cost of public crop-insurance schemes is that they 
invariably attempt to insure risks that are prone to severe moral hazard problems (Hazell, 
1995a). These risks include many climate, disease and pest risks that are difficult to 
quantify and assess, and whose damage can be influenced by farmers' management 
practices. The problem is aggravated by a common practice of insuring 'target' yields 
rather than compensating for actual losses. But this is not the only reason for failure! 
Another overwhelming factor is the incentive problem that arises once the government 
establishes a pattern of guaranteeing the financial viability of an insurer. If the insurance 
staff know that any losses will automatically be covered by government, they have little 
incentive to pursue sound insurance practices when setting premiums and assessing losses. 
In fact, they will find it profitable to collude with farmers in filing exaggerated or falsified 
claims. 
Yet another common reason for failure has been that governments undermine public 
insurers for political reasons. In Mexico, the total indemnities paid has borne a strong 
statistical relationship with the electoral cycle, increasing sharply immediately before and 
during election years, and falling off thereafter. In the USA, the government has repeatedly 
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undermined the national crop insurer (FCIC) by providing direct assistance to producers in 
disaster areas. Why should farmers purchase crop insurance against major calamities 
(including drought) if they know that farm lobbies can usually apply the necessary political 
pressure to obtain direct assistance for them in times of need at no financial cost? 
Another reason for their high cost is that crop insurers tend to be too specialized, 
focusing on specific crops, regions and types of farmers, particularly when the insurance is 
tied to credit programs designed to serve particular target groups identified by the 
government. Without a well-diversified insurance portfolio, crop insurers are susceptible to 
covariability problems, and face the prospect of sizable losses in some years. Since public 
insurers are rarely able to obtain commercial reinsurance or contingent loan arrangements, 
this specialization increases their dependence on the government. 
Public crop insurers also tend to have high administration costs. This is partly because 
they often insure small-scale farmers, but also because crop-insurance work is very 
seasonal, and the absence of a well-diversified portfolio means that staff and field 
equipment are underemployed for significant parts of the year. 
There is no convincing evidence that public subsidization of crop insurance has been 
socially beneficial. Indeed, social benefit-cost analyses of the Mexican and Japanese 
schemes show negligible social returns in relation to their high costs (Bassoco et al., 1986; 
Tsujii, 1986). Nor is there much evidence that it has increased agricultural lending or 
benefited agricultural banks. In a rare study, Pomareda (1984) compared the performance 
of insured and uninsured loans in the portfolio of the Agricultural Development Bank 
(BDA) of Panama. Insured loans had slightly higher and more stable returns than uninsured 
loans. They were also repaid and cleared from the books closer to their expected duration. 
But the overall gains to the Bank were modest, and could have been achieved more easily at 
no cost to the government simply by allowing a 2% increase in the interest rate that BDA 
charged its borrowers. This would also have been cheaper for the borrowers than the 
premium rates they paid for the compulsory insurance. 
Private crop insurance is growing in some countries, and annual premiums worldwide 
are thought to exceed $1 billion per year (Gudger, 1991). The drawback is that private 
insurance is almost exclusively confined to specific perils for large-scale commercial farms 
growing high-value crops, and it is not likely to become a major factor for the larger 
population of farmers. 
Disaster relief 
Disaster relief policy, or sometimes the lack of it, represents a significant opportunity for 
public intervention. There has been a tendency for emotion and public outcry to drive a 
process that leads governments to intervene in ways that, with the wisdom of hindsight, are 
demonstrably ineffective and distorting of individual incentives to better plan for what in 
many situations are inevitable occasional seasonal outcomes. Such planning would naturally 
include selective purchase of insurance contracts, as discussed above. We need to remind 
ourselves from time to time that the world is typically risky, and the extent of resultant 
costs can be considerable. Witness the average annual damage cost of natural disasters in 
California of $2b for the past five years (according to a late-1995 announcement from the 
Governor's office). 
The hallmark of a good policy is one that swings into action as needed, without requiring 
(or even allowing) political grandstanding, and yet provides no dis-incentives for affected 
producers to do the best that individually they can to plan for and manage their own 
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natural-disaster (e.g., drought) experiences as they unfold. Australia, for instance, at last 
has such a system now in place (DPRTF, 1990), after a long history of regrettable 
interventions in fodder and livestock markets under the rubric of assisting producers in their 
drought management. 
General and credit instruments for risk intervention 
Other mechanisms are available to governments intent on easing the pain of dealing with 
risk in various parts of the economic system. In an economy where the income-tax system 
functions well, schemes may be put in place that enable taxpayers, including farmers, to 
manage their post-tax income streams in a manner that causes them less financial hardship 
and presumably boosts enterprise efficiency in the face of variable fortunes in productivity 
and markets. Where some groups contribute little to taxation revenues, as may be the case 
with many farming communities, there are obvious limitations to such instruments as risk-
management mechanisms. The idea of having mechanisms that are neutral across sectors of 
the economy is, however, virtuous. 
One potential such mechanism is the credit market. Credit, as noted above, serves as a 
useful, largely self-managed instrument in MDCs, but is not so straightforward in LDCs, 
where most agricultural lending is tied to farm inputs and must be repaid at the end of the 
season, even if it is a bad one. Consumption credit to smooth consumption across years is 
rarely available from the formal sector in LDCs. 
Rural financial markets have proved more effective in servicing the needs of commercial 
farms than subsistence-oriented farms, many of which are hardly viable borrowers and are 
relatively costly to serve, as well as facing high production and default risks. Many 
governments thus established publicly owned agricultural development banks (ADBs) to 
provide targeted and subsidized loans to the small-farm sector. The high costs and 
miserable performance of such ADBs in the 1970s and 1980s led to much effort at reform. 
The key elements have involved liberalization of financial markets and encouragement of 
private-sector lending of various levels of formality. 
Formal banking institutions, particularly those in LDCs lending to agriculture, face 
considerable risk in identifying 'problem borrowers' who have little intention of repayment. 
Amongst their own resource-management approaches they typically diversify across sectors 
and regions, maintain financial reserves, establish contingent loan arrangements with other 
banks, and build up personal relationships with their clients. In times of stress they will 
work with a borrower to develop a rescue plan of roll-overs, interest rate adjustments, and 
so on around the agreed collateral. But such flexibility is seldom encountered in the ADBs, 
which are thus correspondingly vulnerable (Hazell, 1995b). One hope for progress was 
agricultural credit insurance, but this too has met the fate of most crop insurance programs 
(Pomerada, 1984; Hazell, 1995b) and attention has now shifted to the possibility of loan 
guarantee schemes. There is little evidence yet to suggest that these help banks much, or 
that they increase the volume of lending to agriculture in general and to small-scale farms in 
particular, but they may still prove to be effective. 
4 Uncertainty and policy-making 
Thus far, our attention has been concentrated on policy-making to reduce risk and 
uncertainty in the rural sector. There is, however, an inverse set of considerations that are 
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deserving of comment. This is the creation of additional risk within the rural sector as a 
result of policy interventions that have uncertain outcomes, or which are subject to frequent 
and unpredictable political changes in their design and implementation (MacLaren, 1980; 
Gardner et al., 1984). 
The current attempt by many countries to reform domestic policies within the context of 
the recent GATT trade agreement is a case in point (Von Witzke, 1987). Despite valuable 
work that has been done on the effects of trade liberalization by analysts such as Anderson 
and Blackhurst (1992), the consequences for world agricultural market prices remain 
uncertain, both in terms of their means and in variability. For example, while more open 
agricultural trade between countries should have a risk-pooling effect that reduces world 
price variability, this may be more than offset by price spikes stemming from reductions in 
global food stocks that are themselves the result of the reductions in domestic price 
supports. Moreover, as governments in many countries manoeuvre to balance their 
commitments to the GATT Agreement with domestic political interests of farmers and 
consumers, they are likely to adjust and modify policies during the transition in 
unpredictable ways that add to the overall level of uncertainty. 
An intriguing feature of policy-induced risk is that some governments are now 
contemplating additional public risk-management policies to help farmers cope with it. For 
example, the USA has recently been contemplating an income insurance scheme that would 
protect farmers against all sources of income risk, including price changes induced by 
government policies (Tweeten et al., 1994). Given the unfortunate experience with public 
crop insurance in the US that has focused only on biological and climatic risks, income 
insurance, if enacted, is likely to elevate the concept of 'farming the government' to heights 
hitherto unimagined! 
One emerging agricultural field that is riddled with uncertainties is 'the environment' 
(Anderson and Porceddu, 1995). The complexities that befuddle this topic are profound, 
and range from the biological, through the physical and chemical, to the social and 
economic (Walker and Gardner, 1992; NSCGP, 1995). The phenomena of potential 
concern are also diverse, and include, for instance, agricultural contributions to the 
Enhanced Greenhouse Effect, pollution of soils through inappropriate use of agricultural 
chemicals or ill-managed intensive animal production, or even plain old anthropogenic (as 
opposed to geological) soil erosion (Anderson and Thampapillai, 1990). It is the uncertain 
policy response to such matters as governments translate their international agreements and 
commitments into domestic policy and new requirements for farmers that will contribute to 
new uncertainties for the sector. 
5 Conclusion 
Risk is reality. No one obliges farmers to stay in farming. Farmers everywhere know that 
farming is a risky business. The farm sector is probably no more risky than other sectors 
dominated by a preponderance of small-scale business operators. Combining these few 
sentiments raises fundamental questions about the tendency for governments to mess around 
with farmers' risk management in the name of 'helpful' policy interventions (Tweeten, 
1995). 
Our canvassing of the rationale for and experience with various instruments that purport 
to modify the risk environment faced by farmers has led us to a rather sceptical position 
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about the virtue of most forms of intervention. Have we been too harsh in our assessment? 
Is there a systemic bias in the profession of agricultural economics that has led to the 
proliferation of misguided interventions? Is professional rent-seeking to blame? We are not 
sure, but such questions seem legitimate ones to ponder in this conference, and we hope we 
have provided some fuel for the fire. 
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RISK RESPONSE OF FARMERS TO CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
E. Berg 
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany 
Summary 
The paper addresses the questions as to how the reform of the European agricultural policy 
influences the risk of farming and how decision makers respond to the new situation. A 
stochastic production function approach is used to analyse the risk associated with various 
levels of production intensity and to investigate the influence of different attitudes towards risk 
on the optimal input use in an expected value-variance framework. The results indicate that 
uncertainty about input effectiveness generally influences the optimal input level. Risk 
aversion as the most common assumption normally induces higher input levels and smaller 
adjustments to declining output prices than expected for the certainty case. Finally, it is shown 
that under conditions of risk aversion direct payments to farmers need not fully compensate 
for the loss of expected income to maintain their well-being, measured in terms of their 
certainty equivalent income. 
1 Introduction 
The progress in plant breeding and production methods during the past decades have led to a 
continuous growth in crop yields as well as in the level of fertilizer and pesticide inputs. 
Besides increasing yield levels the increasing production intensity has also improved the 
stability of crop yields. The latter means that high input production has generally decreased 
the risk associated with the variability of yields. This development was reinforced by 
relatively high product prices due to the past system of the common agricultural policy of the 
European Union (hereafter CAP). After the CAP reform of 1992 the economic conditions 
have changed considerably. Grain prices have reduced stepwise and farmers receive direct 
payments as a partial compensation for income losses induced by the policy reform. The 
decrease in output prices calls for a reduction in input levels, which in turn is likely to 
destabilize yields, thereby increasing the risk of production. The fact that the overall 
economic situation for most arable farms has worsened further adds to the financial risk of the 
farming business. On the other hand, direct payments provide a risk-free income to the 
farmer. 
The paper addresses the interdependencies between these components and analyses the 
aggregate effects on farmers' risk and response to the new situation. A stochastic production 
function approach is used to analyse the risk associated with various levels of production 
intensity and to investigate the influence of different attitudes towards risk on the optimal 
input use in an expected value-variance framework. A numerical example that relates to the 
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production of winter wheat is used to provide insights into the orders of magnitude of the risk 
effects. 
2 Production function approach 
The analysis of optimal input and output levels in crop production is often based upon yield 
response functions reflecting the law of diminishing returns. While many empirical studies 
employ production functions ofthat nature (e.g., Schulte, 1984; Weinschenck and Gebhardt, 
1985; Krayl et al., 1990) this approach seems hardly consistent with the fact that the 
composition of yield is chemically fixed and the components must be supplied as growth 
factors. The latter indicates the existence of linear input-output relationships. These are also 
implied in tables that are commonly used for practical planning of fertilizer application. Such 
tables normally contain constant coefficients for nutrient uptake per unit of yield (e.g., 
Heyland, 1991, p. 222). 
The assumption of linearity is in accordance with Liebig's well-known principle of the 
minimum factor that imposes an upper limit on the achievable output level. Some authors 
therefore suggest that linear response functions be used, which they have found suitable for 
representing crop response to nutrients in homogeneous settings of soil and climate conditions 
(Grimm et ai, 1987; Paris and Knapp, 1989; Bäumer, 1994; Wagner, 1995). 
The apparent contradiction between Liebig's minimum principle and the law of diminishing 
returns can be resolved if one considers the variability of growing conditions and the 
imperfect knowledge about them. Kuhlmann (1992) has shown this for the case of genetic 
variability within a plant population. This paper focuses on the variability and the stochastic 
nature of climate conditions. 
Liebig's principle can be represented by a linear production function (Leontief production 
function) of the form: 
y=AfJ^A,..A) (1) 
U , a2 a,, J 
where y denotes the output, xt (i = l,2,..,n) is the level of the Z-th input and the a, (Z=l,2,..,n) 
are constant production coefficients, representing the necessary input of the respective factor 
per unit of output. This formulation states that the total product amounts to the smallest ratio 
within the brackets and that the subscript associated with this ratio marks the minimum factor 
which limits the output. The*, includes controllable as well as non-controllable inputs. 
Assuming that nitrogen is the relevant controllable input, the above relationship can be 
represented as given in Figure 1. The yield level increases linearly with the available 
nitrogen, where the total amount of nutrient is composed of the fertilizer nitrogen plus the 
nitrogen supply from the soil. The latter marks the intersection of the production function 
with the ordinate. The total production is constrained by the availability of other growth 
factors (e.g., temperature, solar radiation, water, pest damage, etc.). One of those represents 
the minimum factor, if sufficient nutrients are supplied. 
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N supply from soil mineral fertilizer N 
Figure 1. Linear production function with random variations 
In this setting the production function denotes the situation of a particular year with a given 
weather pattern. At the moment decisions have to be made, this pattern is unknown so the 
maximum achievable yield as well as the nitrogen mineralization from the soil must be 
regarded as uncertain parameters. Thus the system is stochastic in nature and can be 
formulated as follows: 
y = a l(x + s) ioxy<ymax and y •• otherwise (2) 
with 
N{ym <>°\„„ and N\ s,°A 
The parameters y^ (maximum yield) and s (nitrogen supply from the soil) are assumed to 
be uncorrelated random variables that are normally distributed with the given means and 
standard deviations. In reality one would certainly expect these variables to be correlated, 
since they basically depend on the same climatic factors. We abstract from this for simplicity 
reasons and because no information on the direction and magnitude of a possible correlation is 
available. 
Based on these assumptions, stochastic simulation, which is often referred to as Monte 
Carlo simulation (Berg and Kuhlmann, 1993, p. 240), can be used to study the yield response 
to varying nitrogen inputs. The model parameters were taken from the literature and represent 
the production function for winter wheat under relatively favourable soil and climate 
conditions. The expected yield potential is set at 85 dt/ha and the nitrogen uptake {i.e., 
parameter a) amounts to 2.5 kg/dt of yield. According to the literature the annual nitrogen 
supply from the soil can reach up to 150 kg/ha (Heyland, 1991, p. 165). We therefore assume 
a mean of 75 kg/ha and a standard deviation of 35 kg/ha. Analyses of farm data report 
standard deviations of grain yields between 9 and 12% of the respective means (cf. Reitmayr, 
1995, p. 69). From this we derive a standard deviation for the maximum yield of 10 dt/ha. 
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Figure 2. Simulated average production function and 95-percent interval (2000 random 
simulation runs; smoothed values) 
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The simulation results in terms of the average yield response and the interval that covers 
95% of the cases are given in Figure 2. The upper graph depicts the response resulting from 
the parameters above. The average production function exhibits decreasing marginal returns. 
The range of possible yields first decreases with increasing nitrogen input and expands later 
on. The remaining diagrams demonstrate the impact of the variability of the nitrogen supply 
from the soil and the yield potential respectively. A high variability of nitrogen supply from 
the soil results in a large variance of yields at low fertilizer levels and a significant reduction 
of the yield variance at higher input levels and vice versa. The variability of the yield 
potential, in turn, limits the possibility of reducing the yield variance through fertilizer 
application. The higher the variability of the yield potential, the earlier the variance of yields 
starts to increase with increasing nitrogen input. In sum, we can conclude that increasing 
fertilizer levels in a particular range are able to reduce the variance of yields. The extent to 
which this occurs mainly depends on the variability of nitrogen supply from the soil, relative 
to the variability of the yield potential due to other growth factors. 
The remainder of the analysis is based on the means and variances of the yield associated 
with different levels of fertilizer input. The respective response functions are depicted in 
Figure 3. The markers represent the results as obtained from the stochastic simulation model. 
Regression analysis is then used to fit third-degree polynomials to the simulation results. The 
estimated equations are also given in Figure 3. These functions are used for further analysis. 
The yield response function exhibits diminishing marginal returns in the relevant range of 
inputs and has its maximum at an input level of 217 kg N/ha. The maximum achievable 
expected yield amounts to 85.4 dt/ha. The minimum variance input is 199 kg N/ha, which 
results in a yield variance of 94 (dt/ha) or a standard deviation of 9.7 dt/ha. 
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Figure 3. Mean and variance of yield as functions of nitrogen input 
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3 Analysis of risk response 
A common approach to comparing risky choices is by means of expected value-variance 
analysis (EV analysis). EV sets describe a risk-efficient frontier, from which the expected 
utility maximizing choice can be found. Robison and Barry (1987) have worked out the 
conditions under which the EV approach yields results consistent with the more general 
expected utility models. Furthermore they emphasize the strength of the EV model as a 
deductive tool. Particularly the latter made it the favourable approach for our analysis too. 
This analysis heavily draws on Robison and Barry's work. 
Expected value-variance framework 
In our case the EV set is built by varying levels of fertilizer application that result in different 
combinations of expected profit E(y) and its variance c?(y) according to the respective 
functions outlined earlier in this paper. Curve A in Figure 4 represents an EV set of this 
nature. Starting at low fertilizer levels one moves from left to right on the EV curve which 
results in a reduction of variance accompanied by an increase of the expected profit until the 
maximum is reached at point MP. Further increase of nitrogen input still reduces the variance 
of profits but likewise causes a reduction of the expected return. The minimum variance 
solution is represented by point MV. Risk-efficient choices occur between points MP and MV. 
A risk-neutral decision maker would choose the expected profit maximizing solution 
MP. A risk-averse decision maker, however, would be willing to trade expected returns for 
a smaller variance. His/her optimal choice is where the slope of the EV curve equals the 
slope of the iso-expected utility line EUiy). In Figure 4 this choice is marked as point OC. 
It yields the expected return E(y{) with variance er,2'. 
E(y) ' 
E(y,) 
E(y2) 
YCE, 
y*cE2 
ycE2 
2
 OC 
EU(y)=k 
• 
/ ^ 
ZS^'ÏV MP 
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° 2
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Figure 4. Expected value-variance framework 
Risk response of farmers 291 
If the linear tangent line at this point is extended towards the ordinate, the intersection 
with the vertical axis yCEl represents a return that has zero variance. This certain return is 
equivalent in terms of expected utility to the risky choice with expected outcome EiyJ and, 
therefore, called the certainty equivalent to the uncertain expected return (Robison and 
Barry, 1987, p . 73). The slope of the tangent, which we refer to as certainty equivalent 
line, relates to the decision maker 's attitude towards risk. By definition the certainty 
equivalent equals the expected return E(y) minus the risk premium n. For the latter Pratt 
has derived the approximate relationship: 
x=
X
-R[E{y)y ( 3 ) 
where R[E(y)] indicates the decision maker's absolute risk aversion measured at the expected 
value (Robison and Barry, 1987, p . 34). Thus the certainty equivalent can be expressed as: 
yCE=E{y)-\R[E{y)V ( 4 ) 
The absolute risk aversion function is defined as R(y) = -U"(y)/U'(y) and can represent 
decreasing (DARA), constant (CARA) or increasing absolute risk aversion (LARA) with 
increasing wealth (cf. Robison and Barry, 1987, p. 31). For CARA equation (4) becomes: 
AY ï À * ( 5 ) 
y CE =E(y)--a 
where A denotes the constant measure of absolute risk aversion. From this we can derive the 
equation for the tangent line in Figure 4 as 
E{y) = yCE+^o1 <6> 
which therefore has the slope A/2. The slope of the certainty equivalent line times the variance 
yields the risk premium. 
To analyse the effects of the European CAP reform on the EV set we first develop an 
algebraic formulation for the mean and variance of returns. Let p be the output price, ct the 
proportional costs of input x and c0 the costs that are independent of input level, then the 
expected return E(y) becomes 
E{y) = pE[f(x)\-c0-clx (7) 
where fix) denotes the yield response function and E[] indicates the expectation operator. The 
variance of returns is given by 
*\y) = pW[f(x)]
 (8) 
since the cost are assumed to be non-stochastic. 
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From the equations above we can see that the price reduction through the CAP reform 
leads to a decrease of expected values as well as the associated variances at all input levels. 
Thus the EV set is shifted downwards and towards the vertical axis. In Figure 4 this 
movement leads to the EV curve marked by the letter B. For decision makers with constant 
absolute risk aversion the new optimal choice is found by shifting the certainty equivalent line 
downwards until it touches the EV curve B. Although the variance is reduced to <J2 the 
certainty equivalent decreases to yCE1. 
As a partial compensation for price reduction, farmers receive a direct payment. Since this 
is a risk-free income, it only adds a constant to the equation for the expected return and 
therefore results in a vertical shift of the EV set. If CARA applies, this only alters the 
expected return while the variance of the optimal choice remains unchanged. If the EV set is 
shifted upwards until it touches the certainty equivalent line yCEU the decision maker's well-
being would be the same as before the reform. Thus there is a unique compensation payment 
yCE2~ycEi trmt would leave the decision makers with the same certainty equivalent income. 
Although the expected return declines from Eiy{) to E(y2) this would not affect their well-
being. 
This, however, is valid only for the case of constant absolute risk aversion. Yet the most 
common assumption is that decision makers display decreasing absolute risk aversion. In our 
case this means that the decline in the expected total income due to the policy reform would 
lead to an increase of absolute risk aversion. In Figure 4 this is indicated by a certainty 
equivalent line with a steeper slope (y*CK). Now the optimal choice would be one with 
smaller variance and the direct payment must be higher to compensate for the change. 
A numerical example 
In the remainder we shall apply the framework above along with the production function 
introduced earlier to get some insight into the orders of magnitude of the risk effects. To find 
the optimal input level we maximize the certainty equivalent for a given degree of absolute 
risk aversion: 
maxyCE = E(y)--a2(y) 
Substituting E(y) and a(y) by equations (7) and (8) yields: 
(9) 
max>>C£ = p E[f(xj\ -c0 - c,x - - p2a2 [ƒ(*)] 
^ (10) 
The first-order condition is 
*f4/MH-f^ ![/M]=» 
or by re-arranging the terms: 
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dx [JK '] p 2 dx L W J (11) 
Omitting the last term on the right-hand side of equation (11) yields the certainty solution 
that also holds for a risk-neutral decision maker. Since the variance decreases at increasing 
levels of x, the derivative of a {fix)] is negative until its minimum is achieved. Thus risk is 
decreasing with x up to the minimum variance input. The result is that uncertainty associated 
with the effectiveness of inputs induces risk-averse decision makers to use these inputs at 
higher levels, as long as the minimum variance input falls above the one that maximizes 
expected returns. This is consistent with the results that Robison and Barry (1987, p. 118) 
have derived for the risk associated with the quality of inputs. 
The functions for the expected yield E\f(x)] and variance (?[fix)] are those derived by 
regression analysis and given in Figure 3 for the example of winter wheat. The output price p 
is 33 DM/dt before the policy reform and 23 DM/dt afterwards. The coefficient cx represents 
all costs that increase with an increasing level of intensity. Besides nitrogen and other 
fertilizers these partly include pesticide and variable machinery costs. The value derived from 
field records is 3.5 DM/kg of nitrogen input. The variable costs that are independent of input 
level c0 amount to 600 DM/ha. The return y then represents the gross margin per ha. Since 
the compensation payment would simply add a constant to equation (10), it has no influence 
on the optimal input level that is only affected by the change of the output price. The direct 
payment is therefore excluded from the analysis. Instead we compute the necessary 
compensation to offset the decline of the certainty equivalent income, as demonstrated in 
Figure 4. 
The results of the analysis are depicted in Table 1. They include the optimal nitrogen 
input, expected gross margin as well as its standard deviation, and the certainty equivalent 
before and after the CAP reform and for different risk attitudes. The upper part of the table 
covers the case of a risk-neutral decision maker (or the certainty case) that serves as a 
reference. The initially optimal nitrogen level amounts to 178 kg/ha yielding an expected 
gross margin of 1527 DM/ha. Through the price reduction induced by the CAP reform the 
optimal input level drops to 160 kg/ha, i.e., by 11.25%, resulting in an expected return of 
703 DM/ha. The necessary compensation would therefore amount to 824 DM/ha. The actual 
direct payment for the region to which the data apply is 616 DM/ha. Thus the farmers face a 
loss of net income, which is true for most locations with relatively favourable natural 
conditions. 
The second section of Table 1 covers the case of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). 
A value was assigned to the risk aversion coefficient Â so the actual payment of 616 DM/ha 
balances the certainty equivalent income. It can be seen that risk aversion causes a higher 
input level in the initial situation. After the CAP reform it decreases from 189 kg/ha to 176 
kg/ha, i.e., by 6.9%. Thus the input reduction is less than computed for the certainty case. 
The initial gross margin amounts to 1522 DM/ha resulting in a certainty equivalent of 
1095 DM/ha. After the CAP reform the certainty equivalent drops to 479 DM/ha so the 
required compensation equals the actual direct payment. With risk aversion, therefore, the 
necessary payments to maintain farmers' well-being need not fully compensate for the loss of 
expected returns. 
In most instances one will have to assume that the absolute risk aversion decreases with 
increasing wealth (DARA). This case implies that the absolute risk aversion A increases after 
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the CAP reform due to the reduction of total expected income. This situation is represented in 
the third section of Table 1. Compared with the CARA solution it results in a smaller 
reduction of input level while the necessary payment to offset the loss of certainty equivalent 
income increases. The opposite is true if I ARA applies, which can yet be regarded as a rarely 
observed risk response. 
Table 1 Results of the expected value-variance analysis 
Nitrogen Gross margin 
input £(y) o(y) 
kg N/ha DM/ha DM/ha 
Certainty 
equivalent 
DM/ha 
risk indifference (A = 0) 
Initial situation 
After CAP reform 
Required compensation 
178 1527 327 
160 703 239 
824 
1527 
703 
824 
constant absolute risk aversion (A= 0.00826) 
Initial situation 
After CAP reform 
Required compensation 
Initial situation 
After CAP reform 
Required compensation 
Initial situation 
After CAP reform 
Required compensation 
189 1522 322 
176 695 229 
827 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (A= 0.00826 
189 1522 322 
182 687 226 
835 
increasing absolute risk aversion (À= 0.00826 
189 1522 322 
172 699 235 
823 
1095 
479 
616 
-> 0.015) 
1095 
305 
790 
-> 0.005) 
1095 
565 
530 
E(y) = expected value of gross margin; o(y) = standard deviation of gross margin 
4 Conclusions 
We can draw the following conclusions from the analysis: Uncertainty about the effectiveness 
of inputs generally influences the optimal input level unless decision makers are risk neutral, 
which is rarely the case. The most common assumption of risk aversion causes higher input 
levels than expected if certainty or risk indifference is proposed, as long as the minimum 
variance input is above the input that maximizes expected returns. In this instance the input 
reduction caused by a decline of output prices is smaller than derived from certainty models. 
This holds if constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion applies, where the latter increases 
the effect. For the case of the CAP reform this means that its influence on the intensity of 
production will most likely be smaller than commonly expected. If CARA applies, the input 
reduction is, ceteris paribus, independent of the amount of direct payments to the farmers. 
Finally, we have shown that under conditions of risk aversion the direct payments need not 
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fully compensate for the loss of expected income to maintain the decision maker's well-being, 
measured in terms of their certainty equivalent income. 
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Summary 
A model of land allocation with government program participation is presented in the 
context of a mean-variance framework. It is used to show the impact of planting flexibility 
provisions, base acreage, farm returns and risk aversion behaviour on crop selection 
decisions. An empirical application of the land allocation model shows that revenue 
assurance provides a higher certainty equivalent for farmers while involving a much lesser 
cost to the government than price support based policies. 
1 Introduction 
Agricultural commodity programs have attracted considerable attention among agricultural 
economists in the United States because a large proportion of the farm population benefits 
from income support and because participation seems to offer an opportunity to increase 
and stabilize revenues. Indications are that major changes to traditional farm programs will 
be considered in the comprehensive farm legislation Congress passes every five years. 
Commodity programs and deficiency payments, which have been the cornerstone of 
agricultural policy legislation, will be re-evaluated in terms of their efficiency, equity, 
environmental benefits, and fiscal burden. Several policy options have been suggested as an 
alternative to the current programs. These options fall into two general categories: risk 
management programs and flex acreage policies. Risk management policy options are being 
considered to address the major criticisms about the existing system of commodity 
programs and deficiency payments. A popular alternative is the revenue assurance program. 
Revenue assurance is expected to have a potential for reducing federal expenditures while 
creating a safety net for producers. Such a program has the potential to reduce the influence 
of government policy on farmers' land allocation and crop mix decisions. Flex acreage 
policies are another alternative suggested. This option targets mainly the expansion of the 
mandatory flex acreage to a higher percentage. This increase will give producers greater 
flexibility in cropping decisions, but it will reduce the acreage eligible for deficiency 
payments. 
This paper attempts to contribute to the policy debate on farm policy legislation by 
analysing the issue of land allocation under price support and income stabilization schemes 
in a mean-variance framework. The model is used to show the impact of planting flexibility 
provisions, base acreage, farm returns and risk aversion behaviour on crop selection 
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decisions. The availability of commodity programs presents farmers with a typical portfolio 
selection problem with a mixture of risky activities with different expected returns and risk 
levels. The difference between the standard portfolio selection model used in the finance 
literature and the agricultural setting is that farmers have a choice in participating in 
commodity programs. In a portfolio selection context, there are several questions to be 
addressed: How is optimal land allocation affected by policy parameters such as base 
acreage, planting flexibility and acreage reduction requirements? How are land allocation 
and participation decisions affected by risk preferences? These questions are not only 
academic issues. They represent concerns for both sides involved in agricultural policy: 
lawmakers and the government on the one hand and farmers on the other. Changing key 
features in agricultural policy affects aggregate supply and prices through changes in land 
allocation decisions made at the farm level. A better understanding of the determinants and 
the magnitude of output changes is a necessary condition for better aggregate supply 
forecasts. This paper provides some answers to the questions raised above, based on a land 
allocation model with random returns in a mean-variance framework. 
Mean-variance and mean-standard deviation models have been extensively used in the 
agricultural economics literature to analyse land allocation decisions of risk-averse 
individuals (e.g., Adams et al., 1980; Featherstone and Moss, 1990; Perry et al., 1989; 
Chien and Leatham, 1994; Marra and Carlson, 1990). While providing very interesting 
insights into crop-mix decisions under alternative agricultural and environmental policies, 
these studies do not give possible explanations to observed behaviour in regions having 
different commodity programs participation levels. The model presented in section 2 is 
flexible enough to accommodate the analysis of a wide range of policy options being 
considered in drafting farm legislation in the United States. The main emphasis will be on 
determining the impact of acreage reduction requirements and planting flexibility on optimal 
land allocation. 
2 The model 
A generic model of producer behaviour under risk that can be used to determine the 
behavioural implications of alternative commodity policies is to consider land allocation a 
portfolio problem with 'no short-selling' allowed and no risk-free rate. The analysis is made 
assuming that the size of a given farm is one acre, which can be allocated to two crops. 
Suppose the government, in an effort to (1) manage supplies of agricultural production, (2) 
stabilize farm income, and (3) allow enough flexibility in farming decisions, offers a 
program based on a target price, planting flexibility provisions and set-aside requirements. 
We model how a farmer producing, for instance, corn, and soybeans, might respond to 
price stabilization with or without an acreage control provision in the following way. Let R 
be the random returns from crop production: 
R=brc + (\-b)(\-G-a)rP + (\-b)Grs (1) 
E{rc) = r; E(rp) = r + d; E(7s) = rs (2) 
Modelling land allocation 299 
where rc is the random market returns from corn production on the non-base acres, rs the 
random market returns from soybeans, rp the random returns from the program crop (corn 
in this case), d a program participation mean shifter, G the percentage of land allocated to 
the flex crop, b the percentage of non-program land and a the Acreage Reduction Program 
(ARP) rate. The farmer receives rc on a portion b of the land not enrolled in the program. 
The extreme cases b=0 and b=\ refer to no participation and full participation 
respectively. If 0<b< 1, the farmer receives rp on (l-b) (l-G-a) representing the portion 
of his/her base planted to the program crop and finally rs on the flex acres (l-b) G. We 
assume in this first setting that the flex rate is 100%, meaning that the farmer can plant any 
crop (s)he wants on the base acreage. The way participation is modelled here is that price 
support for the program crop shifts the mean returns by a factor d originated by the price 
truncation from the existence of either a target price, a loan rate or both. The variance of 
returns under participation is also assumed to be different from the market returns variance. 
The farmer has to decide how much land is to be allocated to (1) non-participation crop, (2) 
program crop and (3) flex crop. Assuming an E-V type of model that is supposed to yield 
results consistent with the more general Expected Utility models, we now form the certainty 
equivalent expression for a farmer who idles 'a' in exchange for price support translated 
through the shifter d: 
X 
max YCE = ER--VR (3) 
subject to 
b>0 
l-b>0 
G > 0 
1-a-G > 0 
The first and third constraints are non-negativity constraints imposed on land allocation 
representing the equivalent of no short-selling in the standard portfolio model. The second 
and fourth constraints are wealth constraints. Solving for the first-order conditions (FOC) in 
the maximization problem above is difficult, given the way the choice variables enter into 
the objective function. We choose to solve instead for the absolute land allocation by setting 
g = (l-b) G as a choice variable instead of G. Let us now rewrite the previous 
maximization problem as: 
~ X ~ 
max Ya; = ER'--VR' (4) 
subject to 
b>0 
l-b>0 
8>0 
(l-a)(l-b)-g > 0 
where 
R'=b7c + ((l-b)(l-a)-g)(7c + d) + gr> (5) 
The Lagrangian for this constrained optimization problem is: 
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A = r„+ £*,ƒ, (ft, g) (6) 
=i 
The form of this maximization problem, referred to as the Unrestricted Flex Model 
(UFM), when no constraints are imposed on how many soybeans the farmer can plant on 
the flex land leads to several cases depending on which inequality constraint is binding. The 
number of possible solutions is reduced substantially by the fact that some constraints 
cannot be binding at the same time. For instance, we cannot have b=0 and l-b=0 at the 
same time. The focus in this analysis is on the most general case where (i) a portion of the 
land is not included in the program and (ii) both program and flex crop are planted on land 
included. 
The maximization problem as described above assumes a 100% flex rate. However, this 
is not how the current program works. Constraining the flex rate to G<G0 will affect the 
maximization problem presented above. How is the land 'freed' from the constraint 
allocated? The analysis requires solving instead the following optimization problem referred 
to as the Restricted Flex Model (RFM): 
max ER' VR' (7) 
2 
subject to 
b>0 
l-b>0 
g>0 
(1-a) (l-b) -g>0 
(l-b) G0 - g > 0 
This would only add one case to the overall analysis when g = (l-b) G0. How an 
increase in the flex rate would affect land allocation is a question that has been posed in the 
current farm policy debate. Would there be more land allocated to the program crop or to 
the flex crop? Under which conditions will an increase in flex rate lead to an increase in the 
program participation? These questions can indeed be answered through this E-V setting. 
Some comparative statistics for the optimal land allocation solutions are presented next. 
Unrestricted flex model 
In this section we examine the case with no binding constraints and no constraint imposed 
on the flex crop. The optimal solutions (bx for land not included, gl for the flex crop and tl 
for the program crop) for this case are: 
r - O - a)(r + d)- À(l - a)(Scp - (1 - a)Sp) (1 -a)Sp- scp - 0 - a)Sps + scs 
rs-(r + d)-Z(l- a)(Sps - Sp) sp-2 Sps + ss 
bi = 
Var(rc - G - a) 7P) Cov((l -a)7p-7c,7p- 7S) 
Cov((l-a)rp-rc,rp-rs) Var(7p-rs) 
(8) 
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r-(\-a)(r + d)-A(l-a)(Scp-(\-a)Sp) Cov((l-a) 7p-7c,7p-7s) , / m 
g = ô, {y) 
Var(7p-7S) X Var(7p-7S) 
h = ( l - 6 i ) ( l - f l - g , ) (10) 
The determinant in the numerator of bx must be positive for b{ to be an optimal solution 
since the denominator is always positive. We can see that an increase in program 
attractiveness increases program participation for a risk-averse farmer, when the covariance 
of net returns is positive, i.e., 
„ ,,, , „ cb Cov((\-a)rp-rc,rp-rs)-(l-a)Var(rp-rs) . 
Cov((l-a)r,-rc,r,-rP)>0=> — = P- s—— p- <0 
da A D[b] 
(11) 
where D[b] is the denominator in the expression of b. However, an increase in program 
attractiveness will always decrease flex land: 
as (1 - a) + Var{Tc - r D) 
^- = --
 K c
 "<0 (12) 
dd A D[b] 
Restricted flex model 
The case where flex land is restricted to a level G0 is analysed next. The optimal land 
allocation in this case is given by the vector (b2, g2, t2) where: 
r-Gors-(\-a-Go)(r + d)-A((\-a-Gû)scP-0-"-Go)2 sp + Gosa-Gos.,-2GoQ-a-Go)sps) 
bi = 
A Var(rl-(\-a-Go)?p-Gors) 
(13) 
g2 = (1 - bi) Go 
t2 = V-b2)V-'>-Go) 
While the signs of the derivatives with respect to program attractiveness, returns and the 
ARP rate are all as expected, it is not clear what will happen to non-program land if the 
flex rate goes up. This seems to be an empirical issue with the direction depending on the 
values taken by the exogenous variables. Obviously, in the particular case where non-
program land is not responsive to changes in the flex rate, flex land will go up and program 
land will go down by a factor equal to (l-b). Based, however, on the chain rule, we can 
only say that in the case where participation goes down, flex land will go up and program 
land will go down. To provide more insights into land allocation patterns and policy 
parameters, such as the flex rate, an application of the model is presented next. 
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3 An empirical analysis of optimal land allocation for alternative support policies 
Over the years, there have been numerous government policies dealing with the problem of 
price/yield uncertainty and income instability. Recently, there has been some interest in 
designing a new income assurance scheme for agricultural crop producers. It has been 
suggested that such a program could replace the present programs used in supporting 
farmers. Several income assurance schemes have been proposed (Harrington and Doering, 
1993; Iowa Farm Bill Study Team Report, 1993). The empirical application in this paper 
focuses on one type of income assurance, the so-called 'Iowa plan', suggesting that gross 
revenue of crops be insured by the federal government in lieu of the current target/loan 
program. Since gross revenue is determined by both price and yield, an income insurance 
plan designed to stabilize the product of price and yield should reduce the effects of 
uncertainty on resource allocation decisions and access to capital markets. The recent 
interest in income insurance has been stimulated by groups trying to influence the design of 
the 1995 Farm Bill. However, there is limited knowledge of the impact, structure and 
design that a revenue assurance program should have. In this section, we use the E-V model 
of land allocation to evaluate specific support policies currently used or proposed for 
consideration in farm legislation. 
The basic thrust from the models presented in section 2 is that, given random crop 
returns r{ and r2, optimal land allocation Lx for crop 1 is: 
, _ (Er i -Er
 2)~ HCovjruri) ~ ^ M r 2)) 
L\ — (.14) 
À Var(f\-ri) 
where £(•) is the expected value operator, Var(-) is the variance operator and Cov(-) the is 
the covariance operator. This is a generic formulation that can be adapted for any type of 
support policy, whether it is a standard target price policy or a revenue assurance 
alternative. There are two different types of impact generated by these policies within the 
framework of this paper, a net returns effect and a risk effect. Depending on the importance 
of each of these effects, a different land allocation might result. Two important questions 
arise in this context: (1) Which type of policy yields the highest certainty equivalent? (2) 
What is the cost of the price and income support policies to the government? 
A simulation model was developed to generate probability distributions of a 
representative farm revenue function for the following support schemes: (1) the current 
policy with a deficiency payment targeted at a single crop (corn) and an acreage reduction 
feature (10%), (2) a constrained flex policy with constant base acres for corn and a 
flexibility provision with soybean plantings limited to a percentage of base (10%), (3) a 
'decoupling' policy, which assumes that deficiency payments are received independently of 
the crop planted, (4) a free market scenario, where total returns are generated from crop 
sales at the market price, (5) a revenue assurance plan guaranteeing 70% of crop specific 
average gross revenue, (6) a 85% revenue assurance plan and (7) a 90% revenue assurance. 
The policy alternatives presented above differ by the nature of the random variable to be 
stabilized and the key parameters in the design of the policy (e.g., constraints on flexibility 
provision, destination of the deficiency payment, variability of base acreage, etc.). 
Policies were simulated with 1000 sample states of nature. Each state is defined by a 
randomly selected vector of values from a normal distribution of crop prices and yields for 
corn and soybeans (for more details on the simulation approach, see Chaherli, 1995). Table 
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1 shows the percentage of land planted with soybeans, certainty equivalent measures (CEM) 
and government costs for the different options presented above and by degree of risk 
aversion (DRA). Decoupling is a policy that would rank high with farmers. It provides the 
highest level of certainty equivalent. The version of the current program tends to provide a 
slightly lower CEM than revenue assurance at 90% for low DRA levels and slightly higher 
than revenue assurance at 85% for high DRA levels. The performance of the current policy 
is higher than the constrained flex performance because of the diversification effect. At high 
DRA levels, a higher CEM is obtained because farmers are able to switch to as many 
soybeans as they want. 
Table 1. Impact of price and income support policies on soybean acreage, certainty 
equivalent and government cost 
RAC1 
0.0005 
0.0025 
0.0050 
0.0075 
0.0100 
0.0005 
0.0025 
0.0050 
0.0075 
0.0100 
0.0005 
0.0025 
0.0050 
0.0075 
0.0100 
1
 Risk ; 
Price support 
Flex Current Decoupling 
Soybean landholding (%) 
00.0 
00.0 
00.0 
00.5 
10.0 
00.0 
00.0 
00.0 
00.5 
13.1 
Certainty equivalent ($/ac.) 
145.0 
142.0 
138.2 
134.4 
130.9 
Costs ($/ac.) 
39.1 
39.1 
39.1 
38.9 
34.7 
»version coefficient 
145.0 
142.0 
138.2 
134.5 
132.5 
39.1 
39.1 
39.1 
38.9 
34.0 
90.0 
90.0 
83.1 
71.9 
66.3 
157.1 
154.0 
150.3 
147.7 
145.5 
37.7 
37.7 
37.8 
38.0 
38.1 
Market 
scenario 
100 
100 
93.6 
83.5 
78.4 
132.6 
129.0 
124.6 
121.0 
117.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Revenue assurance 
70 
100 
100 
91.9 
81.9 
76.9 
135.0 
131.9 
128.1 
125.1 
122.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.5 
2.7 
2.9 
85% 
100 
100 
94.9 
84.0 
78.6 
141.7 
139.4 
136.6 
134.3 
132.3 
8.8 
8.8 
9.0 
9.6 
9.8 
90% 
100 
100 
96.9 
85.5 
79.8 
145.6 
143.6 
141.2 
139.2 
137.4 
12.6 
12.6 
12.8 
13.4 
13.7 
Costs for income support tend to be close to costs reported in other studies on revenue 
assurance. Policies based on price support provide a higher level of compensation for 
farmers (between $35 and $40 depending on the level of risk aversion). This is to be 
contrasted with revenue assurance at 90% which provides on average a $12 commitment 
from the government. At high levels of risk aversion, the cost of the current target price 
program goes down. This is mainly due to the impact of diversification away from corn and 
into soybeans. The main result from the table is that income support covering between 85% 
and 90% of average income, while providing a similar level of certainty equivalent, 
involves a much lower cost to the government. Other studies on revenue assurance have 
looked solely at mean returns, inferring that the current program would be preferred by 
304 Chaherli 
farmers because of the higher compensation they get. Results in Table 1 point in another 
direction. When risk is incorporated into the picture, revenue assurance is favoured because 
of the much higher risk reduction potential. However, for revenue assurance to be preferred 
by farmers, a higher level of coverage than the 70% level proposed in the 'Iowa Plan' 
should be considered. While decoupling is an attractive policy for farmers, its cost is as 
high as the cost of the current program. Even though a reduction in the target price level 
could lower the cost to the government, farmers may still prefer the alternative proposed to 
the current program. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper tried to shed light on some of the issues related to government policy by 
proposing a modelling framework for decision making on land allocation. In this 
framework, we have looked at the sensitivity of optimal land allocation to changes in 
behavioural and policy parameters, and optimality conditions for resource allocation. 
In this model, the individual farmer faces a decision involving the use of base acreage in 
the short run and program participation in the long run. In the short run, the farmer's 
objective is to maximize the utility function of net revenues in terms of expected value, 
variances and covariances of crop net revenues and the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion 
coefficient. This model has been used to compare land allocation and certainty equivalents 
for several price and income support policies. The major conclusions are: (1) land 
allocation is very sensitive to the type of support provided; current provisions in farm 
policy tend to favour the program crop over the non-program crop, (2) revenue assurance 
with a coverage level of 85 % or more would yield a certainty equivalent comparable to the 
level generated by the current program at a much lower cost to the government. The 
explanation behind the higher performance of revenue assurance comes from the different 
planting patterns generated by market returns. The model used in this paper has several 
advantages. It is flexible enough to show directions and magnitudes in acreage response at 
the farm level under various support programs, and the relative performance of price and 
income support schemes when both risk and returns are incorporated into the decision-
making process. 
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UTILITY VERSUS PROFIT MAXIMIZATION MODELS FOR AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY DECISION SUPPORT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF RISK-AVERSE BEHAVIOUR 
D.R. Oglethorpe 
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK 
Summary 
A survey of farmers in the north of England was carried out to obtain data on farm 
management strategies and risk preferences using an equally likely, certainty equivalents, 
approach. Negative exponential income utility functions were elicited and the risk aversion 
parameters derived analysed with regard to farm situation and farmer characteristics. Using 
the management information, the study estimates farm-specific MOTAD-generated expected 
income/variance frontiers and demonstrates the sensitivity of land use intensity to minor 
reductions in expected farm income if the risk-averse farmer makes utility maximizing 
decisions. A comparison was made to the acceptability and accuracy of employing profit or 
utility maximizing objective functions within a decision supporting mathematical 
programming model, with regard to the prediction of observed farm activity. The results 
confirm that a utility maximization approach corresponds better with real farm data and imply 
that market instability could make the risk-averse, utility maximizing farmer, voluntarily 
adopt less intensive farming methods. The conclusion could be drawn that a reversal of 
agricultural policy towards exacerbating market instability could therefore actually assist the 
achievement of environmental goals. 
1 Introduction 
Globally, there is continuing pressure from environmental lobby groups upon national and 
international authorities to encourage farmers to adopt less intensive agricultural methods. As 
a result, policymakers are beginning to accept that agriculture is no longer sustainable as an 
increasingly intensive industry, a fact which holds true from the uplands of England to the 
rain forests of South America. Attempts are therefore being made to introduce agricultural 
market support instruments which will operate independently of production levels thus 
discouraging farmers from expanding or intensifying their farming systems. However, this 
external pressure not only demands a review of applicable policy instruments, but also 
requires an appraisal of what motivates farm production decisions. Clearly, the success of any 
policy aimed at farmers will be influenced by the production objectives of the target farmers. 
For example, a farmer who operates to derive some adequate income level and simultaneously 
protect the ecological environment of the farm is unlikely to deliver the required outcome 
anticipated by a policy which delivers increased profits at the cost of environmental 
degradation. 
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Within the European Union (EU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has recently 
undergone substantial reform in an attempt to move towards production abatement and 
environmental protection. Previous surplus-inducing market price support mechanisms have 
now been replaced by income support derived through the deliverance of direct payments, 
made regardless of production levels. The fundamental basis of these reforms, particularly in 
the arable sector, could be viewed as an appeal to the risk-averse nature of farmers. 
Essentially, farmers within the arable sector have the option of either facing market prices 
(which could possibly fall to world clearing levels) or joining the Arable Area Payment 
Scheme (AAPS), which in the broadest sense, delivers partial guaranteed payments in return 
for a fall in prices and production area (Set-aside). In other words, farmers broadly have the 
option of facing an income gamble or a reduced income guarantee. If this guarantee was 
removed, farmers might still adopt farming methods which derive reduced incomes from the 
maximum attainable under the gamble, as long as the variability of their income was also 
reduced. The occurrence of this event would, however, depend crucially on the farmers' 
attitudes towards income risk. 
If farmers are significantly averse to income risk, as most studies suggest (Muscardi and 
De Janvry, 1977; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Binswanger, 1980; Oglethorpe, 1995), rather 
than producing to maximize profits, the farmer would be producing to maximize the level of 
utility derived by the trade-off made between income and income variability. Further, if the 
alternative farming practices adopted under utility maximization involved significantly less 
intensive methods, then policies seeking to achieve production abatement or environmental 
protection may also be achieved through an exacerbation of price instability, by removing the 
guaranteed payments. 
Using an established method for estimating the relationship between income and income 
variance for certain farm situations, this study examines how farm plans estimated by using a 
mathematical programming model with an objective function of profit maximization differ in 
intensity from those derived by a model with an objective function of utility maximization. 
The study also tests which model estimates farm plans the closest to those actually observed. 
Directly elicited utility functions are derived for a survey of 20 farmers in the north of 
England and risk aversion parameters are estimated. The analysis concludes that not only does 
the utility maximizing model validate as a better representation of real farm activity for use in 
policy decision support, but also that the risk-averse, utility maximizing farmer will adopt 
significantly less intensive methods than the profit maximizing farmer at the recorded levels of 
risk aversion. Moreover, if the majority of farmers are averse to income risk, the analysis 
suggests that the aggregate outcome of a policy designed to exacerbate market instability 
could be environmentally favourable. 
2 Utility maximization and income, variance (E,V) frontiers 
Parameterizing all attainable levels of expected income (£) with the associated minimum 
variance (V), derives the efficient E,V set of farm plans for the risk-averse farmer. The point 
on this E,V frontier at which a particular farmer operates depends upon his/her utility for 
varying E,V pairs. Specifically, the utility maximizing farmer will seek to adopt the farm plan 
occurring at the point of tangency between the E,V frontier for the farm and the highest 
attainable iso-utility curve (displaying dEldV>Q and dE2/dV2>0 qualities) described by 
his/her utility map. 
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Figure 1. Utility maximization along an E, V frontier 
This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1. Maximum attainable profits are derived at 
the unique farm plan where E=Ep and V=Vp; however, for a farmer with a utility map 
described by iso-utility curves Ix to /3, maximum feasible utility is derived at the farm plan 
where E=EU and V= Vu. Clearly, due to the slope of the E,V frontier between points P and 
U, more than proportionate reductions in V are available from reductions in E. Thus, the 
relative variation per unit of expected income will increase as we move from U to P. 
If a farmer demonstrates such an averse attitude to risk that the farm plan described by 
utility maximization plans is significantly lower in terms of intensity of land use than the farm 
plan described by profit maximization, then it is possible that reductions in farm intensity 
could also be made possible by creating a more unstable market environment, assuming 
aversion to risk does not change. Moreover, any model used in policy decision support 
attempting to simulate farm performance could give quite misleading results if the objective 
function had been incorrectly defined. Therefore, it is necessary to first test whether a model 
of utility maximization is more desirable than one of profit maximization for accurate farm 
simulation, and second to test whether the farm plans described by the utility maximizing 
model are in fact less intensive than those described by a profit maximizing model. 
In order to address this problem it is necessary to have a model which can accurately 
estimate the E,V frontier faced by a particular farmer, and a method of linking the portfolio of 
potential E,V pairs to a function of expected utility. Once this is done, comparison of model 
output can be made with observed data to see which maximizing method is more relevant to 
actual farm decision making. 
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3 Estimating farm-specific E,V frontiers 
This study uses a MOT AD programming model (Hazell, 1971) validated against observed 
financial farm data (Oglethorpe and O'Callaghan, 1995). Incremental changes in the expected 
income constraint of this model allows parameterization of the efficient set of expected 
incomes (£) and associated minimum of total absolute deviations (A). An estimate of true 
variance can be derived from the sample mean absolute deviation (MAD), by taking the mean 
of each parameterized level of total absolute deviations over the relevant time period for 
which the model was constructed. Multiplication of the square of this sample MAD by a 
mathematical constant derives an estimate of true variance (Hazell and Norton, 1986), 
allowing subsequent derivation of an E,V frontier. The MOTAD model can also be run as a 
profit maximizing model by changing the expected income constraint to an objective function 
to be maximized, and allowing total absolute deviations to be unconstrained. 
Following Freund (1956), it is possible to link the parameterized E,V pairs, estimated for 
particular farm situations, to the following function of expected utility (E(U)), 
E(U) = E-^V (1) 
given that the Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion (ß) is known (Pratt, 1964; 
Arrow, 1971). Derivation of the parameter ß for a particular farmer necessitates elicitation of 
the farmer's utility function, a process which is referred to in the next section. 
The MOTAD model used was constructed using data supplied by the Farm Business 
Survey (FBS) for farms in the north of England (Johnson, 1983-92). These data allowed the 
calculation of the absolute deviations in farm enterprise gross margins over the ten-year 
period 1983 through to 1992 inclusive. The constraint set of the model was elaborated to 
account for resource qualities as well as quantities, likely to arise between different farm 
situations. This elaboration primarily entailed inclusion of a land capability classification 
system (Bibby et ai, 1991), in conjunction with crop yield estimates produced by a crop 
growth model (EPIC, Jones et ai, 1991) across nitrogen response curves (Moxey et al., 
1995). Inclusion of this facility permitted the model to be calibrated to represent farms of 
differing land quality and hence production potential. Model elaboration also involved 
specification of labour quality and mechanization differentials; incorporation of pluriactive 
enterprises; and restraints regarding the availability of, and dependency on, loan capital. The 
data required to modify the model for all the factors above, to represent particular farm 
situations, were supplied for a total of 20 sample farms in the north of England. Once 
established, model parameterization of E,V pairs was then carried out, estimating 20 farm-
specific E,V frontiers. 
4 Elicitation of farmers' utility functions 
The function of expected utility in E,V space, developed by Freund (1956) and described by 
equation (1), is derived from a utility function of income (Y) based on the negative 
exponential functional form 
u(y)=\-e-iir (2) 
Utility versus profit maximization models for policy support 311 
and by assuming farm incomes to be normally distributed (Hildreth, 1954). 
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for this equation is found to be equal 
to ß and is constant. Intuitively, we would possibly expect decision makers to become less 
willing to accept gambles with fixed probabilities and fixed payoffs as their income increases, 
and hence, expect their absolute risk aversion to fall (Fleisher and Robison, 1985). However, 
the negative exponential form benefits from being able to be estimated directly from 
questionnaire data. Moreover, a constant value for ß is also useful when comparing the risk-
preferences of different producers estimated using the same questionnaire procedure. For 
these reasons, the negative exponential functional form was employed in this analysis. 
The questionnaire procedure used for this study was based on the 'equally likely risky 
prospects with certainty equivalents' (ELCE) approach (Anderson et a/., 1977). The interview 
followed a bartering procedure whereby the farmer had to decide upon a certainty equivalent 
(CE]), to the nearest £250, for an initial gamble between two equally likely risky outcomes of 
£2,000 and £20,000. The procedure was repeated for the equally likely gamble between CEy 
and £20,000, to find CE2, and again for the equally likely gamble between £2,000 and CEU to 
find CEy 
In order for these data to allow derivation of a negative exponential utility function, the 
initial equally likely outcomes of £2,000 and £20,000 were assigned arbitrary utility values of 
0.2 and 0.8 respectively. For this arbitrary scale to vork, a variable intercept term was added 
to the utility function in order to absorb any constant added to, or subtracted from, U(Y) 
(following Buccola, 1982). Through direct application of the Bernoullian axiom of continuity 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) data points relating to the certainty equivalents on an 
income/utility map could thus be obtained for each farmer interviewed. 
Utility 
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Figure 2. Derivation of income/utility data points through the ELCE questioning procedure 
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Figure 2 shows the derivation of such data points where the utility derived from a certainty 
equivalent is equal to half the sum of the utilities gained from each of the outcomes of the 
equally likely gamble. Once these points were established, the negative exponential utility 
function was fitted to the data using nonlinear least squares (SAS Institute Inc., 1989). 
5 Results 
The Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute risk aversion iß) derived from the utility functions of 
all participating farmers are given in Table 1, with their respective standard errors given in 
parentheses. 
Table 1. Estimated Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute risk aversion (ß) 
Farm 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ß 
0.000129 
0.000056 
0.000029 
0.000118 
0.000043 
0.000169 
0.000096 
0.000096 
0.000169 
0.000096 
(Standard error) 
(0.000016) 
(0.000012) 
(0.000016) 
(0.000013) 
(0.000028) 
(0.000030) 
(0.000009) 
(0.000009) 
(0.000030) 
(0.000009) 
Farm 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
ß 
0.000096 
0.000055 
0.000015 
0.000055 
0.000075 
0.000096 
0.000015 
0.000085 
0.000129 
0.000075 
(Standard error) 
(0.000009) 
(0.000012) 
(0.000020) 
(0.000012) 
(0.000009) 
(0.000009) 
(0.000020) 
(0.000008) 
(0.000016) 
(0.000009) 
These measures of risk aversion were used to determine at what point on the farm-specific 
E,V frontier the farmer should operate to maximize expected utility, as defined in equation 
(2). It was then determined whether the farm plan associated with this equilibrium differed 
significantly in terms of land use from the estimated farm plan which derives maximum profit. 
Table 2 shows the prime characteristics of farm intensity (grazing livestock units per 
hectare, glus/ha, and fertilizer nitrogen applications, kg N/ha) associated with the objectives 
of profit maximization and utility maximization produced by the model for each sample farm. 
These values are-also compared with the actual intensity of land use observed on the farms at 
point of survey. The model estimate for each characteristic which is closest to the observed 
intensity is highlighted in bold and italic font, in the table. 
The results show that in 13 of the 20 cases, the utility maximization model produces the 
closer representation of actual farm activity. This can be said for the profit maximization 
model in only two instances (farms 15 and 20). The remaining five situations include two 
cases where the observed management factors are best described by a mixture of the two 
modelling approaches (farms 9 and 16). A possible explanation for this is poor model 
calibration regarding land quality, making the fertilizer response data used within the model 
unsuitable for these farms. For the remaining three cases, neither approach derives an 
appropriate or representative farm plan (farms 5, 14 and 17); rather, the two approaches 
derive identical results. This is due to relatively low levels of risk aversion being recorded 
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and consequently utility is maximized under the same farm plan which derives the maximum 
profit. 
Table 2. Profit and utility maximization model results versus observed data 
Farm 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Profit maximizing 
model 
glus/ha 
0.24 
1.65 
1.33 
2.30 
4.09 
2.30 
1.91 
3.73 
1.85 
2.92 
2.05 
0.76 
1.08 
2.17 
1.50 
2.31 
0.84 
2.17 
1.47 
2.31 
output 
kg N/ha 
356 
213 
145 
362 
360 
362 
247 
330 
300 
363 
335 
100 
134 
367 
96 
342 
0 
349 
240 
362 
Utility maximizing 
model 
glus/ha 
0.18 
1.13 
1.12 
1.90 
4.09 
1.35 
1.24 
3.56 
0.92 
2.87 
1.57 
0.55 
0.82 
2.17 
1.18 
1.46 
0.84 
1.33 
0.98 
1.60 
output 
kg N/ha 
62 
24 
62 
12 
360 
11 
14 
303 
0 
347 
158 
21 
35 
367 
0 
120 
0 
40 
58 
100 
Observed land use 
glus/ha 
0.18 
0.86 
0.72 
1.52 
2.04 
1.36 
1.01 
2.53 
0.84 
1.57 
1.75 
0.37 
0.86 
1.22 
1.56 
2.08 
1.35 
0.94 
1.08 
2.12 
kg N/ha 
10 
49 
6 
103 
116 
109 
69 
178 
250 
157 
207 
22 
22 
134 
135 
120 
169 
76 
70 
280 
Using a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test for association between paired observations (Kvanli et 
al., 1992), it was possible to test the null hypothesis of association between either of the 
approaches and the observed data. This test derived actual z-values as summarized in Table 
3. The critical z-value at 95% significance of +1.96 allows us to reject the null hypothesis of 
association between the profit maximizing approach and the observed data for both the 
stocking rate and fertilizer application predictions. 
Table 3. Test of association between model estimates and observed data 
Profit maximizing output 
paired with observed data 
Utility maximizing output 
paired with observed data 
glus/ha kg N/ha glus/ha kg N/ha 
Actual z-value -3.53 -3.51 -1.25 0.52 
Note: actual z-value = V(«(n+ l)(2n+1)/6) where n = tt ranks (Kvanli et al., 1992) 
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However, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for both sets of paired observations under 
the utility maximization approach, suggesting that this approach is superior in terms of 
reflecting real farm activity. 
6 Consequences for agricultural policy 
In an unsupported market, free of guaranteed payments and if the majority of farmers are 
producing to maximize utility, as this analysis suggests, then there is no reason for the farmer 
to adopt more intensive farming methods once guaranteed payments are removed. Although 
changes in policy involving the removal of guaranteed payments are likely to cause shifts in 
the E,V frontier (Hope and Lingard, 1992), as long as farmers continue to maximize utility, 
and their aversion to income risk remains constant, then there is no reason to suggest why the 
farmers would move towards profit maximization. Farmers would voluntarily adopt less 
intensive methods in order to try to maintain existing levels of expected utility, rather than 
being persuaded to do so by offering guaranteed payments. 
The degree to which the utility maximizing farm plan is lower in intensity than the profit 
maximizing farm plan may even be greater than expected, and hence more environmentally 
favourable, due to shifts in the E,V frontier caused by such changes in policy. Under an 
agricultural policy such as the AAPS, the E,V frontier facing farmers will be positioned so 
that minimum expected income will no longer be zero. There is a guaranteed income in the 
form of a direct payment which is paid regardless of production levels. Thus, a farmer who 
is currently registered within the AAPS, may face an E,V frontier such as that described by 
the frontier AP in Figure 3. Comparing this to an E,V frontier with no guaranteed payments, 
such as the frontier OP, also in Figure 3, then the rate of change of the relative variation 
between points UA and P, and U0 and P, will differ. 
Specifically, if a farmer has to face frontier OP through a removal of all guaranteed 
payments, the difference in relative variation between U0 and P, will now be greater than 
that between UA and P (since the rate of change of E is greater than the rate of change of V 
for any shift in the iso-utility curves). As a consequence, point U0 will lie further away from 
P than point UA, and as we have seen, movement down the E,V frontier suggests the 
adoption of less intensive farm plans. 
The results imply therefore, that the risk-averse farmer who adopts a utility maximizing 
farm plan will produce at a level of intensity significantly lower than that which would be 
adopted under profit maximization. Moreover, with only minor reductions in expected 
income, at suboptimal profit levels, the farmer can greatly reduce income variance. 
Following this, it is possible that the utility maximizing farmer may voluntarily adopt the 
same less intensive methods under a nonsupported system as (s)he did under a system of 
guaranteed payments. Also, any shifts in the E,V frontier caused by removal of those 
guaranteed payments could induce the utility maximizing farmer to further reduce the 
intensity of farm production. 
The evidence suggests that rather than directing production abatement and environmental 
policy controls at absolute price levels and offering alternate, more stable, forms of income 
support, creating more variability in the market place may actually cause the farmer to 
voluntarily adopt less intensive methods. A possible outcome of this could be to achieve such 
policy goals through a far less regulated system, and probably at a lower cost to the 
exchequer. 
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Figure 3. Shifts in the E,V frontier due to removal of income guarantees 
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